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2ABSTRACT
In  this  thesis,  I  highlight  the  crucial  importance  of placing  Origen’s  theology  within  the  correct 
polemical context.  It has been common scholarly practice to interpret the works of Origen within the 
context of the Nicene Controversy. This leads to distortion and confusion. The correct interpretation of 
Origen depends  upon a detailed understanding of the  intellectual  milieu  in which he  wrote.  Origen’s 
Christology,  indeed  his  entire  theology,  is  primarily  apologetic.  He  has  a  specific  set  of doctrinal 
opponents, whose attitudes and beliefs shape and dictate his own theology.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we discuss how Origen’s engagement with pagan opponents led him 
to adopt their central doctrine of the deus absconditus and how Christ takes on the guise of a Middle- 
Platonic  second  God.  We  also  see  how  Origen’s  main  opponents  within  the  Church  were  the 
Monarchians.  It was in response to their extreme unitarianism that Origen was obliged to develop his 
famous doctrine of the three distinct divine ouoiai.
In  chapter  2,  we  consider  the  controversial  fragment  preserved by Rufinus  {Apology  2.9),  in  which 
Origen  apparently  describes  the  Father  and  the  Son  as  6poouoio<;.  By  a  careful  examination  of the 
original  polemical  context  in  which  Origen  wrote,  namely  the  Monarchian  controversy,  we  utterly 
reject  the  authenticity  of  this  fragment.  Consubstantiality  was  the  distinguishing  doctrine  of  the 
Monarchians; as such, Origen could never have endorsed it. Rufinus has skewed the original version to 
suit an entirely different polemical context, namely the Nicene controversy.
In chapter 3, we examine Origen’s doctrine of the earthly life of Jesus Christ. Once again we see how 
polemic and apologetic are the main spur to the development of Origen’s theology.  It is in response to 
widespread  pagan  ridicule  that  Origen  ignores  the  Saviour’s  human  nature  and  presents  Christ  as 
wholly divine.  Moreover,  Origen’s  explanation of the mechanics  of the  Incarnation -   exactly how  it 
was  possible  for  God  to  become  man  -   reveals  a  similar  awareness  of  traditional  philosophical 
objections.
3TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements  P-6
Chapter 1: Origen’s Trinitarian theology in context
Introduction  P-7
The Apologist doctrine of God and the Logos  p. 14
The Eternal Generation of the Son  p.27
The role of the Son within the Godhead  p.32
Origen and the Monarchians  p.39
Monarchianism in the Commentary on St John  p.45
The meaning of otoola  p.55
The meaning of i)7 t6oTaoi<;  p.63
oboia  and imdaxacuq  in Origen’s Trinitarian theology  p.66
The Father and the Son: transcendence and subordination  p.69
The role of the Son in Origen’s mystical theology  p.80
Subordinationism: conclusion  p.88
Conclusion  p.89
Chapter 2: Did Origen apply the term bpoouoioq to the Son?
Introduction  p. 92
Rufinus’ method of translation  p.95
The importance of the  6(ioouoio<; claim in late fourth century Trinitarian Controversies  p.99 
The relevance of the  bpooboioq claim to the charge that Origen believed the Son to be 
innatus  p. 105
The relation of the  bpoouoioc; claim to Origen’s overall theology  p. 106
The attitude of Origen’s immediate successors and disciples to the term bpoouoioq  p.l 17
Consubstantiality in Western and Eastern Trinitarian theology  p. 122
Conclusion  p. 125
Rufinus’ other emendations  p. 126
4Chapter 3: Origen’s Christology in Context.
Introduction  p. 131
Christology as an historically sensitive phenomenon  p. 137
Pagan polemic as a background to Origen’s Christology  p. 138
Origen’s understanding of the fall and of redemption  p. 152
Origen’s theory of the soul of Christ  p. 181
The Temptation  p.202
The Agony in the Garden  p.210
Christ’s arrest, crucifixion and death  p.228
Conclusion  p.234
Bibliography  p.236
5ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Very many people have helped me with the writing of this thesis. To them, I now express my heartfelt 
thanks. I owe a very great deal to Professor Gerard O’Daly, for his patience, encouragement and, above 
all,  his knowledge  and expertise.  I  also thank Professor Bob  Sharpies,  who has helped me in various 
important ways.
On the technical side,  I am indebted to all  the staff at the Institute of Classical  Studies,  especially to 
Sue  Willetts  for  her  unparalleled  computer  knowledge  and  astounding  generosity  with her precious 
time;  thanks  also  to  Sophia  Fisher  for her help  with various  languages.  I  also  thank  the  staff at  Dr 
Williams’s Library, on whose excellent collection my research almost entirely depends.
Personal thanks are due to the many friends who have lent me their emotional support over the years, 
especially Jennifer, Zach, Paul and, from the very beginning, Tania and Anne. My family have helped 
me  in such an array of ways  that I  can never thank them enough;  it is  to  my parents that I  owe  the 
greatest debt of all.  Last but not least, thanks to Russell Henman, for a very different life.
I have decided to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my Grandmother, who always encouraged and 
supported me. We often spoke of the day when I should finish the thesis: I am sorry that she is not here 
to witness it.
6ORIGEN’S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY IN CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
(i)
As head of the Catechetical school of Alexandria, influential teacher of impressionable young converts, 
and later as a preacher and guardian of a large urban flock, Origen was well aware of the dangers of 
doctrinal deviance. Although it would be another fifty years or so before the meeting of the first great 
Councils and the definitive establishment of doctrinal orthodoxy, Origen recognized the existence of a 
set  of beliefs  which  every  Christian  was  bound  to  accept.  Those  who  did  not  were  condemned  as 
heretics.1   Origen’s work at the  Catechetical  school2  centred upon the  rigorous  schooling of potential 
converts  in  the  regula fidei.3   He  had  to  ensure  that  his  pupils  were  taught  the  proper  kind  of 
Christianity;  this  was especially important in a city like Alexandria,  where many variant forms of the 
faith  were  vying  for  attention.  The  thirst  for  doctrinal  orthodoxy  was  something  of a  leit-motif of 
Origen’s whole career. Eusebius’ panegyric in the Historia Ecclesiastica depends to a very large extent 
upon presenting his subject as a pillar of orthodoxy.4 He reports, for example, on Origen’s presence at 
the council set up to try Beryl of Bostra, who was accused of Monarchianism. We are told that Origen 
succeeded in converting the man to the orthodox faith (H.E.  6.33).  He enjoyed similar success  in his 
dealings with an anonymous heretical group, active in Arabia, who denied the immediate release of the 
soul (H.E. 6.37) and with the Helkesaites, who denied the authority of the Pauline Epistles (H.E. 6.38).5 
The  recently  discovered  Dialogue  with  Heraclides  details  Origen’s  rigorous  examination  of  the 
Trinitarian heresy of a  certain Maximus.  As  a young teacher in Alexandria,  Origen often engaged  in
1  The  fei£p68o£,oi, those guilty of alpeoiq. The use of the terms  ‘heresy’,  ‘heretics’,  ‘orthodoxy’ etc. in 
this thesis do not of course reflect the personal opinion of the author nor are they intended in any way 
as value judgements. I am simply reflecting the prejudices of Origen. As we argue below, at this early 
date there was no precise, universally accepted definition of these key terms;  ‘heresy’ was a subjective 
concept,  constantly  re-defined  by  different  religious  groups.  It  was  only  following  the  Council  of 
Nicaea that the terms ‘heresy’ and ‘orthodoxy’ came to have a definite and specific reference.
2 As reported by Eusebuis, Historia Ecclesiastica 6.2.8, 6.15.
3 See below for a discussion and attempted definition of this central phrase.
4 It was of course the major thrust of Eusebius’ defence of Origen to present him in this way. We must 
be  wary  therefore  of a  certain  amount  of inevitable  polemical  exaggeration.  Le  Boulluec  (1985)  II, 
pp.439-442  notes  how  Pamphilus  also  quotes  many  of Origen’s  anti-heretical  diatribes  in  a  similar 
attempt to vindicate the orthodoxy of his master (Pamphilus, Apology for Origen, passim).
5  True  to  the  dictates  of the  biographical  genre,  Eusebius  reports  a  childhood  incident  which  fore­
shadows the major characteristic of the adult subject. After the death of his father, Origen was adopted 
by  a  wealthy benefactress.  In her house,  he  met  a number  of heretics,  but refused  to  associate  with
7public debates with various heretics, notably the Gnostics.6 And as a presbyter in Caesarea, the mature 
Origen made  full  use  of his  clerical  powers  to  excommunicate  anyone  he  deemed  a heretic.7  Bardy 
sums up Origen’s activities: “c’est frequemment qu’Origene avait affaire aux heretiques.”8 
Of course,  at  this  early  stage  in  the  history  of the  Church,  many  fundamental  questions  had  yet  to 
receive  definitive  answers.  On  such  subjects,  Origen  readily  admits  his  own  ignorance  and  allows 
ample scope for debate amongst his pupils and readers. Discussions on such notoriously controversial 
topics as the origin of the soul, the eternity of the world and the Resurrection of the Body frequently 
ended in  diropia.9  The dialectical nature of the de Principiis is an obvious and well-noted feature of
the work and may well indicate its origins in the noisy classrooms of the Catechetical school.10 Origen 
is  certainly  not  a  dogmatic  theologian,  but  one  working  very  much  within  the  tradition  of Platonic 
dialectic.1 1
Nevertheless, Origen does believe that there exists a simple creed, a set of beliefs which are not open to 
discussion,  only to elaboration and explanation.12 Origen begins the de Principiis  with a  list of these 
beliefs,  which  he  calls  the  ‘Apostolic  Doctrine’  or  ‘Teaching  of the  Church’.  He  claims  that  these 
fundamentals  were  first  propagated  by  the  Apostles  themselves:  they  are  the  ‘necessary’  Christian
them:  cpoXdxxcov  en  rcaiSoq  xavdva  exxXr|oia<;  pSeXuxxdpevdc;  xe,  ax;  abxcp  jbrjpaxi  cpqoiv 
7 iou  auxdq,  xaq  xcov  aipfcaeoov 5i5aoxaXla<;  (HE 6.2.14).
Jerome provides evidence of Origen’s debate with the Gnostic, Candidus (Apologia contra Rujinum 
2.19, discussed by Le Boulluec (1985) II, p.440).
7 Hein (1975), pp. 316-22; 328-33.
8 Bardy (1923), p. 19. Le Boulluec (1985) II, pp.439-442 discusses Origen’s role as inquisitor in some 
detail.
9 See,  for example, de Principiis, preface 4 (on the Holy Ghost); preface 5 (on the origin of the soul); 
preface  7  (on what  existed before  temporal  creation);  1.4.1  (on  the  end  of the  world);  1.4.4  (on the 
after-life); 2.2.2 (on the perpetuity of bodily existence);  3.4.5 (on whether men have two souls);  3.6.9 
(on the Resurrection of the Body); 4.4.8 (on the perpetuity of bodily existence).
10  Bardy  (1923),  p. 14  suggests  that  the  de  Principiis  was  a  resume  of the  lessons  held  at  Origen’s 
school.
1 1  See Bardy (1923), pp.11-12, Williams (1927), p.218, Bammel (1989), p.83,  Scott (1991), pp.122-3 
and O’Cleirigh (1992),  p.21.  This  important characteristic  of Origen’s  style was  noted by Pamphilus 
and  used  as  an  excuse  for  some  of Origen’s  more  daring  suggestions  (Pamphilius,  Preface  to  the 
Apology 16-23; passage cited by Bardy (1923), p. 22).
12 Outler (1939), pp. 212-3 tells us that these ‘short summaries of belief began to appear in the second 
century.  He refers to similar examples in Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Hippolytus.  Outler devotes a 
whole paper to the topic, but seems to prefer lengthy quotations to discussion. Bennett (1997), pp. 195-6 
is  more  useful.  He  provides  an  interesting  set  of references  to  xo  xipuypti  xo  exxA.r|aiaGxix6v,  ‘by 
which Origen meant  .  .  .  what was publicly proclaimed  in the  churches  of his  day and (as  far  as he 
knew)  had  been  proclaimed  since  Apostolic  times.  Although  it  did  not  have  a  fixed  creed,  this 
proclamation could be  articulated  in the  form of articles  (56ypaxa).  See  also  Le Boulluec  (1985)  II, 
p.441.doctrines, which even the dullest intellect could grasp (de Principiis, preface 3-10).13 We find similar 
credal  lists  at  Commentary  on  St John  32.16  (9)  and  in  a  fragment  of the  Commentary  on  Titus 
preserved by Pamphilius (PG  17 553B-556D).14 In the  Commentary on St John, Origen lists the basic 
articles of faith. He who believes every point, without hesitation, is the one whom St Paul describes as 
having complete faith (1  Corinthians  13.2). As in the de Principiis, the articles in this list are seen as 
the  ‘necessities’  of true faith.  What is particularly interesting about this passage is Origen’s insistence 
that  faith,  the  right  kind  of faith,  is  the  direct  route  to  salvation:  heretics  will  be  damned.15  In  the 
Commentary  on  Titus,  Origen  makes  a  direct  appeal  to  the  Church  (Ecclesia)  as  the  arbiter  of 
orthodoxy.  Those who believe the wrong doctrines must be excluded from the Church:  qui quomodo 
non ab Ecclesia longe ponendi sunt, cum philarchiae morbo languentes dogmata statuerint quibus ad 
suum nomen discipulos declinarent?16
References  to  ‘the  Church’  as the  final arbiter of Christian doctrine are common in Origen,17 but we 
must be very careful how this is interpreted. Origen certainly did not espouse a literal interpretation of 
the Apostolic succession. That is to say, he did not believe that bishops, simply qua bishops, were the 
ultimate  guardians of doctrinal orthodoxy.18 His own harsh treatment at the hands of Demetrius19 was
13  There  is  some  debate  amongst scholars  concerning the  correct interpretation of the  regula fidei in 
Origen.  Outler (1939), pp.220-221  and Kelly (1956), pp.4-5  see the rule as setting the safe perimeter 
for  theological  investigation  and  as  providing  the  foundation  and  starting  point  for  Origen’s  entire 
oeuvre.  Lyman  (1994),  p.40  similarly  argues  that  the  de  Principiis  is  simply  an  elaboration  of the 
Apostolic doctrine described in the Preface.  Bigg,  Trigg,  Bardy and Lebreton take the opposite view 
and  argue  that  while  the  rule  might  well  be  useful  for  the  spiritually  and  intellectually  naive,  the 
advanced  Christian will  despise  its  simplicity.  Bigg  (1913),  p. 180  therefore  distinguishes  the  rule  of 
faith, the necessary preliminary to Christian belief, comprehensible to even the dullest minds, from the 
higher truths,  available  only to the  spiritual elite.  Trigg (1981), p. 11  emphasizes this  idea of a secret 
tradition,  which  the  Apostles  did  not  divulge  to  the  masses.  Bardy  (1923),  pp.9-11  agrees  that  the 
simple faithful must content themselves with the Apostolic Doctrine, while the learned indulge in more 
esoteric  speculation.  Lebreton  (1923  and  1924)  has  devoted  two  papers  to  the  common  Patristic 
distinction between popular faith and religious philosophy, a distinction epitomized by Origen.
14 Outler (1939), pp. 215-7 also refers to Contra Celsum  1.7 and Commentary Series on St Matthew 33.
15  This  idea  of justification  by  faith  is  fully  developed  at  Commentary  on  Romans,  Book  4.  For  a 
discussion of this interesting topic, see Scheck (2000). It should be carefully noted however that Origen 
insisted upon the intimate connexion between faith and works: the one is the necessary and inevitable 
corollary of the other. Origen is naturally worried that preaching the self-sufficiency of faith might lead 
to antinomianism, so Scheck (2000).
16  See  Hein  (1975),  pp.  305-336  and  Trigg  (1981),  p.7  for a  full  discussion of Origen’s  doctrine  of 
excommunication.
17  Homilies  on  Genesis  2.3.4,  Selecta  in  Genesis  (PG  12,  100B),  Homilies  on  Exodus  9.2-3, 
Commentary on the Song of Songs  13.17, Homilies on Jeremiah 5.16,  Commentary on St John  13.16, 
Commentary Series on St Matthew 61, de Principiis 3.5.1, Dialogue with Heraclides  1.17-18.
18 Le Boulluec (1985) II, p.441 notes that although Origen accepted the existence of the ‘Rule of Faith’, 
inherited directly from the Apostles, he did not come to a corresponding acceptance of the authority of 
bishops:  ‘il prefere conserver le primat dans l’Eglise aux temoins du Christ que sont les ‘spirituels’, les 
‘parfaits’.”
19 As described by Eusebius, H.E. 6.9.5. Hein (1975), pp. 305-6 discusses this formative episode.
9enough to turn him against what one might call the established Church. Nor did he invest the Pope with 
any particular  authority  as  the  successor  of St.  Peter.20  Trigg  and  Bigg  are  right  to  detect  a  certain 
amount of anti-clericalism in Origen.21  Origen repeatedly distinguished the Spiritual Church from the 
Visible Church and often condemned and rejected the actions and opinions of the latter.22 
In the absence of any centralized authority in Rome,  in the period before Creeds and Councils,  and -  
crucially -  without the recognition of any kind of ecclesiastical hierarchy, Origen could allow himself 
to be the final arbiter of orthodoxy and heresy.23 As one presenting himself as a priest of the only true 
Church,  the  invisible  and  spiritual  Church,  it  is  little  wonder  that  Origen  professed  an  arrogant 
assurance  on  all  the  minutiae  of  doctrinal  orthodoxy.  Perhaps  the  safest  conclusion  to  this  brief 
introduction  is  that  Origen  identified  himself and  his  fellow  intellectuals  as  ‘the  Church’  and  that 
‘heresy’ was defined negatively, as whatever they did not believe.
(ii)
Many of Origen’s theological works are direct and deliberate polemics against what he sees as heresy. 
The mistakes of others are the foundation and the springboard for his whole theological system. In my 
opinion,  Origen  is the Apologist par excellence.  Not only does he  defend the  faith from intellectual 
pagan ridicule by creating for Christianity a solid philosophical base, he is also constantly aware of the 
dangers  of the  enemy  within.  No  one  in  the  third  century  could  afford  to  be  complacent.  Not  for 
another  three  hundred  years  could  the  Church  rest  on  its  laurels  and  indulge  in  truly  disinterested 
enquiry. At this early stage it was under constant attack from both within and without and was obliged 
to be constantly on guard.  I cannot accept the conclusions of Leo Scheffezyk and Bethune-Baker that
20 Although, even at this early date, the Pope liked to present himself as the guardian of the teachings of 
the  Church  and  as  the  ultimate  arbiter  of doctrinal  orthodoxy,  (so  Bigg  (1913),  p.258).  Langerbeck 
(1957),  p.68  discusses  the  influence  of Rome  on the  Christian community of Alexandria  in the  third 
century. It was only at the accession of the hard-line Bishop Demetrius (AD  189) that ‘agreement to the 
faith  of  the  Roman  community  (became)  the  standard  of  Christian  orthodoxy  and  therefore  of 
membership of the Church’ (my emphasis).  In the preceding decades, Egyptian Christians had formed 
a much looser group. Trigg (1981), p.7 makes a very similar point.
21  Trigg (1981), pp.5-7  and Bigg (1913), pp.258,  260,  267-9.  The reader is also referred to Jerome’s 
version of Origen’s Letter to his Friends at Alexandria,  in which Origen complains bitterly about the 
Alexandrian Church hierarchy (Jerome, Apologia contra Rufinum 2.18). Although we must allow for a 
certain amount of polemical exaggeration,  it seems reasonable to believe that Origen bore some very 
deep grudges against Demetrius and his fellows.
22  See  Hein  (1975),  pp.317-8  on  the  distinction  between  excommunication  from  the  real,  Spiritual 
Church and excommunication from merely the Visible Church: the latter is quite likely to be invalid.
23  Of course,  this  does  not  mean  that  Origen  considered  himself to  be  working  within  a  doctrinal 
vacuum.  As  we  have  seen,  he  accepted  the  great  importance  of tradition,  of an unbroken thread  of 
orthodoxy reaching back to the Apostles. On this, see Hanson (1954).
10Origen ushered in a glorious new age in which theology could finally become an ars gratia artis24 For 
Origen, theology was essentially and fundamentally apology.  In all his works he is defending himself 
and his beliefs from either internal or external attack, from either the ridicule of pagan intellectuals or 
the ravages of Christian heresy.25
Almost everything that Origen says is said as a response and as a correction of the mistakes of others. 
For example, his famously extreme doctrine of the freedom of the will is developed as a direct response 
to  Gnostic  determinism.  This kind of reactive  or responsive  theology was  of course  a very common 
phenomenon in the early Church.  The history of the  development of dogma  in the first five hundred 
years  of Christianity  is  intimately  connected  with  the  flourishing  and  subsequent  condemnation  of 
specific heresies. For example, the theology of Nicaea was developed almost entirely in response to the 
doctrines of Arius and his followers. It was they who decided the agenda and drew up the battle-lines. 
Everything  that  was  decided  by  the  orthodox  was  decided  in  response  to  the  Arians.  We  must  be 
careful  that  we  do  not  see  Nicaea  as  the  culmination  and  ratification  of  three  hundred  years  of 
theological  enquiry.  It  was  rather  an  ad  hoc,  sometimes  unwelcome,  response  to  contemporary 
pressures. Even the most famous articles of the Nicene Creed were startling innovations. The fact that 
they were formulated at all is simply an accident of history, the desperate reaction to an unforeseen and 
terrible heresy. Arius and his followers had forced the hand of their opponents.
To put the matter simply, without the Arian heresy, there would be no doctrine of the Trinity. Without 
the Nestorian heresy, there would be no Christology.  Without the Pelagian heresy, there would be no 
adequate  doctrine  of grace.  Without  the  Monothelite  heresy,  there  would  be  no  understanding  of 
Christ’s two wills.  It can thus be argued that the major credal statements of the Church, the definitive 
orthodox doctrines  issued by the  great  Ecumenical  Councils,  were  to  a  very  large  extent  accidental, 
unplanned responses  to  unforeseen dangerous  circumstances.  For example,  the  sudden appearance  of 
Arianism forced  its  opponents  to  re-examine  the  relationship  of the  Father and the  Son.  Before  this, 
there  was  no  need,  or  at  least  no  urgency,  to  clarify these  points.  The  Church  could  continue  in  its 
rather vague notion of the Trinity and be satisfied.
24 Scheffezyk (1970), p.82 and Bethune-Baker (1933), p.145.
25  In  the  third  chapter  of this  study,  we  shall  see  how  Origen’s  doctrine  of the  Incarnation  and  his 
description  of the  earthly  life  of Jesus  Christ  were  developed  in  direct  response  to  pagan  ridicule. 
Origen’s task as apologist was to present a Christ who was acceptable to pagan philosophers.  It is this 
intention that directs and dictates the whole of Origen’s Christology.
11In  a  recent  lecture,  Richard  Holloway  made  the  daring  move  of  applying  Kuhn’s  notion  of  the 
‘paradigm shift’ to the process of the development of Christian doctrine.26 He argues that there are no 
definitively and objectively correct answers to the major theological questions and that paradigms need 
to  be  constantly  revised  in  response  to  new  worries,  new  fears  and  new  religious  requirements. 
Theology is very sensitive to particular social and historical milieux. This argument is similar in many 
ways to the argument of Cardinal Newman’s great work,  The Development of Christian Doctrine}1 For 
both Holloway and Newman, the main point is the way in which the theologians of the Early Church 
were constantly defending themselves, responding to the erroneous opinions of others and formulating 
their  own  doctrines precisely  as  a  response.  We  must  therefore  recognize  the  great  importance  of 
heresies  as  providing  the  necessary  impetus  for  the  major  doctrinal  developments  of  the  Early 
Church.28
Bethune-Baker29 quotes a very interesting passage from Origen’s Homilies on  Numbers which shows 
that Origen was fully aware of the advantages of engaging with heretics  in this way:  nam si doctrina 
ecclesiastica simplex esset et nullis intrinsecus haereticorum dogmatum assentionibus cingeretur,  non 
poterat  tarn  clara  et  tarn  examinata  videri  fides  nostra,  sed  idcirco  doctrinam  catholicam 
contradicentium obsidet oppugnatio,  ut fides nostra non otio torpescat, sed exercitiis elimetur (in Num. 
Horn.  9).  Athanasius  shows  how  Origen’s  methodology  came  to  rely  upon  precisely  this  kind  of 
polemical encounter (de Decretis 27.2).
(iii)
Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity is the conscious and deliberate response to two particular heresies. The 
first heresy is the  Gnostic  doctrine that the  Son is a corporeal emanation (TtpoPoXi))  from the Father. 
The  second  heresy  is  Monarchianism,  an  extreme  unitarianism,  according  to  which Father,  Son  and 
Holy Ghost are simply convenient labels used to describe the different actions or operations performed 
by the one God.30 The refutation of Gnosticism and Monarchianism became Origen’s  life’s  work.  He 
wrote  against  them  as  a  young  man  in  Alexandria  and  as  an  old  man  in  Caesarea.  In  order  to 
understand Origen’s theology, it is vitally important to understand the theology of his opponents and in
26 Holloway (2000 I), pp.  1-2.
27 Briefly discussed by Bethune-Baker (1933), p.36.
28  See  Le  Boulluec  (1985)  II,  p.443,  for a brief discussion of ‘la necessite  et la utilite  des heresies.” 
Bethune-Baker (1933), pp.2-4 also discusses the topic. He argues that “heresies have rendered no small 
service to theological science.  The defence of doctrines impugned and the discussion of the points  at 
issue led to a deeper and closer understanding of the subject.”
29 Bethune-Baker (1933), p.2.
12this  way to  understand  his polemical  objectives,  his purpose  in writing  what he  wrote.  Mis-readings 
and mis-representations of Origen are very often the direct result of a failure to take full account of his 
apologetic intentions, specifically of a failure to identify the heretical opponents in response to whom 
Origen developed his theology. For example,  it is very tempting to view Origen through the lens of a 
post-Nicene  orthodoxy.  Various  scholars  seem  to  assume  that  Origen  was  concerned  to  prove  the 
equality,  even the  consubstantiality,  of the  Father  and  the  Son  and  that his  Trinitarian theology  was 
directed towards this specific end.31 But this was not at all Origen’s concern. Those exploring Origen’s 
Trinitarian  theology  must  always  remember  that  his  main  enemies  were  the  Monarchians. 
Monarchianism  was  an  entirely  different  theology  from  Arianism,  even  its  opposite.  It  required 
therefore  an entirely different response.  The Arians argued that the Son was created from nothing by 
the will of the Father and that he was not God, but a mere creature.  In response to this, the orthodox 
were forced to stress the similarity, or rather the identity, of the Father and the Son. The Monarchians 
argued that the  Son was  exactly the  same  as the Father and that the  ‘Trinity’  was  a mere  onomastic 
convenience. In response to this, Origen was forced to stress the difference between the Father and the 
Son.
May this brief, simplified example illustrate the immense importance of identifying and understanding 
a theologian’s doctrinal opponents as the crucial first stage in understanding the theologian himself. As 
Athanasius’ Trinitarian theology makes sense only in the context of Arianism and only as a response to 
Arianism,  so  Origen’s  Trinitarian  theology  makes  sense  only  in  the  context  of  Gnosticism  and 
Monarchianism and only as a response to Gnosticism and Monarchianism.32 In the course of this study, 
it  will  therefore  become  necessary  to  examine  thoroughly  the  theology  of  Origen’s  heretical 
contemporaries.  May the reader understand that this is not a diversion, a mere scholarly aside, but the 
crucial background to any full study of Origen. With all the above in mind, let us now turn to a detailed 
examination of Origen’s Trinitarian doctrine, in its proper historical context.
30 See section 4.1 for a full discussion of Monarchianism.
31 The great debate -  “Did Origen apply the term bpoouoioq  to the Son?” -  hinges on this very point. 
We discuss the debate in detail in chapter two.
32  In  this  study  we  deal  with  the  Gnostics  only  cursorily.  Although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
refutation of Gnostic materialism is a very important factor in the development of Origen’s Trinitarian 
doctrine, this is a Patristic common-place. Almost all the ante-Nicene Fathers, Greek and Roman, voice 
the  same  objections  and  the  same  solutions.  Debate  with Monarchianism is  much more  unusual  and 
therefore, I would argue, much more interesting.
13THE APOLOGIST DOCTRINE OF GOD AND THE LOGOS
(1.1)
A  fundamental  doctrine  of Origen’s  Trinitarian  system,  and  one  familiar  to  even  his  most  casual 
readers,33 is the eternal generation of the  Son.34 In developing this famous doctrine, Origen has made 
the  conscious  and  deliberate  decision  to  reject  the  Apologist  doctrine  of  the  two-stage  Logos,  a 
theological paradigm which had dominated theology for the past hundred years.35 The development of 
the  doctrine  of eternal  generation  was  a  decisive  turning  point  in  the  history  of dogma,  a  crucially 
important paradigm shift, which paved the way for the Trinitarian triumphs of the following century.36 
But  in  order  to  appreciate  the  great  novelty  of Origen’s  doctrine  and  to  understand  the  theological 
motivation behind it, it is first necessary to understand the Apologist doctrine of the two-stage Logos. 
(1.2)
While the writers of the Apostolic Age had been content to write for the Church as a closed and private 
elite,  the Apologists of the second century were  deeply concerned with the  world outside.37 There  is 
much debate  in contemporary scholarship concerning the purpose and function of these Apologies,  in 
particular their intended audience. It has often been assumed that the Apologists were missionaries and 
that  their sole  aim and purpose  was  conversion,38  but this  view has recently been challenged.  Many 
scholars now argue that the Apologists wrote for an internal readership, to re-assure the doubtful and to 
bolster the confidence of recent converts.39 It seems most likely to me that the famous Apologies of the 
second  century  were,  in  the  words  of Simon  Price,40  both  intrinsic  and  extrinsic,  i.e.  aimed  at both 
Christians  and  non-Christians.  Although  there  is  little  evidence  of the  evangelistic  success  of the 
Apologists,  their  works  would  surely  have  been  read  by  potential  converts,  seeking  intellectual
33 As I have gathered from various conversations with non-experts.
34 See section 2.1  for a full analysis of the doctrine.
35 There is some debate as to whether Clement accepted the doctrine of the two-stage Logos. This is not 
the place to enter such a complicated discussion. The interested reader is referred to Edwards (2000), 
for an exhaustive analysis.
36 Bethune-Baker (1933), p. 148 calls the theory “Origen’s chief permanent contribution to the doctrine 
of the person of Christ.”
37 The Apologists with whom I shall be dealing are Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras and 
Tertullian.  Hippolytus,  while  not  technically an Apologist,  wrote  at the  same  time  as  the Apologists 
and shares many of the Apologist doctrines, including that of the two-stage Logos. He will also feature 
in this section. For a useful discussion of the Apologist agenda,  see Grant (1988) and Edwards,  Price 
and Goodman (1999).
38 So, Scheffezyk (1969), pp.54-64 and Grant (1988), p.l 1 and passim.
39 So,  Edwards (1995), pp.279-80,  Edwards,  Price and Goodman (1999), pp.8-10 and Young (1999), 
passim.
40 Price (1999).
14justification for such a bold move.41  By the second century, Christianity was attracting large numbers 
from the educated elite; it should be remembered that many of the Apologists themselves were brought 
up  as  pagans  and  educated  in  the  traditional  pagan  way.42  Converts  of  this  calibre  thirsted  for 
intellectual explanations and for a faith fully attuned to the established philosophical creed.  Christians 
were no longer inprisoned in a cultural vacuum, but took careful note of the beliefs and doctrines of 
the  outside  world.  In  many  cases,  these  doctrines  were  happily  and  readily  absorbed.  It  is  this 
syncretism that is the hall mark of Apologetic literature, distinguishing it sharply it from its precursors. 
The  Apologists  of the  second century recognized the  advantages  of adopting  and  -  only to  a certain 
extent -  adapting the beliefs of their pagan contemporaries.  Potential or recent converts needed to be 
convinced that the tenets of Christianity were similar in many ways to the fundamental credos of pagan 
religious philosophy. An evangelism that preached a radically new system, a thorough overthrow of all 
that was held most dear, would be doomed to failure. So it came about that the God of the Old and New 
Testament was gradually transformed into the God of the philosophers. As a necessary parallel to this, 
Jesus Christ, the Jewish Messiah, was forced to become the Logos, an abstract metaphysical entity.43 
In developing their new theology, the second century Apologists turned for inspiration to the doctrines 
of Middle-Platonism.44 This is the philosophy with which they would have been most familiar. At this 
date  handbooks  and  commentaries  dominated  the  school  curriculum,  at  the  expense  of the  original 
texts.  Schoolboys  would  have  been  much  more  familiar  with  a  work  like  Albinus’  Handbook  of 
Platonism than with the original Dialogues.45  So it was that the God of the Apologists came to have a 
very great deal in common with the God of Albinus, Numenius and Apuleius. He becomes less and less 
the  loving  Father  of the  Bible  and  more  and  more  a  Middle-Platonic  First  Principle.  Tatian,  in  his 
Oratio ad Graecos, is careful to describe God in a way that would directly appeal to the philosophical 
penchants  of  his  educated  readers:  he  is  eternal,  impassible,  invisible  and  entirely  self-sufficient 
(Oratio 4). We find a similar list of divine attributes in Athenagoras’ Embassy. God is one, unbegotten,
41 Nock (1933), p.192.
42 Nock (1933), p.250.
43  Of course  Christ  had  already  been  identified  as  the  Logos  by  the  writer  of the  Fourth  Gospel 
(  ev  dpxfi  fjv  6  Xdyoq), but Logos theology was not fully developed until the time of the Apologists. 
John’s  opening  remarks  simply  provided  useful  Scriptural  legitimacy  for  what  was  an  essentially 
philosophical claim.
44  For  the  purposes  of this  study,  I  take  Numenius,  Apuleius  and  Albinus  as  the  representatives  of 
Middle-Platonic philosophy.  For much of the information and argument of this section, I am indebted 
to John Dillon’s The Middle Platonists (1977).
45 On this point, see Dillon (1993), p.xiv. In this study, we always use the name Albinus for the author 
of the Handbook of  Platonism. The alternative name, Alcinoos, appears on the MSS.
15eternal,  invisible,  impassible  and  apprehensible  to  the mind  alone  {Embassy  10).  In these  theologies 
there is, quite deliberately I believe, no reference to anything that is specifically Christian.
Most relevant to the present enquiry however is the Apologist adoption of the central Middle-Platonic 
belief in the transcendence of the First God. Numenius, Albinus and Apuleius all believed in a supreme 
God who was unknowable and un-nameable and who was concerned with nothing other than himself. 
In a famous and much discussed passage, Albinus argues that God is above and beyond every possible 
category of being, every possible attribute and every possible description:  he is neither good nor bad, 
qualified nor unqualified, neither a part nor a whole,  neither the same as anything nor different from 
anything, neither moving nor moved (Albinus, Handbook  10.4).  If he can be described at all,  it is by 
the via negativa or by the via analogiae {ibid 10.5-6). Albinus goes on to argue that such a lofty being 
would  necessarily be  concerned  with  nothing  other  than  himself:  “since  the  primary  intellect  is  the 
finest of things,  it follows that the object of its intelligizing must also be supremely fine.  But there is 
nothing finer than this intellect. Therefore it must be everlastingly engaged in thinking of itself and its 
own thoughts” {ibid.  10.3, trans. Dillon).46
Numenius  similarly  argues  that  God  is  surrounded  by  an  indescribable  and  unspeakable  silence 
(xiq  acpaxoq  Kai  dSiqyriioq  dxexvax;  epr||ila  Beoneoioq)47  and that he is concerned with nothing other 
than  himself:  ('o  0edq  6  p£v  7 tpd>TO ^  fev  feaoxoO  cdv  eoxiv  & 7 tX oC > <;,  8ia  xo  kaoxw  auyyiyvbpevof;
816X .00 pq  Ttoxe  etvai  5iaipex6<;)48 Apuleius likewise insists on the doctrine of divine ineffability: God 
is indictum and innominabilem\ his nature is hard to understand {de Platone 190; c.f. de Mundo 342). 
The  Apologists  similarly  envisaged  God  the  Father  as  the  deus  absconditus,  a  hidden  and 
incomprehensible being,  who  remained aloof and detached  from the  created world.49 Justin develops 
this  idea by arguing that God can never be named.  He argues  that the traditional divine titles -  God, 
Creator,  Lord,  Master  -   describe  merely  the  functions  of the  First  Principle,  his  relations  vis-a-vis 
creation, and not his essence, which can never be known and never described {Second Apology,  6;  To 
the  Greeks,  21).  This  is  surely a Christian version of Philo’s  famous argument that we can only ever
46 The source of this doctrine is Aristotle’s self-thinking Mind, as described in Metaphysics A.
47 Numenius, fragment 2, des Places.
48 Numenius, fragment 11, des Places.
49  Grant  (1988),  pp.60-61  refers  to  Justin,  Dialogue  with  Trypho  56.1  and  127.2:  the  Father never 
leaves his lofty abode to deal with men, but always remains  in the  ‘highest heaven.’  Grant likens this 
doctrine to Numenius’ insistence on divine transcendence.
16know the Suvdpeiq  of God and not his otioia.50 It is Theophilus however who voices the most thorough
negative  theology.  In  chapter  1.3  of  his  lengthy  appeal  ad  Autolycum,  Theophilus  expresses  the 
transcendence  of  God  through  a  long  list  of  negative  attributes:  God  is  ineffable,  indescribable, 
unfathomable, inconceivable, incomprehensible, unrivalled, unutterable and inimitable. It is only by an 
appreciation  of  the  works  and  powers  of  God,  as  expressed  in  creation,  that  we  might  glimpse 
something of his  ineffable nature. As rays of light point to the sun,  so the wonders of nature point to 
God (ad Autolycum,  1.5-6).51
Having  accepted  that  God  is  a  radically  transcendent being  who  can never be  known  and  never be 
described, the Middle-Platonists and the Apologists were obliged to develop a doctrine of delegation.52 
Delegation was  the necessary and inevitable  corollary of the  doctrine  of divine transcendence.53  The 
tasks  of creation  and providence  must be  delegated  to  an  inferior being,  allowing  the  First  God  to 
remain in splendid isolation, detached and aloof. Thus it was suggested that there existed an inferior, or 
Second God,  who both created the world and was responsible for all subsequent providential control. 
This  model  is  most  clearly  presented  by  Numenius  in  his  work  On  the  Good.  Numenius  explicitly 
states that the First God remained ‘idle’  (dpy6^) during creation (frag.  12). In fragment  13, Numenius 
compares the relationship of the Creator (Demiurge) and the First God to that of a farmer and a sower: 
it  is  the  latter  that  does  the  actual  physical  labour  of planting  the  seeds.  Similarly,  in  fragment  15, 
Numenius  contrasts  the  stability,  in-action  and  eternal  oxdon;  of the  First  God  with  the  inherent 
movement and activity (Kivrjou;) of the Second God. Finally, in fragment  16, Numenius re-iterates the 
claim that it is the Demiurge who is the yevfoeax;  dpyq.54 Albinus also delegates the work of creation 
to  a  Second  God.  In  chapter  10.3  of  the  Handbook,  Albinus  describes  a  model  of  creation  via 
intermediaries: the First God ‘bestows order’ on the Heavenly Intellect, who in turn ‘bestows order’ on 
world.  Furthermore,  basing himself on the arguments of the  Timaeus, Albinus posits the existence of 
various ‘created gods’  or ‘daemons’, who are responsible for the administration of the sub-lunar world 
(Handbook  15).  Apuleius  too  develops  a  detailed  doctrine  of delegation  to  explain  the  day  to  day 
running of the cosmos. In order to preserve the dignitas and maiestas of God, we must assume that he
50  On  this,  see  Sandmell  (1979),  pp.92-93  and  Witt  (1933),  p.330  (citing  Philo,  Fragment  60).  For 
Origen’s acceptance of this credo, see sections 10.2 and 12.1.
51 See Tatian, Oratio, 4 and Athenagoras, Embassy,  10 for similar descriptions of divine transcendence.
52 For a brief but useful discussion of the doctrine of delegation, see Sharpies (1995), pp.9-11.
53 The alternative was the Epicurean theory that there is no providence and that men are left entirely to 
their own devices.
17works through a complex of intermediaries. In a famous and much quoted passage, Apuleius compares 
God to an Eastern potentate who relies on deputies and satraps to rule his vast empire {de Mundo 343- 
352).55
The Christian Apologists agreed with their pagan confreres that the First God, God the Father, must be 
protected from any unworthy activity. If God is indeed the kind of abstract, distant being described by 
the Apologists,  it becomes  impossible to believe that he  created and redeemed the world and that he 
directs and dictates our lives with meticulous providential control. Such busy activity would ill become 
such a  superior being.  Yet,  as  Christians,  the  Apologists  could not reject the authority of the  Bible, 
which repeatedly and explicitly states that God cares  for his creation as  a father for his children:  not 
even a sparrow can die without his knowledge.  The Apologists were thus  faced with the problem of 
reconciling the philosophical insistence on divine transcendence with the Biblical insistence on divine 
providence.  The solution to this dilemma lay in the doctrine of delegation and mediation. The crucial 
tasks of creation, providence and redemption are delegated to the Son, or as he is usually known in this 
period,  the  Logos.  The  God  of the  Apologists  never  deigned  to  leave  his  lofty  abode  and  involve 
himself directly with the doings of men.
In the Dialogue with  Trypho, Justin attempts to convince his interlocutor that the manifestations of God 
described in the Old Testament are all manifestations of the Son. It was not God the Father who  ‘shut 
Noah up in the  ark’  (Gen.  7.16), who destroyed  Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen.  19)  and who  ‘spoke  to 
Moses’  (Exodus  6.2ff),  but the  Son {Dialogue  128.2).  Theophilus uses  the  same  argument.  How,  he 
asks,  could  God  possibly  have  ‘walked  in  the  garden’  (Gen.  3.8)?  It  must  have  been  the  Son  who 
assumed the guise of the Father and thus conversed with Adam. In a rare pun, Theophilus argues that 
the ‘voice’ which Adam heard must have been the Logos {ad Autolycum 2.22).
If the transcendence of God would not allow him a direct and active role in the day-to-day running of 
the  cosmos,  neither  could  it  allow  him  a  direct  and  active  role  in  its  original  creation.  It  is  in  their 
cosmogonical  theories  that  the  Apologists  stress  most  fully  the  need  for  mediation.  Such  a  lowly, 
workmanlike  task  as  creation would obviously compromise  the  dignity of the  supreme  God.  For the 
Apologists,  the  Son  (the  Logos)  takes  on the  role  of Demiurge.  It  is  he  who  creates  the  world.  The
54 As Dillon (1992), p. 13 points out, the First God is creator only insofar as he is father of the creator.
55 The origin of this metaphor was of course pseudo-Aristotle’s de Mundo. Written in the first century 
B.C., this text became extremely popular with the Middle-Platonists.
18proem of the  Gospel  of John was  seized upon as the perfect Scriptural base  for the claim,  since  the 
Evangelist clearly states that it is the Logos through whom all things were made.56 
So,  for the Apologists, the Logos exists as the tool or intermediary of the Father, the one to whom he 
delegates the lowly tasks of creation and providence. But having formulated this basic belief, a number 
of difficult  questions  inevitably  arose.  Did  the  Logos  exist  only  for  the  purposes  of creation  and 
providence?  Did  he  come  into  existence  only on  the  ‘eve  of creation’,57  only  at  such  a  time  as  his 
existence was needed and required?58 Was he therefore a creature, like all other creatures, created at a 
particular time and for a particular purpose? Must one accept that, before this time, God the Father was 
without  the  Logos,  aXoyoq  (irrational)?  It  was  in  the  attempt  to  solve  these  questions  that  the
Apologists  developed their  doctrine  of the  two-stage  Logos.59 At the  first  stage  of its  existence,  the 
Logos  resides  within the Father as his  immanent reason,  or rational  faculty.  At the  second  stage,  he 
processes from the Father in order to create the world.
(1.3)
The  Apologists  argue  that  at  the  first  stage  of its  existence  the  Logos  is  to  be  identified  with  the 
Father’s immanent reason or rational faculty. There was no time therefore when the Father was aXoyoq. 
In  his  Embassy  on  Behalf of Christians,  Athenagoras  insists  that  the  Logos  did  not  come  to  be 
(ot>x  yevdpevov)  but  was  with  God  from  the  beginning.  Being  eternally  rational 
(6i5ico<;  XoyiKoq  wv),  God  was  in  eternal  possession  of  his  rationality  (A.dyo<;)  {Embassy  1.10). 
Theophilus agrees that the Logos always exists,  residing within the heart of God. For before anything 
came  into  being,  (God)  had  (the  Logos)  as  his  counsellor,  being  his  own  mind  and  thought  {ad 
Autolycum 2.22, trans. Dods). Theophilus goes on to provide an exegesis of the first verse of the Fourth 
Gospel. Highlighting John’s claim that the  Word was with  God, Theophilus argues that God was never 
alone, because his word was eternally ‘with him’. Tertullian and Hippolytus both adopt the paradigm of 
the two-stage Logos.  Tertullian’s arguments in the Adversus Praxean are strikingly similar to those of 
Theophilus.  Describing the  ‘period’  before creation, Tertullian insists that the Logos existed eternally 
as God’s rational faculty {ratio), that by which he planned and arranged the creation of the world:  ne
56 See section 1.3 for a discussion of the Logos’ role in creation.
57 Scheffczyk’s phrase (Scheffezyk (1970), p.59).
58 This question did not arise for the pagan Middle-Platonists,  for whom (despite the evidence of the 
Timaeus),  the  eternity of the  world  was  axiomatic.  An eternal  creation obviously requires  an eternal 
creator.
59 So Casey (1924), p.48.
19tunc quidem solus:  habebat enim secum  quam  habebat in semetipso rationem suam.  rationalis  enim 
deus.  .  .  nam  etsi Deus nondum Sermonem suam  miserat60 proinde eum cum  ipsa et in  ipsa ratione 
intra semetipsum habebat, tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per Sermonem mox erat dicturus 
(Adversus  Praxean  5).  Hippolytus  is  similarly  insistent  that  God  is  in  eternal  possession  of all  his 
divine  attributes and that  it therefore  makes no  sense  to  say that the  Logos  came  into  existence  at a 
particular  time:  ai)xo<;  Si  pdvoc;  a>v  noXic,  fjv.  ouxe  yap  aXoyoq  ouxe  acrcxpoq  ouxe
& 8uvaxoq  ouxe  &PouXeuxoc;  i^v.  rcdvxa Si  fjv  ev  abxcp,  abxdq  Si  fjv  xo  nav (contra Noetum  10.2). This 
idea is repeated at the end of the Refutatio, where Hippolytus summarizes his own views: ouxoq ouv 6 
pdvoq  Kai  xaxd  Ttavxcov  0eo<;  X6yov  rcpcoxov  Evvor|0£i<;  (moyevvq.•  oi)  Xdyov  coq  cpcovf|v,  bXX' 
Ev8ia0£xov  xou  Ttavxdq  Xoyiopdv (Refutatio 10.33.1).61
There  is  some  disagreement amongst Patristic  scholars  concerning the precise  status of the  Logos  at 
this first stage.  Crehan, the translator of Athenagoras’ Embassy, insists that the Logos exists eternally 
as  an  individual  divine  person.  Having  reviewed  the  Apologist’s  doctrine  of the  immanent  Logos, 
Crehan warns incautious readers that “this does not mean that he thought of the Word (at this stage) as 
a  mere  faculty  of the  Father’s being.”62  d’Ales,  discussing  the Apologist  doctrine  in  general,  agrees 
with Crehan: “les textes qui nous montrent le Verbe existant etemellement en Dieu ne permettent guere 
de le concevoir comme un simple attribut divin. C’est done une personne.”63 Against this, Bardy argues 
a propos Athenagoras that “lorsqu’il  ecrit que  Dieu est etemellement raisonnable,  ne  semble-t-il pas 
faire de  la raison,  du Verbe, un attribut et non une personne distincte?”64 Puech argues similarly that 
“anterieurement a la creation,  le Verbe serait plutot une  faculte qu’une personne.”65 Prestige  likewise 
concludes that the doctrine of the first-stage Logos  “could easily be made to support the contention that 
the  Logos  was  impersonal  -   a  mere  attribute  of God  -   until  the  point  in  historic  time  at  which  he 
proceeded forth from the Father in the act of creation. Any such previous impersonality could derogate
60 This is a reference to the second-stage Logos, which we discuss below.
61  I  do  not  accept  Edwards’  interpretation of this passage:  “for all  we  are  told,  the phase  when  (the 
Logos) is merely a conception in the mind may be instantaneous” (Edwards (2000), p.  163). There are 
two main problems with this reading. First, why has Edwards ignored the evidence of Contra Noetum 
10.2,  in which Hippolytus clearly states that the Logos was an eternal attribute of God, that there was 
no time when he was aXoyoq  etc? Second, if Hippolytus’ God was possessed of his Logos only for an 
instant, was he irrational prior to that? This would not make sense.
62 Crehan (1956), p.22.
63 d’Ales (1905), p.88.
64 Bardy (1943), p.56. See also ibid., p. 41: “lorsqu’il ecrit que Dieu ayant en ses entrailles son Verbe 
interieur .  .  . ne semble-t-il pas insinuer qu’avant la creation, le Verbe ne possedait pas sa personalite, 
n’etait pas reellement distinct du Pere?”
65 Puech, Les Apologistes Grecs, pp. 188-189 (quoted by Bardy (1943), p.57).
20from the worth and even from the reality of his eternal existence.”66 Bethune-Baker agrees and argues 
that  the  first-stage  Logos  is  “still  impersonal  -   in  indistinguishable  union  with  God  as  the  divine 
intelligence.”67  Finally,  Spanneut,  discussing Tertullian’s  doctrine  of the  immanent Logos,  concludes 
that it does not have “une individuality totale.”68
This  is  an  important  point  that  will  have  far  reaching  ramifications  for  our  discussion  of Origen’s 
Trinitarian theology, in particular his development of the doctrine of eternal generation. We shall argue 
below that Origen’s main doctrinal opponents were the Monarchians, who denied that the Father,  Son 
and Holy Ghost were distinct from one another and who identified the three persons of the Trinity as 
merely  different  attributes  of one  and  the  same  indivisible  Godhead.  In  refuting  this  heresy,  Origen 
must show that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three distinct and individual ouoiai and not simply 
immanent  mental  faculties.69  If the  Apologist  doctrine  of the  two-stage  Logos  posited  a  period  of 
existence  for  the  Logos  in  which  it  was  indistinct  from  the  Father,  a  mere  attribute  of the  Father, 
Origen would have good reason to reject the doctrine. Having studied the evidence, it seems to me that 
the  Apologist doctrine  of the  immanent Logos  is  almost  identical  to  the Monarchian doctrine  of the 
Unitarian God.  I agree wholeheartedly with Bardy, Puech, Prestige,  Bethune-Baker and Spanneut that 
the immanent Logos is simply an attribute of the eternal Father, that aspect of his divinity with which 
he  thinks  and  reasons  and  plans.  If the  Logos  were  eternally  ‘une  personne’,  as  d’Ales  and  Crehan 
suggest, what would be distinctive about the second stage of his existence? As it is, the Apologists are 
at great pains to distinguish these two stages, to distinguish the Logos as the Father’s immanent reason 
and the Logos as the creator of the world.
Having decided to create the world, the Father sends forth his Logos to be the instrument of creation. 
The instrumental function of the Logos is most clearly described by Tertullian:  ut primum Deus voluit 
ea quae cum Sophia et Ratione et Sermone disposuerat intra se,  in substantias et species suas edere, 
ipsum primum protulit Sermonem  .  .  .  ut per  ipsum fierent universa per quern  erant cogitata  atque 
disposita (Adversus Praxean 6). Theophilus uses the same model: when God wished to make all that he 
had determined on,  he begot his  Word {ad Autolycum 2.22, trans. Dods). Hippolytus similarly stresses 
the role of the second-stage Logos in creation:  When  the Father commands that a world should come 
into  being,  the Logos  in  his  unity with  him performed what was pleasing to  God {Refutatio  10.33.1,
66 Prestige (1936), pp. 123-4.
67 Bethune-Baker (1933), p. 108.
68 Spanneut (1963), p.313.
21trans.  Edwards).  This  idea  is  also  found  in  the  earlier  Contra  Noetum: 
6 t£  f|06A.r|a£v,  Ka0d><;  fi06Xr|a£v,  eSei^cv  xov  X6 yov  aoxou  Kaipoic;  a>pio|j£voi<;  nap’  aOxd)-  81’  ou  xa 
Tidvxa  £7toiria£v  (Contra  Noetum  10.3).  Athenagoras  and  Tatian  hold  the  same  view:  the  immanent 
Logos processes ad extra only in order to create the world.70
Having  recognized  the  necessity  of two  Logoi,  the  Logos  as  the  Father’s  immanent  reason  and  the 
Logos as creator of the world, the Apologists were obliged to clarify the relationship between the two. 
Is the Logos which creates the world the  same as the Logos which exists eternally within the Father? 
Are  the  Apologists  simply  describing  two  stages  in  the  existence  of one  and  the  same  being?  It  is 
common practice for Patristic scholars to speak of the identity of the two Logoi and thus to distinguish 
the  Apologist doctrine  from the  later Arian version.71  The Arians taught that there were  two  distinct 
Logoi, (i) God’s eternal rationality and (ii) the instrument of creation, created ex nihilo at a particular 
time  and  for  a  particular  purpose.72  For  the  Apologists,  however,  the  situation  is  much  more 
complicated. They argue that the two Logoi are, if not exactly one and the same Logos passing through 
two different stages of existence, at least intimately connected with one another. The one arises out of 
the other and is  directly dependent upon it.  The eternal Logos,  immanent in the Father, processes ad 
extra for the purposes of creation.  But the Apologists are also keen to stress that this procession does 
not diminish or in any way effect the rationality of the Father: he is not thereby deprived of his Logos, 
rendered akoyoq.  In an attempt to  explain this  idea,  the  Apologists  made  use  of the  originally Stoic 
distinction  between  the  kbyoq  £v8iti0£xo<;  and  the  kdyoq  npotpopitcoq,  word  as  silent  thought  and
word  spoken  aloud.  As  we  shall  see,  this  image  implies  that the  two  Logoi  are  neither  identical  nor 
entirely different and discrete.
(1.4)
Details  of this  doctrine  outside  the  works  of  the  Apologists  are  unfortunately  scanty.73  We  must 
conclude however that this is simply an accident of history, the inevitable result of the loss of ancient 
texts,  since  the  doctrine  was  clearly  a  common-place.  The  juxtaposition  of kdyoq  £v8id0£xoc;  and
kdyoq  npotpopiKoq  occurs in a variety of different sources, without the apparent need for explanation
69 See section 5 for a full discussion of Origen’s refutation of Monarchianism.
70 Athenagoras, Embassy 1.10 and Tatian, Oratio 5.
71  So d’Ales (1905), p.88,  Stead (1964), p.20, Casey (1924), pp.45-6 and Prestige (1936), p. 123.  We 
shall argue below that it is not quite correct to identify the two Logoi. The relationship between the two 
is rather one of type and image.
72 For an overview of the Arian doctrine of the Logos, see Stead (1964).
22or elaboration. It was clearly assumed that the doctrine would be familiar to most readers. Origen, Philo 
and Porphyry all use the terminology, very much in passing.74 Sextus Empiricus provides a few more 
details,  when  he  argues  that,  while  certain  animals  (crows,  parrots  and  jays)  possess  and 
exhibit  Xdyoc;  rcpoipopiKdc;,  only  humans  have  Xdyoc;  Ev8id0£xo<;  (Mathematici  8.287.3).  Galen
analyses  Xdyoc;  £v8ia0£xo<;,  identifying  it  with  intelligence,  thought  and  mind  and  clearly
distinguishing it from Xdyoc;  Kara  (pcovijv (in Hippocr.  de med.  officina iii,  18B).75 Albinus similarly
distinguishes  the  Xdyoq  £v8id0£toq  from the  Xdyoc;  rcpocpopucdc;,  by pointing  out  that  it  is  the  latter
which is heard (Prologue to Plato 2.2). Ptolemy, the Alexandrian polymath, is our most useful source 
for understanding this doctrine. His evidence becomes particularly important if we recall that he wrote 
in the second century AD, i.e. at the same time as the Apologists. In a rather obscure and little known 
work, de iudicandi facultate, Ptolemy attempts to explain the rational process. In chapter two, Ptolemy 
identifies  Xdyoc,  £v8ia0£xo<;  as  8idvoia  (thought)  and  Xdyoc;  TipocpopiKoq  as  8idX£KXo<;  (discourse).
What  is  cmcial  about  his  discussion  is  the  intimate  connexion  between  these  two  Xdyoi.  They  are
certainly not ‘discrete phenomena’:76 the one emerges from the other and is entirely dependent upon it.
While of course not every thought need express itself in the spoken word,77 every spoken word must
originate as a thought. Thus Ptolemy calls the Xdyoc;  7tpo(popiKoc;  an  eikcov  (‘image’):
Sidvoia  p£v  feaxiv  6  Xdyoc;  6  £v8id0£xoq  8i££o8d<;  T V (^   0uaa  xai  dvandXr|ot<;  xai  Sidxpiaic;  xcov 
pvr|povE\)0£vx(ov  SidX£Kxo<;  8e  xa  xijc;  cpcovfjc;  oupPoXa,  8i’  d>v  7 ipocp6p£xai  xoiq  7tXr|oiov  xa 
8iavor|0£vxa-  xai  eoxiv  eLkcov  xk;-  6  p£v  cp0dyyoc;  auxou  xou  vou-  xf|<;  8’   Evvoiac;  b  cpcovrV  xfjc;
8£  8iavoiaq  f|  SuxXekxoc;- xai  oXcoc;  6  7 tpo(popiKd<;  Xdyoc;  xou £v8ia0^xou  (de iudicandi facultate 2).
A  similar  picture  is  found  in  Plutarch,  who  also  highlights  the  clear  causal  priority  of 
the  Xdyoc;  fev8id0£xo<;. Making use of the mythological distinction between Hermes the Leader and the
Hermes the Messenger, Plutarch identifies the  Xdyoc;  Ttpocpopixdc;  with the latter and argues that it is
73 For much of the information in this section, we are dependent upon the TLG CD ROM.
74 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.65; Philo, Special Laws 4.69; Porphyry, in Aristot.  Categ. 4.1.64.
75 Edwards (2000), p.  161  should not have missed the evidence of Galen when he claims that there is 
only  one  example  of the  coupling  of Xdyoc;  £v8id0£xo<;  and  Xdyoc;  Tipocpopixoc;  in  SVF.  Although 
Galen  does  not  use  the  term  Xdyoc;  Ttpocpopixdc;,  he  is  obviously  referring  to  the  same  theory; 
Xdyoc;  xaxd cpcovijv is simply a paraphrase.
76 Edwards (2000), p. 161. Edwards has missed the important evidence of Ptolemy.
23somehow  ‘stale’,  being  one  remove  from  the  original  thought:  to  6£  Xkyziv  on  600  X.6yoi  Eioiv, 
6  p£v  kvSidBexoq  . . .   6  5’   fev  7tpo<pop§  SidKTopoq  Kai  6pyaviK6<;,  ecoX.6v  feativ  (maxime  cum 
principibus  777B).  Plutarch’s  discussion  is  particularly  interesting,  in that the  Xdyoc,  Ttpocpopucoq  is
cast  in  the  guise  of an  instrument  or  servant  of  the  A .6yoq  evSidGexoq.  As  we  have  seen,  it  was
precisely  this  kind  of subordinate  role  that  was  envisaged  by  the  Apologists  for  their  second-stage 
Logos.
Finally, we refer the reader to a brief comment made by Plotinus. At Ennead 5.1.3, Plotinus compares 
the  procession  of  Soul  from  Intellect  to  the  speaking  of  a  thought:  Intellect  is  compared  to  the 
Xdyoc,  £v5id0£xo<;  and Soul to the  A .6yo<;  Ttpotpopncoc;. The important point for us to note is that the
‘processed logos’ is again described as the image (eIkcov) of the ‘interior logos’.
From this brief over-view,  we  can conclude  that the  Xdyoc,  £v8id0£TO<;  is  interior,  silent thought  and 
that the Xdyoc,  7rpo(popiKO<; is the spoken version of this same thought, typically expressed as discourse
or  argument.  It  is  clear  from  the  evidence  of  Ptolemy,  Plutarch  and  Plotinus  that  the 
Xdyoc,  TtpcxpopiKdc;  is that by which our thoughts (the  Xdyoc,  £v§id0£Toq) are expressed: the former is
thus the ‘image’ of the latter.
The  Apologists  of the  second  century  seized  upon  this  philosophical  common-place  to  illustrate  a 
number  of important  theological points.  (1)  The  image  was  primarily used to  show that the  second- 
stage Logos was not a new creation, created ex nihilo, but that it had been eternally present within the 
divine mind,  or rather as the divine mind. As the spoken word necessarily pre-exists as a thought,  so 
the creative Logos pre-exists as the Father’s rationality. Thus the Apologists insist that the second-stage 
Logos  did  not  ‘come  to  be’  (oi)x  < * > < ;  yEvdpevov),  but  merely  ‘processed’.  It  is  not  entirely  correct 
however to speak of the identity of the two  Logoi.  The relationship between the two is rather one of 
image  or reflection,  as  the  spoken word  is  an  image  or reflection of its  preceding  thought.  (2)  The 
image  also  illustrates  how  the  procession  of the  Logos  did  not  deprive  the  Father  of his  powers  of 
reason, did not render him aXoyoc,. Tatian makes precisely this point: “The word coming forth from the 
Father does not deprive the begetter of the power of rational speech.  I speak and you hear:  yet surely 
when I address you,  I am not myself deprived of speech through the transmission of speech” {Oratio
77 As is clearly stated in chapter 5 of the de iudicandi facultate.
241.5, trans. Whittaker). Justin similarly argues that the begetting (speaking) of a logos does not diminish 
the  logos  which  remains  within  the  speaker  {Dialogue  with  Trypho  61).  (3)  Finally,  the  image 
illustrates  how  the  procession  of the  Logos  was  entirely  incorporeal  and  how  it  did  not  reduce  the 
Father  in  any  way.  The  Apologists  were  particularly keen  to  stress  this  point  in  order to  refute  the 
Gnostic claim that the Son was a TrpoPoA.fi of the Father. The image of the Son as the spoken word is 
the perfect illustration of a non-physical generation.  So Tatian insists that the Son did not come  into 
being Kara  & 7 t0K0Ttr|v; he is not severed or divided (Kexcbpiaiai) from the Father {Oratio  1.5). Justin 
makes a similar point. Speaking, the begetting of a word, does not involve  ‘cutting off or ‘severance’, 
so neither does the procession of the Son {Dialogue with Trypho 61).78
(1.5)
It is very important to recognize how the Apologists do not regard the Father and the Son as integral 
and  complementary  components  of  the  one  Godhead.  Each  is  complete  in  and  by  himself:  the 
rationality of the  Father,  for instance,  exists  eternally,  irrespective  of the  rationality of the  Son.  The 
Apologist doctrine  of the two-stage Logos makes  sense only if one accepts that the Father alone  is a 
complete and perfect God and that he requires the Son only at a later stage to be his  instrument and 
mediator  ad extra.  The  Apologists  cannot  therefore  be  properly  labelled  ‘Trinitarians’.  There  is  no 
sense  that  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost  have  any  contribution  to  make  to  the  life  of God.  On  the 
contrary,  the  Apologists  constantly preached the  eternal  self-sufficiency of an independently existing 
Father.  Such  is  their  insistence  on  monotheism,79  the  necessary  rejection  of pagan  polytheism,  that 
there  is  no  adequate  cognisance  of the  Trinity.80  When  the  Apologists  speak  of ‘God’,  they  almost 
invariably mean God the Father. So, for example, in Theophilus’ long description of God in chapters 3- 
6 of the ad Autolycum, there is no reference to the Son or to the Holy Ghost. We are left with the strong 
impression that, had there been no creation, there would have been no Trinity.  The  Son and the Holy 
Ghost are simply the necessary means for creating the world, caring for it and redeeming it. They have 
no effect upon the Father and no relevance for him, other than allowing him to remain in transcendent 
peace, while his minions toil away.
78 On this use of the image, see Stead (1977), p. 169.
79 See, for example, Athenagoras, Embassy 4-8, 4 chapters devoted to proving that God is one. Tatian, 
Oratio  1.4, places monotheism at the top of his list of theological credos.  Edwards (2002), pp.67 and 
69 comments upon the Apologist insistence on Monotheism.
80 This was also in response to strict Jewish monotheism.  It must be remembered that at this date the 
Jews as well as the pagans were criticizing the new faith. Justin’s Dialogue with  Trypho is an apology
25It  would  seem  therefore  that  the  Apologists  have  fallen  foul  of the  Monarchian  heresy.81  Like  the 
Monarchians,  the  Apologists  believe  that  there  is  but  one  God  who  contains  within  himself all  the 
divine  attributes,  merely  as  attributes  of his  one  undivided  being.  We  have  already  seen  how  the 
Apologists  argue  that  in  the period  before  creation,  when  the  Father was  alone,  he  was  not  without 
reason, without will, without power or without wisdom. All were eternally immanent within him. There 
was  no  need  for  an  independently  existing  Son  to  provide  the  Godhead  with  these  essentials.  The 
Apologists also insist on the self-sufficiency and independence of the Father after the procession of the 
Word. He still remains complete and perfect, in possession by himself alone of all the divine attributes. 
It is with this in mind that the Apologists insist that the processed Logos did not diminish or effect in 
any way the Logos that remained within God the Father. Although he has sent forth a Logos who is to 
be  identified  with  reason,  will,  wisdom  and  power,  the  Father  is  not  thereby  rendered 
aXoyoq,  doocpoq, dPouXsxoq,  and  aSuvaxoq.  With  post-Nicene  hindsight,  one  might  be  tempted  to
interpret  this  claim  as  an  acknowledgement  of the  Trinitarian  oiKovopia,  i.e.  that the  Son  has  now 
become  the reason,  will,  wisdom and power of the  Father.  I  feel however that the Apologist scheme 
was entirely different from this. Following the procession of the Son, there were two wills, two reasons, 
two  wisdoms  and  two  powers.  The  image  of  the  two  torches,  used  by  both  Justin  and  Tatian,82 
illustrates precisely this point. Although a second torch is lit, the first remains exactly as it was before. 
The  image of the  Xdyoc;  8v8id0exo<;  and the  X6yo<;  Ttpocpopncog carries the  same  implication.  As  the
spoken word does  not deprive  the  speaker of his power of rational thought,  so  the processed  Logos 
does not deprive the Father of his eternal, 
the  Apologists,  the  existence  of the  Son 
temporal creation.
(1.6)
dealing with specifically Jewish complaints.  In the first section of the  True  Word,  Celsus assumes the 
piise of the Jew and argues from a peculiarly Jewish perspective.
1   Bardy (1943), p.56 seems to agree with me:  “on peut alors se demander si,  en appuyant comme le 
fait sur 1’unite, Athenagore ne risque pas de compromettre la realite des personnes et s’il ne donne pas 
de la foi chretienne un enonce qui preparait en quelque sorte le Sabellianisme.” It is interesting to note 
that Paul of Samosata resurrected the doctrine of the X6yoq  fev8ia0£xoq  as the perfect illustration of his 
Monarchian doctrine {apud Epiphanius, Haeres.  65.1.5; passage cited by Grant (1988), p. 169). Lawlor 
(1918), p.41  discusses Paul’s use of  Xdyoq  £v8id0£xo<;: this Logos is simply an element of the Father’s 
personality; it does not exist in i3 7tap^i<;  and is not an  bn6oxaoi<;.
82 Justin, Oratio 5 and Tatian, Dialogue 61.
internal Logos.  We therefore reach the conclusion that,  for 
is  irrelevant  to  the  Father:  he  exists  merely  in  relation  to
26Such then is the Apologist doctrine of the two-stage Logos, the ubiquitous theological paradigm which 
dominated second and third century Christian theology. Origen would undoubtedly have been aware of 
the  doctrine,  whether he  encountered  it in the  classrooms  of the  catechetical  school83  or through his 
own  voracious  reading.84  Origen’s  doctrine  of the  eternal  generation  of the  Son  must  be  seen  as  a 
deliberate and conscious rejection of the theology of his immediate predecessors. In sections 3, 4 and 5 
of this study, I should like to suggest a possible explanation for this remarkable innovation. But let us 
begin with a brief overview of the famous doctrine of eternal generation.
THE ETERNAL GENERATION OF THE SON
(2 .1)
The  doctrine  of  eternal  generation,  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  Origen’s  Trinitarian  system,  is 
discussed and developed in a number of key texts. In chapter 1.2 of the de Principiis, Origen begins his 
long description of Christ with the emphatic assertion of eternal generation:  it is irreverent to believe 
that the Father existed for even a single moment without begetting the Son. Origen attempts to defend 
this  belief by referring  to  a  standard  argument  of the  Greek philosophical  schools.  If the  Son is  not 
eternally begotten,  one must suppose either that God was unwilling to beget him before he did so or 
that he was  unable*5 Origen tells us that both alternatives are absurd and impious and that one must 
therefore  conclude  that  the  Son  is  eternally  begotten.86  A  little  later  in  the  same  chapter,  Origen 
challenges those who deny the eternal existence of the Son to explain why the Father delayed begetting 
him.  Origen’s  response  again  hinges  on  the  willing/able  argument.87  We  find  similar  claims  in  the 
Commentary on  Genesis,  where  Origen  is  keen to  refute  the  view that  God began (fjp^axo)  to  be  a 
Father  at  a  particular  point  in  time.  Origen  begins  by  pointing  out  that  God  always  had  the  ability
83 i.e. if Clement were an exponent of the doctrine.
84 We can be sure that Origen did read the Apologists, because he refers to them. See, for example, On 
Prayer 24.5 and Contra Celsum 6.51.
85 This argument -  the so-called  ‘willing and able argument’ -  originates in the tenth book of Plato’s 
Laws (10.899D-905C). After Plato, the argument became the standard entree into the perennial topic of 
innocent suffering:  is God unable to prevent it or unwilling to prevent it? As far as I know, Origen is 
the first theologian to apply the argument to the eternal generation of the Son.  For an over-view of the 
argument in the ancient philosophical tradition, see Sharpies (1995), pp. 6-7.
86 quomodo autem extra huius sapientiae generationem fuisse aliquando deum Patrem, vel ad punctum 
momenti alicuius, potest quis sentire vel credere,  qui tamen pium aliquid de deo intelligere noverit vel 
sentire? aut enim non potuisse deum dicet generare sapientiam, antequam generaret,  ut earn quae ante 
non  erat postea genuerit ut esset,  aut potuisse quidem et,  quod did quoque de deo nefas est,  noluisse 
generare;  quod utrumque  et absurdum  esse  et impium  omnibus patet,  id est,  ut aut ex eo  quod non 
potuit deus proficeret ut posset,  aut cum posset dissimularet ac differret generare sapientiam. propter 
quod nos semper deum patrem novimus unigeniti  filii sui (de Principiis 1.2.2).
27(8uvapig) to be  a father. Unlike humans, who must wait for puberty until they can reproduce,  God is 
eternally perfect and nothing prevents him from begetting the  Son eternally.  Origen goes  on to point 
out that it was good /right/proper (KaXov) for the Father to beget such a Son.88 The argument is - once 
again -  that God was both willing and able to generate the Son eternally.89
At  de Principiis  1.2.4  Origen  uses  the  image  of the  sun  and  its  rays  as  an  analogy  for  the  eternal 
generation of the  Son:  est namque  ita  aetema  ac sempitema generatio,  sicut splendor generatur ex 
luce.90 The image is repeated in chapter 1.2.7, accompanied this time by a brief technical discussion of 
the precise meaning of ‘eternal’ as that which has no beginning and no end.  In the anacephalaisis, the 
summary  of the  work’s  most  important  doctrines,  Origen  reminds  us  that,  as  the  sun  cannot  exist 
without emitting light, so the Father cannot exist without generating the Son.91
It  could perhaps  be  objected  that Origen’s  image  of the  sun  and  its  rays  implies  a  necessary,  even 
unconscious generation, what might be termed an ‘emanation’. This is certainly an important aspect of 
the  image  for  Plotinus,  who  repeatedly  compares  the  emanation  of Intellect  from  the  One  to  the 
emanation of light from the sun.92 At Ennead 5.1.6-7, for example, Plotinus likens Intellect to rays of 
light and tells us that,  like the sun,  the One gave no assent (ob  7tpoav£boavxog)  and issued no decree 
(oi)8£  Poi)Xt|06vto<;),  but  remained  unmoved  and  unaffected  by  the  emanation  of  Intellect 
(&Kivf|xog,  oi)8£  KivqOevxog,  p£vov, pevovxog).93 The implication is that the emanation of Intellect was 
natural, necessary and inevitable (8ei  rang  eTvai  exeivo  to  yevdpevov). Plotinus goes on to give a brief
87 God always had both the ability and the desire to generate the Son: semper et poterat deus et volebat, 
numquam  vel decuerit  vel causa  aliqua  existere potuerit,  ut  non  hoc,  quod bonum  volebat,  semper 
habuerit {de Principiis 1.2.9).
88  oi)  yap  6  0eog  Tiaxijp  etvai  qp^axo,  xcakudpevog,  cog  oi  yivdpevoi  7iax£peg  av0pamoi,  brco 
toO  pi)  8dvao0ai  7tco  7tax6peg  etvai.  ei  yap  del  x6X.eiog  6  0eog,  xai  Tidpeaxiv  abxcp  8uvapig  too 
7iax6pa  abxov  etvai,  xai  xaXdv  abxov  etvai  7tax6pa  too  xoiooxoo  liob,  xi  dvapdAAexai,  xai  feaoxov 
too  xaXob  oxepioKei,  xai,  cog  eoxiv  eirceiv,  e^  oo  8dvaxai  rcaxqp  etvai  oiob;  {Commentary  on 
Genesis, P.G.  12 45C).
89 In fact the willing/able argument is rather flawed in that it begs the all-important question: why is it 
good  for the  Son to  exist eternally?  Why does  God want this?  Origen’s  answer to  this  question will 
form the bulk of the present chapter.
90  Sorabji  (1983),  p. 116  is  right to point  out  that  there  is  no  important  semantic  difference  between 
aetema and sempiterna in Rufinus’ translation: the words are synonyms which are repeated simply for 
emphasis.  It  was  only  later  that  the  terms  came  to  be  distinguished  as  ‘eternal’  and  ‘everlasting’ 
respectively.
91 Bostock (1975), p.248 and (1992), p.255 and Logan (1980), p.126 both remark that the sun analogy 
underpins the doctrine of eternal generation. Yet the image has other important functions, on which see 
section 13.1.
921 am grateful to Armstrong (1937) for gathering together all the Plotinian references to the sun and its 
rays as a metaphor for emanation.
93  Armstrong (1967),  p.241:  “There  is  no  deliberate  action on the part of the  One  and no willing or 
planning or choice or care for what is produced.”
28precis  of  the  general  theory  of  emanation,  according  to  which  all  things  necessarily  produce  a 
secondary hypostasis:  snow produces coldness, perfume produces fragrance and fire produces heat. In 
the same way, the One produces Intellect. At Ennead 1.7.1, Plotinus similarly insists that, like the sun, 
the  One  remains  still  (p£veiv)  and  at  Ennead  5.3.17,  we  read  that  it  is  immobile  (  eaxqicdxa)  and 
forever unmoved (del  p£vovxa). At Ennead 6.8.18, Plotinus repeats the idea of necessary emanation: as 
the rays of the sun are not a thing of chance (ouvxuxia), so neither is Intellect.
Armstrong describes the emanation of Intellect from the One as ‘an over-flowing of superabundant life, 
the  consequence  of (the  One’s)  unbounded perfection.”  94  I believe  that this  description can also be 
applied to Origen’s doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. At de Principiis  1.2.9, for example, 
Origen  describes  the  generation  of the  Son precisely  as  an  emanation.  There  exists  in  the  Father  a 
power so immense that it has somehow ‘bubbled-over’ and become a separate power: 
huius ergo totius virtutis tantae et tam immensae vapor et, ut dixerim, vigor ipse in propria subsistentia 
effectus  quamvis  ex  ipsa  virtute  velut  voluntas  ex  mente  procedat,  tamen  et  ipsa  voluntas  dei 
nihlominus  dei virtus  efficitur.  efficitur ergo  virtus  altera  in sua proprietate subsistens,  ut ait sermo 
scripturae, vapor quidem primae et ingenitae virtutis dei, hoc quidem quod est, unde trahens.95 
In this passage the eternal generation of the Son is described as the natural, inevitable consequence of 
the  Father’s  ‘superabundant  life’.  Despite  his  use  of the  language  of willing96  and  despite  Lyman’s 
valiant attempts to recast Origen as a Christian voluntarist,97 Origen obviously preached the necessity 
and  inevitability  of the  eternal  generation  of the  Son.  God  chooses  neither  when  nor  whether  to 
generate  him.98  The  image  of the  sun and its  rays  is the perfect illustration of this belief.  As  Origen 
clearly states at de Principiis 4.4.1, the existence of sunlight is coterminous and concomitant with the 
existence of the sun. An eternal sun emanates eternal light.
94 Armstrong (1967), p.241.
95  See  section  4.3  for  a  further  discussion  of this  passage,  particularly  Origen’s  insistence  on  the 
propria subsistentia of the second power.
96 A category which even Plotinus was willing to apply to the One (Ennead 6.8).
97 Lyman (1992), pp.39-81.
98 Like Plotinus, Origen understood that the possession of will in the sense of the liberty of indifference 
was a characteristic of the lower orders from which God was blissfully exempt. To believe that the Son 
was willed into existence would make his existence worryingly precarious: he could just as easily not 
have existed. See chapter 3, section 8.4.1  for a discussion of the proper way to interpret the divine will 
in Origen’s theology.
29It is very important to appreciate that the image of the sun and its rays implies a continuous begetting. 
Bethune-Baker is right to stress that this is a doctrine of eternal and not merely timeless generation." 
The Son is continuously generated by the Father as rays of light are continuously generated by the sun. 
It is not the case that the Son was generated at some particular point, outside time, and was thereafter 
left to  his  own devices,  left,  as  it were,  to  fend for himself.  In Origen’s Trinitarian system,  the  Son 
relies absolutely on his Father for his continued existence. As rays of light cannot exist without the sun, 
so the Son cannot exist without the constant succour and constant support of his Father.
This idea of continuous generation is most clearly stated in the 9th Homily on Jeremiah.  Commenting 
on Proverbs 8.25, Origen draws attention to the odd use of the present tense in Wisdom’s claim that the 
Lord  rcpo  navxcov  Pouvd>v  yevvq.  (is.  Origen  explains  this  oddity  by  interpreting  the  verse  as  a 
reference to eternal generation. It is not the case that the Son ‘was bom’ or ‘has been bom’, but that he 
is ‘always being bom’. This passage is very important and should be quoted in full:
TSoopev  8£  xic,  fipicov  feoxiv  6  ocoxrip-  varaiuYaapa  86£r|<;."  to  d7tauyaapa  xf|<;  86^r|<;  obxi 
anaZ,  yeyfevvrixai  xai  oux'i  yevvaxai-  hX X a  oaov  feoxiv  to  " cp co< ;"   7ioir|Tix6v  too  dTtauydopaxoq,  £7ti 
xoaouxov yevvaxai to  dTiauyaapa  xf|<; 86£r|q xou  0eou.  'o  ocoxf|p  ripiov "oocpla”   feoxiv "xou 0eou"- eoxiv 
56 h  ooipia  "drcauyaopa cptoxoq  diSiou".  ei ouv  6 ocoxip del  yevvaxai,  -xai  8ia xouxo A.6yei  •   "Tipo  8£ 
xavxcov  Pouvdav  yevvqi  pe", oOx'i  86‘  ^po  8£  Tiavxcov  PouvdW  yev£vvr|x£v  pe,  dX X d-  "Tipo  navxcov 
Pouvrov yeyyg. pe" {Homilies in Jeremiah 9.4).
The doctrine of eternal generation plays a very important role in the first two books of the Commentary 
on  St John.  At  Commentary on  St John  1.29 (31),  commenting on the  famous verse -   Today have I 
begotten thee (Psalm 2.7) -  Origen points out that for God every day is today.100 The Son is therefore 
bom ‘every day’, not yesterday nor today, but always:
oh  oatpcoq  f|  eby^veia  7iapioxaxai  xou  uiou,  oxe  8£  xo  "ui6<;  pou  el  ou, eyco  aqpepov  yey£vvr|xd  oe" 
"Aiyexai  rcpoq  abxdv  imo  xou  0eou, q >   dei  feoxi  xo  "oqpepov",  -  oi)x  evi  yap  feo7i£pa  0eou,  eytb 
8£  f|yoC>|j.ai,  oxi  ot>8£  Ttpcoia,  dX X d  6  oupnpexxeivcov  xf|  dyevf|xcp  xai  di8ico  ahxou  ^cofi,  iv’  ouxcoi; 
ei7i(oxp6vo<;  ftpj-fepa  eoxiv  abxco  oqpepov,  ev  ft  yey6vvr|Tai  6  ui6g  -  dpxqc;  yevfeoeax;
abxou  ouxax;  ohx  eupioxop£vri<;  coq  oi)8£  xft<;  ftp£pa<;.
99  Bethune-Baker  (1933),  pp. 147-8.  See  also  Bigg  (1913),  p.219  for  a  similar  emphasis  on  the 
continuous begetting of the Son.
100  On  this  interpretation of ‘today’  compare  Commentary on  St John  32.32  (19),  a propos  Christ’s 
words to the Good Thief -  Today shalt thou be with me in Paradise (Luke 32.43). The main point of 
the  exegesis  is  that  in  the  Bible  the  word  ‘today’  (oqpepov)  is  always  used  to  mean  ‘eternity’:  
oxi  rc>AAaxou  xo  "oftpepov"  fev  xf|  ypacpq  xai  fcrci  oXov  7iapaxeivei  xov  eveoxqxdxa  aicova.
30This  passage  is  very  similar  to  the passage  from the  Homilies  on  Jeremiah,  quoted  above.  In both, 
Origen argues  that the  Son is  eternally generated  by the  Father  and  is  therefore  eternally dependent 
upon him.  It could thus be argued that Origen’s theory of eternal generation reduces the status of the 
Son  to  that  of an  eternally  contingent being.  Without  the  Father’s  constant  support,  the  Son  would 
cease to exist.1 0 1
Origen further defends the theory of eternal generation by drawing attention to the use of the verb  ‘to 
be’ in the proem of the fourth Gospel -  in the beginning was the  Word (e v   dpxfl  $Y  f>   A.6yo<;). Origen 
compares this  statement with a common Old Testament trope.  The prophetic books  often begin with 
the  phrase  The  word  of the  Lord  came  to  Isaiah/Jeremiah/ Hosea.102  The  verb  used  in  the  Greek 
version of these verses is yiyv£o0ai. Origen then develops a detailed and important exegesis based on 
the difference between yiyv£a0ai  and Etvai.  While the  ‘word of the Lord’  comes to the prophets  at a 
particular time and inspires those who were not previously inspired, the ‘Word of the Lord’ eternally is 
with the Father:
’aAAa  Trpoq  p&v xouq  dv0pco7iou<;  7ip6x£pov  oi)  xcopobvxaq  xrjv  xou  uiou  xou  0eou,  A.6you
xuyxdvovxoq,  E7ii5qplav  6  A.6yo<;  yivExai-  "rcpoi;  8e  xov  0eov"   ob  yivexai,  coq  TtpdxEpov  obx 
d>v  7tpd<;  abx6v,  napa  5&   xo  del  ouvEivai  xcp  Ttaxpi  Xeyexai-  "xai  6  A.6yoq  fjv  npoq  xov  0e6v" -  oi) 
yap ’ "ey^vexo  Ttpdq  xov  0e6v''.  xai'   xabxov  ()qpa  xo  "fjv"  xou  A.6you  xaxqyopEixai,  oxe  " ev  dpxfl 
fjv"  xai  oxe " 7tp6<;  xov  0eov  fjv",  ouxe  xf(<;  dpxriq  x^piCdpEvoq  ouxe  xou  7iaxpo<;
d7ioX.£i)i6p£vo<;,  xai  7rdA.1v  ouxe  dTio  xou  pq  Etvai  " ev  dpxfl"  yivdpEvoq  " ev  dpxfi"  ouxe  d7ro  xou 
pq  xuyxavEiv  "Trpoq  xov  0eov"   eni  xo  "Trpoq  xov  0e6v”   Etvai  yivdpEvoq-  Tipo  yap  7ravxoq  xP^vou  xai 
aicovoq  " ev  dpxfl  fjv  6  Xdyoq",  xai "6 Xdyoq  Tfy 7rpo<; xov  0e< 3 v"  (Commentary on St John 2.1 (1)). 
Having established that Origen believed the Son to be eternally generated by the Father, we must now 
attempt  to  discover  the  theological  motivation  behind  this  momentous  ‘paradigm  shift’.  Why  was 
Origen so keen to reject the ubiquitous Trinitarian paradigm of the two-stage  Logos?  It seems to me 
that there are two main reasons for this.
(1)  Origen  believes,  against  the  Apologists,  that  the  Son  exists  for  the  fullness  of the  Godhead, 
irrespective  of  any  future  roles  in  creation,  providence  and  redemption.  He  is  not  merely  a 
functionary or tool of the Father, but the substantiation of essential divine attributes. As such, he
1 0 1   The arguments of these passages are very similar to Plotinus’  claims in the Enneads.  See section
10.1-10.2  for a discussion of Plotinus’  theory of the utter dependence of the second hypostasis on the 
first and of the similarity of this theory to Origen’s Trinitarian doctrine.
102 Isaiah 1.2.1, Jeremiah 2.1.1, Hosea 1.1.1.
31does  not  come  into  existence  at  a  particular  time,  to  fulfil  a  particular purpose,  but  must  exist 
eternally.
(2)  Origen believes,  against the  Monarchians,  that the  Son must exist eternally as  an individual  and 
distinct ouoia.  He is not merely an immanent attribute of God the Father.
In the following sections of this study, we shall thoroughly examine both these points.
THE ROLE OF THE SON WITHIN THE GODHEAD
(3.1)
Although Origen believed that the tasks of creation and providence must be delegated to the Son and 
although he writes fully and eloquently on the Son’s function as a quasi-Platonic Demiurge, this role is 
quite  obviously  secondary.103  While  for  the  Apologists,  the  Son’s  entire  raison  d ’etre  was  to  be  a 
functionary and an intermediary ad extra, the necessary bridge between the transcendent God and the 
created world, Origen’s Son enjoys an eternal and integral role within the Godhead itself. For Origen, 
the Son exists primarily for God, not merely vis-a-vis the external, temporal creation. Without the Son, 
God  would  lack  fundamental  attributes  of  divinity.  This  is  entirely  different  from  the  Apologist 
doctrine  of the  eternal  self-sufficiency of the  Father.  We have  already discussed how the Apologists 
viewed  the  Father  as  complete  and perfect  in himself and  the  Son  as  simply a  temporary  economic 
necessity  which  had  no  effect  upon  the  eternal  nature  of the  Father.104  We  concluded  that  for  the 
Apologists  the  Father  alone,  the  Father  by  himself,  is  God.  In  direct  and  obvious  contrast  to  this 
paradigm,  Origen  views  the  Son  as  a  necessary  and  eternal  aspect  of the  divine  nature.105  In  this, 
Williams and Widdecombe are correct to see an important foretaste of orthodox Trinitarian theology.106 
Origen pre-empted the  orthodox conclusion by recognizing  that the  Father,  Son and Holy Ghost are 
integral members of the one God-head, indispensable to the very definition of God. He is, in short, the 
first Trinitarian theologian.107
103 See section 11.3 for a full discussion of the Son’s role in creation etc.
104 See Lyman (1993), p.51 for the phrase ‘temporary economic’ necessity.
105 Lyman (1985), pp.258-9 has also recognized this important aspect of Origen’s theology.
106  Williams  (1987),  p.143;  Widdecombe  (1997),  p.91.  Balas  (1975),  p.260  relegates  Origen  to  the 
Apologist camp when he  argues  that,  for the Alexandrian,  ‘God’  =  ‘God the Father’.  In making  this 
remark, Balas has entirely missed the great Trinitarian revolution instigated by Origen.
107 There is however an important difference to be noted. The orthodox doctrine of eternal generation 
was  developed  against  the  background  of the  Arian  controversy:  its  whole  aim and purpose  was  to 
defend the status and position of the Son against the blasphemous suggestion of the Arians that he was 
a mere  creature.  In contrast to  this,  Origen’s  whole  concern was with the Father:  to deny the eternal 
generation of the Son is a blasphemy against the Father, not against the Son. If there were a time when 
the  Son  did not  exist,  the  Father would be  unfinished  and  incomplete.  On this  important point,  see 
Wiles (1961), p. 286.
32Origen asserts that each person has a distinct, yet complementary function within the Trinity. Each has 
his own particular role and his own particular sphere of influence.108  In the fust three chapters of the 
de Principiis, devoted to a detailed description of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, there is no over-lap 
and no repetition of role or function. Each has his own nature, his own titles, his own attributes and his 
own particular tasks. For example, the Father and only the Father is called ‘mind’; the Son and only the 
Son is called ‘wisdom’ and ‘reason’. In chapters 1.3.7-8 of the de Principiis, Origen details the ‘special 
activity’  and  ‘special  ministry’  of the  three  first  principles.  The  Father  bestows  existence,  the  Son 
bestows rationality and the  Spirit bestows  sanctity.  Origen then quotes  I  Corinthians  12.4-7 to prove 
that  in  the  Trinity  there  are  diversities  of gifts,  differences  of administrations  and  diversities  of 
operations. The same verse is quoted at Commentary on St John 2.10 (6), to illustrate the same point. 
In  the  anointing  of the  saints,  each  member  of the  Trinity  has  his  own  peculiar  part  to  play:  “the 
material of these gifts is made powerful by God, is ministered by Christ and owes its actual existence in 
men to the Holy Ghost” (trans. Menzies, adapted).
The  Son’s  function  as  complementing  or  as  perfecting  the  Father  is  evident  throughout  the  de 
Principiis.  Origen’s  description  of God the  Father  in chapter  1  of the  de Principiis  carefully resists 
anything  that  is  specifically  Christian.  This  is  not  an  analysis  of the  Biblical  deity,  but  rather  of a 
metaphysical  First  Principle.109  In  common  with  Numenius,  Origen  believes  that  the  First  God  is 
simply  intellect.  He  is  intellectualis  natura  simplex;  mens',  natura  ilia  simplex  et  tota  mens  (de 
Principiis  1.1.6-7). But a mind without a will is sterile, inert and unable to act. It is thus necessary for 
the Son to exist to be God’s will: he proceeds from the Father as an act of will proceeds from the mind 
(de Principiis  1.2.6; 4.4.1). Without the Son, God would be without a will.110 Similarly, Origen insists 
that the  Son is the wisdom of God, without whom God could not be wise (de Principiis  1.2.1-2).  To 
deny the  eternal  generation of the  Son,  to believe  that there  was  a time  when he  did not exist,  is  an 
impiety against the Father, implying that he was once aoo(po<; (de Principiis  1.2.3).1 1 1   These ideas are 
summed up in the anacephalaisis at the end of the work:
108  Lyman (1993),  pp.50-51  is right to highlight the way in which Origen ascribes different kinds  of 
activity  to  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  but  she  is  wrong  to  restrict  the  distinctions  within  the 
Godhead to such economic criteria. As we shall later see,  Origen responded to the Monarchian threat 
by positing a much more thorough and more fundamental distinction.
109 Where is the loving Father of the Bible, the beneficent and omniscient director of sacred history?
110 See Domer (1861), p. 129:  “In Origen’s view, there existed in God no actual will prior to the Son: 
the Son himself was first this will.”
111  Edwards (2002), p.67: “Unless we are prepared to say that there was a time when God was without 
his wisdom, Origen reasons, we cannot put a beginning to the existence of the Logos.”
33“How then can it be said that there was once a time when the Son did not exist? For this is nothing else 
but to say that there was once a time when truth did not exist, when wisdom did not exist, when life did 
not exist” (de Principiis 4.4.1, trans. Butterworth).112
The argument here seems to be remarkably similar to the orthodox refutation of Arianism.  In various 
works, Athanasius highlights what he sees as the blasphemous implication of the Arian doctrine of the 
temporal creation of the Logos: if there were a time when the Logos did not exist, throughout that time 
God the Father must have been akoyoq and  aoocpoq (de Decretis 4 and 26; contra Arianos  1.14, 2.32,
3.63, 4.14).113 Indeed, in his Epistle on the Decrees of the Council of Nicaea, Athanasius feels able to 
quote from the de Principiis in support of his anti-Arian polemic:  “Let the man who dares to say that 
there was a time when the Son was not understand that he will be saying  ‘Once wisdom did not exist 
and  word  did  not  exist  and  life  did  not  exist’.”114  This  argument is  so  very  similar  to  the  Rufmian 
version that we can only conclude, with Koetschau, that Athanasius has preserved a Greek fragment of 
de Principiis 4.4.1.
The belief that the Son must exist eternally insofar as he is to be identified with eternal divine attributes 
is repeated in the  Commentary on Ephesians.  Commenting on Ephesians  1.1,  Origen explicitly states 
that the Son is the power of God, the wisdom of God and the will of God:
£7uaxijaei<;  hi  xai  ne  pi  xou  0£Xf|paxo<;  xou  0eou  ei  6uvaxai  xdooeo0ai  ’ eni  Xpioxou-  IV  coartep  eaxi 
0soi>  5uvapi<;  xai  0eoi>  oocpia,  o u x g c n;  fj  xai  06A.r||ia  abxou (Commentary on Ephesians, fragment 10). 
Without the Son, the Father would be without power, without wisdom and without will. In the Homilies 
on Jeremiah,  Origen explicitly argues that rrdvxa  yap  ooa  xou  0eou  xoiauxa  eoxiv, 6  Xpiox6<;  eoxiv. 
This remark is explained and elaborated by the claim that Christ is the wisdom of God, the power of 
God, the justice of God and the reason of God (Horn, on Jerem.  8.2). This is very similar to the remarks 
made at Commentary on St John 3.31(9), where Origen again describes the Son as the word, wisdom, 
justice,  truth and power of God.  At Commentary on  St John  2.19 (13),  Origen explicitly defends the 
doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son by denying that the Father could ever be aA.oyo<;: the Son, 
as the wisdom of God, must exist eternally.  Similarly, commenting on Proverbs  1.2, Origen identifies
112  Wolinski  (1995),  p.488  has  written,  a propos  this passage,  that the  Son  is  ‘integral to  the  life  of 
God.’
113  See  especially  Wiles  (1989)  and  Stead  (1964)  for  a  discussion  of  Athanasius’  criticisms  of 
Arianism.  Athanasius has  of course misunderstood Arius’  theology.  As  we have  shown above,  Arius 
believed in the existence of two entirely distinct Logoi. One was created ex nihilo, at a particular time 
and for the particular purpose of creating the world. The other exists eternally and unchangeably as the 
mind of God. God was never therefore aX.oyoq  or aaocpoq.
34the Son with the power and wisdom of God: Xpioxoq  yap  0eou  Suvapn;  Kai  0eou  oocpia  (Fragmenta
in  Proverbia,  P.G.  13,  20A).  Finally,  we  have  the  evidence  of  Calcidius,  who  quotes  Origen  as 
believing that neque enim tempus ullum,  quo Deus fuerit sine sapientia (Commentary on the Timaeus, 
76).
(3.2)
It is  in the  first two books  of the  Commentary on  St John  that Origen most  fully develops this new 
Trinitarian theology.  These books were  written at the  same  time  as  the de Principiis and contain an 
elaboration and repetition of many of the same themes.115  Most important for the present study is the 
re-iterated claim that the Son exists in and for God himself, irrespective of any future roles relating to 
creation. The famous doctrine of the fenivoiai  of Christ illustrates precisely this point. The crux of the
argument is  the  categorizing of the various  Christological titles  (enivoiai)  into two groups.  The  first 
group,  comprising most  of the  Christological  titles (e.g.  Redemption,  Sanctification,  Shepherd,  Way, 
Rod, Vine, Door), details the Son’s relations to temporal creation, usually his dealings with fallen man. 
Origen is very careful to point out that these 87uvoiai  are not constitutive or descriptive of the  Son’s 
eternal and essential nature. They describe merely a temporary economic necessity, the forced response 
to an unplannned situation.116 Origen illustrates this argument by analyzing the Evangelist’s claim that 
in him was life (John  1.3). Coupling this claim with the second half of the verse -  and the life was the 
light of men -  Origen concludes that the etuvoui  ‘Life’  is not a description of Christ’s eternal nature, 
but  is  merely  a  consequence  of creation.  The  argument  is  as  follows.  Before  there  were  men,  there 
could be no light of men; if life is the light of men, before there were men, there was no life: 
bXka  £coi)  eySvETO,  ei  ys  fecm  to  cpcog  tgov  dvOpfbraov".  "ote  yap  oi)867ta>  avOpconoq  fjv,  o()5£ 
"cpcoq  taw  &v0p(broov"  fjv,  xou  cpcoT 6<;  T(ov  dvOpcoTtcov  xaxa  ti)v  Ttpoq  dv0pco7tou<;  ax£oiv  voou|i£voi)
(Commentary on St John 2.19 (13)).
Origen believes that the majority of the Christological titles describe the  Son’s relations to us (r|piv): 
because of man and his sin, Christ was obliged to become (yiyv£o0ai) a variety of new personae and to 
take on a whole range of new tasks. At Commentary on St John  1.20 (22), Origen argues in some detail 
that Christ became the  ‘First Bom of the Dead’,  the  ‘Shepherd’, the  ‘Physician’, the  ‘Redeemer’  and
114 This quotation is explicitly ascribed to the ‘labour-loving Origen’.
115 For the chronology of Origen’s writings, see Harl (1957), pp. 379-386.
116 Bigg (1913), p.210 calls them ‘accidental accretions.’
35the  ‘King’  only as a consequence of the Fall.  These are titles which were conferred on him at a later 
date; they are not descriptions of his eternal nature.117
Moreover, Origen is very clear that, as this first group of buvoiai  are required only at a particular time
and  only  in  response  to  a  particular  situation,  so  the  time  will  come  when  they  will  no  longer  be 
needed.  Instructed,  purged  and  purified,  we  shall  finally  be  able  to  understand  Christ  as  he  is  in 
himself,118  not merely  in relation to us.  That is  to  say,  this  first group  of ETcivoiai  comprises  simply 
temporary  pedagogic  tools.  The  doctrine  of the  eitlvoiai  epitomizes  the  major  strand  of Origen’s 
pedagogic theory, i.e. the grading of Christian instruction to suit the spiritual and intellectual capacity 
of the individual pupil. For Origen, the learning process is a process of gradual advancement through a 
series of carefully graded hierarchies.  So Christ reveals himself progressively, bit by bit, until we are 
able to bear the full revelation of the real and essential Christ, Christ himself. In condescension to the 
weakness  and  immaturity of fallen man,  Christ  is  obliged to become  what he  is  not,  to  disguise  his 
essential nature  and to  appear in a role  suited  to  our present  state.  The  Incarnation  is  of course  the 
supreme example of this pedagogic condescension.119 For those unable to understand God as God, he 
appears  as man.  He  becomes what he  is  not.  But the crux  of the argument is that the  Incarnation  is 
merely the necessary first stage, a stage which we can and must transcend as we grow and develop as 
Christians. Eventually, we shall understand God as God and not God as man. The same can be said of 
all the Christological titles in this first group. The perfect (x£A.eo<;) Christian will no longer see Christ as 
the Vine,  the Door,  the Rod etc.,  but simply and essentially (& 7tXco<;) as himself.120 The crucial point 
about this first group of etuvokii is that they do not describe Christ as he really is, but refer simply to 
our present point of view.
In  contrast  to  these  extrinsic,  temporal  and  relational  eTuvoiai,  Origen  posits  another  group  of 
Christological  titles  which  describe the true  and eternal  nature  of Christ,  Christ  as  ‘wisdom’,  ‘word’ 
and ‘power’.1 2 1  While the first group is characterized as f|piv /rtpoq  rpaq  (‘to/towards us’), the second
117 On this passage and the general argument, see Wolinski (1995), pp.474, 483-4 and Crouzel (1980), 
pp.132 and 141.
118 The descriptions of Christ as he is in himself form the second group of  buvoiai, discussed below.
119 So Harl (1958), p.114.
120  See  Commentary on St John  1.20 (22)  for a description of the progress  of the Christian from the 
contemplation of the lower btlvoiai to an understanding of  auxou  xa  KtiMioxa.  See chapter 3, section 
5.3 for a further discussion of these important points, including relevant quotations.
1 2 1  An interesting parallel to this classification of the Christological titles is Tertullian’s debate with the 
Gnostic  Hermogenes.  Hermogenes  claimed  that  creation  must  be  eternal,  because  God’s  title 
‘Dominus’ requires the existence of something over which he might be  ‘Dominus’. In response to this,
36group describes Christ as he is in and for himself (abxco,  feauxcp),  ‘simply’ and ‘essentially’ (dnXox;).122
As  Grillmeier puts  it,  ‘the epinoiai are partly absolute  and partly relative  (for us).’123 While the  first 
group  describes  what  Christ  becomes  (yiyv£o0ai),  the  second  describes  what  he  is  (etvai).124  For 
example, when St John tells us that “in the beginning was the word”, he is describing Christ’s eternal 
nature as the Logos. As we have seen, this is contrasted with ‘Life’, which he became}25 In this second 
group  of biivoiai  are  those  titles  which  describe  Christ’s  role  within the  Godhead,  his  internal  and 
essential attributes.126 Origen even suggests that there are some divine attributes which have absolutely 
no relevance for man; as such, they will never be known {Commentary on St John 2.18 (12)).127 
Wolinski cites Commentary on St John  1.17 (20) as the locus classicus for the doctrine of the two tier 
eTuvoiai.128 Origen explicitly contrasts  Christ’s  divinity,  which is his  ‘nature’  (cpuoiq),  as the wisdom 
and power of God, with his manhood, which is purely relational (rcpoq  fj|j.ac;) and subjective:  for those 
unable  to  grasp  the  whole  truth,  he  appeared  as  man.  These  remarks  form  part  of  an  extended 
commentary on St John’s  opening claim,  In  the beginning was  the word (John  1.1).  Origen starts by 
detailing the various possible meanings of the word beginning (dpxo)-  In the following passage, he is 
considering  dpxn  as the dpxo  |ia0f|O£(o<;:
Tertullian  divides  the  divine  titles  into  two  groups.  In the  first group  are  those  titles  which describe 
God’s eternal, essential and unchangeable nature, e.g. the title ‘God’ {Dei nomen dicimus semper fuisse 
apud semetipsum et in semetipso). In the second group are those titles which imply relations, which are 
not grounded in the unchangeable nature of God and which are not therefore eternal (e.g.  ‘Dominus’, 
‘Pater’  and  ‘Iudex’).  God  becomes  a judge  only  in response  to  sin;  he  becomes  a  Father only  after 
begetting  the  Son;  he  becomes  a  master  only  after  creating  the  world.  It  is  clear  that  Tertullian’s 
classification has a great deal in common with Origen’s. For both, the distinction is between (a) eternal, 
unchangeable and essential nature and (b) temporal relations. I am dependent upon Casey (1924), p. 52 
for this report of the Tertullian/Hermogenes debate.
122 So Bigg (1913), p. 210: these brivoiai  ‘are properties of his Deity which can never change .  .  . they 
belong to Christ as properties of his eternal nature.’ See also Crouzel (1980), p. 132: these fenivoiai  “ont 
un fondement dans sa nature, en dehors meme de ses rapports avec nous.”
123 Grillmeier (1965), p.  166.
124 On this point,  see Heine (1993), p.97:  “(yiyv£o0ai) implies a time of not being followed by being; 
(clvai) applies to a continuous state of being.”
125 Origen insists on this temporal distinction, although he is well aware that it will annoy some readers 
{Commentary on St John 2.19 (13)).
126 The enlvoiai  ‘wisdom’ and ‘word’ have an external aspect as well as an internal aspect (so, Crouzel 
(1980), pp. 133-7 and Wolinski (1995), p.476). For example, Christ as ‘word’ (‘reason’) makes rational 
beings  rational;  Christ  as  ‘wisdom’  is  creator  of the  world.  But  it  is  certainly not  the  case  that  this 
divine title is always to be considered in relation to us.  I disagree with Wolinski (1995), p.489,  who 
writes  that  “Origene  n’envisage jamais  la  Sagesse  come  une  hypostase  divine  sans  relation  avec  le 
monde.” Edwards (2002), p.73 makes the same mistake when he writes that “whatever is predicated of 
(wisdom) is held to be true by virtue of her actions in this world.”
127 Passage cited by Wolinski (1995), pp.476-7.
128 Wolinski (1995), p.474. He also cites Commentary on St John  1.34 (39-40) for a similar discussion 
of the distinctions between hnX&q  and
375ixxt)  5£  f|  co<;  |ia0f)oe(o<;  dpxi).  h  p£v  xf|  (puoei.  h  5£  cue;  rtpoc  fipac.  ax;  ei  A.£yoi|i£v  'em  Xpiaxou, 
(ptioei  p£v  abxou  dpxh  h 0edxr|<;,  7tpoc  ripac  66, pi)  (m o  xou  |I£y60ou<;  abxou  8uvap6vou<;  ap^aaGai  xrjq 
7iepi  abxou  (tkrfieiaq  f|  &v0pam6xr|<;  abxou,  Ka0’  oxoiq  vr|7uoiq  xaxayyfeXXexai  Tqaouq  Xpiox6<;,  Kai 
obxoq  £axaupcop£vo<;-  cue;  xaxa  xouxo  eirceiv  &pxhv  elvat  paGijoecoq  xf)  p£v  cpuqei  Xpiaxov  Ka0’  
o  acxpia  Kai'  5uvapi<;  0eou,  7 ipoq  fipaq  86  xo  "6  k dyoq  aap£  £y6vexo",  i'va  OKrjvtbon  ev  r)piv, 
ouxg)  p6vov  Tipcoxov  abxov  xwpf|°ai  8uvap6voi<;.  Kai  xdxa  8ia  xouxo  ob  pdvov  npcox6xoK6<;  eoxiv 
7idor|q Kxioecoq, dXXa Kai ’"ASdp",  o  bpprjveuexai "av0pamo<;".
It is clear therefore that the relational btivoiai  are  secondary, both temporally and logically.  Christ’s 
dealings with man are certainly not his entire raison d ’etre, as they were for the Apologists. It is very 
important to recognize this  as the fundamental tenet of Origen’s Trinitarian theology:  the  Son exists 
first  and  foremost  for himself and  for  the  Father.  Oddly,  this  fact  seems  to  have  been  missed by  a 
number  of Patristic  scholars.  Otis  and  Grillmeier,  for  example,  explain  and justify  the  doctrine  of 
eternal  generation  by  arguing  that  an  eternally  existing  creation  requires  an  eternally  existing 
mediator.129 This unfortunate mis-reading is based upon two false assumptions. The first mistake is to 
assume that Origen believed that the world, or at least souls, existed eternally. This is certainly not the 
case. On the contrary, the whole theological scheme of the de Principiis, the drama of the eternal rise 
and  fall  of souls,  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  souls  are  created  ex  nihilo  and  are  therefore  morally 
wayward and unstable.130 The belief that Origen preached the eternity of creation is presumably based 
upon  the  confusion  of the  eidetic,  nouomenal  world  -  which certainly  exists  eternally  {de Principiis 
1.2.10;  1.4.3-5) -  with the phenomenal world.131  The  second mistake is the failure to understand the 
doctrine of the biivoiai, specifically Origen’s insistence that Christ’s role as Mediator and Redeemer of 
fallen man is  simply a temporary economic  necessity and not the expression of an essential, primary 
and eternal nature.132 
(3.3)
We  can  conclude  therefore  that  Origen  explains  and justifies  the  doctrine  of eternal  generation  by 
positing the eternal existence of the Son as the sine qua non for the eternal existence of essential divine
129 Otis (1958), pp. 103-4; Grillmeier (1965), p.166.  Lowry (1936), pp.229 and 231, Tollinton (1932), 
p.22 and Wiles (1989), p.47 make the same mistake.
130  See  chapter  3,  section  8.3  for  a  further  discussion  of this  important  point,  including  relevant 
quotations.
131  This  confusion has a venerable pedigree, beginning with Methodius of Olympus  {de  Creatis  2.5). 
Balas  (1975),  p.260  rightly  warns  against  confusing  the  created  rational  souls  with  the  eternal 
archetypes.
132 In describing Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity, Otis (1958), p. 104 explicitly refers to the  ‘economic 
Logos’. This could not be further from Origen’s concept of the eternal Logos.
38attributes. Without the Son, God would be without a will, without reason and without power. Origen’s 
theology  is  therefore  wholly  and  fully  a  Trinitarian  theology.  The  eternal  existence  of the  Son  is 
necessary for the completion and perfection of the Godhead itself. With Origen, the Son ceases to be a 
mere tool or instrument and is finally welcomed as an integral and essential member of the Godhead.
But a question still remains.  Why could Origen not have been satisfied with the doctrine of the Logos 
remaining immanent within the Father? Why did he need to identify the Father’s will, wisdom, reason 
and power with the  eternally and independently existing  Son?  Why could these attributes not simply 
remain immanent attributes of the Father? I believe that the answer to these questions lies in Origen’s 
life-long mission as a heresy-hunter. I shall argue that Origen’s main aim in developing the doctrine of 
eternal generation was the refutation of Monarchianism.
The  doctrine  of the  eternal generation of the  Son and the doctrine  of Trinitarian distinction are  thus 
intimately connected with one another. We must be careful however that we do not confuse cause and 
effect. Kelly writes that “the idea that each of the three is a distinct hypostasis from all eternity, not just 
as  manifested  in the  ‘economy’,  is  one  of the  chief characteristics  of (Origen’s)  doctrine  and  stems 
directly from the eternal generation.” 133 It seems to me that the real situation was quite the reverse. The 
doctrine of three distinct hypostases was primary: from this stemmed the eternal generation. It was his 
desire to defeat the Monarchians that obliged Origen to posit the eternal existence of the Son.
ORIGEN AND THE MONARCHIANS
(4.1)
The Monarchians were an heretical group which appeared in the mid-second century.134 None of their 
writings  has  survived  fully  intact,  but  a  sufficient  number  of  fragments  remain,  in  the  form  of 
quotations preserved by their orthodox opponents, to allow us to piece together the main lines of their 
theological system.135 The foundational tenet of Monarchian theology was the ‘oneness’ of God, a strict 
unitarianism which  led  to  the  denial  of the  Trinity and the return to  what was  seen as  a more pure, 
Jewish  notion  of Monotheism.  Traditional  catholic  doctrine  was  dismissed  as  ditheism  or  tritheism. 
Against this, the Monarchians argued that the Father,  Son and Holy Ghost were not different (£iepo<;)
133 Kelly (1956), p. 129.
134 For much of the information in this section, I rely on Kelly (1956), pp.l 15-123.
135  See  especially  Epiphanius,  Pinarion  54.1-54.6;  57.1-57.10;  62.1-62.8;  Tertullian,  Adversus 
Praxean;  Hippolytus,  Contra Noetum and Refutatio  7.23-9.27;  10.19;  10.23; Justin Martyr, Dialogue 
with Trypho 56.11, 62.2,  129.1, 129.4 and Apology 1.22.
39in any way, specifically that there was no numerical distinction within God.136 Thus it was argued that 
the names of the three persons of the Trinity did not have any corresponding objective reality, but were 
simply convenient  onomastic  labels used to  describe  different kinds  or  ‘modes’  of action (fev&py£ia) 
performed by the one Godhead.137 As the sun has three modes of operation -  warming, lighting and the 
actual shape of the sun - while remaining only one sun, so it is with God.138 The Monarchians strongly 
objected to the hypostasizing or substantializing of these £v£pyeiai. They would not accept that the Son 
or the  Holy  Ghost  was  an  ouoia.  The  only  distinction  allowed  in  God  was  a  subjective,  onomastic 
distinction. Hippolytus, quoting Callistus, provides a neat summary of this central Monarchian tenet: 
6v6paxi  p£v  uiov  xai  7tax£pa  A.ey6pevov  xai  6vopaC6pevov, obaiq  8£  e v   ovxa  .  .  .  6v6paxi  p£v 
pepii;6|ievov, obaiq  8£ ou (Hippolytus, Refutatio 10.27).
The  term  obala/substantia  was  the  key  term  of  the  Monarchian  controversy.  Justin  Martyr,  for 
example,  reports  that  the  Monarchians  believed  the  Son  to  be  merely  an  sv£pyeia  and  not 
an oixna  (.Dialogue  with  Trypho  128).  Beryl  of Bostra,  (whom we  discuss below,  section 4.2),  also 
argued that the pre-existent Christ was not an oboia: xov ocoxripa  xai  xbpiov f|pcov  Aiysiv xoXpdbv pi) 
rcpoocpeaxdvai  xax’   i8iav  oboiaq  7iepiypa(pi)v  (Eusebius,  H.E.6.33.1).  Hippolytus  similarly  criticizes 
Noetus and his followers  for believing the Father and the  Son to be distinct only in name and not in 
oixna:
xai  abxoq  6poA.oyci  Eva  ctvai  0eov  xov  naztpa  xai  xov  Sqpioupyov  xob  navzdq-  xouxov  8£  Elvai 
xov  X6yov, 6v6paxi  p£v  uiov  xai  7iax£pa  X£y6p£vov  xai  6vopa^6p£vov,  obpvj  8e'  ev  ovxa,  xo 
7 tvsupa  d8iaipsxov (Refutatio 10.23).
Finally,  both  Praxeas  and  Paul  of  Samosata  were  rebuked  for  denying  that  the  Son  was  an 
obola.139 This point will become very important in the following chapter.
Kelly  has  shown  how  from  the  same  basic  assumption  of divine  unity  arose  two  entirely  different 
attitudes  to  the  Incarnation.140  If one  believes  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  identical,  it becomes 
impossible to believe that the Son alone was incarnate, sent by his Father to redeem the world. Instead
136 On this, see Orbe (1991), passim and Bigg (1913), p.219.
137  ‘Modalism’,  the  alternative  name  for  Monarchianism,  refers  to  this  fundamental  tenet  of  the 
movement.
138 Sabellius, apud Epiphanius, Panarion 62.1.
139 See section 5.1 for a further discussion, including all the relevant quotations.
140 Which he  categorizes  as  Modalistic Monarchianism and Dynamic  Monarchianism.  Other scholars 
make the  same point:  Cadiou (1935), pp.346-7,  Bardy (1929), p.234,  Edwards (2000), p. 175  and Le 
Boulluec (1985) II, p.531.
40of this, one can conclude either that the Father was also incarnate and suffered along with the Son1 4 1  or 
that  Jesus  Christ  was  a  mere  man  and  that  neither  the  Father  nor  the  Son  was  incarnate.142  It  was 
because of these two accompanying or correlative heresies that Monarchianism was particularly feared. 
Unitarianism tout court was much less of a worry than either Patripassionism or Adoptionism.  If the 
nature or the reality of the Incarnation is called into question, so too are Salvation and Redemption.143 
I  believe  that  it  was  as  a  direct  response  and  conscious  refutation  of Monarchianism  that  Origen 
developed many of the characteristic  features  of his Trinitarian theology.  The doctrine of the eternal 
generation of the Son and the definitive rejection of the two-stage Logos paradigm can be understood 
only within this particular polemical  context.  Although the  Son is to be  identified with the  essential 
divine  attributes  of will,  power,  wisdom  and  reason,  Origen  cannot  allow  that  these  remain  mere 
attributes.  Against  such  modalism,  Origen  argues  that  these  divine  attributes  are  hypostasized  and 
substantized as the eternally existing Son. Origen’s insistence that the Son is an individual and distinct 
oi)oia/i)7i6oTaoi<;144  is a direct and deliberate response to the fundamental Monarchian claim that he is 
merely  an  fev£py£ia.  The  Apologist  doctrine  of the  X6yoq  evSidBexoc;  would  surely  have  appeared
dangerously  close  to  the  horrors  of Monarchian  theology.  Indeed,  as  we  argued  in  section  1.5,  the 
ubiquitous notion of the eternal self-sufficiency and perfection of the Father, containing within himself 
all  the  divine  attributes,  was  virtual  Monarchianism.  In  order  to  avoid  this,  Origen  was  obliged  to 
develop an entirely new theological paradigm that would allow the Son an eternally independent and 
distinct existence.
This is the thesis proposed in the Introduction.  Origen’s paradigm shift is the direct result of polemical 
confrontation.  Without  the  Monarchian threat,  there  would have  been no  urgency to  amend  the  old 
Apologist paradigm of the two-stage Logos.  Origen’s doctrine of the eternal generation of the  Son is 
thus a perfect example of what Bethune-Baker calls ‘progress through conflict’.145
(4.2)
Although  Edwards  is  rather  scornful  of  the  influence  of  Monarchianism  on  the  development  of 
Origen’s  theology,146  there  are  other  scholars  who  recognize  its  important  imput.147  We  cannot  of
141 Patripassionism, or Modalistic Monarchianism.
142 Adoptionism, or Dynamic Monarchianism.
143 So Cadiou (1935), pp.347-8.
144 See sections 4.3-5.6.
145 Bethune-Baker (1933), p. 2.
146 Edwards (2000), p. 175.
41course disagree with Edwards that at this date Monarchianism was much more of a problem at Rome 
than  in  either Alexandria  or Palestine.148  Rome  was  indisputably the  centre  of the  controversy.  The 
main proponents of the doctrine, Theodotus, Callistus, Sabellius and the pupils of Noetus, all taught at 
Rome.149  Hippolytus,  their  main  opponent,  lived  and  wrote  in  Rome150  and  Tertullian’s  various 
refutations  were  written  in  Latin  for  a  Roman  readership.151  But  this  is  an  insufficient  reason  for 
rejecting the influence of Monarchianism on the development of Origen’s theology. Let it first be noted 
that,  although the leading Monarchians finally settled in Rome,  they all spent their early years  in the 
East.152 Their doctrines would certainly have been known in the Greek Church. Let us also recall that 
Origen went to Rome as a young man (c. 212-215).153 It is very likely that he would have been caught 
up  in  the  orthodox  controversy  with  the  Monarchians.154  Jerome  even  tells  us  that  Origen  met 
Hippolytus, the arch-refuter of Monarchianism.155
We  also have  the  important evidence of Eusebius that Origen was  sent to  examine  and to refute the 
heresy of Beryl, Bishop of Bostra. The main charge against Beryl was that he believed Jesus Christ to 
have  been  a  mere  man.  But,  as  was  so  often  the  case,  this  Adoptionism  was  the  consequence  or 
corollary of Monarchianism. Eusebius explicitly reports that Beryl did not allow the pre-existent Christ 
his  own distinct oboia:  (Bf|pu^Xo<;)  ££va  xiva  xf|<;  nioxeox;  7 tapeiacp6p£iv  erceipaxo,  xov  otoxfjpa  Kai
147 Logan (1985), p.427, Witt (1933), pp.334-5, Bardy (1923), p.25, Heine (1998), pp.57-58 and Orbe 
(1991).  Le Boulluec  (1985)  II, pp.  521-2  discusses Origen’s various engagements with Monarchians, 
but  concludes  that  their  views  were  of only  ‘moindre  gravite’.  According  to  Le  Boulluec,  Origen 
viewed  the  Monarchians  as  well-meaning  Christians,  who  had  simply  lost  their  way  and  landed 
themselves  in  trouble.  I  disagree:  I  see  the  Monarchians  as  amongst  Origen’s  major  doctrinal 
opponents.
148 Edwards (2000), p. 175.
149  The  identity of Praxeas,  perhaps  the  most  famous  of the  Monarchians,  remains  a  mystery.  Kelly 
(1958), p. 121  suggests that the name was a pseudonym for Pope Callistus. Heine (1998), p.58 admits 
that Tertullian uses the name as a ‘cover for referring to Callistus’ views.’
150 Although Hippolytus wrote  in Greek,  his  theology is best characterized as Western,  (so  Bethune- 
Baker (1901), p.73 and Bigg (1913), p. 205).
151 Bardy (1929), pp. 234-5.
152 Bardy (1929), p.224 is correct to stress the Eastern origins of the heresiarchs.
153 Eusebius, H.E.6A4A0.
154 Bigg (1913), p.202, suggests that Origen’s visit to Rome would have made him ‘keenly alive to the 
perils  of the  (Monarchian)  crisis.”  Bigg  goes  on  to  argue  that  Origen’s  Trinitarian  theology  was 
developed as  a direct response to Monarchianism.  Trigg (1985), pp.76-80 makes the  same point.  He 
even suggests that Origen attended Hippolytus’ lectures in Rome and that it was Hippolytus ‘who made 
Origen  fully  aware  of the  issues  at  stake’  in  contemporary Trinitarian  controversies.  Bethune-Baker 
(1933), p. 105 reminds us that Sabellius was active in Rome c. 198-217, i.e. at the time of Origen’s visit. 
Heine  (1998),  pp.57-58  is  also keen to place  Origen’s Trinitarian theology within the  context of his 
visit to Rome at the height of the Monarchian crisis.
155 Jerome, On Famous Men 61. Marcovich (1986), p.9 discusses this point.
42Kupiov  fipdjv  AiyEiv  xoA.|ia>v  hi)  7ipoijcp£Oxdvai  xax’  I8iav  obaiaq  rcEpiypacpqv156  rcpd  xf|q  eiq 
dveptbuoix;  £7u8r||iia<;  pr|5£  0ebxr|xa  i81av  exeiv,  bXX'  Epxo^ixEoo  p£vr|v  abxq)  pdvqv  xi)v
7 iaxpiKf|v  (Eusebius,  HE.  6.33.1).157  Bardy  is  right  also  to  draw  attention  to  the  fragmentary 
Commentary on  Titus, where Origen lists the whole gamut of contemporary heresy.158 Monarchianism, 
as both Adoptionism and Patripassionism, figures prominently:
sed et eos qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum praecognitum  et praedestinatum,  qui ante adventum 
camalem  substantialiter et proprie  non  existerit,  sed quod homo  natus  Patris solam  in  se  habuerit 
deitatem,lS9 ne illos quidem sine periculo esse Ecclesiae numero sociari: sicut et illos qui superstitiose 
magis quam religiose,  uti ne videantur duos deos dicere,  unam eademque subsistentiam Patris et Filii 
asseverant,  id  est  duo  nomina  secundum  diversitatem  causarum  recipientem,  unam  tamen 
bndoraoiv subsistere,  id est,  unam personam duobus nominibus subiacentem, qui Latine Patripassiani 
appellantur (Commentary on Titus P.G.  14 1304D).160
The Dialogue with Heraclides provides further proof of Origen’s personal knowledge and experience 
of Monarchianism. The Trinitarian doctrine developed in this work is an explicit attempt to avoid three 
specific heresies: Adoptionism, Ditheism and Monarchianism.  In chapter 4, Origen refers explicitly to 
Monarchianism (povapxia). He warns the court that they must not fall into the trap of the Monarchians 
who,  in denying the Son, deny also the Father:  dvaipouvxcov  xov  uiov  dvaipouvxcov  xai  xov  Ttaxcpa. 
Those who believe this are rightly ‘separated from the Church’ (4.4-7).1 6 1
Faced  with  such  evidence,  it  seems  beyond  doubt  that  Origen  was  personally  acquainted  with 
Monarchianism. For him, it was a dangerous and worryingly prevalent heresy that must be eradicated.
156 The phrase xax’  I8iav  oboiaq  TtEpiypacpqv  is also used by Origen at Commentary on St John  2.10 
(6):  the  Monarchians  deny  this  to  the  Son.  Bethune-Baker  (1933),  pp.99  and  110,  Wolinski  (1995), 
pp.485-6 and Edwards (2002), pp.69 and 84 discuss the use and meaning of the term TtEpiypacpr)  in this 
particular polemical context.
For my discussion  of Beryl  of Bostra,  in particular his  Monarchianism,  I  am mostly reliant upon 
Bardy (1929), p. 232-4. Orbe (1991), p.40 provides a brief discussion of H.E. 6.33.1.
158 Bardy (1929), p. 232.
159 Bardy (1929), p.232, Orbe (1991), pp.39-42 and Le Boulluec (1985) II, p.531  all point out that this 
is  very  similar  to  Eusebius’  report  of  Beryl’s  heresy.  That  is  to  say,  the  heresies  listed  in  the 
Commentary on Titus are likely to reflect Origen’s personal knowledge and personal experience.
160  We  must  be  alert  to  the  anachronistic  terminology  of this  passage,  especially  the  way  in  which 
Rufinus translates urcdoxaoic; as persona. Orbe and Bardy both miss this important point. We discuss in 
detail the meaning of the term Orcdaxaou;  in section 8. Despite this quibble however there can be little 
doubt that Rufinus has kept very close  to the original  Greek.  By the time that Rufinus translated the 
Commentary on  Titus (late fourth century), Monarchianism was no longer a danger to the Church and 
there  would  have  been no  particular reason  for Rufinus  to  invent  the  above passage.  We  can  safely 
conclude  that  Origen  did  indeed  regard  Monarchianism  as  one  of the  most  worrying  contemporary 
heresies.
1 6 1  Wolinski (1995), p.475 agrees that this passage is an “allusion explicitement aux monarchianisme.”
43In conscious and deliberate refutation of this,  Origen must prove that the Father,  Son and Holy Ghost 
are three distinct and individual  oboiai  and not mere attributes of one indistinguishable Godhead.
(4.3)
Origen’s response to the Monarchian threat can be clearly seen in fragment  10 of the Commentary on 
Ephesians, discussed above (section 3.1). As we have seen, Origen begins by identifying the Son as the 
power of God,  the will  of God  and the  wisdom of God.  He  insists  however that these  are  not mere 
attributes  or modes  of operation.  They form a separate  and individual being (okria).  The  Son  is the 
substantized or hypostasized (ouoicopevcov) power of God, will of God and wisdom of God:
ETtioTfjoeiq  8&   Kai  rcepi  xou  0£A.f|paxo<;  too  0eou  eI  8uvaxai  xdoo£o0ai  £7ii  Xpiaxou-  IV  cooTtEp 
feoxi  0£oi>  Suvapu;  Kai  0eou  oocpia,  ouxax;  fj  Kai  06Xr|pa  abxou,  ©eou  uraksxaoiv  e^ov  aOxdv  feav  86 
xivi  dTiEpcpaivov  cpaivrixai  obaicooGai  X6y£iv  xo  xou  ©eou  06A.r|pa,  £7uaxr|adx(G  £i  pi)  q  SoKouoa 
d^pcpaoiq  TrapaTrXfjoidi;  feoxi  Kai  etc!  SuvapEcoc;  ©eou  Kai  oocpia<;  ©eou  Kai  >.6you  0£oi)  .  .  . 
7tapa7cA.f|aiq  ydp  poi  8okei  xuyxdvEiv  7i£pi  7idvxcov  xouxcov,  cog  oboicop^vcov  ev   xa>  povoyEVEi
X6yco.
We find similar remarks at de Principiis  1.2.2. Having identified Christ as the Wisdom of God, Origen 
is quick to pre-empt a potentially embarrassing mis-reading of this claim: “Let no one think, however, 
that  when  we  give  him  the  name  ‘wisdom  of  God’  we  mean  aliquid  insubstantivum”  (trans. 
Butterworth).  To view divine wisdom as  ‘something  insubstantial’,  i.e.  an immanent  divine  attribute, 
was of course a distinctive tenet of Monarchian theology. Against this, Origen insists that Wisdom is a 
separate,  individual substantia.  As  Orbe points  out,  Origen is  keen to  distinguish wisdom as  a  mere 
passing quality, as it is for example in humans, from the eternal and hypostatic Wisdom of God: “entre 
hombres la sabiduria no pasa der ser un accidente o una cualidad, en si insubsistente.  Hay el hombre 
sabio. No hay humana sabiduria subsistente. En Dios la Sabiduria subsiste y es engendrada; identica en 
persona  al  Unigenito  Hijo  de  Dios.”162  When  we  speak  of the  Wisdom  of God,  it  is  in  no  way 
analogous to the way in which we speak of an ordinary being (animal quoddam) as wise: 
nemo tamen putet nos insubstantivum dicere, cum eum  ‘Dei Sapientiam ’ nominamus: id est, ut exempli 
causa finxerim, quod eum non velut animal quoddam sapiens, sed rem aliquam, quae sapientes efficiat, 
intelligamus, praebentem se et mentibus eorum,  qui capaces virtutum eius atque intelligence fiunt. si 
ergo  semel  recte  receptum  est,  Unigenitum  Filium  Dei  Sapientiam  eius  esse  substantialiter
162 Orbe (1991), p.58. Trigg (1983), p.96 makes a similar remark.
44subsistentem. nescio si iam ultra evagari sensus noster debeat ad suspicandum, ne forte ipsa hypostasis 
(id est substantia) eius corporeum habeat...  163
Similarly,  at  de  Principiis  1.2.9,  when  Origen  compares  the  generation  of  the  Son  to  a  ‘power 
proceeding from power’  or to an  ‘act of will proceeding from the mind’, he immediately qualifies the 
statement by insisting that the second divine power has its own individual properties (proprietas)164 and 
is  certainly  different  (altera)  from  the  power  of God  the  Father:  vigor  ipse  in  propria  subsistentia 
effectus .  .  .  efficitur ergo virtus altera in sua proprietate subsistens.  Indeed, throughout this passage, 
Origen insists that the power with which God plans, arranges and controls the universe has processed 
ad extra  and does not remain immanent within God the Father.  It is a power so immense that it has 
become a separate power. This paradigm has some interesting similarities with the Apologist doctrine 
of the procession of the Logos, but the all important difference is that this is an eternal procession.165 
Finally,  at de Principiis  1.3.1,  Origen emphasizes  the  separate  and  individual  existence  of the  Holy 
Ghost by referring to the subsistentia spiritus sancti.
I  believe  that  all  the  above  remarks  are  made  with the  Monarchians  firmly in mind.  But  it  is  in the 
Commentary on St John that we find the clearest evidence of the development of Origen’s Trinitarian 
theology as a direct and conscious refutation of Monarchianism.166 
MONARCHIANISM IN THE COMMENTARY ON ST JOHN
(5.1)
At Commentary on St John  1.24 (23) and  1.38 (42), Origen attacks the Monarchian exegesis of Psalm 
45.1: my heart is indicting a good matter (fe^qpeu^axo  q  KapSia  pou  X6yov  hya06v). This passage is a 
fine example of Origen’s exegetical style. He begins by stating the basic belief of his opponents and its 
implications.  He  then  responds.  The  style  is  overtly  dialectic  and  may  well  reflect  real  debates  at
163 These remarks can be usefully compared to the remarks made at Commentary on St John  1.34 (39). 
Here  too  Origen  is  keen  to  pre-empt  a  Monarchian  mis-reading  of his  Trinitarian  doctrine.  Having 
described  Christ  as  the  ‘Wisdom  of  God’,  Origen  is  quick  to  add  that  this  wisdom  is  an 
docbpaxov  tmdoxaoiv. As at de Principiis  1.2.2, Origen distinguishes wisdom in man (‘thoughts’) from 
the  Wisdom  of  God:  oi)  yap  fcv  \|/iXai<;  (pavxaoiaiq  xou  0eou  Kai  naxpoc;  xcov  oXcov
xqv  budaxaoiv  f|  oocpia  abxou  xaxa  xa  hvaXdyov  xoiq  &v0p(O7tlvoi<;  fevvof|paai  cpavxaapaxa.
This passage is referred to by Crouzel (1980), p. 133 and briefly discussed.
164 proprietas (I8i6xqq) is a crucial term in Origen’s Tinitarian theology. See sections 5.4 and 6.2 for a 
full discussion.
165 See section 2.1 for a further discussion of this passage.
166 Logan (1985), p.427 is correct to point out that Origen’s “real opponents in the Commentary on St 
John (were) Monarchians of various sorts.”
45Alexandria.167  Like  Plotinus,  Origen  leaves  his  opponents  anonymous,  describing  them  simply  as 
xig  or xiv£g.  ‘Some  people’,  we  are  told,  interpret Psalm 45.1  as  implying  that the  Son  is merely a 
Ttpoqjopav  TtaxpiK^v.  That is to say, they interpret the ETUvoia ‘Word’ literally and believe that the Son 
is simply a word spoken by the Father.  Origen ridicules this literalism. As the Son is only figuratively 
the Vine, the Rod,  the Door etc.,  so he is only figuratively the Word (Commentary on St. John  1.24 
(23)). David’s words, My heart is indicting a good matter, are only a metaphor. Orbe reviews Origen’s 
life-long  dispute  with  the  simpliciores,  who  insist  on  an  anthropomorphic  God,  as  an  important 
background to this passage.168 Against the simpliciores, Origen insists that God neither has a heart nor 
can he speak (Commentary on St John  1.38 (42)).169 
Moreover, to claim that the Son was literally the ‘word of God’ would imply
1.  That he is not an bTtboxaoig.
2.  That his oboia  is left unexplained.  Origen is not concerned at this stage with specifying that the 
Son is this or that kind (xoidv8£  f|  xoidv5e) of obola, but simply that he is some kind (oncog).
(oidpevoi  rcpocpopav  raixpiKijv  oiovci  fcv  ouMaPaig  K£ip6vr|v  clvai  xov  uiov  xob  0£ou,  Kai  Kaxa  xo 
uxo  tmdoxaaiv  abxcp,  d   dxpiPwg  abxrav  7tov0avoi|i£0a,  ob  8t86aoiv  ob8£  obalav  abxou  aacpr|vigouaiv 
,ob86roo  cpap&v  xoidv8£  t)  xoidv8£,  hXk'  orccog  noxi  oboiav  {Commentary on St John  1.24(23)).
It is clearly the Monarchians who are the object of the present attack, i.e. those who deny that the Son 
is a separate, individual oboia/bndoxaoig.170 It was a common-place of Monarchian theology to regard 
the  Son  as  literally  God’s  spoken  word.  By  this  method,  they  would  reduce  the  Son  to  a  mere 
£V£py£ia  of the Father and deny him eternal and substantial existence: as the words which we speak are 
insubstantial and ephemeral,  so is the Word of God.  He is but a temporary means of communication,
167 For more on this, see Introduction (i) and Chapter 3, section 6.1. Origen’s method is very similar to 
that of Plotinus; both are ultimately based on Platonic dialectic. Le Boulluec (1985) II, p.440 refers to 
Origen’s  debate  with  the  Gnostic  Candidus  (Jerome,  Apologia  contra  Rufinum  2.19)  and  notes  its 
similarity to ‘les joutes philosophiques’. Scherer (1960), pp. 13-17 refers to Origen’s many ‘entretiens’:  
the most famous of these is the Dialogue with Heraclides, but c.f. also the various debates recorded by 
Eusebius (H.E .6.33, 6.37, 6.38).
168 Orbe (1991), pp.60-62.
169 See Edwards (2000), pp. 170-1, who speaks of Origen’s “warning against the facile application of a 
religious  metaphor  (and)  caution  against  mistaking  Christ  for  his  homonym,  our  daily  medium  of 
communication.” He shows that Clement and Hippolytus issued the same warning.
170 In this, I agree with Logan (1985), p.425, Wolinski (1995), p.475  and Heine (1993), pp.9-100 and 
(1998), p.73. Blanc (1966), p.136 and Witt (1933), p.354 argue that it is the Gnostics who are Origen’s 
anonymous  opponents  here.  This  cannot  be  right.  The  Gnostic  doctrine  of the  Trinity was  founded 
upon the claim that the  Son was the  rcpoPoA.ft  of the Father:  this would obviously entail that he  was 
distinct  from the  Father and that he  was  a  separate  oboia  and  budoxaoig.  Although Origen  strongly
46existing only when God speaks to his people.171  Specifically, Heine tells us that Psalm 45.1 had a well- 
known tradition of exegesis  amongst the Monarchians.172 Tertullian tells us that Praxeas,  perhaps the 
most  famous  of  the  Monarchians,  insisted  on  the  literal  interpretation  of  the  Word  of  God.  He 
interpreted David’s famous words -  My heart is  indicting a good matter -  as  Scriptural proof of the 
insubstantiality  of the  word  of God:  quid est  enim  -   dices  -  Sermo  nisi  vox  et sonus  oris  et,  sicut 
grammatici  traduut,  ‘aer  offensus  intellegibilis  auditu’,  ceterum  vacuum  nescio  quid  et  inane  et 
incorporate.  He  continues that,  if the  Son is merely a vox,  he  is not a substantia:  non  vis  enim  eum 
substantivum  habere  in  re per substantiae proprietatem  (Adversus Praxean  7).  Filastrius  makes  the 
same criticism of Paul of Samosata: prolativum autem,  id est quasi aera quendam dicebat non tamen 
personam  vivam Filii sempitemam  cum sempiterno Patre credendam  docebat (Haeres.  64).  Pseudo- 
Marius  Mercator shows  that Paul’s  doctrine was  very similar to the  anonymous  doctrine  reported  at 
Commentary  on  St  John  1.24  (23),  i.e.  the  doctrine  that  the  Son  is  merely
a  TtpocpopiKdv  xai  rcaxpiKov  \6yov  Kai  fevepyrixiKov,  id  est  prolativum  et  potestatis  effectivum 
verbum sensit, non substantivum, quern Graeci  e v o u o io v   dicunt (Appendix ad contra XII anath. Nestor 
19).  Finally,  Epiphanius  reports  that  the  judges  who  condemned  Paul  insisted  that  the  Son  be 
recognized as an oboia  and not merely a verbal utterance (Panarion 73.12).173
At Commentary on St John  1.24 (23) and  1.38 (42) Origen is objecting to the Monarchian claim that 
the Son is literally the word of the Father, which implies that he is not an oboia  and not an bndoxaoit;. 
As Heine puts it, “The modalist exegesis of Psalm 45.1  treats the term Logos as a category of speech 
rather than as a category of being.”174 In response,  Origen argues that there are two possible ways of 
explaining the relationship between the Father and the Son:
1.  Either the Son is indistinct from the Father (oi)  Ksycopiopfevov), which means that he is not a Son
and that he is not an brtdoxaoiq.
2.  Or the Son is distinct from the Father and is therefore an  oboia (oboicop£vov).
(Kai  Xdyov  xoiobxov  Ka0’  abxov  £covxa  Kai  rjxoi  ob  K£xcopiop£vov  xob  rcaxpdc;  Kai  Kaxa  xouxo
objected to the  Gnostic  doctrine  of the Trinity,  it is not the object of the present attack.  His present 
worry is almost entirely the opposite.
171 Orbe (1991), p.55.
172 Heine (1998), pp.64-66.
173 The above information, including quotations,  is taken from Bardy (1929), pp.366-7, Kelly (1956), 
pp.118 and 121 and Orbe (1991), pp.55 and 68.
lf4 Heine (1998), p.66.
47T(p  nil  wpeoxdvai  ob8£  uiov  xuyxdvovxa  rj  Kai  Kexcopiop^vov  Kai  oboico|i£vov  (tnayyeXXixtooiv 
tipiv  0£ov  Xdyov).
Explanation  (1)  is  dismissed  as  Monarchianism.  Against  this,  Origen  insists  that the  Son  is  distinct 
from the Father and that he  is  therefore  an oboia  and an bn6oxaoi<;.  He  is  an  eternally substantized 
existence and not merely a temporary, transitory ev£pyeia.
It  is  important  to  note  that  throughout  this  passage  the  terms  oboia  and  bndoxaoiq  are  used 
synonymously.  As  we  shall  see,  this  is  a  pattern  repeated  throughout  the  Commentary  on  St John. 
These  are the key phrases  in Origen’s  refutation of Monarchianism.  Against the heretical suggestion 
that the Son is merely an evepyeia of the Father, Origen insists that he is an oboia and an bndoxaou;.  I 
do not believe that there is any important semantic difference between these two terms.175 In sections 6- 
7, we discuss the precise meanings of oboia  and bndaxaaiq  and enter the important debate that arises 
from this controversial issue. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that the two words have 
the same meaning.
(5.2)
At Commentary on St John 2.10 (6), Origen again sets up a straw man Monarchian whose ideas he will 
quickly  demolish.  As  part of a  lengthy exegesis  of John  1.3  {All things  were made by him)  Origen 
considers whether the Holy Ghost is one of the  ‘things’  made by the  Son.  He begins by detailing the 
three possible explanations for the existence of the Holy Ghost:
1.  The Holy Ghost is made (yevrixoq) by the Son.
2.  The Holy Ghost is dy£vvr|xoq.
3.  The Holy Ghost is merely a verbal construct, without  its own oboia.
In  his  conclusion,  Origen  decides  that  the  first  explanation  is  correct.  We  discuss  elsewhere  his 
arguments and their ramifications.176 For the moment, let us concentrate on Origen’s refutation of (3). 
Once again, his opponents are anonymous, but we can easily identify them as Monarchians:
'emai  8£  xi£  Kai  xpixoq  napa  xobq  8uo,  x6v  xe  8ia  xou  X6yox>  napaSeydpevov  xo  nveupa  xo  a y io v  
yeyov£vai  Kai  xov  dy£vvr|xov  abxd  etvai  bnoA.ap|3dvovxa,  8oypaxi£a)v  pr|8£  oboiav  xiva  i8iav
bcpeaxdvai  xou dyiou  nveupaxo<;  £x£pav napa  xov nax£pa  Kai  xov  u io v
175 Hanson (1985), p.201  agrees that the two  ‘are virtually synonymous’. Edwards (2002), p.67 argues, 
a propos  this  particular  passage,  that  the  two  are  ‘nearly  coterminous  in  meaning’.  Hammerstaedt 
(1991), p.20 concludes his article with the firm assurance that oboia  and bndoxaoiq are interchangeable 
synonyms.
176 See section 8.2 and 9.2.
48According to this report, the Monarchians  deny the  Holy Ghost  an individual oboia that is  different 
from the oboia of the Father and the oboia of the Son.  In response, Origen begins by drawing attention 
to the Saviour’s warning that a sin against the Holy Ghost is unforgivable, while a sin against the Son 
will  be  forgiven  (Matthew  12.32).  The  Holy  Ghost  must  therefore  be  different  from  the  Son 
(6pokoyoup6vco<;  8iaip6aeG)<;  8r|A.oup£vr|<;  xou  dyiou  Tiveupaxo;  rcapd  xov  uiov).  Origen  then 
reaches the famous conclusion that there are xpeiq  brcooxdosic; in the Trinity.  Once again, we see that 
oboia and bndoxaoi^ are used as synonyms'77 and once again they are the key phases in the refutation 
of Monarchianism.178  Against  the  heretics,  Origen  must  show  that  the  Holy  Ghost  is  not  simply  a 
convenient  label  used  to  describe  a  particular  mode  of operation,  but  an  individual  oboia  and  an 
individual brokjxaou;.
(5.3)
This point is made most clearly at  Commentary on St John  10.37  (21).  Discussing the Resurrection, 
Origen notices  a  discrepancy between Christ’s challenge  to  the money-lenders -  Destroy this  temple 
and in three days I will raise it up (John 2.10) -  and Paul’s claim that it was God who raised up Christ 
(1  Cor.  15.15).  Seeking to  explain this  discrepancy,  Origen admits  that it is tempting to  identify the 
Father and the Son and to claim that
1.  They are not numerically distinct (pi)  8ia(p6peiv  xcp  dpiBpco.).179
2.  They are one oboia.
3.  They are one  brcoKeipevov.180
4.  They are different only in enivoia.
5.  They are not Father and Son Kaxa  bTtdoxaoiv.
This  is  a neat  summary of Monarchian theology.181  Origen’s Monarchian opponents believe  that the 
Father and Son were merely verbally distinct (4), not numerically (1) nor substantially (2), (3), (5). The
177 contra Orbe (1991), p.49, a propos this particular passage.
178  We  agree with Logan (1985), p.425  that Origen’s  doctrine  of the three  hypostases  is  deliberately 
aimed at the Monarchians.
179 As we showed above (section 4.1), this was the recognized short-hand for Monarchianism.
180  In the Patristic  period,  the term bTtoKeipevov  appears  to  be  coterminous  with the  term oboia  (so 
Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon). I cannot accept the argument of Orbe (1991), p.47 that buoKeipevov 
means oboia + 7toi6xr|<;.  Origen often uses the term brcoKeipevov  in a polemical context, to distinguish 
the Father and the Son: On Prayer 10.37 and 15.1 and Commentary on St Matthew 17.14.
181 Orbe (1991), p.45-46, Heine (1998), p.89 and Wolinski (1995), p.475 point out that the ambiguity of 
the  Resurrection  (did  Christ  resurrect  himself or  was  he  resurrected  by  the  Father?)  was  a  stock 
argument  of Monarchian  theology.  See,  for  example,  Hippolytus,  Contra  Noetum  3.2  and Refutatio 
frag 2 for the same argument as that used by Origen’s anonymous opponents in the present passage.
49names  ‘Father’ and  ‘Son’ do not apply to different beings, but merely to the different modes of action 
of one  and  the  same  being.  Against  this,  Origen  insists  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  different 
(exepov  elvai)  from one  another.  In  support  of this  position,  Origen  repeats  the  classic  Aristotelian 
argument  that  a  son  must  be  the  son  of a  father  and  a  father  must  be  the  father  of a  son.182  The 
particular problem  of the  Resurrection  is  then  explained.  Although  the  Son  resurrected himself,  the 
power to  do  this  was  given to  him by the  Father.  As  Christ  explained  to  the  Jews:  the  Son can do 
nothing by himself (John 5.19).
It is important to note how in this passage Origen juxtaposes obaia,  b^OKeipevov  and  imdoxaoic;  with 
ETtivoia.  In order to understand  fully  Origen’s  argument  here,  it will be  helpful  to  recall briefly his 
theory of the feuivoiai  of Christ, developed in the first two books of the Commentary on St John. As we 
have  seen  (section 4.2),  Origen  defines  the  various  Chistological  titles  as  the  ferrivoiai  of Christ.  A 
crucial point in the discussion is that an siuvoia is a merely verbal distinction. Despite such a variety of 
titles,  Origen  reassures  his  readers  that  Christ  remains  one,  undivided  oboia:  pir|8eiq
5&   7ipooK07tx6x(D  SiotKpivdvxcov  hi1®''  X (*S  kv  xcp  ocoxipi  ercivoiat;,  otdpevoq  xai  xf| 
oboiqi  xabxov  tmaq  7toieiv  (Commentary on St John  1.28 (30)).183  As Stead points out, the feuivoiai 
are  entirely  subjective  human  constructions,  the  inevitable  reflection  of our  tendency  to  divide  the 
indivisible  and  to  compartmentalize  the  unitary.  Despite  this  plurality  of  names,  it  is  crucial  to 
remember that the  Son is  ‘perfectly one  and  simple.’184  So  if the Monarchians  claim that the  Father, 
Son  and Holy  Ghost  are  different  only  in euivoia,  they  are  claiming  that the  Father,  Son and  Holy 
Ghost are one, undivided obcla which manifests itself in a variety of different ways and hence -  for our 
convenience -  is given a variety (Trinity) of names. As we saw in section 4.1, this was the central tenet 
of Monarchian theology: the only distinction allowed in God is a subjective, onomastic distinction.
In a very useful essay on the meaning of tm6oxaoi<; in Greek philosophy until Plotinus, Witt provides 
the  Stoic  background  to  this  passage.185  Beginning  with  Posidonius,  the  distinction  between
182 Aristotle, Categories 7.19, 7b 18. The argument is also used at de Principiis 1.2.10.
183 See also  Commentary on St John  fragment  1, line 64.  In this passage, Origen similarly argues that 
the  titles  ‘Logos’  and  ‘Sophia’  are  mere  verbal  distinctions.  The  obaia  of the  Son remains  one  and 
undivided:  obx  exepov  ovxa  abxijq  xax’  obaiav  bXX  e7tivou?  xai  cx£aei.  Wolinski  (1995),  pp.482-3 
draws  attention  to Homilies  on Jeremiah  8.2,  where  Origen  again  argues  that  one  buoiceipevov  can 
reveal  itself under a plurality of femvoiai:  'aX X d  xo p&v  imoKelpevov  ev  feaxiv,  xait;  8£  eTcivoiaiq  xa 
noX X a  6v6paxa  ferri 8iacp6pcov feaxiv.
184 Stead (1984), pp.142 and 278. See also Orbe (1991), p.44, Crouzel (1980), p. 131, Wolinski (1995), 
pp.482-3 and Harl (1958), p.234.
5  Witt  (1933).  Stead  (1984),  p. 142  also  notes  the  Stoic  provenance  of Origen’s  doctrine  of the 
biivoiai.
50Korea  i)7c6aTaoiv  (‘objective  reality’)  and  xax’  biivoiav  (‘purely  mind-dependent  existence’)  quickly 
became  a  philosophical  common-place.  Posidonius  categorizes  rainbows,  for  example,  as 
Kat’  bdvoiav,  insofar as they do not have an objective reality, but are illusions which exist only in the 
mind.186 Philo and Alexander of Aphrodisias regularly make use of this distinction.187 In this passage 
from the Commentary on St John, Origen is making direct use of technical Stoic terminology to explain 
his  doctrine  of the  Trinity.  For  him,  as  for  the  Stoics,  the  term  buvoia  signified  a  purely  mental 
construction, without a corresponding objective reality.188
Origen’s  use  of  the  term  ertivoia  is  exactly  paralleled  in  the  works  of  his  slightly  younger 
contemporary, Plotinus.  Logan189 draws attention to an important passage from the Enneads in which 
the Gnostics are attacked for claiming that the hypostases are distinct only in buvoia and are therefore 
not hypostases at all: ’ a X X ' ei  buvouj  (pijooixn  .  .  .  xdjv  TtXeidvcov brcooxdoECov <btooxf|oovxai (Ennead 
2.9.1).  This  is  exactly  Origen’s  criticism  of the  Monarchians:  if Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  are 
distinct  only  in  buvoia,  they  cannot  be  hypostases.  Conversely,  throughout  the  Enneads,  Plotinus 
shows  how one  and the  same  nature  (called  variously oboia, cpboi<;,  bn6axaai<;)  can be  distinguished 
according to  £7uvoia  without disrupting its essential unity.190 This is exactly Origen’s doctrine  of the 
Son.  For both Plotinus  and Origen,  an buvoia  is merely a verbal or mental distinction,  a convenient 
onomastic formula by which the human mind seeks to distinguish the various activities or operations of 
one and the same indivisible nature. To claim that the Father and Son are different only in buvoia is 
the Monarchian heresy. Against this, Origen insists that there are three oboiai in the Trinity.19 1
(5.4)
186 Witt (1933), p.325. See Posidonius, fragments 16 and 92 (Edelstein-Kidd).
187 Witt (1933), pp.328 and 330.
1881 cannot agree with Grillmeier (1965), p.164 when he writes that ‘the epinoia is typical of Origen in 
so  far as  it has  a  subjective  and an objective  side.  It  is  ‘title’,  ‘expression’  at the  same  time  as  it  is 
objective  reality.’  Surely  the  main  point  about  the  doctrine  of  the  femvoia  is  that  there  is  no 
corresponding objective reality. The various divine titles are simply a reflection of our human way of 
understanding and of describing the nature of Christ.
189 Logan (1985), p.425.
190 Ennead 5.9.5.11, 6.2.3.23, 6.2.7.19, 6.2.13.38, 6.6.9.13-14, 6.8.7.26. It is also interesting to compare 
Apuleius,  de Mundo  370,  where  we  are  reminded  that,  although  he  has  a multiplicity of titles,  God 
remains ‘one’: et cum sit unus, pluribus nominibus cietur, specierum multitudine, quarum diversitate fit 
multiformis  vis.  The  origin  of Apuleius’  argument  here  is  pseudo-Aristotle’s  de Mundo,  a  text  with 
which Origen would most likely have been familiar.
191  c.f.  Commentary on St Matthew  17.14,  where  Origen similarly attacks those who believe that the 
Father  and  Son  are  one  b7i6oxaoi<;  and  one  b7ioK£i|i£vov,  different  only  in  £7 uvoia- 
oi  oi)yx&ovx£q  rcaxp6<;  xai  uiob  gvvoiav  xai  xfj  brcooxtioEi  £va  8i86vxe<;  dvai  xov  raxx£pa  xai
xov  ui6v,  xf|  feTuvoiq:  |i6vp  Kai  xoi<;  6v6paoi  SiaipobvxEc;  xo  ev  bTtOKEijiEvov.
51The reader is also referred to Origen’s discussion of the Holy Ghost preserved in fragment 37 of the 
Commentary on St John. The discussion forms part of an exegesis of the famous verse from the fourth 
Gospel:  the wind blows where it wills (John 3.8). The Monarchians interpreted this verse as implying 
that the Spirit is simply an fev£py£ia of God. The term ev£pyeia  (Latin, inoperatio) was a technical term 
of Monarchian theology,  which would have  been  instantly recognized by  Origen’s  erudite  and  wary 
readers.  It was used by the Monarchians to describe the different  ‘modes of operation’ performed by 
God.192  In this passage, the Monarchians are accused of reducing the status of the Holy Ghost to that of 
a  mere  fev&py£ia,  the  manifestation  of  a  particular  kind  of power.  In  response  to  this  economic 
modalism, Origen insists that the Holy Ghost is a separate oboia  with individual properties of existence 
(brcdp^EGx;  i8i6xr|Ta).  As  an active  force  operating  in the world,  the  Holy Ghost must be  seen as  an 
oOola  kvepyr|TiKf|  and not simply an fev£pyeia:
aqpaivEi  8£  xobxo  xai  oboiav  eTvcu  t o   7rv£b|ia.  ot)  ydp, (be,  nveq  oiovxai,  fcv£pyeid  feoxi  G eou, 
obK  &xov  xax’  abxobg  imdp^eocx;  i8i6xr|xa  . . .   el  8^  0£A.ei  xai  fevepyei  xai  8iaipei,  obola  yobv 
eoxiv  £vepyr)TiKf|,  b X X '  obx  sv£pyeia  {Commentary on St John, frag. 37.5).193
The  arguments  of this  passage  can be  usefully  compared  to  the  brief critique  of Monarchianism  at 
Commentary on St John 2.2.194 In this earlier passage, Origen similarly objects to the way in which the 
Monarchians  deny  the  Son  an  individual  oi)ola  and  therefore  also  deny  him  his  own  i8i6xr|<;-
dpvoi)p6vo\)<; iSidxrixa  iriob  fex£pav Tiapa  xijv  t o o   7iaxpo<;  6poX.oyouvxa<;  0sdv  elvai  xov p ix p i 
bvdpaxoc;  Ttap’  abxoi<;  "uiov"  7ipooayop£o6p£vov.195
The term  I8i6xr|q  is central to Origen’s definition of obola.196 He believes that each obola displays its 
own unique  I8i6xr|<;, i.e. peculiar distinguishing properties,  oboia X is distinct from oboia Y precisely 
because,  and  only because,  it possesses  a  distinct  I8i6xr|<;.  This  argument  is  most  fully developed  at 
Commentary on St John 20.24 (20), where Origen argues that gold, lead and wax are different oboiai 
because they possess different  i8i6xqq. Conversely, the rational souls are  6poouoio<;  (the same oboia)
192 See section 4.1 for a discussion of this important aspect of Monarchian theology.
193  See also  Commentary on St John  fragment  123.5.  Commenting on the same verse,  Origen attacks 
the  same  opponents  for  the  same  reason:  xiv£<;  ydp  oiovxai  fev&py£iav  ctvai  0£ob,  (iq  £%ov 
L81av  brcdoxaoiv.
194 We discuss this important passage in section 9.2.
195  c.f.  de  Principiis  1.2.9  (discussed  in  section  4.2),  where  Origen  similarly  argues  that  the  Son, 
although a ‘power’ (virtus) nevertheless exists in sua proprietate (proprietas = I8i6xqq).
196 So, too, Orbe (1991), p.43, who speaks of “la correlacion necesaria entre ousia et idiotes  .  .  . una 
ousia, una idiotes.’ ’’ ’
52because  they  possess  the  same  i8idxr|<;.197  Let  it  be  carefully  noted  that,  according  to  Origen’s 
definition,  the term i8i6xr|q  does not refer to personal qualities that distinguish particular individuals, 
but to generic  characteristics  shared by and common to a particular group or species.  I  do not agree 
with  Orbe  who  interprets  i8i6xr|<;  ‘como  distintivo  o  propiedad  personal’.198  For  Origen,  the  term 
i8i6xr)<; signifies a generic and not a personal distinction.199  This point has important ramifications for 
our assessment of Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity. When Origen claims that the Holy Ghost exhibits its 
own unique I8i6xq<;, he is concerned with much more than a mere ‘personal’ distinction.
In  fragment  37  and  in  chapter  2.2  of  the  Commentary  on  St  John  Origen  explicitly  attacks  the 
Monarchian theory that there is only one oboia and therefore only one i8i6xqq in the Trinity.200 Against 
this, Origen insists that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three separate and individual obolai, each with 
its  own  unique  iSibxqq.  Origen  will  not  accept  that  the  persons  of the  Trinity  are  simply  different 
modes  of operation and that the  distinction between them is  simply a  convenient onomastic  formula 
used to describe the various different roles assumed at various different times. We have already seen 
and discussed in detail how Origen insists that each member of the Trinity has its own particular sphere 
of influence and its own particular tasks to perform.201 But the distinction between the Father, Son and 
Holy Ghost must not be  restricted  to  such  economic  criteria.  Lyman has  missed the point when  she 
compares  Origen’s  Trinity  to  the  Stoic  doctrine  of ‘individuation within  shared  being;  the  different 
activity (producing)  a  distinct,  if essentially related  individual.’202  It  is  not  simply the  fact that they 
perform different tasks that distinguishes the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. This is Monarchianism. It is 
precisely against this that Origen insists that the three  are  individual  and separate oboiai,  not simply
£v6pY£iai.
(5.5)
Another passage  from the  Commentary on St John  provides us  with our final piece  of evidence  that 
Origen’s  Trinitarian  theology  was  built  upon  the  refutation  of Monarchianism.  Commenting  on  St
197 We discuss this important passage in detail in section 6.2.
198 Orbe (1991), p. 42.
199 It would appear that Origen is following the original Aristotelian definition of this term. At  Topics 
102al8, Aristotle defines i8i6xr|<; as a property which defines a species: for example, the ability to learn 
grammar is iSiov  to man, but to no other species. On this point, see Urmson (1990).
200  See  Orbe  (1991),  p.42:  “segun los  “monarquianos”  no  hay idiotes  que  distinga personalmente  al 
Hijo de la idiotes del Padre. Se adivina la razon: porque toda idiotes responde, como propiedad fisica, a 
una substancia ( = ousia). Y por tanto, donde hay una sola substancia -  la ousia divina -  ha de haber 
necesariamente una sola idiotes.”
201 Section 3.
202 Lyman (1993), p.72.
53John’s identification of the Logos as ‘the light shining in the darkness’ (John 1.4-9), Origen points out 
that the Father is also called light (e.g. at 1  John 1.5). Noticing the common metaphor, people are wont 
to  conclude  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  not  different  in  oboia:  xf|  obcriq  pi)  8ieoxr|K6vai  xob
uiob  xdv  7 tax£pa  (Commentary on  St John  2.23  (18)).  For Origen  this  is  a  careless  exegesis.203  The 
meticulous scholar will conclude that the Father and Son are not the same (oi)  xabxov). The light that 
‘shines in the darkness’  is different from the light in which there is no darkness at all. The Father and 
the Son are numerically distinct and are to be identified as the ‘two lights’ of Psalm 36.10.
Huet, the great 17th  century apologist for Origen, is quick to remove any negative implications from the 
above  claims.  He  argues  that Origen believed the  Father  and the  Son to be  ‘of the  same  substance’ 
(Patrem  eiusdem  esse substantiae ac Filium).204  The  distinction between the two  can only therefore 
refer to the difference between the Incarnated Christ and his Father. But although Origen does refer to 
the Incarnation and does interpret the  ‘light shining in the darkness’  as a reference to Christ’s earthly 
mission,  he  is  also  keen  to  stress  the  difference  between  the  Father  and  the  Son  before  the 
Incarnation.205  Moreover,  in  this  passage,  Origen  is  not  concerned  with  numerical  distinction  tout 
court,  with  the  basic  refutation  of Monarchianism by  claiming  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  two 
(oholai) and not one.206 Origen goes much further than this. Basing himself on the traditional Platonic 
dogma  that  that  which  produces  is  necessarily  greater  than  that  which  is  produced,207  Origen 
thoroughly  subordinates  the  Son  to  the  Father.  The  distinction  between  the  two  is  the  inevitable 
consequence of complete causal dependence:  cp 8£  X6yto  6  7taxT)p  xf|<;  &X.r|0£la<;  Beoq  TtXetcov fcaxi xai 
pei^cov  f|  dX.i)06ia  xai  6  naxr)p  a>v  oocpia<;  Kpdxxcov  feoxi  xai  8iacp£pa)v  q  oocpla,  xoux©  bTtsp^yei 
xob  slvai  cp cb < ;  &Xq0iv6v.208  It  is  not  simply  the  Incarnation  which  distinguishes  the  Son  from  the 
Father.  It  is  the  basic  fact  that  the  latter  produces/causes  the  former  that  makes  the  Father
203 Hanson (1988), pp.66-7 and (1985), p.412 has made the mistake of attributing this view to Origen 
himself.
204 Huet,  Origeniana,  quoted in P.G.  14,  154 not.  We discuss the crucial topic of consubstantiality in 
chapter 2.
205 Orbe (1991), p.44 has also restricted the difference between the Father and the Son to the fact of the 
Incarnation. Like Huet, he has not paid sufficient attention to how the argument develops.
206 This is a crucial point which will form the backbone of the remainder of this chapter.
207 See Plotinus, Ennead 5.1.6 and 5.3.15.
208  Dillon  (1992),  pp. 17-18  provides  a brief discussion of this  passage.  He  argues  that  it  is  “a most 
interesting use of an old Platonist principle” that God is above being because he is the cause of being 
(/?ep.6.505B). In this passage, Origen argues that the Father is ‘above’ light because he is the father of 
light.
547 iA.eitov,  psl^tov  and xpeixxcov.  It is for this reason that the Father is different from (8ia<p£pcov) the Son 
and surpasses (bTiepfcxei) him.
(5.6)
We  can  conclude  therefore  that  it  was  Origen’s  conflict  with  the  Monarchians  that  formed  the 
foundation  of much  of his  Trinitarian  doctrine.  It  was  in  response  to  the  Monarchian  theory  of 
economic  modalism that Origen proclaimed the  eternally distinct existence  of Father,  Son  and  Holy 
Ghost as three separate and individual obciai/b7iooxdo£i<;. The names of the three persons of the Trinity 
refer to real, distinct beings and are not simply convenient labels (emvoiai) describing different modes 
of action (svfepyeiai). Although the Son is certainly to be identified with the essential divine attributes 
of wisdom,  will  and power,  these  must not be understood merely as  attributes  of the Father,  but  as 
eternally substantized and hypostasized in a separate  individual being.  And although the Holy Ghost 
has his own particular sphere of influence and his own particular tasks to perform, his distinction from 
the  Father  and  the  Son  is  not  restricted  to  such  economic  criteria:  like  the  Son,  he  is  an  eternally 
existing  individual oboia.  But further discussion and further clarification is  needed.  In particular,  we 
must ask what Origen means by the terms oboia  and bndaxaaiq.  When he claims that the Father and 
the  Son  are  different  in  oboia  and  that  there  are  xpeiq  brcooxdoEit;  in  the  Trinity,  does  he  mean 
anything more  than a mere numerical  distinction,  the basic refutation of Monarchianism by claiming 
that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three oboiai/brcooxdoEii; and not one? A very great deal hinges 
upon the precise meaning, in Origen’s oeuvre, of these notoriously ambiguous and slippery terms. We 
begin with an analysis of the term oboia.
THE MEANING OF oOoia
(6.1)
Various scholars have attempted to explain and excuse Origen’s Trinitarian doctrine by claiming that 
when he employs the term oboia he means simply ‘an individual existent’, the equivalent of ‘person’ in 
the orthodox Trinitarian terminology of the next century.209 That is to say, Origen’s assertion that there 
are three oboiai  in the Trinity and that these three  obolai  are different and distinct from one another is 
nothing  more  than  a  swipe  at  the  Monarchians,  nothing  more  than  the  bald  assertion  of numerical 
distinction.  Stevenson explicitly claims that “Origen uses obola  to mean ‘person’. This usage serves to
209 Bethune-Baker (1901), pp.77-78  and (1933), pp.149; Hanson (1985), p.201; Jay (1954), pp.126-7 
and Wolfson (1956), p.318.
55distinguish the divine persons and avoid Sabellianism.”210  Wolfson and Jay support this argument by 
pointing out that the use of oboia to mean ‘individual existent’ was sanctioned by Aristotle himself in 
the  Categories.  At  Categories  2all,  Aristotle  distinguishes  primary  oboia  -  that  which  makes  an 
individual  different  ffom  everyone/everything  else,  that  which  makes  Socrates  Socrates  -   and 
secondary oboia -  that which makes Socrates a man and not a dog.211  It would certainly be legitimate 
for Origen, working within a conventional philosophical framework, to use the word oboia to mean an 
individual existent, an individual example of a particular species. Plotinus, writing at roughly the same 
time, discusses in great detail the 7tpd)xr|  oboia  of Socrates (Ennead 6.3.9). The Aristotelian distinction 
between secondary and primary oboia was also familiar to Christian writers. Hippolytus, for example, 
discusses the topic at Refutatio 7.6. If Origen does indeed mean primary oboia when he claims that the 
Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  are  different  in  oboia  and  that  there  are  three  distinct,  separate  and 
individual obolai  in the Trinity,  the apologetic  advantages are obvious.  The defenders of Origen can 
proclaim his  doctrinal  orthodoxy,  avant  I 'heure,  and  hail  him as  a  precocious  precursor  of Nicaea. 
They would  argue  that,  in Origen’s  theological  system,  the oboia  of the  Son is simply an individual 
example or instance of the generic oboia of divinity, an oboia  shared equally by Father, Son and Holy 
Ghost.
Richard Hanson,  a tireless  campaigner for the rehabilitation of Origen,  agrees with Jay and Wolfson 
that Origen ‘seldom or never uses oboia  to mean essence or substance’, but almost always in the sense 
of primary oboia.212  The  claim that the  Father  and the  Son are  different in oboia  must therefore be 
interpreted in a  simple numerical  sense,  allowing that  ‘the  distinct persons  share the same nature.’213 
Hanson  and  his  allies  follow  the  well-trodden  scholarly path  of lamenting  the  poverty  of the  Greek 
language at this date as hampering the development of Trinitarian theology in the Eastern Church.214 
The lack of a Greek equivalent to the Latin term persona led to an unfortunate confusion. The modern- 
day Apologist for Origen argues that he wholeheartedly agreed with his Latin confreres that the Trinity 
comprised three persons and one  substance, but that he  lacked the necessary technical vocabulary to
210 Stevenson (1927), p.84.
211  For a discussion of Aristotle’s theory of primary and secondary oboia, see Stead (1977), pp.57-62. 
Edwards (2002),  p.65  defines  ‘primary oboia’  as  a  ‘concrete  individual’  and  ‘secondary  oboia’  as  a 
‘natural kind or species.’
212 Hanson (1985), p.201.
213 Hanson (1988), p.65.
56express himself.  Without being able to use the term  7ip6oco7iov,  Origen was obliged to make do with 
oboia  to express the concept of a divine ‘person’.215
It  seems  to  me  however that there  are  two  main problems  with this  argument.  First and  foremost,  a 
careful reading of Origen’s oeuvre will reveal that he always uses the term oboia to mean ‘substance’ 
or ‘nature’.216 He has no use for the Aristotelian concept of primary oboia.  So  to claim that the Father, 
Son and Holy Ghost are different in oboia  must mean that they are different in nature or substance and 
not simply numerically distinct.217 Second, Origen’s Trinitarian theology is characterized by an obvious 
and  thorough  subordinationism.  We  have  already  seen  that  at  Commentary  on  St John  2.23  (18), 
Origen  explains  or  justifies  the  claim  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  different  Kax’  oooiav,  by 
describing a strictly hierarchical Trinity in which the Father is ‘fuller’, ‘mightier’ and ‘greater’ than the 
Son. This is a model repeated throughout Origen’s oeuvre. I cannot therefore accept the conclusions of 
Hanson and the others that Origen was a fully orthodox Trinitarian, avant I’heure. We shall soon see 
that  Origen’s  Trinitarian theology  is  in  fact entirely different from that proposed  at Nicaea.  Even  if 
Origen had been aware of a Greek equivalent to the Latin term persona, he would not have wanted to 
use  it.  For  him,  the  distinction between  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  is  not  simply  a  numerical 
distinction, a distinction o f‘persons’, but something much more fundamental.218
(6.2)
We have shown that Origen’s refutation of Monarchianism depends upon the assertion that the Father, 
Son and Holy Ghost are  three  distinct and individual oboiai,  eternally different from one  another.  In 
order to understand the full meaning of these claims, we must understand in as much detail as possible
214  It  is  a  common-place  of  Patristic  scholarship  that  the  Romans,  under  the  able  leadership  of 
Tertullian, were the first to develop the ‘one substance, three persons’ formula.  See chapter 2, sections
7.1-7.3 for a full discussion of this topic.
215  The  use  of  the  term  rcpdoomov  to  mean  a  ‘person’  did  not  become  current  until  the  Arian 
Controversy.  In previous years, the term had been scrupulously avoided as being uncomfortably close 
to  the  Monarchian  concept  of God  assuming  different  guises.  Indeed,  the  term  originally  meant  a 
theatrical mask. Bethune-Baker (1933), pp.73-74 discusses the use of the term Tipdoconov  by Sabellius 
et  al  and  its  consequent  defilement  for  ‘orthodox’  theologians.  Origen  never  uses  the  term  in  a 
Trinitarian context. It is true that Hippolytus, writing against Noetus, uses the term but he is something 
of a maverick in the Eastern Church.
2161 assume that ‘nature’  and  ‘substance’  are synonyms. Although Aristotle distinguished the two, the 
difference does not appear to have had any relevance for Origen.
217 We discuss this first point in sections 6.2-6.3. In sections 7.1-7.3, we discuss the precise meaning of 
the term bndoxaoiq  in Origen’s oeuvre and reach a similar conclusion.
218 We discuss this second point in sections 9.1-12.1.
57the  technical  vocabulary  involved.219  Scholarly  discussions  of  Origen’s  Trinitarian  theology,  in 
particular his use of the term oboia, seem to me to have been focussed far too narrowly.  In claiming 
that Origen uses oboia  to mean individual  existent or individual  example,  the equivalent of ‘person’, 
scholars  have  restricted themselves  to  examining the  uses  of the  term in Trinitarian contexts.  I  feel 
however that any full  enquiry into the meaning of oboia  must take into consideration the uses of the 
term in every context. I do not believe that Origen had a peculiar or specific meaning in mind when he 
spoke  of the oboia  of the Father,  Son and Holy Ghost that was  different from what he  had in mind 
when he  spoke,  for example,  of the oboia  of rational souls or the oboia  of lead,  silver and gold. An 
examination of the use and meaning of oboia  throughout Origen’s oeuvre is thus the fundamental first 
stage in understanding his Trinitarian theology, in which the term plays such a central role.
The most useful evidence in this quest comes from book 20 of the Commentary on St John, in which 
Origen repeatedly uses the term oboia  in the course of his famous attack on the Gnostic theory of soul 
natures.  One  of Origen’s  major  quarrels  with  the  Gnostics  is  (what  he  sees  as)  their  deterministic 
theory. This is the belief that there are two soul natures, the pneumatic and the choic. The pneumatics 
are pre-determined to virtue and salvation, while the choics are pre-determined to sin and damnation.220 
For  Christian  Gnostics,  the  Gospel  of John  became  something  of a  proof text,  since  there  were  a 
number of famous verses which appeared to endorse this particular brand of determinism.  Origen has 
preserved  for  us  large  portions  of a  commentary  on  the  fourth  Gospel  written  by  the  Valentinian, 
Heracleon.221 Heracleon’s exegesis is often the starting point for Origen’s own comments.
Book 20 of the Commentary on St John deals in detail with Heracleon’s exegesis of Christ’s words to 
the Jews -  Why do you not understand my speech? Because you cannot hear my word.  You are of  your 
father  the  devil  (John  8.44).  In  Heracleon’s  exegesis  of  this  passage,  he  argues  that  the  ‘Jews’ 
addressed by Christ are the  choics: by very nature, they are unable to hear the message of salvation. 
What  is  particularly  important  to  the  present  enquiry  is  the  fact  that  in  both  the  quotations  from 
Heracleon and Origen’s response, the term for a soul nature is either oboia or cpboiq. The two are taken 
as synonyms and are used interchangeably.
219 It is of course far beyond the scope of the present study to provide a history of the various different 
meanings of the term oboia in Plato, Aristotle  and the Stoics.  It is also unnecessary:  although Origen 
was undoubtedly influenced by previous uses of the term, he has his own peculiar gloss.  Stead (1977) 
provides an exhaustive analysis of the uses of the term throughout antiquity.
Origen  is  perhaps  not  entirely  fair  to  the  Gnostics.  A  third  group,  the  psychics,  who  are  free  to 
choose their own destiny, are very rarely mentioned.  It obviously suits Origen’s polemical purpose to 
concentrate on the pneumatics and the choics. On this point, see Dihle (1982), pp.150-57.
58The  Gnostics,  we  are  told,  hold  a  ‘doctrine  of  natures 
(ouvioxaoBai  xdv  rcspi  guoerog  A .6yov;  oi  xaq  cpuoeic  elodyovxeq;  xcov  xd<;  cp bosu;  sioaydvxcov;  oi
xi)v  7 tepi  8iacp6pcov  (pboEtov  £iodyovx£<;  poOoTiouav).222  They believe  that  the  choics  have  a  peculiar 
‘nature’  ((pboic)  and  that  they  are  unable  to  understand  Christ’s  words  because  of their  ‘incurable 
nature’  (8id  cpuoiv  dvidxcoq  sxoooav);  they  are  the  children  of  the  devil  ‘by  nature’ 
(xobq  cpboEi  xob  8iaP6A.ou  uiouc;).  Conversely,  the Gnostics believe that certain men are  sons  of God 
‘by  nature  and  by  constitution’  (cpbosi  Kai  ek  nptoxriq  KaxaoK£i)f|<;);  they  share  the  ‘blessed  nature’ 
(paKaplaq  (pboscoc)  of the  Saviour  and  for  this  reason  are  able  to  hear  his  word.  In  the  above 
quotations, the term used for a soul nature is <pboi<;. Yet there are many passages in which Origen uses 
the term oboia  to describe a soul nature. For example, we are told that Heracleon believes the choics to 
be  of the same oboia  as the devil (bpooboioc  xq>  8iap6A.co),  which is different from the oboia  of the 
pneumatics and the psychics:
£x£pa<;  oboiac  xuyxavovxac;  nap’  ob<;  KaXoboi  vj/uxiKobq  f)  TtveopaxiKobq;  8iaP6A,oo  oboiac  rcapa 
xqv  xd»v aAAcov  XoyiKwv  oboiav.
The  choics  are  repeatedly  described  as  ek  xf|<;  oboiai;  xob  8iaP6Xou.  Against  the  Gnostics,  Origen
assures  his  readers  that  we  become  children  of the  devil  by  our deeds  and not  as  the  result  of our 
oboia  or  KaxaoK8uf|;  we  become  ‘lying  spirits’  because  of sin  and  deceit  and  not  because  of our 
oboia.  In  fine,  we  are  told  that  it  is  ‘absurd’  (napdXoyov)  to  think  that  souls  could  be  different 
oboiai  from one another (£x£pa<;  Kai  £x£pa;  oboiac).
In his  famous refutation of determinism at Commentary on St John  20.23  (20),  Origen uses the term 
oboia  to describe a soul nature:
noXX&Kiq  8£  EixcopEV,  oxi  £av  oi)yxa>pr|0f|  xobxo  xo  d8bvaxov  (X£yco  8£  xo  slvai  oboiac  £x£pa<;  Kai 
&v£7ii8eKxov  xcov  Kpsixxdvcov  xov  8idPoXov),  Ttspi  p£v  ekeivoi)  dnoXoyr|o6p£0a  o o< ;  ob8apob  aixiou 
xf|<;  7iovr)pia<;,  xo  8£  £yK>.r)pa  xcp  abxov  oboicboavxi  Kai  8r)pioupyf|oavxi  npoodvj/opEv,  onep  soxi 
Tidvxcov  dxo7icbxaxov.  In chapter 20.28  (22),  Origen employs exactly the same argument, but uses the 
term cpbou;  in place of oboia. Heracleon believes that the devil is unable to abide in truth (John 8.44) 
because  of his  ‘nature’:  ek  xt\<;  abxob  cpboscoc;  i8iov  excqv  xo  \p£b8o<;, cpuoikcoc  pi)  Suvdpsvdq  tcoxe
221 See Brooke (1891), pp.41-7 for a summary of Heracleon’s theology.
222  c.f.  Commentary  on  St  John  28.21  (16)  for  the  same  description  of the  Gnostic  determinists: 
oi  xaq  (pbosic;  Eiodyovxs;;  Kaxa  xob<;  Eiodyovxaq xaq  (pbosic.
59& A .r|08iav  EiTretv.  Origen replies that if this were the case, the devil would be completely exonerated: he 
would be unlucky rather than guilty.
From this brief overview, it is clear that Origen uses the terms oboia and (puoiq  as synonyms. They are 
employed absolutely interchangeably to describe a group of souls who share the same characteristics. 
We can conclude therefore, contra Bethune-Baker, Hanson, Jay and Wolfson, that Origen uses the term 
oboia  in a  generic  sense.  It means  ‘nature’,  Aristotle’s  ‘secondary oboia’.  This  conclusion has  very 
important ramifications  for our understanding  of Origen’s Trinitarian theology.  When he  argues  that 
Father,  Son and Holy Ghost are  separate,  distinct and individual oboiai,  Origen must mean that they 
are separate, distinct and individual natures.
Against  the  Gnostic  theory  that  there  are  different  kinds  of soul,  Origen  insists  that  all  souls  are 
bpooboioq, i.e. of the same nature or the same substance. This is glossed as meaning that they share the 
same  i8i6Tr|<;.223  Specifically,  Origen  points  out  that  every  rational  soul  exhibits  the  same  mental 
abilities of memory, thought, imagination and -  most importantly -  the same capacity for moral choice. 
Origen  cannot  accept  the  Gnostic  argument  that  souls  of a  different  oboia  could  share  the  same 
psychological  attributes.  He uses  an analogy to  illustrate  the point.  The  reader is  invited to  imagine 
three statues of the same shape, cast from the same mould, but made from a different material (oboia) -  
lead, wax and gold. Obviously the three statues would display different individual properties (i5i6xriq). 
The  same  applies  to  human  souls:  were  they  different  in  oboia,  they  too  would  display  different 
properties. The fact that everyone is able to remember, think, imagine and make moral choices proves 
that their souls are  6poouoio<;.
Origen anticipates  a possible  objection to  his  argument:  how will  he explain the  fact that some men 
have a better memory or a better imagination than others, that some men are virtuous, while others are 
sinners?  Origen  will  not  admit  that  this  proves  that  there  are  different  soul  natures  (oboiai).  As  a 
diseased eye is bpooboioq with a healthy eye, so the soul of the devil is 6pooboio<;  with the souls of the 
saints  and  angels.  A  disease  of  the  eye,  like  the  corruption  of  the  devil,  is  merely  an  accident 
supervening upon the substance. As such, it can always be reversed. As a diseased eye can be cured, so 
the  devil  can  repent.  This  is  an  interesting  Christianization  of a  classic  Aristotelian  tenet.  Aristotle 
repeatedly distinguishes the accidental from the essential. The accidental can be altered, even reversed, 
without  affecting  the  substance  in  any way:  fat  men  can become  thin  and  still  remain men.  Origen
223 See section  5.4 for a discussion of the crucial term i8i6xr|<;.
60adopts this famous maxim as part of his lengthy refutation of Gnostic determinism.  Sin, he argues, is 
not  the  reflection  of  an  irreparably  lost  nature,  but  is  merely  a  temporary  and  curable  state 
{Commentary on St John 20.23 (20).
The claims in this passage recall a similar argument used in the conclusion of the de Principiis. At de 
Principiis  4.4.9,  Origen  asserts  that  all  the  rational  souls  are  unius  naturae  and  unius  substantiae, 
because they all share the same ability to participate in intellectual light.224 Likewise, all eyes are of the 
same  substance, because they all  share  the  same  ability to receive  light and all  ears  are  of the  same 
substance, because they all share the  same ability to receive sound.  Origen then makes a comparison 
between (a) men who are nearly blind and men who see perfectly and (b) men who are sinners and men 
who are saints.  The  crux of the argument is that the same nature can be healthy, well developed and 
well used or neglected, impaired and diseased. This is very similar to the arguments of Commentary on 
St John  20.23  (20).  Once again, Origen’s main aim is to refute the claim that the unequal spiritual or 
mental development of different men is the result of different soul-natures.
Having examined the various uses of the term oboia /substantia in the Commentary on St John and the 
de  Principiis,  it  becomes  extremely  hard  to  accept  the  conclusion  of Richard  Hanson  that  ‘Origen 
seldom or never uses ousia to mean essence or substance.’225 It seems to me that this is precisely what 
the  term  does  mean.  For  Origen,  oboiai  substantia  is  always  ‘secondary oboia’,  a  common  nature 
shared by a group of individuals, each exhibiting the same generic characteristics (i5i6ir|c;). So Origen 
can speak of the oboia of rational souls, meaning a nature common to all rational beings, be they men, 
stars,  angels  or devils,  who  share  the  same  capacities  and capabilities.  Similarly,  he  can refer  to the 
oboia of wax, common to everything made of wax but entirely different from anything made of lead or 
gold.  Origen has  no  use  for  the  Aristotelian  concept  of ‘primary oboia.’  He  does  not,  for  example, 
speak of the oboia of an individual soul and claim it to be different from the oboia of every other soul. 
Whenever Origen uses the term oboia, he means generic, ‘secondary oboia.’226 
(6.3)
224 Note  the  synonymous  use  of natura  and substantia,  undoubtedly the Latin versions  of cpboic;  and 
oboia.  See de Principiis  1.5.5  for a similar juxtaposition of these two terms.  As part of an attack on 
Gnostic  determinism,  Origen  again  argues  that  no  rational  soul  is  good  or  evil  by  nature  or  by 
substance:  per  hoc  ostenditur  substantialiter  vel  naturaliter  esse  aliquem  immaculatum  neque 
substantialiter pollutum.
225 Hanson (1985), p.201.
226 de Riedmatten (1957), p.58  shares this view.  In a brief discussion of the use of the term oboia in 
Origen,  he makes no reference to  ‘primary  oboia’  but rightly refers to the oboia  of angels,  daemons
61This  claim is  supported by a very important, but strangely neglected passage in Origen’s treatise  On 
Prayer.  In chapter 27.8  Origen indulges  in a  scholarly and rather irrelevant excursus  on the  various 
possible meanings of oboia proposed by the various philosophical schools.227 The basic debate is the 
familiar  one  between  the  nominalists  and  the  realists:  are  universals  simply  the  creation  of  the 
enquiring  mind  abstracting  common  qualities  from  empirical  data,  or  do  they  exist  in  a  prior  and 
causative way as the Platonic forms?228 The relevance of this passage to the present discussion is that, 
throughout the argument, oboia  is interpreted in a generic sense.  It is surely extremely important that 
there is no reference to Aristotle’s ‘primary oboia’ in such a detailed discussion of the various possible 
meanings of the term.
A little earlier in this same treatise, Origen makes the famous and much discussed claim that the Son is 
exepoq  xax’  oboiav  Kai  bTtoKelpevdv  from the Father and that prayer should therefore be addressed to 
the  Father alone  (On  Prayer  15).229 This  recalls  the  various  claims  in the  Commentary on  St John, 
discussed above.  The correct interpretation of this passage from the treatise  On Prayer will therefore 
help immeasurably in our quest to understand the Trinitarian doctrine developed in the Commentary on 
St John.  In particular, it will help clarify the precise meaning of the term oboia  as used in Trinitarian 
contexts: does it mean ‘person’ or ‘substance’? It is not surprising that this passage has received a great 
deal  of scholarly attention.  Bethune-Baker,  Hanson,  Jay,  Wolfson  and Bigg  all try to  rescue  Origen 
from a theological tight spot by arguing that in this passage he  is using oboia to mean a person,  i.e. 
‘primary oboia’.230 Once again, the apologists for Origen will not accept that he believed the Son to be 
different  in  substance  from  the  Father.  But  however  convenient  it  might  be,  I  cannot  accept  this 
interpretation. First, this use of the term oboia  would be at odds with all the various examples quoted 
above.  Our  discussions  have  proved  that  Origen  always  uses  the  term oboia  to  mean  ‘nature’  or 
‘substance’:  it is  always generic,  never individual.  The arguments of On Prayer 27.8 prove the point 
definitively.  Since there is no mention of Aristotle’s  ‘primary oboia’  in such a detailed discussion of
and  human  souls.  He  concludes  that  “oboia  comme  terme  technique  comporte  une  reference  a  la 
substance existente.”
227 Jay (1954), p. 172 believes it to be simply ‘a display of erudition’. Stead (1977), p. 138 suggests that 
the information was drawn from a philosophical dictionary.
228 Jay (1954), pp. 172-3 and Stead (1994), pp. 164-6.
229  Trigg  (1985),  p. 160  writes:  “Origen  believed  that  offering  prayers  indiscriminately  to  God  the 
Father and to Christ implied the heresy that the Father and the Son are identical in substance.” While I 
agree with this basic point, Trigg has failed to take adequate notice of how the argument develops, i.e. 
how  Origen  is  not  concerned  with  a  simple  refutation  of  Monarchianism,  but  rather  with 
subordinationism.
62the  various  possible  meanings  of the  term,  I  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  accept  that  Origen  has 
‘primary  oboia’  in  mind,  when  he  claims  here  -   only  a  few  chapters  previously -   that  the  Son  is 
different icax’  obaiav.  He must mean that the Son is generically different from the Father, different in 
nature and substance.
Indeed,  the  claim  that  the  Son  is  of a  different  nature  from the  Father  and  not  merely  a  different 
‘person’  is fundamental to the argument of On Prayer  15.  If the Son were merely a different person, 
there  would  be  no  reason  why  prayer  should  not  be  offered  to  him  as  much  as  to  the  Father.  By 
claiming that we must pray to the Father alone -  through the Son -  Origen is asserting a much more 
fundamental  distinction between the  two.231  The  Son is  presented  in the  guise  of a  Middle-Platonic 
intermediary, relaying the prayers of men to an untouchable Father.232 
THE MEANING OF imOOTaOiq
(7.1)
Like  oboia,  the  term b7 i6axaai<;  is  central  to  Origen’s Trinitarian theory.  We  have  seen how  Origen 
regularly criticizes his Monarchian opponents for failing to distinguish Father, Son and Holy Ghost as 
xpeiq  bnootdoeiq.233  At Commentary on St John  1.24 (23) and 1.38 (42), we read that the Monarchians 
do  not  give  the  Son  an  bTtdoxaou;,  but  identify  him  as  merely  the  Father’s  spoken  word.  At 
Commentary on St John  10.37, Origen attacks those Christians who distinguish the Father and the Son 
according to buvoia but not according to  b7 i6oxaoi<;. In fragment 123.5 of the Commentary on St John, 
Origen reports that the Monarchians reduce the Holy Ghost to a mere evfepyeia  of the Father and do not 
therefore  allow  him  an  iSiav  brcdoxaaiv.  Similarly,  at  Commentary  on  St  Matthew  17.14,  Origen 
attacks those who believe that the Father and the Son are one bndoxaoK;.
In  the  fragmentary  Commentary  on  Titus,  Origen  again  denounces  the  claim that  there  is  only  one 
bTidoxaoiq  in the Trinity (P.G.  14  1304D).  We find a very similar discussion at Contra  Celsum  8.12. 
Having established the divinity of the Son and his union with the Father, Origen turns his attention to 
those who believe that the Father and Son are different only in  buvoia and who therefore deny that the 
Father and the Son are 8bo  b7 iocxdo£iq. Keen to dispel any hint of Monarchianism, Origen insists that
230 Bethune-Baker (1901), pp.77-78 and (1933), pp.149; Hanson (1985), p.201; Jay (1954), pp.126-7; 
Wolfson (1956), p.318; Bigg (1913), p.203.
231  O’Meara  (1954),  p.210  is  right  to  interpret  this  passage  as  a  clear  example  of  ‘Origen’s 
subordinationism’. Jerome also quotes the passage as proof of Origen’s subordinationism and calls it an 
aperta blasphema (Epistola 92.2 and Epistola 96.12).
2 2 The Son’s role as intermediary will be discussed in detail in sections 10.1-12.1.
63the union between the Father and the Son is merely a union of will and purpose and that they remain 
distinct xf[  (jTiootdaei.234
At Commentary on St John 2.10.6, Origen similarly responds to the Monarchian threat by stating that 
there are xp£i<;  imooTdoeiq  in the Trinity. Origen cannot accept the central modalist creed that the Son 
and  the  Holy  Ghost  are  simply  aspects  or  ‘modes’  of divine  expression.  Although the  Son  is  to  be 
identified with the essential divine attributes of will, power and wisdom, these must be understood as 
eternally substantized as a separate  and individual i)7 i6oxaoic; (Commentary on St John  1.34  (39),  de 
Principiis 1.2.2 and Commentary on Ephesians fragment 10).
Witt and Logan discuss the importance of the term brcdoxaoiq in the wider Monarchian controversy.235 
The  orthodox  theologians  of  the  third  and  fourth  century  repeat  the  complaints  of  Origen:  the 
Monarchians do not allow the Son his own, individual b7i6oxaoi<;. Indeed, Epiphanius cites this as the 
main  grounds  for  the  condemnation  of Paul  of  Samosata  at  the  Council  of Ephesus  (Epiphanius 
Pinarion 65.1).236
(7.2)
It  is  clear therefore that,  together with oboia,  i)7 t6oxaoiq  is  the key term in Origen’s debate with the 
Monarchians  and  the  crux  of his  Trinitarian  doctrine.  It  is  impossible  to  understand  his  theology 
without  a  precise  interpretation  of this  term.  I  believe  however  that,  over  the  years,  it  has  been 
repeatedly mis-interpreted.  In the technical Trinitarian terminology of post-Nicene theology,  the term 
bndaxaaq  came to be used as the Greek version of the Latin term persona. It was used to distinguish 
the three persons of the consubstantial Trinity.237 As such, it was the equivalent of Aristotle’s ‘primary 
oboia’, i.e. an individual instance of the same generic oboia, the oboia of divinity.238 
It  is  extremely  tempting,  particularly  for  Origen’s  apologists,  to  seize  upon  his  use  of  the  term 
brcdoxaoiq  as  proof of precocious  orthodox  credentials.  Indeed  it  is  common  scholarly  practice  to 
interpret the term in Origen’s oeuvre in a precise and technical post-Nicene sense. For example, Heine 
explicitly  argues  that  Origen  uses  bndoxaaxq  in  the  same  way  as  Tertullian  uses  persona  and
233 See sections 4.3-5.4.
234ovxa  8bo  xf|  b7tooxtiGEi  7ipdypaxa,  ev  5£  xfi  bpovoig  Kai  xfi  oi)|i(pcoviqi  Kai  xfi  xauxdxqxi  xob 
(3ouXf|(iaxoi;. See chapter 2, section 4.2 for a further discussion of this important passage.
235 Witt (1933), p.335; Logan (1987), p.427.
236 See also ibid. 65.2, 65.3, 73.12.
237 On this, see Bicknell (1950), pp.64-5.
238 On this point, see Prestige (1969), p. 162 and Edwards (2002), p.68.
64Hippolytus uses  7tp6ocorcov,  namely as  ‘individual  existent’.239 Trigg,  Orbe,  Bigg and Bethune-Baker 
give the same interpretation.240 Cecelie Blanc is even more specific. She explicitly claims Origen as the 
first  exponent  of Nicene  catholic  orthodoxy:  “i)7t6oxaaiq  a,  lui,  le  sens  qui  demeurera  apres  Nicee, 
celui  d’existence  distincte,  de  realite  individuelle.  Et  c’est  sans  doute  la  premiere  fois  qu’il  sert  a 
definir les personnes de la Trinite.”241
It  seems  obvious  to  me  however  that  Origen  did  not  use  the  term  uudoxaoK;  to  mean  ‘individual 
existent’  and  that  those  scholars  who  claim  that  he  did  are  guilty  of  a  blatantly  anachronistic 
projection.242 An overview of the uses of the term elsewhere in Origen’s oeuvre reveal that it is used 
either  to  mean  ‘nature/substance’  or  to  mean  ‘objective  reality’  as  opposed  to  a  subjective,  mental 
construction. I find no examples of the use of the term to mean ‘individual’.243
(7.3)
Dome is correct to argue that the terms im6oxaoi<;  and cpuoiq  are not distinguished by Origen.244 There 
are many examples of the use of the former to mean ‘nature’. For example, in the Commentary on St 
John, Origen twice applies the term to the two natures of Christ.245 At Commentary on St John 20.21 
(19),  Origen argues that if the devil were  a  liar  xaxa  tmdaxaoiv,  he  could not be blamed:  this must
mean -  if the devil were a liar by nature . . .  At Commentary on St John 20.22 (20), Origen discusses 
the npor|You|!£vr|  tmdoxaoiq  of humans, meaning their  ‘primary nature’. The Contra  Celsum provides 
us  with  further  examples  of this  use  of the  term.  Origen  speaks  of the  i)7t6oxaoi<;  of souls  (Contra 
Celsum  6.26),  the  \m6cxaai<;  of evil  (ibid.  6.56),  the  tmdoxaait;  of  all  things  (ibid.  6.65)  and  the 
(mdoxaoiq  of the  angels  (ibid.  6.71).  Similarly,  in  chapter  27.8  of the  treatise  On  Prayer,  Origen 
discusses the 67t6oxaai<;  of incorporeal things.  In the Homilies on Jeremiah,  we  find reference to the 
undoxaoic;  of water and the imdoxaoiq  of mortal beings.246 It is interesting to note that Plotinus appears 
to share Origen’s semantic framework. That is to say, he too uses the term bndoTaoiq  to mean ‘nature’
239 Heine (1998), p.73.
240 Trigg (1983), p.96, Orbe (1991), p.47, Bigg (1913), pp.202-3 and Bethune-Baker (1933), p.78.
241 Blanc (1966), p.401.
242 Hammerstaedt (1991) has strongly argued against this in a very useful article on the use of the term 
bndoraoiq  in Origen’s Trinitarian theology.
243 I do not deny that this might well have been the primary meaning of the term for the  Stoics (Witt 
(1933), pp.321-322, 342-343).
244 Dome (1976), p.53.
245 Commentary on St John 2.35 (29) and 32.9 (20).
246 Homilies on Jeremiah  18.4 and ibid. in Philocalia 1.28.
65or ‘substance’. For example, he refers to the unboxaoiq of wisdom (Ennead 1.4.9) and the i> 7 r6axaoi<; of 
matter (ibid.  1.8.15).247
We have already discussed how Origen often juxtaposes the term tmbaxaoiq with the term 87uvoia.248 
Against the Monarchian theory that Father,  Son and Holy Ghost are merely verbally distinct,  Origen 
insists that they are distinct Kara  bndoxaaiv  (Commentary on St John  10.37 (21)). This use of the term 
is paralleled in fragment 36 of the Commentary on St John, where the water of baptism and the Spirit 
are  distinguished  Kara  brokfxaaiv  and  not  merely  xax’  snlvoiav.  Similarly,  at  Contra  Celsum  8.67, 
Origen  asks  the  pagan  allegorists  whether  Athena  has  an  i)7t6oxaoiq  that  corresponds  to  her 
metaphorical  attributes.  At  Contra  Celsum  1.23  Origen  makes  very  similar  remarks  concerning  the 
imdoxaoK;  of Mnemosyne: does she have an existence above and beyond her various mythological and 
allegorical attributes? In fragment 16 of the Commentary on Lamentations, Origen refers to those who 
are God’s  enemies rjxoi  xf|  femvouy  f|  Kai  xfi  Imoaxdaei.  In these passages,  the term bndoxaaiq  is to 
be translated as ‘reality’ or ‘genuine existence’, as opposed to a purely mental construction.249 
This use of the term was popular with the Stoics.250 Gerson notes that Plotinus also uses im6oxaoi<;  to 
mean  ‘extra-mental existent’.251  He refers to Ennead 6.2.13  as a particularly clear example of this.  In 
this passage, Plotinus argues that numbers have an objective existence outside the mind: they must be 
considered according to wtboxaoiq and not merely according to enivoia.  Similarly, at Ennead 3.7.13, 
Plotinus  is  keen  to  assure  his  readers  that  time  exists  sv  tmooxdoei  and  sv  imdp^ei,  i.e.  it  is  not  a 
purely  mental  category.  We  have  already  discussed  how  Plotinus  objects  to  the  Gnostic  system  of 
aeons: if the imooxdoeu; are distinct only in femvoia, they are not tmoaxdoeiq at all (Ennead 2.9.1).252 
obota  AND  i)7t6oTaoi<; IN ORIGEN’S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY
(8.1)
We  conclude  this  section  with  the  firm  assurance  that  Origen  always  uses  the  terms 
oboia  and  (j7 t6oxaoi<;  to  mean  ‘nature’,  ‘substance’  or  ‘objective  reality’.  I  cannot  agree  with  those 
scholars  who  seek  to  explain  or  excuse  Origen’s  Trinitarian  doctrine  by  interpreting  these  terms  as
247 For a discussion of these passages,  see Gerson (1994), p.3.  Witt (1933), p.336 notes that Plotinus 
uses the term (m6oxaoi<;  as a synonym for oboia.  He also points out, p.320, that Augustine could see 
no  lexical  distinction between ouoia  and tm6oxaoi<;  (< de  Trinitate  5.8).  Urmson (1990)  argues  that it 
was common practice amongst later Greek philosophers, especially the Neo-Platonists, to conflate the 
two terms.
248 See section 5.3.
249 1 am grateful to Witt (1933), p.334 and Borret (1969), p.200 for some of the above references.
250 See Witt (1933), discussed in section 5.3.
251 Gerson (1994), p. 1.
66‘person’.  It  is  quite  obvious  that this  is  not what Origen means.  Moreover,  as  we  shall  shortly  see, 
Origen  has  important  philosophical  and  theological  reasons  for positing  a  clear  distinction  between 
Father, Son and Holy Ghost and for preaching a thorough subordinationism. Had Origen been aware of 
a term to describe the Son as merely a different person, as merely an individual instance of one and the 
same  divine  substance,  he  would  not have  wanted to  use  it.  Those  scholars  who  lament the  lack  of 
technical vocabulary in third century Greek Trinitarian theology and who try to twist the terms oboia 
and  i)7 i6oTaoiq  to  mean  ‘person’  are  guilty  of anachronism.  Whatever might be  the  concerns  of the 
Fathers at Nicaea,  Origen had no need and no  desire to view the  Son as merely numerically distinct 
from the Father.
(8.2)
Let us return briefly to those passages  from the  Commentary on St John  in which Origen refutes the 
Monarchians  by  claiming  that  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  are  three  distinct  and  individual 
oi)otai/i)7tooxdoei(;. As we have seen, Hanson and his fellow apologists interpret these claims as purely 
and  simply  the  refutation  of  Monarchianism,  the  bare  and  bald  assertion  that  there  are  three 
numerically distinct persons in the Trinity and that these three persons are of the same nature and the 
same ontological status. I cannot accept this. It seems to me that any close and careful reading of these 
passages  supports  my  contention  that  Origen  uses  the  terms  oboia  and  bndoxaoK;  in  the  secondary 
sense, to mean ‘nature’  or ‘substance’. Whenever Origen claims that the Son and the Holy Ghost are 
different in oboia  or different in brcdoTaoiq  from the Father, he  immediately justifies or explains this 
claim by describing  a strictly hierarchical Trinity.  In these passages,  Origen is  concerned with much 
more than a mere numerical or ‘personal’ distinction.
At  Commentary  on  St John  1.38  (42),  having  ridiculed  the  Monarchian  exegesis  of Psalm  45  and 
having  argued  that  the  Son  is  distinct  from  the  Father  as  an  individual  oboia  and  an  individual 
b7 t6oxaoic;,  Origen  proceeds  to  envisage  for  the  Son  the  role  of  a  Middle-Platonic  intermediary. 
Although he will not accept that the Son is literally the word of God, Origen exploits the metaphor to 
the full and shows how the Son fulfils all the functions of a quasi voice.  ‘God’s Word’ announces what 
is  in his heart;  he reports the  secrets  of his  Father.  As  with us,  the  spoken word is the messenger of 
what the mind perceives, so the Son is the messenger of the Father.  If Origen meant that the Son were
252 See section 5.3.
67simply a different ‘person’, a numerically distinct instance of the same generic nature as the Father, the 
Son would be unable to fulfil such a role. A mediator must be ontologically inferior.253 
At  Commentary  on  St John  2.10  (6),  Origen  responds  to  the  Monarchians  by  arguing  (a)  that  the 
onoia  of the Holy Ghost is different from the obata  of the Father and from the oboia  of the Son and 
(b)  that there  are  three  i)7 rooxdoeiq  in the  Trinity.  That these  claims  are  not  to be  read  as  a  simple 
assertion  of numerical  distinction  is  obvious  from  the  argument  that  follows.  Origen  proceeds  to 
describe a carefully graded Trinity, in terms that owe a very great deal to traditional Platonic ontology. 
Throughout the chapter, Origen stresses the dependent and contingent nature of both the Son and the 
Holy Ghost: only the Father is &y6vvr|TO<;. The original claim that the Holy Ghost is an individual and 
distinct oboia  is glossed and expanded as meaning that the Holy Ghost is a thoroughly subordinate and 
inferior  being.  The  Spirit  utterly  depends  upon  the  Son  for  both  his  existence  simpliciter  and  his 
characteristic existence as wise:
|i6voi)  xob  povoyevobc;  cpuoei  oiob  &pxf|0ev  xuyxdvovxoq,  ob  xPflCew  eoixe  to  ayiov  Ttvebpa 
5iaKOvobvxo<;  abxob  xfi  briooxdoei,  ob  pdvov  eiq  to  elvai  dAAa  Kai  ootpov  elvai  Kai  koyiKdv  Kai 
Slxaiov  Kai  Ttav  bxiTtoxobv  xpt)  abxo  voeiv  xuyxdveiv  Kara  (lexoxnv  xa>v  7tpoeipr||i6vGov  fijatv 
Xpioxob eivoicdv.254
We  reach  a  similar conclusion by re-reading  the  arguments  of Commentary on  St John  10.37  (21). 
Origen begins by arguing that the Son is a different oboia and a different b7t6oxaoiq  from the Father. 
He  then explains  or justifies  these  claims  by reminding his  readers  of Christ’s  words  to  the  Jews  at 
John 5.19:  Verily, verily I say unto you, the Son can do nothing by himself, but what he sees the Father 
do,  the Son does. Origen then concludes, a propos the Resurrection, that it was the Father who enabled 
or empowered the Son to perform this miracle (xob  Ttaxpoc;  abxcp  xobxo  xapi£o|i6voi)).255 Once again, 
we see that Origen responds to the Monarchians by positing a radical and thorough distinction between 
the persons of the Trinity. In this passage, the Son is presented as a dependent and helpless being, who 
can act only as his Father dictates.
253 On this point, see especially sections  10-11. Lyman (1994), p.40 agrees with me that if the Logos is 
to be the Mediator, his subordination is axiomatic.
254 See section 9.2 for a further discussion of this passage, particularly its Platonic provenance.
255 This passage can be usefully compared to Origen’s exegesis of John 5.19 at de Principiis  1.2.12. In 
both passages, Origen emphasizes the Son’s absolute obedience to and dependence upon the dictates of 
his Father. In the de Principiis passage, Origen compares the Son to a mirror which copies exactly the 
movements  of the  one  looking  into  the  glass:  sicut ergo  in speculo  omnibus motibus atque omnibus 
actibus,  quibus  is  qui  speculum  intuetur  movetur  vel  agit,  isdem  ipsis  etiam  ea  imago;  quae per 
speculum deformatur, actibus et motibus commovetur vel agit, in nullo prorsus declinans.
68Finally, we have the clinching evidence of Commentary on St John  2.23  (18).  In this passage,  as we 
have  seen,  Origen  elaborates  the  claim  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  different  Kat  obolav  by 
detailing  the  thorough  subordination  of the  Son  to  the  Father.  The  Father  is  nXeifov,  |iei^(ov  and 
KpekxGov  than the  Son and surpasses  (imsp^xei) him.  To be  different Kax  oboiav  means much more 
than being simply numerically distinct.
So while it is of course true that Origen develops his new Trinitarian theology as a direct and deliberate 
refutation of Monarchianism, we must be careful that we do not mistake his counter claims as purely 
and  simply the refutation of Monarchianism,  i.e.  as  purely  and  simply the  assertion  of numerical  or 
personal distinction. For Origen, the distinction between the three persons of the Trinity is much more 
fundamental.  It is the  distinction of three different natures,  each with their own tasks to perform and 
their own roles to play. In the remaining sections of this chapter, we shall see how Origen’s theological 
imperatives demand the establishment of a strictly hierarchical Trinity.  The fact that Father,  Son and 
Holy Ghost are different in nature and different in substance is not simply the response to Monarchian 
unitarianism; it is crucial to Origen’s entire theological system.256 
THE FATHER AND THE SON: TRANSCENDENCE AND SUBORDINATION
(9.1)
In section 2.1  we saw how Origen developed an exciting new Trinitarian paradigm, by being the first 
to describe the eternal generation of the Son. In conscious rejection of the old Apologist paradigm of 
the two-stage  Logos,  Origen proclaimed the  Son to be  an eternal aspect of the divine nature  and not 
simply  a  temporary  economic  necessity.  But  we  must  not be  misled  by  the  famous  and  innovative 
doctrine  of eternal generation into believing that Origen thereby implied that the Father and the  Son 
were of equal status. For Origen, as for the vast majority of ancient philosophers, eternal existence was 
certainly  not  the  guarantee  of ontological  superiority:  pre-eminence  was  the  prerogative  not  of the 
temporally  prior,  but  of the  logically  or  causally  prior.  The  locus  classicus  for  this  theory  is  the 
Enneads  of Plotinus.  Having  accepted  the  eternal  existence  of all  reality,  Plotinus  is  still  able  to 
structure the universe as a strict hierarchy. For example, although they have both existed eternally, the 
One is infinitely superior to Nous. The reason for this superiority is that the One has caused Nous to
256 This point is also emphasized by Trigg (1983), p.96 and Edwards (2002), p.67: the Son needs to be 
distinct from the Father in order to fulfil his roles and functions as a dieu subalterne. It could be argued 
therefore  that  Origen’s  major  objection  to  Monarchian  theology  was  that  it nullified  the  notions  of 
transcendence and subordinationism that were so crucial to his philosophical system.
69exist;  the  One  is  logically  or  causally  prior  and  is  therefore  superior.257  Origen’s  doctrine  of the 
generation of the Son is similar in many ways to Plotinus’ doctrine of the emanation of Nous. We must 
always  remember  that  Origen  is  working  within  the  same  framework  of  orthodox  Platonic 
philosophy.258 In any such system, the gulf between cause and effect, producer and produced, is such as 
to provoke a necessary and inevitable subordinationism. For Origen therefore the subordinate status of 
the Son is the unavoidable consequence of causal dependence.259 Although he exists eternally, the Son 
is inferior to the Father because he is a contingent and needy being who depends absolutely upon the 
Father for every moment of his existence. We have already discussed how Origen interprets the eternal 
generation of the Son as a continuous begetting and how this implies a continuous causal dependence. 
As  the  rays  of the  sun are  eternally dependent upon  their  source  and  origin,  so  is  the  Son eternally 
dependent upon the Father.260 This model of the Son’s reliance on the Father is repeated and elaborated 
throughout Origen’s oeuvre.
(9.2)
At  Commentary on St John  2.23  (18).  Origen explains the  subordination of the Son to the Father by 
arguing that it is simply because the Father is the Father,  i.e. the cause or producer, that he surpasses 
the  Son.  Applying the traditional Platonic  dogma that the  cause is necessarily greater than the effect, 
Origen thoroughly subordinates the Son to the Father:  < p   5£  A.6ycp 6  7taxi)p xf|<; dA.r|0elaq  Gsoq  7tX.sicov 
eoxi  xai  pei£cov  f|  &Xq0eia  Kai  6  xaxqp  a>v  ao(pia<;  Kpeixxcov  eoxi  Kai  5ia(p£pcov  q  oocpia,  xouxcp 
l)ft£p6X£i  xou  elvai  "cpdx;  &A.q0iv6vH .  This Trinitarian paradigm is very similar to the one described at 
Commentary  on  St John  2.10  (6),  discussed  above.261  Throughout  this  passage,  Origen  stresses  the 
dependent and contingent nature of both the Son and the Holy Ghost.  Only the Father is independent 
and self-sufficient, because only he is 6y£vvqxo!;. By contrast, the Son and the Holy Ghost are causally 
dependent  upon  their  immediate  prior.  Origen  explicitly  argues  that  the  Holy  Ghost  is  ‘in  need’ 
(xpq^eiv) of the  Son,  that it is by  ‘participation’  (pexoxfi)  in the Son that the Holy Ghost comes into 
being.
257 See especially Ennead 5.1.6 and 5.3.15.
258 Despite Edwards’ argument in his recent work, Origen Against Plato (2002).
259 Bigg (1913), p.243,  rightly notes  that the basic  difference between the Father and the  Son is  ‘the 
difference between cause and effect’. He does not however place this belief within the correct Platonic 
context  and  does  not  therefore  recognize  the  extreme  subordinationism  that  it  inevitably  involves. 
Edwards (2002), p.70 is much closer to the mark: “The Father is superior to the other two hypostases in 
so far as they are logically, if not temporally, posterior to his act of generation.”
260 See especially Homily on Jeremiah 9.4, discussed in section 2.1.
261 See sections 5.2 and 8.2.
70This theory of participation is most fully developed at Commentary on St John 2.2.  Origen begins by 
describing  a  dilemma  that  can  easily  beset  well-meaning  Christians  who  are  anxious  to  escape  the 
heresy of ditheism:
(1)  Either they deny the individuality of the Son and argue that one and the same God is simply called 
the Son (i.e. the Monarchians).
(2)  Or they deny the divinity of the Son, arguing that his oboia  is distinct from that of the Father and 
that they are separate and different from one another (i.e. the Adoptionists).
Kai  to  noXXotiq  (piXo06ooq  elvai  £bxop6voi)<;  xapdaaov,  EbA.aPoi)|i£vooq  8bo  dvayopeGoai  0£ouq  Kai 
napa  xobxo  7iepi  Trircxovxaq i|/eu5£Oi Kai  doePeoi  8dypaaiv,  rjxoi  &pvoup6voi)<; iSidxrixa uiou  fex£pav 
napa  xijv  tou  naxpoc;  bpoXoyouvxaq  0£ov  elvai  xov  |i£xPl  dvdpaxoc;  nap’  abxoiq  "uidv" 
npooaop£udji£vov,  rj  dpvoupEvoix;  xijv  0e6xr|xa  xoi)  uiob  xi0evxa<;  8e  abxob  xqv  i8i6xr)xa  Kai  xqv 
oboiav Kaxa  ncpiypaipijv  xuyxavouoav fex£pav  xou  naxpd<;,  fevxeG0ev  Xueo0ai Suvaxai.262 
In solving this  dilemma,  Origen must assert both the  individuality of the  Son and his  divinity.263  To 
believe  that  the  Son  is  an  individual  oboia,  distinct  from the  Father,  need  not automatically  lead to 
Adoptionism.  Origen’s  solution is  to  distinguish abx60eo<;  from 0eoq  and to  identify the  former with 
the Father and the latter with the Son. By using the term abxdbeoq, Origen implies that the Father is the 
‘form’  of  divinity,  ‘divinity  itself,  in  which  the  Son  participates  and  thus  becomes,  is  made, 
divine:  xav  8e  to  7iapa  to  abx60£oq  pcxoxfi  xf|<;  ekeIvoo  0£6tt|to<;  0£O7toiob|i£vov  obx  "6  0£oq"
itkXa  ,,0£6< ;,,  (Commentary on St John 2.2).
Both the argument and the language of this passage are overtly and deliberately Platonic. It is simply a 
Christian version of the theory of forms.  As  Christopher Rowe points out, the term traditionally used 
for  a  form  is  abxd  to  F.264  At Phaedo  75-8,  for  example,  we  read  of abxd  to  KaX.6v  (the  form  of 
beauty),  abxd  xd  aya06v  (the  form  of  goodness),  abxo  to  8ixaidv  (the  form  of  justice)  and
abxo  xo  loov  (the form of equality).265
262 Hein (1993), p. 100 discuses this passage and agrees with me that the first group described by Origen 
are the Modalistic Monarchians and the second group are the Dynamic Monarchians or Adoptionists. 
Balas (1975), pp.269-170 also discusses this passage, albeit very briefly.
263 It is interesting to note that we find exactly the same dilemma in the Dialogue with Heraclides  1.6- 
2.27:  anxious to escape both Monarchianism and Adoptionism, Maximus has fallen headlong into the 
heresy of Ditheism.
264 Rowe (1993), p.7.
265  The  same  language  is  used  in  book  6  of  the  Republic,  where  Plato  similarly  speaks  of 
abxo  xo  KaXdv  and  abxo  xo  aya0dv.  At  Symposium  21 ICE,  Diotima  repeatedly  refers  to 
abxd  xd  Ka^dv and at Phaedrus 25D, Socrates describes the soul’s vision of abxo  xd  KaXdv.
71By  describing  God  the  Father  as  abx60eoq,  Origen  is  using  technical  terminology  that  would  be 
instantly  recognized  by  his  erudite  readers.  But  it  is  not  only  the  terminology  that  recalls  Platonic 
ontology. The very role and function of God the Father described in this passage is remarkably similar 
to  the  role  and  function  of the  forms  in  Plato’s  metaphysics.  For  Plato,  the  forms  perform  a  vital 
causative or creative role. It is, for example, the unique ‘form of beauty’ that causes the many beautiful 
things of this world to be beautiful. Indeed at Phaedo  100B the forms are explicitly described as aixia. 
This  doctrine  of the  causative  or  creative  power  of the  forms  is  mythologically  elaborated  in  the 
Timaeus, in which Plato describes the created world as modelled upon the world of the forms (Timaeus 
30). At Commentary on St John 2.2, Origen ascribes a very similar creative or causative power to God 
the  Father:  as  the  ‘form  of  divinity’,  the  Father  causes  the  Son  to  be  divine;  he  divinizes  him
(080710lOU|IE VOV).
The  relationship  between  a  form and  its  many phenomenal  instances  is  often  described  in  terms  of 
participation.  In the Symposium,  Diotima argues  that it is by participation in the form of beauty that 
beautiful  things  become  beautiful:  dlX   abxd  k<x0’  abxo  pe0’   abxou  povoei8£q  del  ov,  xd  8£  dXXa
7tdvxa  KaX.a SKeivou nex£yovxa xpdrcov xiva xoiobxov  (Symposium 21 IB). We find the same argument 
in  the  Phaedo:  el  xi  feoxiv  aXXo  xaXov  nXr\v  abxo  xo  \caX6v,  ob8&  8i’  ev  dXXo  kclXov
elvai  f|  8idxi  pex6yei  exeivou  xob  xa^ob  (Phaedo  100C).  The  doctrine  of participation is  central  to 
Plato’s explanation of physical reality.266 Origen adopts the same  scheme,  virtually unchanged,  when 
he  argues that  it is by participation (pexoxfl)  in the  Father -  qua  the  form of divinity -  that the  Son 
becomes divine.267
But by describing the relationship between the Father and the Son in terms of participation, Origen is in 
danger of reducing the status of the Son to that of a fake copy compared with the genuine original. This
266 At least in what are generally known as the ‘Middle-Period Dialogues’.
267 Edwards (2002) has devoted an entire book to distinguishing Platonism and Origenism, to proving 
that -   despite  an almost  universal  scholarly consensus  -  Origen’s  system is  in  fact entirely  different 
from that of a Platonist.  This bold revisionist thesis includes a discussion of Origen’s doctrine of the 
Son’s  participation  in  the  Father,  in  particular  the  use  of the  term  abxd0eoq  (pp.71-72).  Edwards 
explicitly argues that Origen’s Trinitarian theology has nothing whatever in common with the Platonic 
theory of forms: “Had autotheos been the neologism of a Platonist, it would no doubt have implied that 
God the Father is the paradigm in which an infinite host of other gods participates:  Origen, however, 
does  not  teach  that  the  Son  ‘participates’  in  the  Father.”  These  claims  are  surely  refuted  by  the 
unambiguous  evidence  of Commentary on  St John  2.2,  in which Origen explicitly states that it is by 
‘participation’  (pexoxfi)  in  the  Father  as  the  form  of divinity  (abx60eoq)  that  the  Son  is  divinized 
(08O7toiou(i£vov).  Moreover,  Origen goes on to say that those other  ‘gods’  spoken of in the Bible  are 
ordinary men  and  women  who  have  been  similarly  ‘divinized’  by  ‘participation’.  Despite  Edwards’
72is of course an important implication of Plato’s dual ontology. Only the forms have genuine existence: 
their  many  phenomenal  instances  are  poor  imitations,  striving  for  likeness  to  their  archetype  but 
necessarily falling far short. This doctrine is most clearly expressed in the Symposium, where Diotima 
describes the ascent to the form of beauty which involves the transcending and ultimate rejection of the 
many  seemingly  beautiful  things  in  favour  of  the  one  genuine  beauty  {Symposium  209E-212A). 
Explaining the Trinity according to the Platonic scheme of participation, Origen implies that the Son is 
not the full, complete and genuine divinity. This is the prerogative of the Father. It is with this in mind 
that Origen describes the Son as simply 0eoq  and the Father as 6  0eoq, with the article.
It is interesting to compare this passage from the Commentary on St John with de Principiis  1.2.13 (= 
Justinian, Epistle  to Mennas,  in Mansi 9.525).268 Here too  Origen compares the Father to  a Platonic 
form and the Son to one who participates in the form. The Father is described as at>xoaya06v, the form 
of goodness-  as  such,  he  is purely or absolutely good {hnXcbq  hyaQ6q).  The  Son is merely the  image 
(eIkoov) of this goodness,  an inferior copy.  Similarly, he is merely the image of the Father’s divinity, 
not  ‘the  one  true  God’  (John  17.3).269  The  term eLkgov  is  also  part  of the  technical  vocabulary  of 
orthodox Platonism.  It is the conventional, derogatory way to describe the objects of the phenomenal 
world, unfavourably compared with the one original archetype.270 Once again, we see that the status of 
the Son has been undermined by the adoption of the Platonic model of participation.271 
Origen concludes the argument of Commentary on St John 2.2, by re-iterating that the Son is not divine 
by  virtue  of his  own  intrinsic  nature  (oi)K  av  5’  atixo  eoxpkgcn;),  but  is  wholly  dependent  upon  the 
divinity of the Father. The Son draws or attracts this to himself:  anaoac,  xqc;  0£6xr|xo<;  siq  feauxbv. It is 
the  divinity of the  Father -   and that  alone -  that causes  the  Son to be  divine.  Origen describes  this
arguments, we can only conclude that Origen’s  doctrine of participation as described at Commentary 
on St John 2.2 is overtly and conventionally Platonic.
268  See  also  Jerome’s  translation  of this  passage  given  at  Letter  to  Avitus  2  (quoted  in  Butterworth 
(1966), p.27).
c.f. Commentary on St John 2.2, where Origen quotes the same verse with the same gloss: the Son is 
not the one true God, but an inferior copy of this primal divinity.
270  See especially Books  6 and 7  of the Republic.  Dillon (1992), pp. 16-17  discusses this point.  It is 
interesting  to  compare  Commentary  on  St  John  6.6  (3),  where  Origen  contrasts  aOxoaXf|0£ia,  the 
npandxurcoc;  of Truth  (Christ),  with  its  many  Eixdvsq  (true  and just  souls).  Passage  referred  to  by 
Bostock (1975), p.247.
271 Balas (1975), pp. 262-3 and 269-270 discusses Origen’s doctrine of participation as it applies to the 
Trinity.  He  rightly  notes  that  the  doctrine  involves  notions  of  ‘derived’,  ‘dependent’  and  ‘lower’ 
possession compared with the  ‘full’  and  ‘upper’ possession enjoyed by the  ‘source’.  Gregg and Groh 
(1981),  p.108-110  provide  a  brief discussion  of Origen’s  doctrine  of the  Son’s  participation  in  the 
Father.  They  point  out  that  the  Stoics  distinguished  ‘according  to  nature’  from  ‘by  participation’.
73causal relationship in terms of contemplation. It is by contemplating the Father’s divinity that the Son 
becomes divine:
hX X a 7idA.iv xa>v  7iA.ei6vcov eIk6vcov  f|  dpxdxurcoq  eLkcov 6  Ttpdq  xov  0e6v feoxi Adyoq,  oq  "fev  dpxff 
fjv,  xd)  Elvai "Ttpoq xov 0e6v" d£i pbvcov "Qe6q",  oOk  av 8’  abxo  EoxnK®q £1  Pi)  0£ov  fjv,  Kai  ouk
av  pcivac;  0e6<;,  Ei  pi)  napbpcvE  xf|  d8iaXEi7ixcp  06qt  xob  rcaxpixob  pdOouq  (Commentary  on  St John 
2.2).
Once more, Origen is keen to stress the contingent and dependent status of the Son. He is God only in 
so  far  as,  and  only  as  long  as,  he  contemplates  the  Father.  We  have  already discussed how  Origen 
interprets the eternal begetting of the Son as a continuous begetting and how this implies a continuous 
dependence.  The  same  idea permeates  the present passage.  The  eternal  existence  of the  Son as  God 
depends upon an eternal contemplation (d8iaA.£i7ix(p  06<?) of the Father. If he were ever to ‘look away’, 
he would cease to be divine.  We note how Origen draws particular attention to John’s claim that the 
Word was with God (John 1.1). This is taken as further Scriptural proof of the Son’s subordinate status: 
he is ‘God’ only because he is with God?12
This  ‘contemplation-model’ is also Platonic.273 Plotinus uses it to describe the relationship of Intellect 
to  the  One  and  of  Soul  to  Intellect.  The  image  is  most  fully  developed  at  Ennead  5.2.1:  xo 
56  yEvdpsvov  eI<; abxo fe7t£Oxpd(pr|  Kai brA.r|pd)0r|  Kai feybvExo 7tpo<; abxo'  PA.6nov Kai  vobc; obxot;.  Kai 
q p£v  Ttpoq  feKEivo axtiaii;  abxob  xo ov  etioItjoev, f|  5&   rcpdq  abxo  06a  xov vobv.  ’ ET iE i  obv  eoxti  7rp6q
abxd,  Iva  i8p,  dpob  votx;  yiyvfixai  Kai  ov.  Similarly,  soul  achieves  its  fullness  by  contemplating
Intellect: ’ ekei  psv  obv  pAxTtouca, 60ev  byevExo,  TtAipobxai.274  For  both  Plotinus  and  Origen,  the 
lower hypostases are eternally dependent upon their immediate prior. This dependence is expressed in 
terms of contemplation.
We also note that at Ennead 5.2.1, Plotinus  argues that it is the  ‘station’  or ‘position’  of the Intellect, 
specifically  its  proximity  to  the  One,  that  is  the  cause  of  its  existence: 
’etteI  obv  Eoxrj  7tpd$  abxd,  i'va  I8p,  dpob  vob<;  yiyvsxai  Kai  ov. This claim can be usefully compared 
to  Origen’s  exegesis  of John  1.1,  discussed  above:  the  Son  is  God  only  because  he  is  with  God
Origen  was  certainly  very  familiar  with  Stoic  philosophy  (see  Chadwick  (1947)  and  would 
undoubtedly have been aware of this distinction.
272 See Commentary on St John 2.1, discussed next, for an elaboration of this argument.
273 Kelly (1958), p.128 refers to Albinus, Handbook 14.3.
274 See also Ennead 5.1.6, 5.3.11, 6.7.16, 6.7.17
74(rcpdq  xov  0edv). This argument is more fully developed at Commentary on St John 2.1. Origen begins 
by drawing particular attention to the order of the phrases in the first verse of the first chapter of John:
1.  The word was with God.
2.  The word was God.
He then argues that the Evangelist had good reason for arranging the verse in this particular way. The 
order of the phrases illustrates or explains the relationship of the Father and the Son. The divinity of the 
Word  is  solely  and wholly the  result of his  ‘proximity’  to  the  Father.  He  is  God because  and  only 
because he is ‘with’ (7tpoq)  the one true God:  8ia xoiixo, iva  5ovr|0f|  find  xot>  "rcpoq  xov 0e6v"  elvai  6 
X6yoq  vor|0f|vai  yivdpevoq  0e6<;,  k&y£xai-  "Kai  6  Xdyoq  fjv  rcpoq  xov  0£6v",  £7 t£ixa-  "Kai  0£oq  fjv  6 
X6yoq" (Commentary on St John 2.1).
The Saviour's famous reply to the disciples who try to share their pic-nic with him, I have food to eat 
which you  do  not know  (John 4.32),  provides  further material  for  discussion on the  contingent  and 
dependent  nature  of the  Son.  Origen begins  by  arguing  that,  like  men  and  angels,  the  Son requires 
spiritual nourishment and that this is, moreover, an eternal requirement. As we constantly require food, 
so the Son constantly requires the Father. Once again, we see Origen focus on the Father’s continuous 
sustaining  of the  Son.  As  the  Mediaeval  scholastic  philosophers  speak  of the  need  for  the  Father’s 
constant succour and support for the continued existence of the universe, in the same way does Origen 
describe the Father’s relationship to the Son.275 The Son does not exist independently, but requires the 
constant  sustaining  and  preserving  activity  of the  Father.  If that  support  were  withdrawn,  the  Son 
would cease  to exist.  The  Son depends upon the Father not simply for his original existence,  for the 
fact that he  came  into being,  but for every instant,  so  to  speak,  of his  eternal existence.  This eternal 
‘needinesss’  is  strongly  contrasted  with  the  eternal  self-sufficiency  and  independence  of the  Father. 
Origen insists that only the Father is h\z\hzdbq  and  abxdpKOix;:
xai  oi)K  axoTidv  yz  Xiyzxv  pi)  pdvov  dvOpamoix;  Kai  hyykXovq  fev8££iq  ctvai  xwv  vorjxcov  xpocpcov, 
b.XXa  Kai  xov  Xpiaxov  xou  0£ou-  Kai  ai)xo<;  ydp,  iv’  oi3xco<;  eitko, fe7uaK£ud(;£xai  dd  hno  xou
naxpoq  xoi) pdvou  dv£v8£ot>q Kai  abxdpKouq auxcp  (Commentary on St John 13.34).276
Origen stresses the contingent and dependent status of the Son throughout the Commentary on St John. 
Only  the  Father  is  unbegotten,  self-sufficient  and  independent.  By  contrast,  the  Son  relies  wholly,
275  Aquinas,  for  example,  emphasizes  the  intrinsic  and  eternal  existential  dependence  of all  created 
beings.  See  Coppleston  (1955),  p.137.  We  make  use  of some  of Coppleston’s  terminology  in  our 
analysis of Origen’s doctrine.
75absolutely and continually upon the Father.277 As such, within the context at least of Origen’s orthodox 
Platonism, the Son is a necessarily inferior being. In the following section of this chapter, we shall see 
how this ontological fact is exploited to the full. The Son is assigned roles and tasks that suit perfectly 
an inferior, even servile, being.
(10.1)
We have already discussed in some detail (section 1.2) how Origen’s predecessors, the Apologists, saw 
the Son as purely and simply an economic tool, the Father’s means of communicating ad extra. It is the 
Son  who  is  the  creator  and  redeemer  of  the  world  and  who  is  responsible  for  all  providential 
intervention. The transcendence of the Father is such that he must never leave his lofty abode to deal 
directly with his creation, but is always obliged to work through an intermediary. Since mediation was 
the Son’s entire raison d ’etre, the Apologists argued that he came into existence only when he needed 
to  exist,  only  on  the  ‘eve’  of creation.  In  direct  and  obvious  contrast  to  this  theological  paradigm, 
Origen  preached  the  eternal  existence  of the  Son  as  the  sine  qua  non  of the  eternal  existence  of 
essential divine attributes. Without the Son, God would not be wise, rational, powerful etc. The Son is 
not  simply  a  temporary  economic  necessity,  but  an  eternal  and  essential  component  of the  divine 
nature. As we have shown, Origen explained the existence of the Son first and foremost in terms of the 
life of God.278 But this is not the whole story. Although the Son is to be identified with essential and 
eternal divine attributes and although he is integral to the fullness of divine life, he is nevertheless the 
tool or servant of the transcendent Father. There is a very important element of delegation in Origen's 
Trinitarian theology which must not be  ignored.  Like  his predecessors,  Origen believes that it is  the 
Son who deals directly with fallen man, who communicates with him, educates him and who gradually 
prepares him for the ultimate revelation of God the Father.
(10.2)
Origen  agreed  with  the  Apologists  that  God  the  Father  was  a  transcendent  and  ultimately 
incomprehensible  being.  He  too  had  read  and  was  deeply  influenced by  the  philosophy  of Middle-
276 c.f. Albinus Handbook 10.3: only the first God is & 7ipoo8ef|<; (Blanc (1975), p.149).
277 Russell (1988), pp.54-55  argues that Origen distinguishes the participation of the Son as a peculiar 
kind of participation,  namely  ‘self-existent’,  ‘static’  and  ‘ontological’.  He distinguishes this  from the 
kind of participation which can be enjoyed by ordinary souls and which is ‘contingent’ and ‘dynamic’. 
While  it is of course obvious that Origen does not reduce the eternal relationship between the Father 
and  the  Son to the  temporary, precarious  participation  of the  blessed  (see  chapter 3,  section 9.3),  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  doctrine  of  participation  implies,  by  very  definition,  the  notion  of 
contingency.  Moreover,  as  we  have  seen,  Origen  repeatedly  argues  that  only  the  Father  is  self- 
sufficient; the Son is eternally ‘in need’.
76Platonism.279 Origen’s theology, as developed in the first chapter of the de Principiis, reveals a being 
who  is  (once  again)  very  different  from  the  loving  Father portrayed  in  the  Bible.  Like  the  God  of 
Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras and Theophilus, Origen’s God has been transformed into a Middle-Platonic 
First Principle. As far as he can be described at all, he is  ‘simple intellectual existence’  (de Principiis 
1.1.6). There is no mention here of the love of God or of his concern for creation. Origen’s main aim in 
this  chapter  seems  to  be  the  rather  repetitive  insistence  that  God  is  entirely  incorporeal.  This  is 
presumably  intended  both  as  a  nod  to  pagan  religious  sensibilities  and  as  a  rejection  of Gnostic 
materialism.280  But  there  is  nothing  specifically  or  even  characteristically  Christian  about  Origen’s 
description  of God.  The  first  chapter  of the  de Principiis  could very easily have  been written by  a 
pagan.
In chapters  1.1.5-6 of the de Principiis Origen repeats the claim of the Apologists that the transcendent 
God can never be fully known. He introduces the discussion with an unambiguous statement of divine 
incomprehensibility:  dicimus  secundum  veritatem  quidem  deum  incomprehensibilem  esse  atque 
inaestimabilem.  Whatever might be our present perception of God, it will necessarily fall far short of 
his reality. Using an image that has some interesting echoes of Buddhist theology, Origen compares the 
search for God to the attempt to understand the brightness of the sun by understanding the glimmer of a 
tiny  lamp.  Knowledge  of God  is  simply beyond  our present  capabilities.281  Origen  then  repeats  the 
doctrine, which we have already met in Justin and Theophilus, that an appreciation of the wonders of 
nature and of the meticulous workings of divine providence may allow us to infer the greatness of their
278 See section 3.
279 It is of course impossible to know precisely all the works read by Origen.  Gregory Thaumaturgos 
(Panegyric  13)  and Eusebius  (H.E.  6.19) both tell us  how much he valued pagan philosophy.  Dillon 
(1992),  p. 13  and  (1988),  p.223,  Lyman  (1993),  p.89  and  Trigg  (1983),  p.69  argue  that  Origen had 
certainly read Numenius: indeed he is actually cited at Contra Celsum  1.15 and 4.51. Dillon (1993), p.v 
points out that Albinus is never cited by name until the 6th  century, but that this does not mean that his 
work  was  not  used  as  a  preliminary  handbook,  his  ideas  absorbed  and  tacitly  reproduced.  Indeed, 
Dillon (1988), p.227 suspects that he influenced Origen. Even without a precise Quellenforschung, it is 
still  possible  and  indeed  necessary  to  place  Origen’s  philosophy  within  the  intellectual  milieu  of 
Middle-Platonism.
280 Edwards (2002), p.57  suggests that Origen’s insistence on divine incorporeality was also aimed at 
Epicurean  and  Stoic  materialism.  Dillon  (1988),  p.218  suggests  that the  arguments  of de Principiis 
1.1.1-4 are a deliberate response to objections raised by pagan polemicists, maybe even in direct debate 
with Origen.
281 Did Origen believe that created souls could never understand God or was this ignorance simply the 
temporary handicap of being in a body? The  answer to this is not immediately obvious,  since Origen 
appears to contradict himself (compare, for example, de Principiis  1.1.5-6 with de Principiis 4.3.14). It 
seems to me however that the famous Origenist doctrine of ‘satiety’ (ic6po<;), according to which souls 
have their fill of the Beatific Vision, become bored and so fall again (de Principiis 1.3.8,  1.4.1) implies 
that God can indeed be fully known (Otis (1958), p. 102 discusses Origen’s doctrine of satiety). It was
77originator and creator.282 But Origen adds the  all-important proviso that this method will reveal  only 
the Suvdpsiq  of God and not his oboia, the warmth and illumination of the sun and not the sun itself.283 
The doctrine of the transcendence and incomprehensibility of God is repeated at de Principiis 4.3.14, 
where  Origen  cites  the  example  of the  Apostle  Paul.  Although  persistent  and  diligent,  aided  and 
inspired  by  the  Holy  Ghost  itself,  Paul  could  only  conclude  that  the  judgements  of  God  are 
unsearchable and his ways past finding out (Romans  11.33). Such is the transcendence of God that the 
theological enterprise is necessarily doomed to failure.284
(10.3)
Having accepted that God is a transcendent and unknowable being,  Origen was obliged to develop  a 
doctrine  of  mediation  and  delegation  to  explain  both  the  original  creation  of  the  world  and  all 
subsequent providential control.  For Origen,  as  for the Apologists,  it is the Logos  who performs the 
crucial tasks of creation and providence. Origen’s doctrine of mediation and delegation is very obvious 
in the first two books of the Commentary on St John. Basing his argument upon a detailed exegesis of 
the first verses of the fourth Gospel, Origen argues that it is the Logos and not the Father who is the 
direct  and  immediate  creator  of the  physical  world.  The  task  of creation  is  delegated  to  a  lesser 
being.285  But although the Logos is the actual creator, Origen is keen to stress that he is simply the tool 
through whom the Father works. Commenting on John  1.3, Origen develops a careful ‘metaphysics of 
prepositions’.  He  argues  that the  world  is  created  ‘by’  (bno)  the  Father and only  ‘through’  (8ia)  the 
Son.  In  Aristotelian  terms,  the  Father  is  the  efficient  cause  and  the  Son  is  merely  the  instrumental 
cause.286  It is particularly important to note how Origen emphasizes  the  superiority of the Father,  as 
mightier  (kpeIttcdv)  and  greater  (psiCcov)  than  the  Son:  outgo  xoivov  Kai  evGdSe  d   ndvxa  Sia  too 
X6yov  kyevExo,  obx vno  xov Xdyov ey£vexo,  hXX'  biro  Kpdxxovoc;  Kai  pelCovoc; napa xov  X6yov.  xiq 
8’  av  aXXoq  ouxoq  xuyxdvq  f|  6  7taxf|p  (Commentary on St John 2.10 (6)).  Similarly, at Commentary
on St John 2.14 (8), Origen argues that while the Son ‘makes’ (rcoidv) and ‘furnishes’ (KaxaoKEud^eiv)
in attempt to correct this doctrine that Gregory of Nyssa proposed that God was infinitely ‘knowable’: 
if there is always more to leam, souls cannot become bored or sated. On this, see Sorabji (1983), p. 151.
282  This  is  the  via  analogiae,  already  popular  with  pagan  theologians  (see,  for  example,  Albinus 
Handbook 10). For a brief discussion, see Crouzel and Simonetti (1978), p.24.
283 For more on this point, see sections 1.2 and 12.1.
284 On this point, see Dillon (1988), pp.223, 225, 228-229.
285 de Faye (1923), III, p.40-41: “Origene ne peut concevoir Dieu manipulant la matiere, faconnnant le 
Cosmos de ses mains . . . le role effectif du Demiurge est devolu ou delague au Logos.” See also Lowry 
(1936), p.230.
286 On this particular point and for a useful discussion of the  ‘metaphysics of prepositions’, see Dillon 
(1992), p. 15. Bostock (1992), p.259 also notes that the Son is merely the ‘instrumental cause’.
78the world,  it is the Father who is the real creator.  It is the Father who  ‘acts’  (svepyeiv), who is, once 
again, the  ‘efficient cause’.  Quoting Psalm 33.9 -  he spoke and they were made;  he commanded and 
they stood firm -  Origen imagines God the Father ‘ordering’ the Son to create the world: ’ " svexelA.axo"  
yap 6 &y£vr|xo<;  0s6<;  xq>  npooxoxdKfp ndariq  Kxiaecoq  "Kai  £Kxia0r|oav".  For  this  reason, the Logos is 
described as the Father’s servant:  oxi  i)7ir|p6xr|<;  •  •   •   ysvdpevoq 6  Xdyoq  xov  k6g[iov Kaxeoxeuaoe.
It could thus be  argued that Origen’s Demiurge  is  even more  inferior and more  subordinate  than the 
Demiurge  of contemporary  pagan  philosophy.  The  Demiurge  of Albinus  and  the  others  has  carte 
blanche to create what and how he likes. The First God of Middle-Platonism has no interest whatsoever 
in creation and is probably unaware that it is even taking place.  In Origen’s scheme, by contrast, the 
Father is still in ultimate control: he tells the Son what and how to create. It is the Father who has all 
the creatorial initiative. The Demiurge is the mere workman who obeys the orders of his superior.
In describing the creation of the world,  Origen makes  frequent use of the Platonic  doctrine  of a pre­
existent plan, the eidetic blueprint of the future creation. Like a boat-builder or architect, the creator of 
the universe works according to a plan.287 This plan is identified with the Kdopoq  vor|xoq, the world of
the  forms.288  It  should  be  noted  however  that  it  is  the  Father  who  created  the  forms  and  who  then 
orders  the  Son  to  create  according  to  this  plan:  Kai  A.8kx£ov  oxi  Kxioaq,  iv’  obxcoq  eirao,  ep\|/uxov 
oocpiav  6  0e6<;,  at>xf|  £7i6xpev|/ev  drcd  xd>v  fev  abxfi  xtirnov  xoiq  0601  Kai  xp  \3A.r|  napaoxeiv  Kai  xf|v 
TtXdoiv Kai  xa elSrj,  eyd> 5£  ecpioxr||!i ei  Kai  xaq  obalaq  (Commentary on St John  1.19 (22)). The key
word in this passage is 87r£xpevj/ev: the Father entrusts the task of creation to the Son.
There  is  a  similar  paradigm  of creation  developed  in  the  Contra  Celsum.  At  Contra  Celsum  6.60, 
Origen argues that, although it is the Son who actually creates, it is the Father who orders him to do so 
and who is therefore the ‘primary creator’:
Xkyovxeq  xov  p£v  rcpooexcoc;  Srpioupydv  etvai  xov  uiov  xoi)  0eoi>  A.6yov  Kai  coorcepei  abxoupyov  xo 
u  k6o|!od,  xov  8£  7iax£pa  xoi)  X6you  xq>  7ipoaxexax£vai  xtp  oiq)  fcaoxoi)  X6yq)  7toif|aai  xov  K6op.ov 
elvai  Ttpcbxax;  Sripioupydv.
At  Contra  Celsum  2.9,  Origen  likewise  describes  creation  in  terms  of the  Father ordering  the  Son. 
When,  for  example,  the  Lord  says  Let  us  make  man  in  our  own  image  (Genesis  1.3)  -   we  are  to
287 See, for example, Commentary on St John  1.19 (22).
288 The Platonic original for this theory is the Timaeus, a dialogue which Origen knew well.
79understand  a  collaborative  creation  in  which  the  Son  obeys  the  orders  and  commands  of  his 
Father:  Kai'  xouxcp  dprpckvai  x6-  "TtoiqacQpEv  av0pco7iov  Kax’  dKdva  Kai  6poia>oiv  qpExkpav"-
7ipooxax6^vxa  8k  xov  A .6yov  7i£7ioir|Kkvai  7idvxa, oca  6  7iaxi)p  abxco  kvcxdXaxo.  Origen  quotes  the 
famous verse -  He spoke and they were made;  he commanded and they stood firm  (Psalm 33.9)  in 
support of his general theory of creation: God speaks to the Son, who obeys his commands and creates 
the  world.289  These  ideas  are  repeated  almost  verbatim  at  Contra  Celsum  2.31,  where  Origen 
summarizes the arguments of the previous chapters:
oxi  6  0£O <;  £V£X£iX.axo  7i£pi  x(ov  xoaooxcov  kv  Kdopco,  Kai  £Kxia0r|,  Kai  oxi  6  xi)v  kvxoXr|v  A.apd>v 
6  0£O <;  X6yoc;  t^v.
The  subordinate  status  of the  Son and his  role  as  the  mere  tool  through whom the  Father works  is 
epitomized in Origen’s gloss on Genesis  1.3, Let there be light. This verse was a notorious crux in early 
Patristic exegesis. The controversy centred upon the precise mood of the verb. The Hebrew original (y- 
hee) was translated into Greek as y£vr|0f|xa>. This is an ambiguous form: it could be either an optative 
or an imperative. Tatian read the verb as an optative and was roundly condemned by both Clement and 
Origen for imagining the Father praying or wishing for light.290 Correcting this foolish exegesis, Origen 
insists  that  the  verb  be  read  as  the  Father’s  command to  the  Son:  Sripioupyoq  yap  ucoq  6  Xpioxdq
kaxiv,  d o  Xkyci  6  7iaxi)P’  "y£vr|0f|xcD  cpabq’'  (Commentary  on  St  John  1.19  (22)).  We  find  the  same
exegesis  at  Contra  Celsum  2.9:  kv  xf|  Kaxa  Mcoooka  koojiotiouq:  Tipooxdxxovxa  xov  rcaxkpa
EipqKkvai  x6-  "y£vri0f|xco  (pax;"  Kai  "y£vr|0f|xco  oxEpkcopa"  Kai  xa  Xoind,  ooa  Ttpoakxa^Ev  6  0eo<; 
y£vko0ai.
THE ROLE OF THE SON IN ORIGEN’S MYSTICAL THEOLOGY
( 11.1)
The Son’s role as a quasi Platonic intermediary is also evident in Origen’s mystical theology. The Son 
is simply the necessary means by which and through which we reach an otherwise unreachable Father. 
Origen’s mystical theology is Christocentric only in so far as Christ plays the vital roles of mystagogue
289  ~
Kai  xauxa  XkyopEv  o6k  auxoi  k7uPdXX,ovx£<;  dAAd  xai<;  napa  Too8aioi<;  (pcpopkvaiq  7ipocpr|X£iai<; 
7uax£uovx£q- kv  alq  kkycxai rccpi 0eou  Kai xd>v  Sripioupyqpdxcov auxaiq kk^coi  xa ouxraq  kyovxa-  '"oxi 
abxdq  eIke  Kai ky£vf|0qoav,  at>xd<;  kvcxdXaxo  Kai £Kxlo0qoav. d   yap kvcxdXaxo 6 0£6q,  Kai kKxloOr) 
xa  8r||iioi)pyfipaxa,  xiq  av  Kaxa  xo  dpkoKOv  xcp  7ipo(pqxiKcp  7iv£\3paxi  dr|  6  xqv  xqXiKauxqv  xou 
7iaxpo<;  kvxoXi)v  kK7tX.r|pcoaai  8uvr|0d<;  f|  6,  iv’  ouxcoq  bvopdoco,  E|i\|/i)xo<;  A.6yoq  Kai  "dA.f|0£ia" 
xuyxdvcov;
290 Clement, Eccl.  Proph.  38.1;  Origen,  On Prayer 24;  Contra  Celsum  6.51.  See Chadwick’s (1953) 
discussion ad loc. and Grant (1988), p. 127.
80and  psychopomp.  It  is  he  who  leads  souls  to  God  the  Father.  What  is  particularly  important  to  the 
present argument is the way in which Origen repeatedly insists that the Son is merely the means to an 
end and not the end itself. As such, he will prove ultimately redundant, de trop, to the aspiring mystic 
who has outgrown his rather elementary help.
We have often noted that Origen’s pedagogic theory is founded upon the recognition of the necessity of 
grading teaching according to the different abilities of different pupils and how he therefore develops a 
strictly  hierarchical  structure  of  learning,  distinguishing  sharply  between  the  ‘simple’  and  the 
‘perfect’.291  Origen’s  Christology  reflects  or  rather  epitomizes  this  fundamental  doctrine.  A  central 
tenet of Origen’s Christology and one which would later arouse the fierce indignation of the orthodox 
is the claim that the Incarnation is simply a temporary pedagogic condescension. It is but the necessary 
means of communicating with a fallen race unable, as yet,  to contemplate God as God and therefore 
requiring the preliminary revelation of God as Man.292 This figure of Jesus of Nazareth remains useful 
to the  intellectually and spiritually naive,  to the simpliciores of Origen’s urban congregations.293  It is 
with them in mind that Origen devotes so many of his Homilies to an elaboration of the earthly life of 
Jesus  and  to  glorifying,  with St Paul,  the person of Christ Crucified.294  For the  elite  of the  Church, 
however, it is possible -  indeed necessary -  to transcend this preliminary stage. They must strive to see 
behind  the  veil  of flesh  and  begin  to  contemplate  God  as  God  and  not  God  as  Man.  According  to 
Origen, the Incarnation has absolutely no permanent or intrinsic importance:  it is merely the first step 
on the ladder.295 The mature Christian will pass beyond this first stage and come to contemplate Christ 
stripped of all flesh, returned to his original, pristine and proper state as the discamate, eternal Son of 
God, the Logos.296
291  See Harl (1958), pp.l 19-123 and Bigg (1913), pp.178-84 for interesting discussions of this subject. 
Lebreton  (1923  and  1924)  and  Trigg  (1981)  accuse  Origen  of preaching  two  distinct  versions  of 
Christianity. We discuss this subject in more detail in chapter 3, section 6.1.
292  So  Harl  (1958),  p. 114:  “Origene  con?oit  l’lncamation comme  une  adaptation pedogogique  de  la 
divinite aux capacites humaines.” She discusses this point in some detail in ibid. pp. 229-33.
293  Bigg (1913),  p. 166 provides  an interesting  analysis  of the kind  of congregation who  would have 
heard Origen’s homilies.
294 Harl (1958), p. 199.
295 See chapter 3, sections 5.1-7.5  for a full discussion of the fact that Origen has no understanding of 
the soteriological value of the Incarnation.
296 Origen sees the Incarnation as a purely temporal event, lasting only 32 years. The ascended, exalted 
Christ  has  divested  himself of all  the  dross  of corporeality.  Harl  (1958),  pp.199-200,  241  and  284 
provides  an  interesting  discussion  of this  important  point.  She  quotes  Commentary  on  St John  1.7 
(9):  xoi)  A.6you  87iaveX06vxo<;  (ind  xou  osoapxcooBai  ecp’  o  "f|v  ev  dpxfl  rcpdq  xov  0g6v".  She  also 
refers to the treatise On Prayer 23.2, where Origen similarly presents the exalted Christ as divested of 
all humanity. Bigg (1913), p.211  does not accept that the exalted Christ is permanently divested of his 
humanity.  We discuss this point in chapter 3, sections 5.3 and 5.4.
81But  not even  yet  has  the  mystic  reached  the  final  stage  of the  x^Xeioq  Christian.  It  is  Origen’s belief 
that  even  the  contemplation  of  the  Logos  is  a  stage  to  be  transcended.  The  ultimate  goal  is 
contemplation of the  Father.  In his mystical  theology,  Origen clearly distinguishes the  Father and the 
Son  and  ascribes  to  the  latter  a  markedly  subordinate  role.  The  Son  is  simply  a  tool,  the  means  by 
which  and  through  which  the  Father  might  be  gradually  revealed.  The  Incarnation  is  the  supreme 
example of this kind of mediation. By the assuming of human flesh, the Son sets us on the first rung of 
the  ladder.297  From  this  lowly,  but  necessary  beginning,  he  will  lead  us,  stage  by  stage,  higher  and 
higher, until we can bear the full revelation of God the Father. But when we have reached this, the final 
goal, the ladder will lie discarded, useless and forgotten.
( 11.2)
This hierarchy of ascent is most clearly described at Commentary on St John  19.6. Commenting on the 
Lord’s  famous  reply  to  St  Philip  -   he  that  hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the  Father  (John  14.9),  Origen 
proceeds to describe the flight of the Christian soul and its ascent to the ultimate contemplation of God 
the Father. The crucial point for us to note  is Origen’s insistence that the Son is merely the means and 
not the end. The passage is long, but we quote it in full because it contains so many important points: 
i(p  avaPaiveiv  a no  if|^  yvwocw:;  xou  uioi)  ini  xi)v  yvwoiv  xou  Tiaxpo^  xov  yivwoKovxa  xov  7 tax£pa, 
Kai  pr)  aXXw^  6pao0ai  xov  Ttaxepa  f|  xw  6paa0ai  xov  uidv "o  yap  EwpaKwc;,  cpqoiv,  fcp£  cwpaKE 
xov  n£pvj/avxa  pc"-  ouk  av  hi  cipqKEi  xo  *o  fcwpaKax;  xov  7iax£pa  £wpaK&v  pc",  crceiTrep  6  xov 
X6yov  x£0£wpr|KW^  xou  0eou  0£wpci  xov  0e6v,  dvafialvwv  dno  xou  X6you  7 ipd<;  xov  0c6v-  dpqxavov 
hi  eoxiv  pq  tino  xou  X6you  0£(opfioai  xov  0e6v.  Kai  6  0£wpwv  xqv  oo<piav,  qv  ekxioev  6  0£O <;  npo
~  ->98
xwv  aicovtov  e'u;  spya  auxou,  avaPaivEi  dno  xou  EyvwK&vai  xt) v  otxptav  etu  xov  7 iax6pa  auxq^.“  
aSuvaxov  hi  x(°pis  oo<pia;  npoaywyqq  voq0qvai  xov  xqq  ocxpiaq  0e6v  .  .  .  Kai  xdxa  ye  worcEp
Kaxa  xov  vaov  dvapaOpoi  xive;  rjoav,  8i'  wv  £iaf|£i  xk;  e'k;  xa  ayia  xwv  dyiwv,  ouxwq  oi  n&vxcq 
qpwv  dvafkiOpoi  6  povoyEvqq  eoxiv  xou  Oeou-  Kai  wanEp  xwv  dva(5aOpwv  6  pfev  eoxiv  npwxoq  ini 
xa  Kaxw.  6  8e  xouxou  dvwxSpw,  Kai  oi3xw<;  EcpE^qq  p^XP1   *ou  dvwxdxw,  ouxwq  oi  p£v  ndvxEt;  Eioiv 
dva^aOpoi  6  owxqp-  6  hi  olov  rcpwxoq  Kaxwxfcpw  xd  dvOpwnivov  auxou,  w  ETuPalvovxcq  68£uop£v 
Kaxa  xd  E£,q<;  auxou  ovxa  xi)v  naoav  ev  xoi<;  dva0a0poi<;  68dv,  woxe  dvaPqvai  5i’   auxou  ovxoq  Kai 
dyy£Xou  Kai  xwv  Xomwv  8uvap£wv.  Kai  Kaxa  xaq  ETUvoiaq  hi  auxou,  £i7t£p  EXEpdv  eoxiv  bhoq  Kai
297 See Louth (1981), p.65 for the relevance of this doctrine in a specifically mystical context.
298  c.f.  Commentary  on  St John  2.23  (18),  for  the  claim  that  the  Father  of wisdom  is  ‘greater’  than 
wisdom. See also our discussion of the theological issues involved in sections 5.5 and 8.2.
82Oupa,  7cpoanavTf|oai  5ei  xf|  65w,  iva  pcxa  xauxa  oi3xw<;  cp0aof|  tic;  feni  xqv  0upav (Commentary on St 
John  19.6).
Surely the  most  natural  and  obvious  interpretation  of the  verse  -  he that hath seen  me hath seen  the 
Father -  would be to conclude that the Father and the Son are one and the same. Origen will not accept 
this reading.  Indeed, he  insists that the phrase - he that hath seen me hath seen the Father -  is not the 
same  as  the  phrase  -   he  that  hath  seen  the  Father hath  seen  me.  Instead,  he  interprets  the  verse  as 
Scriptural  evidence  of  the  Son’s  role  as  psychopomp  and  mystagogue.  The  Son,  in  the  guise  of 
Wisdom,  guides  the  mystic:  dSuvaxov  S£  oo<pia$  npoaywyqc;  vor|0f|vai  xov  xf|<;  oocpiac;
0e6\\  At the end of the passage, the Son is described as the steps (dvaPa0poi) of the Temple which lead 
to  the  Holy  of Holies  (the  Father).  Origen  envisages  a  gradual  and  hierarchical  ascent,  through  a 
number of carefully defined stages.  The  Incarnation,  the assuming of human flesh,  sets us on the  first 
step.  From here, we climb higher and higher until we reach the top:  oi  p£v  navxEc;  eioiv  dva(ki0|ioi 6
ow xqp-  o  hi  o lo v   npw xo.;  KaxwxEpw  to  dvO pw m vov  auxoi),  w  etu  fknvovxEc;  66 euo[iev  Kaxa  xd  ferric; 
auxou  o vxa  tt)v  n a o a v   ev  xoic;  avafkzOpoiq  666v.  The  Son  is  the  road  (65o<;)  on  which  we  must  all 
travel.  It is in this sense that we are to understand the Saviour’s response to Philip. To  ‘see’  the Son is 
the  crucial  first stage  on our quest to  ‘see’  the  Father:  xw  dva(3alv£tv  d n o  xf|<;  yvwo£w<;  xoi>  uioi)  E7ri 
xf|v  y v w o iv   xou  naxpo^  xov  yivw oK ovxa  xov  naxEpa,  Kai  |if|  aXXwq  6p a o 0 a i  xov  naxcpa  f|  xw 
6 p a o 0 a i  xov  ui6v.  Yet Origen insists that the contemplation of the Son is not the final goal. There is an 
ascent -  dvafkiivE iv  -  from the Son to one who is much higher.
In  Book  1   of the  Commentary'  on  St John  Origen  similarly  argues  that  the  Son  is  our  only  guide 
(65r|yo^) to God the Father:
Suvaxai  hi  Kai  6  X6yoc;  uioc;  Etvai  napa  to   b.nayytWE.w  xd  Kpucpia  xoi)  naxpo<;  ek eivou ,  dvaX oyov 
xw  K aXoup£vw  uiw   X6yw  vou  xuyxavovxoq.  wq  yap   6  n ap ’  r)|iiv  \6yoc,  a yyeX 6;  eoxi  xwv  uno  xoi) 
vou  6p w |i£vw v,  ouxw g  6   xoi)  Oeou  X6yo^,  EyvwKW^  xov  nax6pa,  ouSevoc;  xwv  yEvqxwv  TxpooPa>.£iv 
auxw   x<°pi?  65qyou  8uvap£vou,  dnoKaXunxEi  ov   Syvw   7tax6pa  (Commentary  on  St  John  1.38  (42)). 
The Son’s role as psychopomp is emphasized by the use of the term  dnoKa^unxEi:  he is the hierophant 
who  reveals  the  secrets  to  potential  adepts.  Finally,  we  might  refer  to  the  brief remarks  made  at 
Commentary  on  St John  19.22  (5).  In  this  passage,  Origen  imagines  the  flight  of the  soul  through  a 
series  of carefully  defined  stages.  From  the  contemplation  of the  sensible,  physical  world,  the  soul 
turns to the contemplation of the intellectual world,  the world of the forms;  from there,  it might make
83the final leap to the contemplation of God himself (aoxov  6pav  xov  0e6v). The particular point to note 
about  this  passage  is  the  identification  of the  Son  with  the  world  of the  forms  (vor|xo<;  K6opo<;).299 
Once again, Origen argues that the vision of the Son is merely the preliminary or preparatory stage for 
the ultimate revelation. He is the mystical guide who takes us by the hand (xeipaYwyoOoa) and leads us 
onwards.
(11.3).
Origen’s  mystical  theology,  particularly  as  developed  in  the  Commentary  on  St John,  has  much  in 
common  with  contemporary  pagan  mysticism.  It  is  especially  similar  to  Plotinus’  description  of the 
flight of the soul and its ascent to the One, via the contemplation of Intellect. Origen and Plotinus agree 
on two fundamental points:  (1) that the Second Principle is the way and the means by which we might 
reach  the  First  Principle,  the  necessary  preliminary  stage  which  cannot  be  by-passed;  (2)  that  the 
Second  Principle  will  be  finally  rejected  and  transcended  in  favour  of the  ultimate  revelation  of the 
highest  reality.  At  Ennead  5.1.6,  Plotinus  compares  the  contemplation  of  Intellect  to  a  pilgrim’s 
contemplation of the images and statues in the outer precincts of a temple. The aim of course is to pass 
through  these  vestibules  and  enter  the  Inner  Sanctum (the  One).  This  image  is  remarkably similar to 
Origen’s  image  of the  High  Priest  leaving  the  outer-court  of the  Temple  and  entering  the  Holy  of 
Holies.  Similarly,  at  Ennead  5.9.2,  Plotinus  compares  Intellect  to  the  vestibule  (rcp60i)pov)  that 
surrounds  the dwelling of the  Supreme Being and  at Ennead 5.5.3,  Intellect is  likened to the ranks of 
officials  that surround  the  Great King.  In this  last image,  Plotinus emphasizes the notion of a gradual 
ascent,  through an obvious and strict hierarchy of beings:  “before the Great King in his progress there 
comes  first  the  minor  train,  then  rank  by  rank  the  greater  and  more  exalted,  closer  to  the  King  and 
mightier;  next  his  own  honoured  company,  until  suddenly  appears  the  Supreme  Monarch  himself’ 
(trans.  MacKenna/Dillon).  As  we  noted  in  the  passages  discussed  above,  Origen  has  a  similar 
understanding  of a  hierarchical  ascent  through  various  distinct  stages.  Finally,  we  compare  Ennead 
6.7.35,  in  which  Plotinus  again  stresses  that  the  contemplation  of Intellect  is  simply  an  intermediate 
stage.  Once  intimately  loved,  it  is  cruelly  rejected  and  dismissed  in  favour  of its  superior.  Although 
Plotinus emphasizes that contemplation of Intellect is the necessary ways and means, the sine qua non 
for  the  aspiring  mystic,  it  is  certainly  not  our  final  goal.  With  this  in  mind,  Plotinus  compares  the
299  sfitfioeic;  8£  ei  Kaxa  xi  xdiv  or||iaivo|i£v(ov  5uvaxai  6  KptoxdxoKog  ndor|<;  Kxioecoq  eivai  Kdapog, 
Kai |id>.ioxa Ka0' o  "oocpia"  eoxiv f|  7roXi)7toiKiXoq-
84mystic  to a visitor to a country house,  who  immediately turns his attention from the lavish furnishings 
and elaborate decor as soon as the owner of the house arrives.
(11.4)
Origen’s  mystical  theology  re-iterates  the  Son’s  status  as  the  tool  or  instrument  through  whom  the 
Father works. Our final goal is not contemplation of the Son, but contemplation of the Father. As Louth 
points out, the mystic strives for union with the Son:  from this position, we shall be able -  like the Son - 
to  contemplate  the  Father.300  Ultimately,  we  shall  all  engage  in  the  same  illustrious  activity,  i.e.  the 
contemplation and adoration of the one true  God,  God the  Father.  There are two interesting passages 
from the Commentary on St John which illustrate this important point. At Commentary on St John  1.16, 
Origen  begins  by  claiming,  once  again,  that  it  is  by  or  through  the  mediation  of  the  Son 
(5ia  xov  X6yov) that we come to the final vision of the Father. He then argues that it is by engaging in 
the  same  activity  as  the  Son  that  we  enter  into  mystical  union  with him and  become  ‘one  Son’:  pia 
npa^iq  eoxai  xcbv  npo^  0eov  5ia  tov  npo^  auxov  X6yov  cpOaoavxcov  f)  xou  Kaxavoetv  xov  0e6v,  iva 
yevcovxai  ouxto^  ev  xf|  yvcooei  xou  naxpo^  popcp(o0£vxe<;  ndvxec;  dicpipd)^  ui6<;,  ok;  vuv  p6voq  6  uidg 
eyvcoKe  xov  Traxcpa.301
At Commentary on St John 20.7, Origen likewise envisages the ultimate beatific vision as the vision of 
God  the  Father.  Commenting on the verse  I tell you  what I have seen  in  my Father‘ s presence (John 
8.38),  Origen provides  an elaborate description of the consummation. He assures us that the time will 
come when the angels (souls of the just) will see God directly; the mediation of the Son will no longer 
be  needed.  We  shall  ourselves  be  in  the  Father’s  presence,  eye-witnesses  to  his  glory.  We  shall  no 
longer  concern  ourselves  with  the  Image  (the  Son),  but  with  the  original  archetype  (the  Father).  The 
important  point  to  note  is  Origen’  insistence  that  our  vision  of the  Father  will  be  like  (6poicoq)  the 
Son’s;  as  he  sees  God,  so  shall  we:  oxc  8£  dx;  6  ulo^  6pcj  xov  7tax£pa  Kai  xd  rtapa  xco  Tiaxpi 
ovj/Exai  xiq.  oiovci  bpoico^  xco  uidx302  Once  again,  we  see  that  the  mystical  goal  is  contemplation  of 
God the  Father, but  that this  state  is utterly dependent upon prior union with the  Son:  it is  in  (cv)  the 
Son that we see the Father.
( 12. 1)
300 Louth (1981), pp. 72-3.
301 Passage quoted, but not discussed, by Balas (1975), p.272.
302 Passage quoted by Bigg (1913), p.211.
85We find a similar picture of the Son’s mediatory role in the de Principiis. Here too Origen insists that, 
while  the  Son  might  well  reveal  something  of God  to  those  as  yet  far  off,  this  is  a  temporary  and 
preliminary  training  which  we  shall  eventually  transcend.  As  in  the  Commentary on  St John,  Origen 
insists  that  our  final  goal  is  the  contemplation  of God  the  Father.  The  task of the  Son (and the  Holy 
Ghost) is simply to train us, teach us and strengthen us until such a time as we might be able to bear the 
final revelation.  This is very clearly expressed at de Principiis  1.3.8, where Origen describes the flight 
of the soul to God via the Son and the Holy Ghost: sapientiae id opus est instruere atque erudire ea et 
ad perfectionem perducere ex spiritus sancti confirmatione atque indesinenti sanctificatione, per quam 
solam deum capere possunt.
In  the  second  chapter  of the  de Principiis,  Origen repeatedly presents  Christ  as  the  one  who  reveals 
God. I do not accept the arguments of Bethune-Baker that the one who reveals God must necessarily be 
the  same nature as God.303  If that were the case, God would presumably be able to reveal himself.  On 
the contrary, Origen insists that we need the mediation of a lesser being to reveal the enormity of God 
the  Father.  We could even say that the  Son protects us  from the  (as  yet)  unbearable  revelation of full 
divinity,  by revealing  it  in a  diluted and weaker  form.  Origen makes this point explicit by comparing 
the  Father  to  the  sun  and  the  Son  to  its  rays  or,  in  the  words  of the  Wisdom  of Solomon,  to  the 
brightness of eternal light (Wisdom 7.26).  In his exegesis of this verse,  Origen argues that the gentle 
rays  of the  sun  help  weak  eyes  to  grow  gradually  accustomed  to  brightness  and  finally  to  become 
strong  enough  to  look  at  the  sun  itself.  In  this  sense,  it  is  correct  to  call  brightness  the  ‘mediator’ 
between men and the light:
per splendorem  namque quid sit lux ipsa agnoscitur et sentitur.  qui splendor fragilibus se et infirmis 
mortalium  oculis  placidius  ac  lenius  offerens  et  paulatim  velut  edocens  et  adsuescens  claritatem 
luminis p a ti.  .  .  capaces eos efficit ad suscipiendam gloriam lucis,  etiam in hoc velut quidam mediator 
hominum ac lucis effectus (de Principiis  1.2.7).
In  the  following  chapter,  Origen  repeats  the  idea  that  we  might  begin  to  understand  light  by 
understanding its brightness.  He is careful to point out however that this is only a preliminary exercise 
(ide Principiis  1.2.8).  Origen had used this same  image  in chapter  1.1.5-6,  similarly arguing that weak 
eyes  which  cannot  bear  to  look  directly  at  the  sun  can  nevertheless  learn  much by  contemplating  its
303 Bethune-Baker (1933), p. 147.
86brightness,  filtered,  if necessary,  through  a  window.304  In  this  chapter,  Origen  stresses  the  inferior 
status of the sun’s rays and distinguishes them sharply from the substantia ac natura of the sun itself. 
The  implication is that by understanding the Son, we understand merely the  Suvdpeig  of God and not
his ouoia.305
The  Son  is  able  to  fulfil his crucial  task  of mediation because  he  is similar to the  Father at the  same 
time as being markedly inferior. The image of the sun and its rays illustrates both these criteria.  While 
the  rays  of light  are  obviously  similar  to  the  sun,  they  are  equally  obviously  inferior  to  it.  We  have 
already  seen  how  Plotinus  compares  the  first  and  second  hypostases  to  the  sun  and  its  rays.306  Like 
Origen,  Plotinus  argues  that  the  rays  are  similar  (6|ioi6v)  to  the  sun,  but  ontologically  inferior 
(eXatTov):  it  is  precisely  for  this  reason  that  ‘the  sun’s  rays  tell  of the  sun’  (Ennead  5.1.7.  trans. 
MacKenna/Dillon).307 The ubiquitous image of the sun and its rays in both Origen and Plotinus clearly 
illustrates the subordination of the Second Principle and its subsequent role as intermediary.
The  famous  image  of the  two  statues  (de  Principiis  1.2.8)  carries  the  same  implication.  While  the 
enormity  of God  the  Father  is  beyond  our  ken  (a  statue  so  large  as  to  be  imperceptible),  we  can 
nevertheless  leam much about him by contemplating the Son (an exact copy of the first statue, but far 
smaller).  Rufinus  has altered the original  argument of this passage,  by  implying that the  image of the 
smaller  statue  refers  simply  to  the  Incarnation  and  kenosis.308  This  is  an  obvious  emendation.  This 
chapter  is  devoted  to  the  Son’s  pre-camate  and  eternal  nature;  discussions  of the  Incarnation  are 
reserved  for  a  later  stage  (de  Principiis  2.6).  Origen  does  not  explain  the  Son’s  mediatory  function 
solely  in  terms  of the  Incarnation.309 Of course  in the  theology of the New Testament,  St Paul  argues 
that  it is only because the Son has become man that he can be a successful advocate with the Father.310
304 As Dillon (1988), pp.220, 222-226 points out, these passages are likely to have been inspired by the 
image of the cave in the Republic, in which Plato describes a similar ascent from contemplating rays of 
light to contemplating the sun itself.
30  On this point, see sections  1.2 and  10.2.
306 See section 2.1.
307 See also, Ennead 5.3.12, 6.8.18.
308  Jerome  (Letter to Avitus  2) has preserved  the  original  version.  It  seems odd that  Edwards  (2002), 
p.72 should accept the Rufinian version.
09 As Edwards (2002), p.72 argues.
310  See,  for  example,  I  Timothy  2.5:  There  is  one  mediator  between  God and man,  the  man  Christ 
Jesus.  On this point, see Forrest (2000), pp.133-4 and our chapter 3, section 5.3.
87Such arguments have no place in Origen’s theological scheme.  It is not the Son’s incarnate nature that 
explains his position as mediator, but his eternal status as a necessarily inferior being.311 
We  have  already  seen  how  Origen  explains  the  Johannine  emvoia  of  Christ  the  Word  in  the 
Commentary’ on St John.312  Origen repeats this exegesis  in the de Principiis:  the  Logos  is cast  in the 
guise  of the  divine  messenger,  reporting  and  revealing  the  deepest  mysteries  of God.  As  the  spoken 
word reveals the secrets of the mind, so the Son reveals the arcana of God. He is the interpreter of the 
secrets of the divine mind -  quia sit arcanorum mentis interpres (de Principiis  1.2.3). At de Principiis 
1.2.7,  Christ  is  explicitly  described  as  the  mediator between  God  and  man.  Fallen  man  is  unable  to 
understand  the  highest  mysteries  of theology  and  requires  a  skilful  interpreter:  quomodo  verbum  sit 
arcana  sapientiae  mysteria  interpretans  ac proferens  rationabili  creaturae.  The  Son,  qua  Word,  is 
God’s  means  of communicating  with  his  creation:  he  ‘makes  God  understood  and  known’  (intellegi 
atque agnosci facit deum (ibid 1.2.8)).
SUBORDINATIONISM: CONCLUSION 
(13)
We  have  seen  therefore  that  in  Origen’s  Trinitarian  scheme  the  role  and  function  of  the  Son  is 
thoroughly and  obviously  subordinate.  Origen accepted  the  fundamental  credo of his pagan confreres 
that  the  transcendence  of the  first  God  necessitated  the  existence  of an  inferior  God,  to  whom  the 
workmanlike  tasks  of creation  and  providence  could  be  delegated  and  who  could  act  as  the  crucial 
intermediary or necessary conduit between the First Principle and the world of men. We have also seen 
how  Origen’s  adoption  of  the  Platonic  schemes  of participation  and  contemplation  epitomizes  the 
dependent and contingent status of the Son, as one who is eternally ‘in need’ of the Father and who is, 
moreover, but a weak copy of genuine goodness and genuine divinity.
311  Of course we do not deny that the  Incarnation is a crucially important pedagogic convenience.  Yet 
this veiling or diluting of divinity is merely an intense and magnified version of the Son’s eternal status 
as mediator and pedagogue.
312 See Commentary on St John  1.38 (42) (discussed above, section 8.2).
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We began this study by pointing out the crucially important paradigm shift of the eternal generation of 
the  Son.  In  preaching  the  eternal  generation  of  the  Son,  Origen  made  a  conscious  and  definitive 
rejection  of  the  old  Apologist  paradigm  of  the  two-stage  Logos  and  paved  the  way  for  the  great 
theological triumphs of the following century. Origen was the first genuinely Trinitarian theologian,  in 
that  he  was  the  first  to  recognize  the  contribution  of the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost  to  the  fullness  of 
divine  life.  No  longer  are  these  two  to  be  seen  as  temporary  economic  necessities:  they  are  finally 
admitted as permanent and fundamental members of the Godhead.  Without the eternal existence of the 
Son and the Holy Ghost, God would lack essential attributes of his divinity.
We  then  attempted to  discover the  reason  for this  great paradigm shift.  Why was  Origen dissatisfied 
with  the  ubiquitous  doctrine  of his  predecessors?  What  prompted  this  momentous  innovation?  We 
found  the  answer  to  these  important  questions  in  Origen’s  debate  with  the  Monarchians,  in  his 
desperation  to  distinguish  as  far  as  possible  the  three  persons  of  the  Trinity.313  It  is  within  this 
polemical  context  that  we  can best understand Origen’s doctrine  of the eternal generation of the Son. 
The  Apologist  doctrine  of the  X6yo^  £v8id0exoq,  the  Logos  eternally  imminent  within  the  Father,
seemed  too  worryingly  close  to  Monarchian  unitarianism.  In  order to  refute  the  heretics,  Origen  was 
obliged to develop an alternative paradigm, in which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost could be eternally 
distinct from one another.
Our analysis of passages  from the  Commentary’ on  Ephesians,  the  Commentary on St John and the de 
Principiis  revealed  how Origen responded  to  the  Monarchian threat by  insisting that Father,  Son  and 
Holy Ghost were three separate and individual oixnai/unooTdoeiq, eternally different from one another. 
Although  the  Son  is  to  be  identified  with  the  essential  divine  attributes  of will,  wisdom,  reason  and 
power,  Origen  will  not  accept  that  these  remain  mere  attributes  of  the  Father:  they  are  eternally 
hypostasized  as  a  separate  ouaia/uTtdotaoK;.  We  then  saw  how  it  is  common  scholarly  practice  to 
interpret  these  claims  as  implying  merely  the  personal  or  numerical  distinction  between  the  three 
persons  of the Trinity and how Origen must therefore be hailed as a Nicene theologian avant I'heure. 
The crux of this argument hinges upon the  interpretation of ouoia  and bndoTaon; as  ‘primary  ouoia’, 
the equivalent of ‘person’ in the orthodox theology of the following century.
313 Without of course resorting to Adoptionism.
89We utterly rejected this argument.  From a thorough study of the uses of these crucial terms  elsewhere 
in Origen’s oeuvre,  we were able  to conclude that Origen almost always uses ouoia and urrdoxaoii; to 
mean ‘nature’ or ‘substance’. To claim that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are different otxjiai  or that 
they are xpeiq  OnooxdaEu;  meant far more than a numerical  or personal distinction.  It meant that they 
were  different  substances  or  different  natures.  This  conclusion  was  corroborated  by  a  further 
examination of passages  from the  Commentary on St John  and elsewhere,  in which Origen refutes the 
Monarchians by describing a strictly hierarchical Trinity.
Although the refutation of Monarchianism was the  impetus for much of Origen’s Trinitarian theology, 
his counter claims were not to be seen as purely and simply the refutation of Monarchianism, i.e. as the 
bald assertion of a mere numerical distinction.  Despite existing eternally,  the Son and the Holy Ghost 
are certainly not of equal status to the Father.  Indeed, subordinationism is a central aspect of Origen’s 
Trinitarian  system:  disparity  of  nature  and  of  rank  is  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the 
transcendence of God the Father.
In the second half of this chapter, we saw how Origen’s Trinitarian theology owed a very great deal to 
traditional Platonic ontology. It was particularly similar to the system of three hypostases developed by 
Plotinus  in  the  Enneads.  We  revealed  how  Origen  constantly  stresses  the  dependent  and  contingent 
nature of the  Son,  how he relies absolutely on the Father for every moment of his existence.  As such, 
the  Son  is  a  necessarily  inferior  being.  Finally,  we  saw  how  Origen  exploits  the  fact  of the  Son’s 
inferior  status:  he  becomes  the  tool  or  servant  of  the  Father,  the  ‘second  God’  to  whom  the 
workmanlike tasks of creation, providence, redemption and revelation can safely be delegated.
Such stark subordinationism is far indeed from the orthodox Trinitarian theology of the fourth century. 
Those  scholars  who  hail  Origen  as  a  precocious  precursor  of  Nicaea,  allowing  only  a  numerical 
distinction between the persons of the Trinity, are guilty of a blatant anachronism. They are projecting 
the  concerns  of a  much  later debate  onto  an  entirely different  historical  and theological  situation.  In 
particular, they have failed to take adequate cognisance of the polemical milieu in which Origen forged 
his  new  theology.  As  we  have  seen,  Origen’s  major  doctrinal  opponents  were  the  Monarchians.  In 
response  to  them,  Origen  must  stress  as  far  as  possible  the  distinction  between  the  Father,  Son  and 
Holy  Ghost.  He  had  no  need  and  no  desire  to  assert  their  equality.  It  would  be  another  fifty  years, 
prompted by the exigencies of the Arian Controversy,  before theologians would feel the need for this,
90the next great paradigm shift. For the moment, Origen’s notion of a hierarchical Trinity was a sufficient 
and satisfactory model.
In  our  introduction,  we  emphasized  Origen’s  role  as  inquisitor  and  the  zeal  for  orthodoxy  which 
inspired  his  whole  career.  This  chapter  has  proved  that  he  succeeded  in  very  many  of his  polemical 
aims.  Origen’s  refutation of Monarchianism must surely be hailed as a triumph of Christian theology. 
Indeed,  from even a  cursory glance  at  the  theology of his  immediate  successors,  we  can  see  that his 
solutions were adopted with great gusto by his co-religionists.314 It is Origen’s great misfortune to have 
developed doctrines which were, in their own time, helpful and useful tools in the endless battle against 
heresy and which would surely have so remained, were it not for the ravages of later heresies forcing a 
more  precise  and  rigorous  theology  and  necessitating  a  merciless  witch-hunt  and  posthumous 
excommunication  of  any  who  had  inadvertently  failed  to  meet  the  new,  exacting  standards  of 
orthodoxy.  For example, although Origen’s wholesale defence of free-will was originally welcomed as 
a  fine refutation of the more extreme versions of Gnostic determinism and although it was later seized 
upon as the perfect riposte to the predestinarians of the fourth century,315 it was eventually condemned 
and  anathematized  as  a  dangerous  proto-Pelagianism.316  The  same  fate  befell  Origen’s  Trinitarian 
doctrine. Although it was originally welcomed as a clever and sincere refutation of Monarchianism and 
immediately  adopted  by  the  Eastern Church,  it  would  later be  utterly  rejected  as  a  dangerous  proto- 
Arianism.  The  sorry  history  of Origen’s  reputation  within  the  Church  thus  epitomozes  Holloway’s 
thesis  of  the  theological  paradigm  shift.317  New  problems  require  new  solutions  and  theological 
paradigms are in need of constant revision. As the historical, social and theological context changes, so 
too must theology. Theology is a discipline particularly sensitive to external stimuli.
3,4 For a brief overview of this, see Kelly (1956), pp. 158-161.
315 Rufinus translated the de Principiis at the request of a certain Macarius, who believed that Origen’s 
doctrines would prove to be the perfect refutation of the mathematici (the determinists).  See Amacker 
and Junod (2002), pp.9-14 and Bardy (1923), pp.90-92.
31* Bigg (1913), p.323.
31  As described in the Introduction.
91DID ORIGEN APPLY THE TERM 6noot3oio<; TO THE SON?
INTRODUCTION.
With all the above in mind, we can now turn to that perennial problem for Origenists, did Origen apply 
the  word  6poouoio<;  to  the  Son?  The  only  evidence  that  we  have  for  Origen’s  use  of the  word  in  a
Trinitarian  context  is  Rufmus’  Latin  version1   of  Pamphilus’  quotation  from  the  otherwise  lost 
Commentary  on  Hebrews}   The  supposed  quotation  is  preserved  in  the  first  chapter  of Pamphilus’ 
Apology for Origen.  The Apology was  written between 308  and  310  and was translated  into  Latin  in 
397.3  It  is  a  point  by  point  response  to  various  contemporary  criticisms  and  accusations  of heresy. 
Much of Origen’s theology aroused suspicion almost as  soon as  it was written.4 As early as  the 290s, 
Methodius  of Olympus  poured  scom  on  Origen’s  doctrine  of creation  and  his  attitude  to  corporeal 
Resurrection.5  By  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  century,  Origen  was  under  almost  constant  attack. 
Pamphilus  (with  the  partial  collaboration  of Eusebius)6  decided  that  it  was  time  to  respond  to  these 
criticisms  and  to  rescue  Origen  from  posthumous  infamy.  The  Apology for  Origen  is  Pamphilus’ 
attempt  to  prove  that  Origen  was  a  faithful  son  of  the  Church  and  that  his  various  critics  have 
misunderstood  and  misinterpreted  the  central  doctrines  of  his  theological  system.  After  a  lengthy 
introduction  to Origen’s  theology,  Pamphilus responds  to  ten specific  accusations.  His response takes 
the form of quotations from Origen, annotated with various parenthetical explanations.
The first accusation dealt with by Pamphilus is that Origen believed the Son to be innatus. The ferocity 
and  fame  of Jerome's  attacks  and  the  success  of Justinian’s  anathemas  have  tended  to  highlight  the 
charge that Origen was an heretical precursor of Arius, that he believed the Son to be a mere creature. 
But  in  the decade before Arius began his momentous career,  Origen was apparently being accused of 
the opposite of the more familiar charge.  Pamphilus, writing at the beginning of the fourth century, had 
noticed  that  various  people  were  accusing  Origen  of believing  that  the  Son,  like  the  Father,  was 
unbegotten.  This  is  of course  the  heresy  of ditheism.  Pamphilus  is  keen  to  refute  what  he  sees  as  a
1  The original Greek is entirely perished.
2  Stead  (1977),  p.212  states  categorically that  the  term  (as  applied  to  the  Father and  the  Son)  is  not 
found  anywhere  else  in  the  surviving  Greek  texts  of Origen’s  writings.  Its  use  is  attested  in  various 
catena fragments, but Edwards (1998), p.658 is rightly scathing of their authenticity.
3 On the dating of the work, see Amacker and Junod (2002), pp.21-4 and 45-52.
4 Murphy (1945), p.65.
5 See Methodius, de Creatis and de Resurrectione.
91dangerous and presumably wide-spread accusation.  Hanson suggests that the basis for this charge was 
Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation.7 At this date,  many traditionalists within the Church were still 
clinging to the old Apologist doctrine of the two-stage Logos, according to which the procession of the 
Son was an obvious temporal event. To argue that the Son was co-etemal with the Father could easily 
seem to imply that he was unbegotten and that there were therefore duo principia.
In  his  general  introduction  to  Origen’s  theological  system,  Pamphilus  insists  that  his  master  did  not 
believe  that  there  were  duo  principia.  He  pre-empts  the  first  accusation  of the  main  Apology  by 
explicitly  denying  that  Origen  believed  the  Son  to  be  innatus.  To  prove  the  point,  he  provides  a 
quotation from the Commentary on Hebrews. In this passage,  Wisdom 7.26 is quoted as clear Scriptural 
proof of the Son’s dependence upon the Father. Origen begins by identifying the ‘eternal light’ referred 
to  by  Solomon  as  the  Father  and  the  Son  as  its  ‘brightness’.  There  follows  a brief discussion  of the 
doctrine of eternal generation:  as the sun cannot exist without light, so the Father cannot exist without 
the  Son.8  Origen  then  argues  that,  as  ‘the  brightness  of eternal  light’,  the  Son  was  obviously  ‘bom 
from’ (natus ex) the Father and not unbegotten (innatus):
erat autem non,  sicut de aeterna luce diximus,  innatus,  ne duo principia lucis videamus inducere,  sed 
sicut  ingenitae  lucis  splendor,  ipsam  illam  lucem  initium  habens  ac fontem,  natus  quidem  ex  ipsa 
(Apologia 50).
The  metaphor  of light  and  brightness  illustrates  the  derivative  status  of the  Son:  he  is  clearly  not 
innatus.  In this exegesis, there is a careful distinction between the unbegotten (innatus) Father and the 
begotten (natus) Son. While the Father is independent and self-sufficient, the Son is utterly reliant upon 
his Father as the origin (initium) and source (fons) of his whole being.9
Pamphilus returns to this important subject in the main Apology.  He begins his response to the innatus 
charge by quoting  from the  Commentary on  Romans:  the  Son,  qua  ‘love’,  must come  ‘from God’  (ex 
Deo),  because  ‘love  is  from  God’10  (Apologia  89).  Two  passages  from the  Commentary  on  St John 
show that Origen believed the only-begotten Son of God to be entirely different from those other ‘sons
6  For  a  useful  discussion  of the  controversy  concerning  authorship  see  Amacker  and  Junod  (2002),
pp.21-4 and 45-52 
Hanson (1985), p.66. Stead (1977), p.211  agrees.
8 For similar remarks, see de Principiis  1.2.4,  1.2.7, 4.4.1  and Homilies on Jeremiah 9.4. See also our 
discussion of this metaphor in chapter 1, section 2.1.
9 Williams (1993), p. 155 is scathing of this passage and suspects the hand of Rufinus. I believe that it is 
almost  undoubtedly  genuine.  The  thrust  of the  exegesis  is  quintessentially Origenist.  At Homilies  on 
Jeremiah  9.4,  for  example,  Origen  makes  very  similar  use  of the  light/brightness  metaphor  as  an 
illustration of the generation of the Son.
92of God’ spoken of in the Bible. Christ is the Son of God by nature and not merely by adoption: only he 
is ex Patre natus {Apologia  91  and 93).  A short quotation from the  Commentary on  Hebrews attacks 
those who are ashamed to admit that the Son of God is God. Origen responds by pointing out that the 
Son  is greater than any creature  in genus, species, substantia, natura and in all other ways {Apologia 
95).1 1   But  it  is  the  last passage  that  has  aroused  such  interest  and  has  encouraged  such an enormous 
amount of scholarly debate.
This passage is also presented as a quotation from the Commentary on Hebrews.  It takes the form of a 
brief exegesis of Hebrews  1.3,  the Apostle’s claim that the  Son is the  brightness of God’ s glory,  and 
Wisdom  7.25,  Solomon’s  description  of Wisdom  as  the  breath  of the power  of God,  and  a  clear 
effluence of the glory of the Almighty.  Origen often juxtaposes these  two  verses;12  it is not surprising 
that he takes the opportunity of a commentary on Hebrews to offer an interpretation of the famous Old 
Testament verse.13 After a brief caveat on the dangers of applying corporeal metaphors to the Trinity, 
Origen proceeds to compare the way in which vapour emanates from a solid body to the way in which 
the  Son emanates  from the  Father.  The  comparison  leads  to  the  famous  conclusion that,  as  vapour is 
bfiooooia;  with that from which it emanates, so the Son is  bpoouoioq  with the Father. Let us quote the 
passage in full:
cum  autem  discuitur hec  quod dictum  est de  Filio  Dei,  quod sit splendor gloriae,  necessario  videtur 
simul disserendum  et illud quod dictum  est,  non solum  quod splendor est lucis aetemae,  sed et quod 
huic simile in Sapientia Solomonis referetur,  in qua seipsam Sapientia describit dicens: vapor enim est 
virtutis Dei, et aporrhoea gloriae Omnipotentis purissima .  .  .  secundum similitudidem eius vaporis qui 
de substantia aliqua corporea procedit,  sic etiam  ipse ut quidam  vapor exoritur de virtute ipsius Dei: 
sic  et  sapientia  ex  eo  procedens,  ex  ipsa  Dei  substantia  generatur.  sic  nihilominus  et  secundum 
similitudinem  corporalis  aporrhcece,  esse  dicitur  aporrhcea  gloriae  omnipotentis  pura  quaedam  et 
sincera.  quae  utraeque  similitudines  manifestissime  ostendunt  communionem  substantiae  esse  Filio 
cum  Patre.  aporrhoea  enim  bpoouoio^  videtur,  id est  unius substantiae cum  illo  corpore  ex  quo  est 
aporrhoea vel vapor {Apologia 97-99).
10 I John 4.7.
1 1 We return to this important passage in section 5.
12 See Contra Celsum 5.10, 7.17, 8.14; Commentary on St John  13.25; Homilies on Jeremiah 9.4 and 
de Principiis  1.2.6.
13  Any exegesis  of the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  would  naturally and almost  inevitably  include  lengthy 
comments  on  the  Wisdom of Solomon.  This  is  because  Hebrews  1.3  is  an overt allusion to  Wisdom 
7.25 (So, Bruce (1990), pp.47-8).
93What are we to make of this passage? Do we have evidence here of Origen’s precocious anticipation of 
fourth century orthodoxy, a flash of insight into the mysteries of Trinitarian theology? Or is the passage 
simply an example of Rufinus’  famous emendations of the texts he translated, the foisting of a spurious 
and  anachronistic  orthodoxy  on  his  beloved  master?  Even  amongst  experts,  opinion  is  divided 
concerning  the  authenticity  of  this  fragment.  Edwards,  in  a  fresh  look  at  the  perennial  problem, 
suggests that there are five main points at issue.14
1.  Rufinus’ method of translation.
2.  The importance of the  bpoouoioi; claim in late fourth century Trinitarian controversies.
3.  The relevance of the bpoouoioq claim  to the charge that Origen believed the Son to be innatus.
4.  The relationship of the bpoouoioq claim to Origen’s overall theology.
5.  The attitude of Origen’s immediate successors and disciples to the term bpoouoiot;.
I  fully accept the importance and relevance of each of these points in assessing the authenticity of the 
Commentary>   on  Hebrews  fragment.  I  shall  deal  with  each  in  turn.  I  am  convinced  of  the  great 
importance of a thorough investigation of this question. The subject is not simply an investigation into 
the history of textual traditions,  nor an irrelevant discursus on the scholarly probity of Pamphilus and 
Rufinus.  I  believe  that  it  is by a  detailed discussion of the  6|ioouoio<;  claim that we  can most clearly 
understand  the  central  aspects  of Origen’s  Trinitarian  theology.  This  controversial  passage  from  the 
Apology' will thus become the perfect entree into the very heart of the present project.
RUFINUS’ METHOD OF TRANSLATION 
(11)
It  is  well  known that Rufinus often altered the text, as he received it, when he translated the works of 
Origen  from  Greek  into  Latin.  Indeed,  he  happily  admits  to  doing  so.  The  justification  for  this 
wholesale emendation is explained  in the work de adulteratione librorum  Origenis:  anything heretical 
must  be  an  interpolation.15  Rufinus  argues  that  over  the  years  Origen’s  writings  had been  repeatedly 
and  systematically  altered  by  heretics.16  He  seizes  upon  the  fact  that  Origen  apparently  contradicts
14 Edwards (1998), p.660.
15 The de adulteratione was written in Rome in c.397 and attached, as a preface, to Rufinus’ translation 
of the  de Principiis.  For brief discussions  of the  form,  content  and circumstances  of its  composition, 
see Bardy (1923), pp.92-3, Murphy (1945), pp.83-89 and Amacker and Junod (2002), pp. 25-31.
16  Cadiou  (1923),  p. 19  suggests  a  possible  motivation  behind  this  kind  of interpolation,  namely  to 
promote heresies under the auspices of a famous name.
94himself as  sufficient  proof of textual  corruption  (de  adult.  1.33).17  Rufinus  even  claims  that  these 
heretics were at work during Origen’s lifetime: he quotes a letter, supposedly written by Origen himself 
to  his  friends  in Alexandria,  in which he  complains of exactly this  kind of tampering {de adult.  7).18 
Rufinus  bolsters  his  claim by  citing  other  writers  whose  works  had been  similarly doctored,  namely 
Clement of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, Denys of Alexandria, Hilary of Poitiers and even St Paul.19 
Rufinus took it upon himself to remove these malevolent additions and to recover the original and, of 
course, orthodox doctrines of his great hero.
To be fair to Rufmus, we must point out that he had no comprehension of the development of Christian 
doctrine.20  He  supposed  that  the  orthodox  faithful  had  always  and  would  always  believe  the  same 
thing.21  The  Nicene  Creed,  for  example,  was  seen  as  simply  the  codification  and  ratification  of the 
beliefs of the Apostles themselves.22 With this firm belief in continuity and tradition, Rufmus could not 
accept  that  Origen  was  anything  other  than  a  Nicene,  avant  I’heure.  Any  statement  that appeared  to 
deviate  from  orthodox  doctrine  must  be  an  interpolation.  We  must  accept  therefore  that  Rufinus 
genuinely  believed  that  he  was  correcting  the  texts  of Origen,  excising  malicious  interpolation  and 
recovering the ipsissima verba of his master.23
What  is  particularly  important  for  us  in  our  assessment  of the  authenticity  of the  Commentary  on 
Hebrews  fragment  is  that  Rufmus  admits  to being particularly heavy handed with passages  that dealt 
with  the  controversial  subject  of the  Trinity.24  In  the  Preface  to  his  translation  of the  de Principiis, 
Rufmus  discusses  exactly  this  kind  of emendation:  sicubi  ergo  nos  in  libris  eius  aliquid  contra  id 
invenimus,  quod ab  ipso  in  ceteris  locis pie  de  Trinitate fuerat  definitum,  velut  adulteratum  hoc  et
17  Rufmus  quotes  a  controversial  passage  from  the  de  Principiis  in  which  Origen  claims  (a)  that  the 
Father and Son are unius substantiae and (b) that they are alterius substantiae.  See section 2.4 for our 
discussion of Rufinus’ claims.
18 For a discussion of this letter, see Bardy (1923), pp. 15-20, Murphy (1945), pp.85-6 and Amacker and 
Junod (2002), p.26. The  letter is known only in Rufmus’  Latin version.  There is some debate as to its 
authenticity. Jerome accuses Rufmus of twisting the original sense {Apologia contra Rufinum 2.18) and 
Bardy admits that a few passages are ‘fictive’ and ‘imaginaire.’
19 Gamble  (1941),  p.83  points  out how easy it  was  for writers  in the  ancient world to  lose  control  of 
their work,  when each copy was made by hand.  Murphy (1945), p.67 believes that this kind of literary 
fraud  was  ‘almost  unbelievably  widespread’.  That  is  to  say,  the  interpolation  of Origen’s  works  by 
heretics is certainly possible, even likely.
20 As described in the Introduction (ii) to chapter 1.
21 See Rufmus, Expositio Symboli 2 for a clear statement of this belief.
" This belief in doctrinal  continuity was of course  a Patristic  topos.  So, Meijering (1968), p. 129 and 
Williams (1993), p. 167.
23 Murphy (1945), pp. 102-103.
24 Bardy (1923), pp.24 -132 discusses this topic and provides all the relevant quotations. He concludes 
that “c’est  surtout la Trinite que Rufin entend l’adapter,  et  l’on comprend ses motifs,  puisque de tous
95alienum  aut  praetermisimus  aut  secundum  earn  regulam  protulimus,  quam  ab  ipso  frequenter 
invenimus adfirmatem.  Although Rufinus excuses this practice by claiming to know of other passages 
(ceteris  locis)  in  which  Origen espouses  the  orthodox position,  Jerome  for one  is  not  convinced.  He 
argues  that  Rufinus  has  altered  the  original  text  to  suit  the  ears  of a  critical,  pro-Nicene  readership: 
quae (scil.  Rufmus’  translation  of the  de Principiis)  cum  legissem  contulissemque cum graeco,  ilico 
animadvert quae  Origenes  de  Patre  et  Filio  et Spiritu  Sancto  impie dixerat et quae romanae aures 
ferre  non poterant  in  meliorem partem  ab  interprete  commutata  (Jerome,  Apologia  contra  Rufinum 
1.6).  Jerome  goes  on  to  say  that  Rufinus  has  taken  the  same  liberties  with  the  Greek  text  of the 
Apology, anything heretical has been overtly and systematically altered.25
( 1.2)
The  detection  of  these  well-meant  corrections  is  of  course  an  extremely  difficult  task.  We  are 
sometimes  able  to  compare  the  translations  of  Rufinus  with  those  of Jerome26  or  with  the  Greek 
fragments preserved by Gregory and Basil in the Philocalia27 and by the Emperor Justinian in his two 
attacks on Origen and Origenism.28 But great care is needed. First, it must be remembered that Jerome 
was  a  far  from  impartial  translator  of Origen.29  He  realized  that  his  precarious  position  within  the 
Church  depended  to  a  very  large  extent  upon  supporting  the  accusations  levelled  at  Origen  by 
Epiphanius and his influential associates.30 Jerome’s response to this First Origenist Controversy31  was 
to join  in  the  attacks  on  his  erstwhile  hero.  Moreover,  as  Bardy has  observed,  Jerome  was  probably 
unable  to  detect  the  delicate  nuances  of Origen’s  more  speculative  doctrines:  quite  often,  he  simply
les  dogmes  chretiennes  c’est  celui  de  la  Trinite  qui  a  ete  le  plus  completement  elucide  au  cours  du 
4eme siecle.”
25  paucisque  testimoniis  de  Filio  et  Spiritu  Sancto  commutatis,  quae  sciebas  displicitur  Romanis 
(Jerome, Apologia contra Rufinum  1.6),  de Eusebii libro multa subtraxerit et in bonam partem de Filio 
et  Spiritu  Sancto  nisus  sit  commutare  (ibid.  2.15);  immutatis  dumtaxat sensibus  de  Filio  et  Spiritu 
Sancto qui apertam blasphemiam praeferebant (ibid.  2.23).
26 Although the  full  text of Jerome’s translation of the de Principiis is now lost, substantial  fragments 
are preserved in his letters and in his various attacks on John of Jerusalem and Rufinus.
27 The Philocalia is a fourth century florilegium of Origen’s writings.
28  In 543, Justinian wrote a lengthy letter to Mennas, Patriarch of Constantinople, condemning Origen: 
the letter contains various quotations from the de Principiis and a list of 10 anathemas.  In 553, Origen 
was  formally  condemned  at  the  Council  of  Constantinople.  Fragments  of  the  de  Principiis  are 
preserved in the fifteen anathemas of the Council.  For a full discussion of the historical circumstances 
surrounding these two attacks, see Bardy (1923), pp. 48-53.
29  We  are  of course  referring  to  the  second phase  of Jerome’s  translating  career.  The  young Jerome, 
translator of Origen’s  innocuous  Homilies  and  Commentaries,  had no polemical  axe  to grind.  On the 
question of comparing Jerome’s translations with those of Rufinus, see Scott (1991), p.71.
30 For a full discussion of Epiphanius’ attacks on Origen and the effects of these attacks on both Jerome 
and Rufinus, see section 2.
31  The  terms “First Origenist Controversy”  and “Second Origenist Controversy” are taken from Clark 
(1992). They refer to the Jerome-Rufinus debate and Justinian’s condemnations respectively.
96missed the point.32 The fragments preserved by Gregory and Basil are of much greater value, insofar as 
their  authenticity  is  beyond  doubt.  Much  useful  work  has  been  done,  particularly  by  John  Rist, 
comparing  Rufinus’  translations  with  the  Greek  text preserved  by the  Cappadocians.33  Yet,  as  Bardy 
points out,34 the brothers selected only those passages of undeniable orthodoxy for their collection. For 
example, they deal in great detail with the question of free-will and determinism. But there would have 
been no need for Rufinus to alter a text which dealt with such harmless subjects.  It is hardly surprising 
to discover that the Latin version of de Principiis 3.1  is a direct and faithful translation of the original 
Greek  text  preserved  in  the  Philocalia.  The  famously  controversial  subjects,  the  Trinity,  the 
Resurrection of the  Body and the pre-existence  of souls,  are  notably absent  from the  collection.  The 
Philocalia is of only limited use therefore in the detection of Rufinus’ emendations.
By  contrast,  the  excerpts  preserved  by  Justinian  deal  almost  exclusively  with  these  controversial 
subjects.  It  might  be  expected  therefore  that  these  quotations  would  be  of the  utmost  value  in  the 
reconstruction of the original Greek text of the de Principiis.  Indeed, Koetschau’s  1923  edition of the 
de Principiis incorporates almost all Justinian’s quotations into the main body of the text.35 There is not 
however  unanimous  scholarly  agreement  concerning  the  status  of  these  fragments.36  Bardy  is  the 
leading light of those scholars who question the value of Justinian’s quotations in the reconstruction of 
the  text of the de Principiis.  Bardy points out that the  Emperor was not at all concerned with a  long- 
dead Alexandrian,  but  with the  contemporary problem of the  Origenist monks  of Palestine.  It  is  they 
who are anathematized. Bardy concludes that the quotations preserved in the Epistle to Mennas and the 
two lists of anathemas may well be described as  ‘Origenist’, but they are certainly not quotations from 
the de Principiis.37
32  Bardy  (1923),  p.206.  See  Russell  (1988),  p.54  for  a  criticism  of Jerome’s  interpretation  of de 
Principiis 4.4.9: he ‘has not understood.’
33  Rist  (1975).  The  conclusion  of  such  investigations  is  that,  although  Rufinus  has  abridged  the 
arguments and at times added explanatory parentheses for the benefit of a rather less educated Roman 
readership (Bardy (1923), p.l 12), the original argument remains intact.
34 Bardy (1923), p.l 12.
35 Scott (1991), p. 170 discusses the reaction, both positive and negative, to Koetschau’s landmark 
edition.
36 For example, the Sources Chretiennes editors of the de Principiis call Koetschau’s use of Justinian’s 
fragments ‘aberrant’ and admit none of them into the text.
37  Bardy  (1923),  pp.50-86.  Although  I  accept  Bardy’s  basic  contention  that  the  Emperor  was  not 
interested in theology per se, but rather with the conflicts and controversies of the Holy Land, I do not 
feel that there can be a blanket rejection of Justinian’s quotations.  It seems to me that Bardy has some 
rather odd things to say on the subject.  For example, he rejects the authenticity of Anathema 9, which 
deals  with the  doctrine  of spherical  resurrected bodies,  on the  grounds that there  is no hint of such a 
theory in Rufinus’  Latin version of the de Principiis. But surely this is just the kind of heretical theory 
that  Rufinus  would excise  from his  translation?  Even  stranger  is  Bardy’s  rejection  of Anathema  13,
97The  safest way to detect Rufinus’  emendations  is  to compare  his  Latin translations with the  works  of 
Origen that survive  intact  in the original Greek.  That  is to  say,  we  should be  wary of claims made  in 
Rufinus’  Latin  versions  that  are  contradicted  by  claims  made  in  works  which  survive  in  Greek. 
Conversely,  we  should  be  inclined  to  accept  the  authenticity  of  a  Rufinian  translation  if  it  is 
corroborated by a passage that survives in Greek.  I believe that this comparative method is the safest, 
most certain way of detecting Rufinus’  emendations.  In the  following discussion of the authenticity of 
the Commentary on Hebrews fragment, we shall make detailed comparisons of the claims made in this 
fragment with claims made in the Commentary on St John and the Contra Celsum.
THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  6|iOOt3oioq  CLAIM  IN  LATE  FOURTH  CENTURY
TRINITARIAN CONTROVESIES
(2.1)
None of the above need concern us if we accept the solution of Mark Edwards that there was no need 
for  Rufinus  to  alter  the  text  of the  Commentary’  on  Hebrews,  specifically that  there  was  to  need  for 
Rufinus to pretend that Origen had used the term bpoouoioc;.38 Edwards argues that by the time Rufinus 
began  to  translate  the  Apology  (c.397),  the  question  of  6|ioouoio<;  had  left  the  centre  stage.  The 
controversy  had  died  down  and  the  term  was  by  and  large  ignored.39  As  evidence  for  this  claim, 
Edwards points out that Rufinus, writing propria persona, does not use the word. He concludes that if 
the  term  6|ioouoio<;  no  longer  had  a  major  theological  significance,  it  would  be  unnecessary  and 
therefore unlikely for Rufinus to insert it into the text.  It is on these grounds that Edwards accepts the 
authenticity  of the  Commentary’   on  Hebrews  fragment.  I  am  not  persuaded  by  this.  My  response  to 
Edwards  will  take  the  form  of  a  brief  overview  of  the  historical  circumstances  surrounding  and 
prompting Rufinus’ translation of Pamphilus’ Apology.40
(2.2)
dealing with the soul of Christ and placed by Koetschau at de Principiis 4.4.4. Bardy comments that it 
is  ‘douteux’  whether Origen would have taught that the soul of Christ pre-existed.  We might ask how 
Bardy  deals  with  de  Principiis  2.9,  in  which  Origen  discusses  at  great  length  the  doctrine  of the 
Saviour’s human soul.  But despite these quibbles,  I believe  that Bardy is correct to cast at least some 
doubt on the quotations preserved by Justinian.  In this, he is followed (to a lesser degree) by Chadwick 
(1948),  pp.95-6,  Guillaumont (1961),  Refoule  (1961),  pp.229,  233  and  256-7  and Grillmeier (1965), 
p.292.
58 Edwards (1998), p.661.
39  Clark  (1992),  p. 162  seems  to  share  this  view:  she  argues  that  by  the  late  fourth  century  other 
subjects, notably the Resurrection of the Body, had become much more important.
40  For  this,  we  rely  heavily  on  Bardy  (1923),  pp.90-93,  Murphy  (1945),  pp.66-81,  Kelly  (1975), 
pp. 195-209, Hammond-Bammel (1977) and Amacker and Junod (2002), pp.4-40.
98Rufinus tells us that he began to translate the Apology in response to the request of a certain Macarius, 
to whom the work is dedicated.41  But although this was the immediate spur, I feel that recent events in 
Palestine  had  provided  Rufinus  with  a  far  more  urgent  motive.  Rufinus’  translation  of the  Apology 
must be understood as a response to  Epiphanius,  Bishop  of Salamis,  and as  a refutation of his  recent 
attacks  on  Origen.  In  the  year  393,  Epiphanius  sailed  from  Cyprus  to  Palestine  to  deliver  a  searing 
attack  against  what  he  saw  as  the  pestilent,  prevalent  and  persistent  heresy  of Origenism.  Having 
already  attacked  Origen  in  print,42  Epiphanius  felt  the  need  for  a  more  personal  and  more  direct 
approach.  John, the Bishop of Jerusalem, was singled out for particular rebuke.  In his own church, the 
Church of the Resurrection in Jerusalem, the Bishop was openly accused of being an Origenist; envoys 
were  dispatched throughout the  Holy Land,  urging the  clergy to reject the  authority of their heretical 
Bishop.  The campaign concluded with the circulation of a lengthy letter detailing the various heresies 
of Bishop  John.43  The  majority  of the  clergy and the  monks  -  (including  St Jerome,  then  living  in a 
monastery near Bethlehem) - fell into line and agreed that both Origen and Bishop John were heretics. 
Rufmus was the notable exception.  He became  the champion of his beleaguered Bishop and accepted 
the challenge of defending Origen - thereby also defending John,  whose passion for Origen could not 
be denied - as an orthodox son of the Church.44 Rufinus’ translation of Pamphilus’ Apology for Origen 
must be seen as the crucial  first stage in this lengthy, but ultimately futile project.  It seems obvious to 
me  that  Rufinus  would  have  had  the  criticisms  of Epiphanius  firmly  in  mind  when he  translated  the 
Apology.  It  was  the  perfect  opportunity  to  prove  to  the  hostile  world  that  Origen  was  an  orthodox 
catholic.45
(2.3)
The  crucial  point  for  us  is  that  Epiphanius  was,  in  the  words  of Hanson,  ‘almost  fanatically  pro- 
Nicene’.46 In both the Pinarion and the Ancoratus he repeatedly insists that the Father and the Son are
41  Bardy (1923), pp.90-92, Amacker and Junod (2002), pp.9-14 and Murphy (1945), pp.83 and 92.
42 In the Ancoratus (AD 374) and Panarion (AD 376).
43 The letter, Against John of  Jerusalem, survives only in Latin translation (Jerome, Epistola 51).
44 I do not of course intend to present Rufinus as a selfless defender of Episcopal authority.  He had his 
own very good reasons for establishing Origen’s orthodoxy.
45 Bardy (1923), pp.95-6 recognizes that Epiphanius’ recent visit to Palestine and his condemnation of 
Origenism  were  very  fresh  in  Rufinus’  mind  when  he  returned  to  Rome  in  397  and  responded  to 
Macarius’ request to translate the works of Origen. Bardy does not however deal with the specific ways 
in which the attacks of Epiphanius might have encouraged Rufinus to alter the text of the Apology.  In 
fact, he accepts that the translation was ‘generalement exact.’
46 Hanson (1988), pp.661-2.
99bpoouoicx;  and  condemns  those  who  think  otherwise.47  In  chapter  64  of the  Pinarion,  Epiphanius 
explicitly  accuses  Origen  of denying  the  consubstantiality  of the  Father  and  the  Son:  ev  T ioX X oiq
xdnoiq  EupapEv  auxdv  k o k clx ;  xov  povoy£vf|  0 e o v   dTtaXXoxpiouvxa  xf|<;  xou  naxpog  0£6xqx6< ;  x e  xai 
oixilai;. 6pou 61 xai x6  fiyiov  TivEupa. He is shocked that Origen did not believe that the Son was of the 
Father’s  substance,  but  taught  that  the  two  were  entirely  different  from  one 
another:  e k   yap  xf|^  ouaia^  xou  naxpo^  ou  06Xei  Eivai  xov  ui6v,  fcXXa  7 tavxa7 taoiv  6XX6xpiov  rcaxp
6$  xouxov  Eioriyeixai.  Epiphanius concludes that Origen was the heretical precursor of the Arians and
the Anomoeans, who ‘rejected the doctrine of bpoouoioq’ (ibid.  76.12.4).48
(2.4)
We  can  further gauge  the  importance  of 6poouoio<;  at  this  date  by examining  the  correspondence  of 
John,  Jerome and Rufmus.  In the spring of 397,  John attempted to clear his name by setting out in an 
open  letter  to  Theophilus  of Alexandria  a  list  of  orthodox  doctrines  to  which  he  wholeheartedly 
subscribed.49  The  list  includes  the  doctrine  of  the  consubstantiality  of  the  Trinity:  sanctam  et 
adorandam  Trinitatem  unius  substantiae  et  coaeternam,  et  eiusdem  gloriae  et  divinitatis  credimus 
(contra lohannem.  8.16-18).  Jerome,  in his reply to the  letter, argues that this doctrine was one of the 
sine  qua  non  of  the  Christian  faith,  but  one  which  John  has  only  very  recently  espoused.50  The 
accusation of hypocrisy is obvious. In chapter 3, Jerome had already argued that the Arians, with whom 
John  was  well  acquainted,  denied  the  consubstantiality  of the  Trinity:  et  Ariani,  quos  optime  nosti, 
multo tempore propter scandalum nominis, bpoouoiov  se damnare simulabant.
47  uid^  dpoouoio^  xq>  Ttaxpi.  ou  ouvouoioq,  6XX'  6poouaio<;  (Ancoratus  6;  in  fact  the  whole  of this 
chapter  is  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  consubstantiality  of  the  Father  and  the  Son);  iva 
pr)  dXXdxpiov  vopia0£ir|  7tuxpo^  pr|5£  uiou,  6XXa  xf|q  auxf|<;  ouoiaq  (ibid.  chapter  8  -   a propos  the 
Holy  Ghost);  pia  oupcpama,  pia  0c6xr|^  xf|<;  auxf|q  ouaiac;  (Pinarion  chapter  67).  In  chapter  76  of 
the  Pinarion  Epiphanius  refutes  the  Anomoeans  by  repeating  the  Nicene  slogan:  uioq  e k   7iaxpo<; 
6Xr|0ivcb>;  xai  bpoouaiax;  yEyEvvrip^voi;;  hri  auxou  xo  iaov  y e v v w v   &xpdVT(P  Ka^   dKaxaXrjTtxw 
ouaiq,  bpoouoito^  xd  ouoiwSe!;  Kai  EvuTidoxaxov 0eiov  y£vvr|pa. In chapter 81, we are again reminded 
of the  crucial  doctrine  of consubstantiality:  pia  ouoia.  In  chapter  116,  the  bishop  attacks  those  who 
distinguish the ouoia  of the Son from the oOoia  of the Father; these heretics must understand that the 
Trinity is  pia ouoia  (118) and that the Father and Son are  6poouoio<;  (119).
48 cf. Against John of Jerusalem 3,  in which Epiphanius again accuses Origen of inspiring the Arians: 
Arii parentem  et aliarum  hereseon  radicem et parentem.  It  is  very likely that Epiphanius would have 
addressed the question of consubstantiality in his sermons in Jerusalem, but the text of these sermons is 
no longer extant.
49 The letter survives only as quotations in Jerome’s reply, Against John of  Jerusalem.  For a discussion 
of the circumstances and contents of this letter, see Kelly (1975), pp.204-208.
50 nisi haec diceres,  ecclesiam  non  teneres.  et tamen  non  quaero si ante non  dixeris  .  .  .  statim sera 
conversione fidelem volo (ibid 8.23).
100The question of Origen’s use of 6|iOOixno<; figures prominently in the Jerome-Rufinus debate. In the de 
adulteratione  Rufinus  specifically  claims  that  Origen  believed  the  Father  and  the  Son  to  be  unius 
substantiae.5 1   Would Rufinus take the trouble to point this out if the subject were not a pressing issue 
in  the  contemporary theological  debate?  In  his  response  to  Rufinus,  Jerome berates his  opponent  for 
being vague and unscholarly: where exactly does Origen use the term 6poouoio<;? Jerome boasts that he 
possesses  Origen’s  complete oeuvre  and has  read almost all  of it.  The  implication  is that Jerome has 
not  come  across  the  bpoouoioq  quotation  and  that  Rufinus  has  invented  it  for polemical,  apologetic 
purposes {Apologia contra Rufinum  2.16).
The intensity of the First Origenist Controversy involved Jerome in a great deal of correspondence. He 
was  in  almost  constant  contact  not  only  with  Rufinus  and  Bishop  John,  but  also  with  friends  and 
colleagues  in  Rome.  It  was  well  known  that  as  a  young  man  Jerome  had  translated  the  Homilies  of 
Origen and that he remained an ardent admirer of his exegetical method.  In the current anti-Origenist 
climate, this put Jerome  in a rather difficult position.  Was he or was he not a disciple of Origen? In a 
series  of  famous  letters  Jerome  attempts  to  convince  his  friends  in  Rome  of his  own  undeniable 
orthodoxy  by  exposing  and  condemning  Origen’s  various  heresies.  In  the  letter  to  Pammachius  and 
Oceanus,  Jerome  (like  Epiphanius)  describes  Origen  as  the fontem Arii.  Specifically,  Jerome  accuses 
Origen of denying that the Son is  ‘from the substance of the Father’: damnantes enim eos qui Filium de 
Patris  negant  esse substantia,  ilium  (scil.  Origen) pariter Ariumque  damnaverunt  (Jerome,  Epistola 
84.4).  In  Letter  94,  Jerome  details  his  allegiance  to  the  Nicene  Creed  and  expressly  insists  on  the 
doctrine  of consubstantiality:  nos  enim  insistentes  patrum  vestigiis  et scripturarum  vocibus  eruditi, 
docemus  in  ecclesiis  et confitemur  Trinitatem  increatum,  aeternam,  unius  esse  in  tribus subsistentiis 
substantiae in una deitate Trinitatem adorantes.
(2.5)
The  most  significant  evidence  in  our  assessment  of the  importance  of the  term  6poouoio<;  at  this 
particular  date  and  in  this  particular  theological  milieu  is  to  be  found  in  Rufinus’  own  works.  Since 
Epiphanius’  visit  to  Palestine  and  his  own  rather rash defence  of Bishop  John,  Rufinus  had  come  to
51 At the start of the de adulteratione, Rufinus attempts to prove the malicious interpolation of Origen’s 
text  by  pointing  out  a  glaring  contradiction:  qui  Patrem  et  Filium  unius  substantiae,  quod  Graece 
6|i0ouoiov  dicitur,  in  consequentibus  statim  capitulis  alterius  esse  substantiae  et  creatum  poterat 
dicere eum,  quern paulo ante de ipsa natura Dei Patris pronuntiaverat natum {de adulteratione  1.33). 
Rufinus  argues  that  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  anyone  could  contradict  himself  on  such  an 
important  matter.  The  text  must  therefore  be  corrupt.  Rufinus  naturally  ascribes  the  first  claim  to
101realize  the  precariousness  of his position within the  Church  and had recognized the pressing need to 
defend  himself  from  the  slur  of  heresy.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Rufinus  wrote  his  three  famous 
Apologies, detailing an unwavering allegiance to the faith of the Church, specifically to the faith of the 
Council of Nicaea. Throughout these works, we find countless references to consubstantiality. Rufinus 
clearly  felt  that  this  was  the  doctrine  on  which  everything  depended,  the  belief that  would  finally 
separate  the  sheep  from  the  goats.  Defending  himself  against  the  accusations  of  Epiphanius  and 
Jerome, Rufinus constantly re-iterates his acceptance of bpoouoioq.
In the first of the three Apologies, written to Pope Anastasius,52 Rufinus makes the following statement 
to anyone who dares to cast doubt on his orthodoxy: sciat quod de  Trinitate ita credimus quod unius 
naturae sit,  unius deitatis,  unius eiusdemque virtutis atque substantiae .  .  .  Trinitatis in subsistentibus 
personis,  unitas  in  natura  atque  substantia  {Apologia  ad  Anastasium  2).  In  the  Apology  against 
Jerome, Rufinus refers to a similar whispering campaign and makes a similar defence: illi ergo sic mihi 
tradiderunt et sic teneo: quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius deitatis sit uniusque substantiae 
{Apologia contra Hier.  1.4.14). A little later in the same work, Rufinus re-affirms his orthodox, Nicene 
credentials  by describing the  Trinitas  in personarum  distinctione,  unitas in  veritate substantiae {ibid. 
1.4.23-4).
The  enormous  Expositio  Symboli,  an  exhaustive  commentary  on  the  Apostles’  Creed,  is  Rufinus’ 
definitive  defence  of himself,  a step by step  description of his  allegiance  to the minutiae of orthodox 
belief.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  we  find  in  this  work  repeated  references  to  the  unity  and 
consubstantiality of the Trinity.53 The three persons are one in nature and substance {unum tamen sunt 
substantia  vel natura)?*  The  Father  and  the  Son  share  one  and  the  same  immortal  substance  {illam 
deitatis  immortalem  substantiam,  quae  una  ei  eademque  cum  Patre  est).55  The  Trinity  is  distinct  in 
name and person, but inseparable in substance {vocabulis personique discreta,  inseparabilis substantia 
deitatis).56  There  is  a  consona  substantiae51  so  that  the  Holy  Trinity  is  one  according  to  substance
Origen.  The second claim, that the Son is different in substance from the Father, even a creature, must 
be the work of malicious interpolators.
52 Murphy (1945), pp. 134-36 discusses the circumstances surrounding the writing of this first Apology.
53 Murphy (1945), pp. 179-184 discusses Rufinus’ Expositio Symboli, but ignores the various references 
to consubstantiality.
54 Expositio 4.33; 4.49.
55 Expositio 5.41.
56 Expositio 8.40.
57 Expositio 37.59.
102{sacra  Trinitas  unum  sit per substantiam).58  Finally,  in  the  Preface  to  his  translation  of Pamphilus’ 
Apology,  Rufmus  presents  the  reader  with  a  resume  of his  own beliefs.  Once  again,  the  unity  of the 
Trinity figures prominently:  nos autem,  sicut traditum nobis est a sanctis patribus,  ita tenemus,  quod 
sancta  Trinitas coaetema sit et unius naturae uniusque virtutis atque substantiae.
(2.6)
From  this  brief  over-view  of  the  Trinitarian  theology  of  late  fourth  century  Palestine,  I  find  it 
impossible to accept Edwards’ claim that the question of 6|ioouoiO(;  was of no importance at this date. 
It  seems  rather  the  case  that  the  question  was  of central  importance  and  that  proof of orthodoxy 
depended to a very large extent upon whether or not one accepted the consubstantiality of the Trinity. 
This  was  especially  true  in  the  Holy  Land,  which  was  still  reeling  from the  attacks  of that powerful 
arch-Nicene, Epiphanius. Before the arrival of Epiphanius, the details of Nicene theology were of little 
importance to the theologians of Palestine.  In Jerome’s early works, there is almost no reference to the 
intricacies of Trinitarian dogma. The young Jerome was far more interested in translating the Bible and 
in  extolling  the  virtues  of chastity  to  aristocratic  young  ladies.59  The  visit  of Epiphanius  changed 
everything.  His attacks on Origen and Origenism aroused an unprecedented interest  in the doctrine of 
the  Trinity.  The  question  of consubstantiality  suddenly became  the  hottest  theological  issue.  Against 
Edwards,  I  feel  that  there  would  have  been  very  strong  reasons  and  a  very  strong  temptation  for 
Rufinus  to  pretend  that  Origen  had  used  the  term  in  a  relatively  obscure  work.  As  we  have  seen, 
Rufinus  prefaces  his  translation  of  the  Apology  with  a  condemnation  of  anyone  who  denies 
6poo0oiOv  it is surely to be expected that the  ‘quotations’  from Origen which follow will conform to 
Rufinus’ strictures. He is advertising to his readers the kinds of doctrines they are to expect.
Our  conclusion  to  this  first  section  is  two-fold.  (1)  Rufinus  would  have  had  good  apologetic  and 
polemical reasons for pretending that Origen applied the term 6|ioouoio<; to the Son. The term could no 
longer be ignored, but had become something of a neck-verse for anyone claiming to be orthodox.  (2) 
Rufinus’  method  of translation  allowed  him  to  amend  any  text  that  did  not  conform  to  the  strict 
standards  of Nicaea.  But  having  established both  motive  and  opportunity,  what evidence  do  we have 
that Rufinus  is in fact guilty? In the remaining sections of this chapter, we shall attempt to answer this 
question.
58 Expositio 46.4.
59 Kelly (1975), pp.141-178.
103THE RELEVANCE OF THE 6 HOOUOIO<;  CLAIM TO THE CHARGE THAT ORIGEN BELIEVED 
THE SON TO BE INNATUS.
(3)
We  begin  our  discussion  by  considering  the  purpose  and  function  of the  Commentary  on  Hebrews 
fragment within the context of Pamphilus’ Apology.  This passage, along with five others,  is part of an 
unusually  long  responsio  to  the  charge  that  Origen  believed  the  Son  to  be  innatus.  This  is  the  first 
charge  to  which  Pamphilus  responds;  it was  obviously very worrying to  him.  Moreover,  as  we  have 
seen, the topic had already been aired in Pamphilus’ general introduction to Origen’s system (Apologia 
III,  109).  It  would  appear  that  Origen  was  accused  of believing  that  the  Son,  like  the  Father,  was 
unbegotten.
But far from refuting the charge in question, the claim that the Father and the Son are 6|ioouoio<;  seems 
(at best) to be irrelevant or (at worst) actually to support and corroborate the charge.60 The conclusion 
of the responsio is particularly odd: satis manifeste,  opinor,  et valde ostensum est,  quod Filium Dei de 
ipsa substantia  natum  dixerit.  id est  6|iOO\knoq  quod est eiusdem  cum  Patre substantiae,  et non  esse 
creaturum,  neque per adoptionem, sed natura Filium  verum ex ipso Patre generatum (Apologia  100). 
According  to  this  peroration,  Origen has  been  vindicated  on  three  important points:  (1)  the  Son was 
generated  from the  substance of the  Father, (2) the Father and the  Son are therefore of one substance 
and (3) the  Son  is not a creature.  This  is an irrelevant conclusion that has no significance whatsoever 
for the charge in question. The conclusion ought to have been simply that the Son is ex Patre natus.61 
Surely our suspicions should be aroused by this and doubt cast on the authenticity of the  Commentary' 
on  Hebrews fragment.  It seems reasonable to me to conclude that the last passage of the responsio did 
not appear  in Pamphilus’  original Apology,  for the simple reason that it does not provide an adequate 
response  to  the  charge  that  Origen believed  the  Son to be  innatus.  I  believe  that  it was  appended by 
Rufinus in order to respond to, or at least to forestall, an entirely different accusation.
At  this  point  it  is  important  to  recall  that  Pamphilus  and  Rufinus  lived  and  worked  in  very different 
historical and theological contexts and had therefore very different apologetic agenda. Pamphilus wrote 
the  Apology for  Origen  between  308  and  310,  in  response  to  a  variety  of contemporary  attacks  on 
Origen.  The  opening  list  of accusations  reveals  the  nature  and  content  of these  attacks.62  First  and
60 Williams (1993), p. 154 and Hanson (1985), p.66.
61 Hanson (1985), p.67 and Williams (1993), p. 154.
62 Williams (1993), p.155.
104foremost, is the accusation that Origen believed the Son to be innatus. As we have seen, this accusation 
was most likely the response to the doctrine of eternal generation.63
Williams64  suggests  another  possible  interpretation  of  the  innatus  charge.  Comparing  the  first 
accusation with the third accusation, that Origen believed Christ to be a mere man, Williams interprets 
the  first  accusation  as  an  accusation  of Monarchianism.  Williams  lays  great  stress  on  the  historical 
context  in which Pamphilus  wrote the Apology.  We  know that the  intended recipients of the Apology 
were the Christian prisoners condemned to the mines of Palestine. Williams argues that these prisoners, 
mostly of Egyptian extraction, had been disturbed by various reports that their fellow countryman was 
in fact a Sabellian. These reports were likely to have been circulated by the Bishops of Asia Minor who 
had had first hand experience of the dangers of Sabellianism and who were most sensitive to any hints 
of  the  heresy.  Williams  concludes  that  Pamphilus  wrote  the  Apology  to  re-assure  the  martyrs  of 
Palestine  that  Origen  was  not  a  Sabellian.  He  feels  able  to  quote  various  passages  which prove  that 
Origen distinguished the Son from the Father as one ‘bom from him’.
When  Rufinus  decided  to  translate  the  Apology'  in  AD  397,  the  main  issues  of  the  Origenist 
Controversy had changed dramatically. At the beginning of the fourth century, Origen stood accused of 
exalting the Son above his proper station, even to equality with the Father, as  ‘unbegotten’. By the end 
of the  fourth century,  the  major objection to Origen’s Trinitarian theology was almost the opposite of 
this:  Origen  was  now  accused  of reducing  the  status  of the  Son  to  that  of a  mere  creature  and  of 
denying  consubstantiality.  It  is  only  within  this  context  of changing  theological  milieux  that  we  can 
understand  Rufinus’  textual  emendation.  I  would argue that it was  in response to this new accusation 
that Rufinus appended the passage from the Commentary on Hebrews. Although it had no relevance for 
the innatus charge, Rufinus could not bear to ignore the issue of bjioouoioq.
THE RELATION OF THE bftOOUOlOQ  CLAIM TO ORIGEN’S OVERALL THEOLOGY.
(4.1)
The problem to which we must now turn is whether the appended passage is a genuine quotation from 
the missing Commentary' on Hebrews.  Did Rufinus manage to find a passage in which Origen had used 
the crucial  term 6|ioouoio^ which he could then quote as definitive proof of his master’s orthodoxy? I 
believe  that this is almost impossible. The 6poouoio<; claim contained in the Commentary on Hebrews 
fragment is entirely at odds with the main thrust of Origen’s Trinitarian theology.
63 See above, Introduction.
105The  quotations and arguments of chapter  1   have shown how Origen’s skirmish with the Monarchians 
led  him  to  insist  upon  the  eternal  existence  of Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  as  three  separate  and 
individual  ouoiai,  different  and  distinct  from  one  another.  Surely  this  alone  is  sufficient  reason  for 
rejecting  the  authenticity  of the  6|ioouoio<;  fragment?  It  would  be  impossible  for  the  ouoia  of the
Son  to be simultaneously different from and the same as that of the Father.
Our discussion of Book 20 of the  Commentary on St John  showed that Origen was certainly aware of 
the  term  bpoouoicx;.65  It  was  part  of his  technical  philosophical  vocabulary  and  it  could  have  been 
easily applied to the Father and the Son had it been applicable.  In Book 20 of the Commentary on St 
John,  Origen defines consubstantiality as  the  sharing of a  certain set of common attributes,  which he 
calls i8i6xrj(;. The rational souls are 6fioouoio<; because they all share the same attributes, i.e. the ability 
to  remember,  to  think  and  to  make  moral  choices.  Conversely,  wax,  lead  and  gold  are  different 
ouoiai  because each exhibits a different set of attributes. If Origen believed that the Father and the Son 
were  bpoouoioc;,  this  would  necessarily mean that they shared the  same  i8i6xr|<;.  But this  is expressly 
denied  in  the  Commentary  on  St  John.  To  deny  the  Son  his  own  i8i6xr|<;  is  the  heresy  of 
Monarchianism:  &pvou|i£vou<;  i8i6xr|xa  uiou  ex£pav  rcapa  xijv  xou  7 iaxpo<;  6poXoyouvxaq  0eov  slvai
xov |i£xPl 6v6paxo<; nap’  auxoiq "uiov"  npooayopeudpEvov  (Commentary on St John 2.2).66  Similarly, 
in fragment 37 of the Commentary on St John Origen vehemently objects to the Monarchian claim that 
the Holy Ghost does not have its own  i8i6xrjc;: ouk  exov  wax'  auxoug  bndp^Eax;  I8i6xr|xa.67 
We  must  always  bear  in  mind  that  Origen  uses  the  term  iSi6xr|<;  to  describe  generic  characteristics, 
properties common to a particular group or species, not the unique qualities of an individual within that 
group.68  For example,  everything golden shares  the same  i8i6xqq:  gold cup “A” has the same  i8idxr|<; 
as  gold  cup  “B”.  Similarly,  Socrates  has  the  same  iSidxqq  as  Simias.69 To  use  a  helpful  Aristotelian 
distinction, Origen applies the term i8i6xr|<; to ‘secondary ouoia’, not to ‘primary ouoia’. This point has 
very  important  ramifications  for  our  understanding  of Origen’s  Trinitarian  doctrine.  When  Origen 
argues that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have their own unique i8i6xr|<;, this does not mean that they
64 Williams (1993), pp. 158-163
65 See chapter 1, section 6.2.
66 See chapter 1, sections 5.4  and 10.2, for our discussion of this important  passage.
67 See chapter 1, section 5.4,  for our discussion of this important passage.
68  Hence,  for  Origen  the  term  6|ioouoio<;  means  that  two  substances are  generically  and  not
numerically identical. On this distinction, see Kelly (1977), pp. 130 and 234 and Hanson (1985), p.62.
69 See Commentary on St John 20.23 (20) and our discussion in chapter 1, sections 5.4 and 6.2.
106are three distinct ‘persons’, three individual examples of the same generic  oixria, namely the  ouoia of 
divinity.70 It means that each is a separate and individual ouoia.
We can only conclude that Origen would not, could not, have applied the term  6poouoio<; to the Son, 
for  fear of falling  into  the  very  heresy he  most  despised.  It  is  the  Monarchians  who believe  that  the 
Father and the Son are one ouoia and who deny the Son his own i8i6xr|q.
We  might  also  note  that  Origen’s  extreme  subordinationism  makes  the  6poouoio<;  claim  even  more 
unlikely. We have seen in some detail how Origen thoroughly subordinates the Son to the Father.71  He 
is  an  eternally  contingent  and  dependent  being,  the  Father’s  tool  and  intermediary  in  creation, 
revelation and redemption, the means through which and by which God might deal with fallen man, but 
who will  eventually prove redundant and de trop.  Surely the notion of consubstantiality incorporates, 
by very definition, the notion of equality? The adoption of the term at Nicaea was primarily intended as 
a  technical  expression  of the  Son’s  perfect  equality  with  the  Father.  So,  too,  when  Origen  calls  the 
rational souls bjioouoioq he means to emphasize their equality, thereby refuting the Gnostic doctrine of 
ranks or classes of soul.
(4.2)
We  must  also be  wary of the  explanation  given  in  the  Commentary on  Hebrews  fragment of exactly 
how and  why the  Father and  the  Son are said  to be  unius substantiae.  Before reaching this  dramatic 
conclusion,  Origen/Rufinus argues that the Son is bom  ‘from the very substance’  of God (ex ipsa Dei 
substantia  generatur).  Indeed,  this  claim  is  taken  as  the  premiss  for  the  conclusion:  it  is  precisely 
because the Son is bom from the substance of the Father that he is consubstantial with him.  Solomon’s 
claim that Wisdom is the effluence of the glory of the Almighty suggests a useful, if imperfect, analogy. 
As  vapor  proceeds  from  the  substance  of a  body  and  is  therefore  consubstantial  with  it  (aporrhoea 
enim  dpoovoiog videtur,  id est unius substantiae cum illo corpore ex quo est aporrhoea vel vapor), so 
the Son proceeds from the substance of the Father and is therefore consubstantial with him.
Although  Origen  certainly  believed  that  the  Son  was  bom  ‘from  the  Father’  rather  than  created  ex 
nihilo,72 it is extremely doubtful that he would have expanded this to mean  ‘from the substance of the
70  Of  course,  this  is  precisely  what  the  term  would  come  to  mean  in  the  aftermath  of the  Arian 
Controversy. On this point, see section 9.
71 Chapter 1, sections  10.1-14.
72 See de Principiis  1.2.2,  1.2.4,  1.2.9,  1.2.11,  1.2.13,  1.5.5,  1.7.2, 2.9.2 and 4.4.8. Of course, this belief 
is an important corollary to the doctrine of eternal generation.
107Father’.  Indeed,  at  Commentary  on  St John  20.18  (157),  this  is  expressly  denied.73  In  this  passage, 
Origen  rejects  the  notion  of  ek  xf|q  ouoiai  xou  naxpdq  as  implying  the  Gnostic  doctrine  of divine
Fission.74  Commenting  on  Christ’s  claim,  I came from  God (John  8.42),  Origen  insists  that the  verse 
must be understood as a reference to the Incarnation and kenosis, and not as a description of the ‘birth’ 
of the Son from the substance of the Father: aXXoi hi  xo ',£^r|A.0ov dnd xou  0eou" 5ir|yf|aavxo dvxi xoC 
"yey^vvripai  xou  0eou",  ol^  6koXou0ei  ek  xf|Q  ouoia<;  cpdaKEiv  xou  naxpoq  y£y£vvf|0ai  xov  ui6v, 
oiovEi  pEioup^vou  Kai  Xeikovxo*;  xf| ouoi<?  f|  rcpdxEpov  eIxev  xou  0eou,  etkzv  yEvvfiop  x6v  ui6v, cocci 
voi)oai  xi< ;  xouxo  Kai  ini  xdjv  cyKujidvcov.  dKoXou0£i  8£  auxoi^  Kai  coopa  Xtyeiv  x6v  naxcpa  Kai 
xov  uiov  Kai  8ir|pf|C0ai  xov  7iax6pa,  ancp  coxiv  56ypaxa  dvOpcoTicov  pr|5’  ovap  cpuoiv  ddpaxov  Kai 
aocbpaxov  7i£(pavxac|i6vcov,  ouoav  Kupicoq  ouolav.  ouxoi  hi  6f|A.ov  ox  ev  acopaxiKcp  xdnco  5cboouoiv 
xov  7iax6pa,  Kai  xov  uiov  xdnov  ek  x6tiou  djicivj/avxa  ocapaxiKox;  £7ti8£5r|pr|K6vai  xq>  pico,  Kai  ouxi
Kaxd  axaoiv  e k   KaxaoxdoEG*;, ooo7t£p  f||i£i<;  E^EiXTjcpajiEv.
It  is  clear  from  this  passage  that  Origen  utterly  rejected  the  idea  that  the  Son  was 
ek  xrj^  ouoiaq  xou  naxpdv  The  doctrine  necessarily  implies  corporeal  division,  that  the  Father  was 
diminished  by  the procession  of the  Son.75  According  to  such an account,  God would become  like  a 
pregnant woman,  severing part of her own body (the foetus)  from herself.  Origen rejects this doctrine 
because it contradicts his fundamental theological credo:  it makes sense only if the Father and the Son 
are bodies. An incorporeal being cannot divide itself.
Jerome  also  reports  that  Origen  rejected  the  notion  of  ek  xf|<;  oboiaq  xou  naxpdc;.  In  the  Apologia 
contra Rufinum, Jerome describes a debate that took place between Origen and the Gnostic champion, 
Candidus.  In the course of the discussion, Origen explicitly denied that the Son was ex substantia Dei, 
as  implying  that  the  Son  was  a  npoPoXi)  of the  Father  and  that  both  Father  and  Son  were  therefore 
bodies  {Apologia  2.9).76  In  Letter  84.4,  Jerome  makes  the  same  complaint:  like  the  Arians,  Origen 
refuses  to  accept  that  the  Son  is de Patris  substantia.  We  have  already  seen how  Epiphanius  places 
Origen in the Arian ranks, precisely for his rejection of this fundamental orthodox belief: he denies that 
the  Son  is  ek  xf|q  ouoia<;  xou  nazpdq  {Panarion  64.4.3).  We  might  also  add  that  Eusebius,  a
731 was alerted to this important, but strangely neglected passage by Hanson (1985), pp.201  and 412. 
See also Stead (1977), p.230.
74 See de Principiis  1.2.6 and 4.4.1  for an express rejection of the Gnostic theory.
75 Hanson (1985), p.412.
76 Passage quoted by Butterworth (1966), p.313. Also discussed by Bardy (1923), pp. 17-19.
108particularly close follower of Origen, repeatedly denied the doctrine (Demonstratio Evangelica 4.3.13, 
5.1.9, 5.1.20).77
It  is  clear therefore  that  Origen  rejected  the  doctrine  of  ek   xf|<;  ouoiaq  xou  rcaxpdc;  as  implying  the 
heretical notion of corporeal division. There is however another important reason for Origen’s rejection 
of the doctrine. Origen seems to suggest that the transcendence of God is such that even the procession 
of the Son must take place via an intermediary. According to this argument, the Son processes from the 
‘power’ of God and not from his substance. The clearest discussion of this doctrine is Commentary on 
St John  13.25  (153).78 This passage  is part of a detailed exegesis of Wisdom  7.25-6;  it is therefore of 
great importance to the present study.79 In this passage, Origen insists that the Son proceeded from the 
‘glory’,  Tight’  or ‘power’ of God and not from God himself:  dTtauyaoiia  oi) xou  0eou itXXa  xf|<;  86E ,r|< ; 
auxou Kai  xou &i8iou cpcoxoq  auxou, Kai  dxpiq  ou  xou  rcaxpdi; tiXXa  xf|<; 8uvdpeax; auxou.  As Stead puts 
it, “it seems that God’s glory,  light and power are conceived as attributes which in some way mediate 
between  the  Father  and  the  Son.”80  This  passage  is  surely  another  clear  rejection  of 
e k   x f|g   ouoiaq  xou  naxp6< ;.
There  seems  to  be  a  trace  of this  important  argument  in  Rufinus’  translation  of the  Commentary on 
Hebrews fragment, where we read that the Son emanates de virtute ipsius Dei. Rufinus wrongly glosses 
this as meaning that the Son emanates de ipsa substantia Dei; the two are entirely different. Taking his 
cue from Philo, Origen regularly distinguishes the ‘substance’ of God from the ‘power’ of God.81 At de 
Principiis  1.2.9, Origen similarly insists that the Son emanates from the virtus of God. This passage is 
also a gloss on  Wisdom 7.26.82 The argument is rather difficult to follow and has probably been ruined 
by Rufinus. However, it is still possible to detect Origen’s original insistence that the  ‘power’ of God is 
a connecting and communicating intermediary.  It is from this  ‘power’  that the Son proceeds, not from 
God himself, not ‘from the substance of God’.
We can only conclude that Rufmus altered the original text of the Apology to include the claim that the 
Son  was  ex  ipsa  Dei  substantia  generatur.  This  claim,  like  the  6poouoio<;  claim,  had  become  an
77 Stead (1977), p. 232. We discuss the question of Origen’s followers in section 6.
781 was alerted to this passage by Stead (1977), p.213. He does not however discuss the full 
implications of the argument.
79 See section 5 for a full discussion of this passage.
80 Stead (1977), p.213.
81  On  Philo,  see  Sandmell  (1979),  pp.92-3  and  Witt  (1933),  p.330.  On  Origen,  see  our  chapter  1, 
sections  10.2 and  12.1.
82 This passage is briefly discussed by Stead (1977), p.213.
109important  slogan  of the  Nicene  faithful.83  There  would  have  been  very  good  apologetic  reasons  for 
altering the text of the Apology on this particular point.
(4.3)
We  have  seen  how  Origen  is  constantly  on  guard  against  compromising  in  any  way  the  eternal 
distinction of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. It is for this reason that he could never have accepted the 
doctrine  of consubstantiality.84  For  Origen,  the  ‘oneness’  of the  Godhead  is  certainly  not a  unity of 
substance, but a union of will,  love and action.85 Despite a shared purpose and a common mission, the 
three ouoiai  remain eternally distinct. This theology is particularly clearly expressed at Contra Celsum 
8.12,  where  Origen  discusses  the  vexed  question  of the  exact  nature  of the  relationship  between  the 
Father  and  the  Son.  The  passage  is  written  in response  to  Celsus’  complaint that the  Christians  have 
abandoned monotheism.
Origen begins by stressing that the Father and the Son are indeed ‘one’ and that monotheism remains a 
fundamental  tenet  of the  new  religion.  He  quotes  various  Scriptural  passages  in  which  the  Saviour 
expresses his  ‘oneness’  with the Father (John  10.30,  14.10-11  and  17.21).  Yet these claims are not to 
be read as an endorsement of Monarchianism,  namely as a  ‘denial of two hypostases’.  Origen insists 
that  the  unity  of  the  Father  and  the  Son  expressed  in  these  verses  must  be  understood  only 
catachrestically,  similar to  the way in which the  early Christians were  said to be  ‘one heart and soul’ 
(Acts 4.32).  For Origen, the  ‘oneness’ of the Trinity is not a unity, but merely a union.86 To claim that 
the  Father  and  the  Son  are  ‘one’  is  no  more  than  the  acknowledgement  of a  shared  will  and  shared 
purpose:  8uo  xf|  urcooxda£i  npdypaxa,  e v  8£  xf|  bpovoiqt  Kai  xf|  ou|i(pcovi(jt  Kai  xf|  xauxdxqxi  xou 
PouXripaxo^  (Contra  Celsum  8.12).87  To accept a more  fundamental union,  a union of substance  or 
of nature, would be to endorse the Monarchian heresy.
The  arguments  of this  passage  are  very  similar  to  those  developed  in  the  opening  chapters  of the 
Dialogue  with  Heraclides  (2.28-3.16).  Mercilessly  cross-examined  by  Origen,  Maximus  finally 
exposes himself as a ditheist: he believes that the Father and the Son are  8uo  0£oi. In correction of this
heresy,  Origen  details  his  own  Trinitarian  paradigm.  As  always,  Origen  is  keen  to  distance  himself
83 Against the Arian claim that the Son was created ex nihilo the orthodox felt obliged to argue that he 
was bom ex substantia Dei.
84 See section 4.1.
85 Kelly (1977), p.130, Hanson (1985), p.54 and Wolfson (1956), p.327.
86 See Webster’s Dictionary for the important distinction between ‘union’ and ‘unity’.
87 As Capelle (1951), p. 148 notes, the union described in this passage is merely a “unite morale.”
110from  any  hint  of Monarchianism.  He  begins  by  insisting  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are  different 
(exepoq)  from  one  another.  Once  again,  the  ‘oneness’  of  the  Trinity  is  described  as  a  union,  or 
unification:  there remains the  vital element of numerical distinction.  The Father and the Son are  ‘one’ 
only as much as, for example, Adam and Eve were ‘one flesh’ or as the souls of the just are ‘one spirit’ 
with  Christ.  Although marriage  unites  a  husband  and  wife,  they remain  separate,  distinct  individuals. 
Similarly,  although  a  shared  divinity  unites  Father  and  Son,  they  remain  distinct.88  We  should  take 
particularly  note  of the  verb  that  is  used  in  this  passage:  fevoup£vov  means  to  unite  what  was  once 
disparate.89
Throughout chapter  1.2  of the de Principiis,  Origen similarly emphasizes the  ‘merely moral’  union of 
the Father and the Son. This is certainly not the kind of union of which the pro-Nicenes would approve: 
it  is  far  indeed  from the  notion  of substantial  unity.  In  this  chapter,  Origen describes  what might be 
called a union of action. At de Principiis  1.2.12, Origen likens the Son to a mirror which copies exactly 
the  movements  of the  one  looking  at  the  glass  (the  Father),  sicut  ergo  in  speculo  omnibus  motibus 
atque omnibus actibus,  quibus is qui speculum  intuetur movetur vel agit,  isdem ipsis etiam ea imago; 
quae per speculum  deformatur,  actibus  et motibus  commovetur vel agit,  in  nullo prorsus  declinans. 
This unity of action  is the sole reason for the unity of the Father and the Son:  they are one because -  
and only because -  they perform the same acts.
Finally,  there  is a very interesting passage  in the  Commentary on St John  in which Origen appears to 
adopt  a  developmental  Trinitarian paradigm:  the  union between the  Father and the  Son  is  a union  of 
what  was  once  disparate.  It  is,  in  the  strict  sense  of the  word,  a  ‘unification’.  At  Commentary on  St 
John  13.36 (228), Origen provides a detailed exegesis of Christ’s words to the disciples: My food is to 
do the will of him who sent me (John 4.34). He argues that there were originally two wills in the Father 
and  the  Son,  but  that these  were gradually united.  As  the  will  of the  Son conforms  to  the will  of the 
Father, the two wills become one will:  oxe  7 ioir|Xi)<;  yivexai  xou rcaxpiKou 0eXf|paxo<;,  xouxo xd 06Xeiv 
ev  eauxcp  tio k uv  onep  i^v  Kai ev  xcp  naxpi, oooxe  elvai  xd  0£>.r||ia  xou  0eou  ev  x(p 0eA.f||iaxi  xou  uiou, 
xai  Y£v£o0ai  x6  06Xrpa  xou  uiou  d7iapdX>.aKXOv  xou  ©eXfjpaxoq  xou  Ttaxpd*;,  ei<;  xd  pr|K6xi 
eivai  8uo  0eXf||iaxa hWa ev 06Xr||ia.  The most important point to be noted is the way in which Origen 
cites  this  congruence  of will  as  the  sole  grounds  for union between the  Father and the  Son.  The  two
88 See Capelle (1951), p. 148  for a discussion of this point.  It is a shared divinity that unites the Father 
and the Son.
89 So, LSJ.
Illhave become one. There is absolutely no suggestion here of substantial unity, or even of shared nature. 
The  Father  and  the  Son  are  ‘one’  simply  because  they  have  come  to  share  the  same 
will:  dnep  ev  06Xr||ia  ainov  r^v  toC  Xkyeiv  xdv  ui6v- "eyco  Kai  6  7 taxi)p  ev  eopev"  (John 10.30).
(5.1)
We conclude this section with an examination of two important passages which seem to me to provide 
indisputable  proof  of  Rufinus’  emendation  of  Origen’s  Commentary  on  Hebrews.  We  begin  with 
Commentary on St John  13.25. The great importance of this passage to the present discussion is that it 
deals with the same subject as the  Commentary on Hebrews fragment  (the relationship of the  Son to 
the Father), supported by the same Biblical texts (Wisdom 7.25-26, Ephesians  1.21  and Hebrews  1.3). I 
believe that it is by comparison with a similar passage surviving in the original Greek that we are best 
able  to test the  authenticity of Rufinus’  translation of the  Commentary on  Hebrews  fragment.  At this 
point, we introduce the other fragment of the Commentary on Hebrews, preserved by Rufinus (Apology 
95).  This  quotation,  a  gloss  on  Hebrews  1.2,  must  belong  to  a  passage  immediately  preceding  the 
controversial  fragment  in  the  original  Commentary.  It  is  therefore  a  vitally  important  introduction, 
which must not be ignored. To facilitate a full and detailed comparison, we quote both passages in full: 
"oor|  yap  So^oXoyia  xou  imep£xovxo<;  Bpdvcov,  Kupioxf|xtov,  dpxd>v,  e^ouoicbv,  Kai  7 iavxo<; 
6v6paxo<;  6vo|ia(;op6vou  ou  pdvov  e v  xcp  aitovi  xouxcp  hXXa  Kai  ev  xcp  p£XXovxi,  7 ipo<;  xouxoig  Kai 
dyicov dyy£Xcov  Kai  7 cveu|idxcov  Kai  i|/uxd>v SiKaicov  xi  5ei  Kai  X6yeiv;  'aX X '  6|iO)<; xcov  xooouxcov  Kai 
xqXiKohxcov lmep£xo)v ohalcy  Kai JtpeaPeiqt  Kai 8uvdpei Kai 0ei6xr|xi  -  epvj/uxoq  ydp eoxi X6yoq  - Kai 
aocpujt,  ou  ouyKpivexai  Kax’  oh8£v  xcp  naxpi.  eiKCov  ydp  eoxiv  xf|q  dya06xqxoq  ahxou  Kai  dKauyaopa 
ou  xou  0eou  hXXa  xqq  5< 5£,riq  auxou  Kai  xou  di8iou  cpcoxog  ahxou,  Kai  dxpig  oh  xou  Tiaxpog  hXXa  xijq 
Suvdpecoq  auxou,  Kai  drtdppoia  eiXiKpivT)<;  xf|<;  7 iavxoKpaxopiKr|<;  56^ri<;  auxou,  Kai  eoonxpov 
dKr|Xi5coxovxf|<;  evepyetaq  ahxou  (Commentary on St John  13.2 5 (151-3)).
interrogamus  igitur  eos  quos piget  confiteri  Deum  esse  Filium  Dei,  quomodo poterat sola  humana 
natura  nihil  in  se  habens  eximium  neque  aliquid  divinae  substantiae,  haereditatem  capere  omnem 
principatum et omnem potestatem et virtutem et his omnibus praeferri ac proponi a Patre. unde rectum 
videtur, quod praestantior esse debeat is qui haereditatem capit et genere utique et specie et substantia 
et subsistentia  vel natura atque omnibus quibusque modis debet praestantior.  .  .  cum autem discuitur 
hec quod dictum  est de Filio Dei,  quod sit splendor gloriae,  necessario  videtur simul disserendum  et 
illud quod dictum est,  non solum quod splendor est lucis aetemae, sed et quod huic simile in Sapientia 
Solomonis  referetur,  in  qua  seipsam  Sapientia  describit  dicens:  vapor  enim  est  virtutis  Dei,  et
112aporrhoea gloriae Omnipotentis purissima .  . .  secundum similitudidem eius vaporis qui de substantia 
aliqua corporea procedit, sic etiam ipse ut quidam vapor exoritur de virtute ipsius Dei: sic et sapientia 
ex  eo  procedens,  ex  ipsa  Dei  substantia  generatur.  sic  nihilominus  et  secundum  similitudinem 
corporalis  aporrhcece,  esse  dicitur  aporrhcea  gloria  omnipotentis  pura  quaedam  et  sincera.  quae 
utraeque  similitudines  manifestissime  ostendunt  communionem  substantiae  esse  Filio  cum  Patre. 
aporrhoea enim 6fioo\3oio<;  videtur,  id est unius substantiae cum illo corpore ex quo est aporrhoea vel 
vapor {Apologia 95-99).
It is immediately obvious that the two passages begin in the same way. In the Commentary on St John, 
Origen quotes  Ephesians  1.21  to  illustrate the  Son’s superiority to creation:  he  is raised far above all 
principality,  and power,  and might,  and dominion,  and every  name  that  is  named,  not  only  in  this 
world, but also in that which is to come. Origen expands this by declaring that he is superior to the holy 
angels,  the  souls  of the just  and  all  spiritual  beings.  This  exalted  status  is  explained  in terms  of the 
Son’s  ‘substance’,  ‘rank’,  ‘power’  and  ‘divinity’.  The  Commentary on  Hebrews  fragment also begins 
with  a  clear  statement  of the  Son’s  superiority.90 Commenting  on  Hebrews  1.2,  Origen considers  the 
Son’s position as heir of all things. As in the Commentary on St John, Origen quotes Ephesians  1.21  as 
proof of the Son’s exalted status: the Father has placed him far above all principality,  and power,  and 
might.  Origen  then  insists  that  the  Son  is  ‘superior’  {praestantior)  in  ‘type’,  ‘species’,  ‘substance’, 
‘existence’, ‘nature’ and ‘every other way’.
So  far,  we  are on  familiar territory.  The  ontological divide between creator and created is one  of the 
fundamentals  of Origen’s  theological  system.91  There  is however a glaring  disagreement  in these  two 
passages  concerning  the  relationship  of the  Son  to  the  Father.  Although  we  find  the  same  Scriptural 
verses  in  both  passages,  they  are  used  in  an  entirely  different  way  to  illustrate  entirely  different 
conclusions.
The  first passage  is  written as  a  response  to  those  Christians  who  would promote  the  Son above  and 
beyond his proper station.  Origen prefaces the argument by quoting John  14.28 {The Father who sent 
me  is  greater  than  I)  and  Mark  10.18  {Why  do  you  call  me  good?).  These  quotations  are  perfect 
Scriptural  proof against  those  who  ‘over-glorify’  the  Son.  Widdecombe  argues  that  this  passage  is 
specifically  aimed  at  the  Gnostics,  as  a  refutation  of their  belief that  the  Son  (the  God  of the  New
90  While  we  must  accept  some  tinkering  by  Rufinus  -   (the  opening  phrase  seems  particularly 
anachronistic) -  I feel that this translation is basically correct.
113Testament)  is  superior  to  the  God  of  the  Old  Testament.92  He  makes  the  further  claim  that  the 
subordination of the  Son is integral to the anti-Gnostic polemic that characterizes the  Commentary on 
St John.  But it was not only the Gnostics who were accused of over-glorifying the Son.  It was also a 
major criticism of Monarchianism.  Both Hippolytus and  Epiphanius accuse Noetus of ‘glorifying’  the 
Son (Hippolytus, contra Noetum  1.16-18; Epiphanius, Panarion 57.1.8 and 57.1.11).93 
In response to this, Origen insists that, although the Son is far superior to every created being, he is not 
in any way comparable to the Father (ou  ouyKpivexai  Kai’  o05£v  ito  rcaipi).  Origen quotes from both 
the  Wisdom of Solomon and the Epistle to the Hebrews to illustrate the subordination of the Son.  He 
begins by reminding  us  that Wisdom  is  merely the  image  of God’s  goodness.  Within the  context  of 
Origen’s  Platonic  philosophy,  this  is  sufficient  proof of subordination.94  With  reference  to  the  New 
Testament passage, Origen highlights the fact that the  Son is described as the  ‘brightness’  not of God 
himself, but merely of his glory. Similarly, Wisdom is called the ‘breath’ not of God, but merely of the 
power of God.  It would appear that these three (‘goodness’,  ‘power’  and  ‘wisdom’) are intermediaries 
which shield the  transcendent  first God  from contact with even his own  Son.95 At  Commentary on St 
John  13.25, Wisdom 7.25-26 and Hebrews  1.3 are used to illustrate the distinction between the Father 
and the Son,  specifically the  subordination of the  former to the latter.96 The verses are employed as a 
Scriptural justification for the claim that the ‘Son is in no way comparable to the Father’. That they are 
intended as a justification or illustration of this claim is clear from the  fact that Origen introduces the 
quotation with the explanatory conjunction ‘for’ (ydp).97
91  This distinction is normally expressed as the distinction between that which exists eternally and that 
which is created in time, out of nothing.
92 Widdecombe (1994), p.39.
93 On this point, see Bethune-Baker (1933), p. 104 and Le Boulluec (1985) II, pp.520-1.
94  See  chapter  1,  section  10.2  for  a  discussion  of this  point.  The  reader  is  also  referred  to  Jerome’s 
paraphrase of de Principiis  1.2.13, where Origen provides a very similar exegesis of Wisdom 7.26:  as 
merely the imaee of God’ s goodness, the Son is to be carefully distinguished from goodness itself.
95 Stead (1977), 213. See our discussion of this in section 4.2.
96  Stead (1977), p.213  and Logan (1981),  p. 126 both note how Origen  is  using Wisdom 7.25-26  in a
strongly subordinate sense.
97 Prestige (1952), pp. 132-3  discusses the above passage  in some detail and attempts to  ‘explain it on 
orthodox  lines’,  by  arguing  that  the  distinction  posited  by  Origen  is  merely  the distinction  of
derivation:  “that is not to say that the glory as derived is any whit less than  the glory as exhibited in its
source.” Two responses can be made to this. (1) This is not at all what Origen says in Commentary on 
St John  13.25.  (2) According to the fundamentals of Origen’s Platonic philosophy, derivation by itself 
is  sufficient  grounds  for  extreme  subordinationism.  See  chapter  1,  sections  10.1-10.2,  for  a  full 
discussion of this point.
114In this passage, Origen develops what one might call a triple ontology. Reality comprises three distinct 
tiers: the Father, the Son and the created order.98 His ontological system is not a simple duality between 
the triune God and his creation. There is a parallel, or even greater, distinction between the Father and 
the  Son.  As  the  Son  surpasses  the  created  souls,  so  he  in turn  is  surpassed by the  Father.  The  locus 
classicus for this theology is Commentary on St John  13.25:
7idvT(ov p£v  xwv  yevriicov imep6xEtv  ob ouyKpioei bXk'  b7t£p(3akkoua|i  UTiepoxfl (pap£v  xov ocoxf|pa  Kai 
to   nveGpa  to   ayiov,  UTrepexdpevov  tooou tov  f|  Kai  rcXfov  find  xou  rcaxpdq,  ooco  brc£p£x£i  abxd<; 
Kai  to   ayiov nvEupa xcbv  koincav,  ou to>v  xuxdvxcov  ovxcov.
This  is a model re-iterated throughout Origen’s oeuvre, but especially in the  Commentary on St John. 
For example,  in chapters 2.2-3, Origen is at great pains to distinguish the Father from the Son and the 
Holy  Ghost:  only  the  former  is  unbegotten,  without  needs  and  entirely  self-sufficient.99  The 
subordination  of the  Son  naturally became  a  major  issue  of the  First  Origenist  Controversy.  Jerome 
translated  Theophilus’  famous  Synodical  Letter,  in  which  he  attacks  Origen  for  precisely  the  views 
expressed at Commentary on St John  13.25: quantum dijfert Paulus et Petrus Salvatore,  tanto Salvator 
minor est Patre (Epistola 92.2). In his response to the letter, Jerome focuses on this particular point as 
an illustration of Origen’s heresy (Epistola 93).
The argument of the  Commentary on Hebrews fragment is entirely different from that of Commentary 
on St John  13.25.  This  is very suspicious.  It seems to me very unlikely that Origen would discuss the 
same  issue,  quote  the  same  Biblical  texts  and  yet  reach  two  entirely  different  conclusions.  In  the 
Commentary on  Hebrews  fragment,  the  verses are used to  illustrate  the  identity of the Father and the 
Son,  specifically the  fact that they are dpoouoioq:  the all-important distinction between the Father and 
the Son has been suppressed. Origen’s triple ontology has been telescoped into a simple duality.
(5.2)
In chapter 8.14  of the  Contra  Celsum,  Origen deals again with the vexed question of the relationship 
between the Father and the Son. The argument of this chapter is very similar to that of Commentary>  on 
St John  13.25.  Although  Origen affirms  that the  Son of God  is himself God,  he  is wary of excessive 
worship of the Son. As in the Commentary on St John, the arguments of Contra Celsum 8.14 are aimed 
at  those  who  exalt  the  Son  above  and  beyond  his  proper  station,  i.e.  the  Gnostics.  Origen  was
98 The precise ontological status of the Holy Ghost is something of a moot point. At Commentary on St 
John  2.10 (6), Origen argues that the Holy Ghost is to be considered as  y£vr|x6<;.  But much of the de 
Principiis depends upon the uncreated status of the Holy Ghost.
" See chapter 1, sections 10.1-10.2.
115particularly worried  about  this  group  within  the  Christian community,  who  believed  that the  Saviour 
was  the  supreme  God:’eoxto  56  xiva<;  co< ;  ev  7tXr|0ei  Tiioxeudvxtov  Kai  5exo(i6vcov  5iacpcovlav 
5ia  x t)v   npo7i6xeiav (moxi0EO0ai xdv  oa)xf|pa etvai xdv  p6yioxov eni Ttaoi  0e6v (Contra Celsum  8.14). 
Origen is quick to refute this heresy and to show that the Son is significantly inferior to the Father. It is 
to  God  alone,  not  his  Son,  that  we  offer  the  ‘supreme  adoration’.  The  Son  is  certainly  exalted,  but 
exalted by the Father,  who  is  therefore the  first  in rank and dignity:  hXX  ouxi  ye  xoioCxov, oi
nei06pevoi auxcp Xeyovxr *o  7taxr)p  6 n6p\|/a<; pe  peiCcov pou eoxi".
The  most  important  and most  interesting point  about this  chapter  is  the  fact that Origen prefaces  his 
remarks by quoting Hebrews  1.3  and Wisdom 7.25.  As we argued above, the use of these verses in a 
passage  that  survives  in  Greek  and  is  therefore  undoubtedly  authentic  has  great  relevance  for  our 
assessment of the authenticity of the Commentary on Hebrews fragment. We have already seen how at 
Commentary on St John  13.25  Origen quotes  these verses as  Scriptural proof of the subordination of 
the  Son  to  the  Father.  At  Contra  Celsum  8.14  Origen  quotes  the  same  verses  and  gives  exactly  the 
same interpretation.
Having compared in some detail the arguments of Commentary on St John  13.25  and Contra  Celsum 
8.14  with  the  arguments  preserved  in  the  controversial  fragment  of the  Commentary on  Hebrews,  it 
becomes  more  and more  likely that Rufinus altered Origen’s original  exegesis  when he translated the 
fragment  and  added  it  to  the  Apology.  Rufmus  appears  guilty  of two  deceptions.  Not  only  did  he 
append two further passages to Pamphilus’ responsio, he radically altered the theology of the appended 
passages.  The  arguments  of  Commentary  on  St  John  13.25  and  Contra  Celsum  8.12  allow  us  to 
reconstruct the original exegesis of the Commentary on Hebrews fragment.
THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ORIGEN’S  IMMEDIATE  SUCCESSORS  AND  DISCIPLES TO THE TERM 
6|ioouoio<;.
(6.1)
The final reason for rejecting the authenticity of the Commentary on Hebrews fragment is that the term 
6poouoio<;  was viewed with grave suspicion not only by Origen’s  immediate successors and disciples, 
but by the whole Greek Church until the Western delegates at the Council of Nicaea managed to force
116through the controversial article.  Even after 325, many of the Eastern Bishops remained opposed and, 
having returned to their sees, were unwilling to continue endorsing 6|ioooaio<;.100 
In  the  following  analysis  of  ante-Nicene  Greek  Trinitarian  theology,  we  shall  see  that  the  term 
6poouoio<;  was  forever associated with the Monarchian heresy.  Its use was restricted to this particular 
group  of  Christians,  specifically  to  the  Bishops  of  the  Pentapolis  and  to  Paul  of  Samosata.  By 
describing the Father and the Son as 6|iOo0oioq, the Monarchians denied the Trinity in favour of a strict 
unitarianism.  Any theologian  wishing  to  uphold  the  doctrine  of the  Trinity  was  obliged  to  avoid  the 
term.101  
(6.2)
Let us begin this  section by recalling the events  of the  year 268.  This  was  the  year  in which Paul  of 
Samosata  was  condemned  at  the  Council  of  Antioch,  by  a  jury  of  Origenist  Bishops,  led  by 
Malchion.102  Paul is a shadowy and rather enigmatic figure, about whom little is firmly known.103 We 
can be reasonably sure, however, that the main charge against him was Adoptionism. This is the belief 
that  Jesus  Christ  was  a  mere  man,  who  at  his  baptism was  filled with  the  grace  of God  and  thereby 
enabled to fulfil his salvific role. The crux of Adoptionism is the belief that Christ was the Son of God 
only  by  grace  (adoption)  and  not  by  nature.  As  Cadiou  has  pointed  out,  Adoptionism was  often  the 
corollary or consequence of Monarchianism.104 If one believes that the Godhead is an indivisible unity, 
it is impossible to say that the Son of God was incarnated. With this theological foundation, it is natural 
and almost inevitable to conclude that Jesus Christ was a mere man.105 It was certainly true of Paul of 
Samosata that Adoptionism and Monarchianism were two sides of the same coin.106 Later reports show 
that he allowed no distinction between Father, Son and Holy Ghost beyond a mere verbal convenience. 
Epiphanius gives the following account of the proceedings of the Council of Antioch:
100 It was  for this reason that the Emperor deemed it necessary to convene a new Council at Seleucia. 
On  this,  see  Cazenove  (1883),  pp.56-7.  See  also  Williams  (1995),  pp. 12-15  for  an  overview  of the 
Eastern opposition to 6|ioouoio<;; even Athanasius, the great defender of Nicene theology, uses the term 
relatively infrequently.
101  I cannot of course claim to be an expert in Trinitarian Greek theology from the death of Origen until 
the Council of Nicaea. The following analyses are therefore necessarily brief and reliant upon the work 
of other scholars.
102 For the following discussion, I am indebted to Bardy (1923), pp.252-8, de Riedmatten (1952), Kelly 
(1977), pp. 117-18 and, Edwards (1998), p.64.
103 See Stead (1993): a paper devoted to the difficulties in interpreting Paul.
104 Cadiou (1935), pp.346-7. See chapter 1, section 4.1.
105  The  alternative  was  to  conclude  that  the  entire  Godhead  was  incarnated,  in  which  case 
Monarchianism becomes the corollary of Patripassianism. On this, see chapter 1, section 4.1.
106 Raven (1923), p.51.
117f|vaYKda0r|oav  oi  7iai6p£<;,  oi  Kplvavi£<;  IlauXov  iov  Sapooaxea  etu  id)  loiouicp  aipenopd),  i'va 
Sd^ooiv  on  6  uid<;  undoiaaiv  exei  Kai  bnapxiov  feaii  Kai  tov  eoiiv,  oux’ i  5£  ^)%ia  eoiiv, 
ouoiav  eineiv  Kai  iov  ui6v,  ii)v  Siacpopav  10O   ie  Ka0’  feauidv  fcvurcdpKiou  Kai  10O   imdp  xovioq  id> 
if|<; ouoiai; 6v6pan £tu8£ikvuvi£<; (Epiphanius, Panarion 73.12).107
It  is  particularly  important  that  Paul’s judges,  who  were  all  Origenists,  condemned  Paul’s  use  of the 
term  6pooi>oio<;. Although there are some contradictory reports, it seems most likely that the term was 
rejected as implying Monarchianism.108 These academic bishops would have known the works of their 
master extremely well and would presumably have felt that they were acting with Origen’s posthumous 
approval.  It seems very unlikely that the Council would have condemned the term if it had been used 
by Origen. But this need not have been simply an argument e silentio. It was probably felt that Origen’s 
belief  in  the  eternal  existence  of three,  separate  ouoiai  in  the  Trinity  precluded  the  possibility  of 
bpoouoioi;.
(6.3)
The  controversies  surrounding  Denys  of Alexandria  confirm  the  Origenist  suspicion  of bpoouaux;. 
Denys  was  almost  a  contemporary of Origen  and  was  greatly  influenced by his  theology.109  What  is 
particularly interesting for us is that his opponents accuse Denys of ignoring the term 6poouoio<;. Prima 
facie,  this  is  a  surprising  accusation;  it  is  generally  assumed  that  no  one  was  concerned  with  the 
question of consubstantiality until the Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicaea. Beatrice is correct 
therefore to draw particular attention to the  identity of Denys’  enemies.110 Who is likely to have been 
upset by the  rejection of the  term bpoouoiog?  The answer is the  Sabellian Bishops of the  Pentapolis, 
for whom the term had become the perfect expression of Unitarian theology.
The  Libyan Bishops appealed to the Pope,  Denys of Rome,  to condemn the Bishop of Alexandria  for 
Trinitarian heresy.111  Denys of Rome duly published an open letter insisting that the term  bpoouoioq be 
accepted  and  warning  against  the  heresy  of ditheism.112  Although  the  letter  did  not  refer  to  him  by 
name,  Denys  of Alexandria  was  obviously  the  main  object  of the  Pope’s  wrath;  he  responded  by
107 Note that the pronouncement of the Bishops is expressed in overtly Origenist terminology:  the Son 
is an urtdoiaoic; -  not just a name -  and his  ouoia  is different from that of the Father.
108 Hilary, de Synodis  81  and Eusebius, Eccl.  Theol.  1.14 tell us that the term was rejected because of 
its  Monarchian  connotations.  Basil,  Epistola  52  and  Athanasius,  de  Synodis  45  tell  us  that  it  was 
rejected because it implied corporeality. For a discussion of this, see Bethune-Baker (1933), pp. 111-12 
and Beatrice (2002), p.253.
109 Bishop of Alexandria from 247-265.
110 Beatrice (2002), pp.251-2.
111 Feltoe (1904), pp. 165-6.
112 This letter is preserved in Athanasius, de Decretis 26 (quoted by Feltoe (1904), pp. 176-182).
118publishing a  lengthy Elenchos.u3  Denys admits that he rejected the term 6poouoto<; as non-Scriptural, 
but argues that he used various metaphors which meant the same thing: as a parent is to a child, a seed 
to a plant and a source to a stream, so is the Father to the Son. Yet, as Feltoe has shown, these images 
do not illustrate the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son:  they show a certain generic  ‘oneness’, 
but certainly not the numerical  identity of substance.114  In his Elenchos, Denys refuses to compromise 
the distinction of the Father and the Son: he continues to insist that they are two, distinct ouoiai.115 
The  implication  is  that  for  Denys,  as  for  Malchion,  6poouoio<;  was  a  denial  of the  Trinity.116  Basil 
reports  that  Denys  rejected  the  term  as  it  abolished  the  distinction  between  the  divine 
hypostases:  vuv  pev  6vaip<i>v  to  bpoouoiov,  8ia  tov  tri  &0£xf|oei  xa>v  uTroaxdaeoov  Kaicdx;
auxcp  Kexpri  p£vov  (Basil,  Epist.  9.2).117  Gustave Bardy118 tells us that this was the prevalent attitude 
of the  school  of Origen at this date:  “(elle) n’etait pas  favorable a  l’emploi du mot 6poouoio<;  . . .   la 
distinction de personnes divines  .  .  . pouvait paraitre compromisee par 1’introduction de ce terme.’  Of 
course,  Hanson is right to advise against identifying the school of Origen as simply the guardians and 
propagators of the teachings of their master: there must have been a certain amount of development and 
deviation  over  the  years.119  But  it  is  surely  important  that  those  who  present  themselves  as  the 
followers of Origen reject the term 6poouoio<; as implying Monarchianism.
(6.4)
It has  also been pointed out that Eusebius,  a particularly staunch Origenist,120 was very suspicious  of 
the  term 6poouoio;.121  Let  us  begin  with  an argumentum  e silentio.  In chapters  1.2-3  of the  Church 
History, Eusebius describes in some detail the nature of the pre-existent Christ. There is no mention of 
the doctrine of consubstantiality.  Indeed, the Trinitarian paradigm described in these chapters seems to
113 The Elenchos is preserved in Athanasius, de Sententia Dionysii 18 (quoted by Feltoe (1904), 
pp. 187-88).
1,4 Feltoe (1904), pp. 187-188.
115 Bethune-Baker (1933), p.25.
116 Kelly (1977), pp. 133-4 and Stevenson (1927), p.86 both discuss Denys’  life-long struggle with the 
Monarchians in relation to his rejection of 6|ioouoioq.
117 Passage quoted and discussed in Beatrice (2002), p.252.
118 Bardy (192), p.258.
119 Hanson (1985), pp.410-423.
120 Evidence for Eusebius’  fondness for Origen can be found in Book 6 of the Historia Ecclesiastica (a 
detailed  panegyric  of Origen)  and  in  his  collaboration  with  Pamphilius  on  the  Apology for  Origen. 
Eusebius’ overall theology, not only his Christology, owes a great deal to Origen.
1-1  For a general discussion of Eusebius’ wariness of the term, see Stevenson (1927), pp.82-3, 99,  102, 
Luibheid (1978), pp.55-58 and Kelly (1956), p.226.  On the relevance of this for the assessment of the 
Commentary  on  Hebrews  fragment,  see  Stead  (1984),  p.212  Hanson  (1985),  pp.58-64  and  Edwards 
(1998), p.669.
119owe  a  very  great  deal  to  Origenist  subordinationism.  The  Son  is  presented  as  a  contingent  and 
dependent being, who receives his divinity, power and honour from the Father. It is by participation in 
the  unbegotten divinity of the  Father that the  Son  is  divinized:  |i£toxf|  xfjq  dy£vvf|xoi)  Kai  7iaTpiKf|<;
OedTrjToq (HE.  1.3).  Moreover,  Eusebius,  like Origen, casts the Son in the guise of a Middle-Platonic 
intermediary: he is the Second Principle who obeys the orders of his Father and to whom are delegated 
the  menial  tasks  of creation  and  providence.122  The  Son  is  also  described  as  the  messenger  of the 
Father, mediating between the transcendent God and his creation.
There is no indication that Eusebius believed the Father and the Son to be  ‘of one substance’ in any of 
his pre-Nicene works. His customary Trinitarian paradigm is the quintessentially Origenist paradigm of 
two  divine  ouoiai,  the  one  subordinate  to  the  other.123  As  we  argued  a propos  Origen  himself,  this 
paradigm preludes  consubstantiality.  In  chapter  7  of the  Praeparatio  Evangelica,  Eusebius  carefully 
contrasts  the  ‘timeless  and  uncreated  ouoia  of the  Supreme  God’  with  the  ‘secondary  ouoia’  of the 
Son.124 Eusebius’  Trinity is overtly hierarchical:  the Father is the Supreme God, the Son is second and 
the  Holy Ghost a  very poor third.125 The Demonstratio Evangelica contains a similar theology.  Once 
again,  the  Son  is presented as a dependent and contingent being,  who  ‘participates’  in the  divinity of 
the ‘one true God’ and is thus divinized (Demonstratio Evangelica 5.4.9-14).126  In chapter 5, Eusebius 
quotes thirty Scriptural references which prove that the Son is a ‘second God’, subordinate to the ‘Most 
High and Supreme God’ (Demonstratio Evangelica 5.30).
In the years following the Council of Nicaea, Eusebius remained extremely wary of the term bjioouoioq 
and  was  remarkably  reluctant  to  use  it.  Although  he  bowed  to  the  authority  of the  orthodox  elite, 
Eusebius  would  never  explicitly  preach  the  doctrine  of  consubstantiality.  In  an  open  letter  to  his 
parishioners,  Eusebius  excuses  his  acceptance  of  the  Nicene  Creed,  specifically  the  controversial 
6|iOOuoio<;  article,  by  explaining  that  he  was  cajoled  and  coaxed  by  the  Emperor himself.  Eusebius’ 
report  of the  proceedings  of the  Council  of Nicaea  is  very  illuminating.  We  are  told  that  the  first 
session  of  the  Council  concluded  with  the  universal  acceptance  of  the  Caesarean  Creed,  which 
Eusebius  quotes  in  full  (ad  Caesarienses  1).  The  Emperor  expresses  his  approval,  but  suggests  two
122 Eusebius even describes him as ‘serving’ (i)7np£Tr|aa|i6vr|) the Father.
123 So Beatrice (2002), p.244.
124|i£Td  t i) v   avapxov  Kai  dy£vr|Tov  xou  0£ou  tc o v   oXcav  ouolav,  apiKTOv  ooaav  Kai  £7t6K£iva  Tiaoqc; 
KaTaXf|vj/£(D<;,  8£UT6pav  ouaiav  .  .  .  dadyouai  (Praeparatio Evangelica 7.12.2). This passage and 
some of the others are cited by Luibheid (1978), p.40.
125 See especially Praeparatio Evangelica 7.15.5-9.
120important amendments:  the inclusion of ek  rf|q  ouoiaq and  bjiooooioq (ibid.  2). Eusebius is suspicious 
of both  terms  and  is  unwilling  to  include  them  in  the  Creed  (ibid 3-7).  Nevertheless,  his  loyalty  to 
Constantine  and  his  desire  for Church  unity  lead  him  to  capitulate.127  In  the  letter  ad  Caesarienses, 
Eusebius explains his  objection to 6|iOouoio<;  by arguing that it implies divine  fission (ibid 3).128 We 
can  reasonably  suppose  however  that  he,  like  Malchion  and  Denys,  also  associated  the  term  with 
Monarchianism.  It  seems  very doubtful  that  Eusebius  would have  been  so  wary of the  term  if it had 
been sanctioned by Origen.
It  is  also  important to  note that the  famous  speech,  which Eusebius  wrote  for Constantine to  deliver, 
contains no reference to 6poouoio<;. Although the Oration of Constantine was written after the Council 
of Nicaea and although it purports to be a summary and explanation of orthodox doctrine, there is no 
discussion  of the  crucial  doctrine  of consubstantiality.  When,  in  chapter  2,  Eusebius  deals  with  the 
thorny question of the  procession of the  Son,  he  begins by quoting  the  useful  Biblical  text that such 
matters  are  beyond  human  comprehension:  Who  can  declare  his  generation?  (Psalm  53.8).  In  what 
follows,  Eusebius concentrates upon the fact that the Father is in no way diminished by the generation 
of the Son. Although this was undoubtedly an important and controversial theological point in the years 
following the Council of Nicaea,  it begs the  important question of the exact relationship of the Son to 
the  Father,  in  particular  the  vexed  question  of 6|ioouoio<;.  It  is  surely  very  important  to  the  present 
study that Eusebius chooses to omit the term.
There is a similar silence in the Life of Constantine.  Eusebius’ report of the Council of Nicaea (Life of 
Constantine  3.13)  is  almost entirely devoted  to  descriptions  of the  Emperor’s  sumptuous  appearance 
and his  mastery of oratory;  there  is  no reference  to  the  crucial debates on bjioououx;.129 An historian 
well-disposed  to  the  term would  surely have  recorded this crucially important episode.  We might  say 
that  the  term  is  conspicuous  by  its  absence.  Finally,  Hanson  has  drawn  attention  to  a  very  important 
passage in the Ecclesiastical Theology.13° This work, written at the very end of Eusebius’ life, includes 
a  detailed  exposition  of the  author’s  religious  beliefs  (Eccl.  Theo  1.8.66).  There  is  no  mention  of 
bpoouoiog.
CONSUBSTANTIALITY IN EASTERN AND WESTERN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY
126 Passage discussed by Prestige (1969), p. 142.
127  I  am  not  persuaded  by  Beatrice’s  revisionist  argument  that  Eusebius  in  fact  welcomed  the  term 
(Beatrice (2002), pp.243, 244 and 247).
128 Luibheid (1978), p.56.
129 Cameron and Hall (1999) ad loc.
121(7.1)
The suspicion of 6poo\joio<; was not restricted to this relatively small group of Origen and his disciples. 
It is characteristic of the whole  Eastern Church. The Western Church of course had long been used to 
describing  the  Trinity  as  three  persons  and  one  substance.  It  was  Tertullian who  first  suggested  this 
influential  paradigm,  which was subsequently adopted by almost  all his  compatriots.131  The  differing 
attitudes of the  East and the  West concerning the consubstantiality of the Trinity is neatly epitomized 
by  the  story  of the  two  Denys-s,  discussed  above.132  While  Denys  of Alexandria  was  vehemently 
opposed to the term, Denys of Rome welcomed it.133
The Greek suspicion of the term was very evident at the Council of Nicaea. It is important to remember 
that  it  was  the  Roman  bishops,  led  by  Ossius,  who  developed  and  championed  the  doctrine  of 
consubstantiality.134 The Greek Bishops were at first vehemently opposed to the innovation, and many 
remained  wary.  They  objected  to  such  prominent  use  of  a  term  that  did  not  appear  in  the  New 
Testament.  More  importantly,  however,  they  were  wary  of  the  Monarchian  implications  of 
consubstantiality.
(7.2)
Let it be carefully noted however that the differing attitudes of the Eastern and Western Church on the 
question of the  consubstantiality of the  Trinity cannot simply be  reduced to a  difference of technical 
terminology.135 It has often been argued that the precocious development of Latin Trinitarian theology 
is  to  be  explained  solely  by  the  semantic  precision  of the  Latin  language.  Had  the  Greek  language
130 Hanson (1988), p.56.
131  See  Tertullian,  Apologeticum  and Adversus  Praxean.  For  a  discussion  of Tertullian’s  Trinitarian 
theology, see Osborn (1981), pp.l 16-39, Stead (1977), pp.202-3 and Bethune-Baker (1901), pp.15-23. 
On  the  immediate  popularity  of Tertullian’s  formula,  see  Kelly  (1956),  p. 155  and  Bethune-Baker 
(1933), p. 107.
132  See section 6.3.  Bethune-Baker (1901), pp.24-5  and (1933), p. 106 makes the point explicit:  it was 
Rome that was invoked against Denys of Alexandria.
133  As  part  of his  argument  in  favour  of the  authenticity  of the  Commentary  on  Hebrews  fragment, 
Bardy claims  that  the  term bpoouoiot;  was  quickly adopted as  the  touch-stone  of orthodox belief.  He 
refers  specifically  to  the  debate  between  Tes  deux  Denys’  as  evidence  for  this  claim:  “le  terme 
6|ioouoio<;  allait  bientot  apres  Origene  etre  adopte  a  Rome  comme  la  formule  meme  d’orthodoxie” 
(Bardy  (1923),  p.94).  But  in  this  argument,  Bardy  has  ignored  the  crucial  difference  between  the 
theologies  of the  Eastern  and  Western  Churches  at  this  date.  The  fact  that  Denys  of Rome  was  in 
favour of 6|iOouoiO(;  has no bearing whatsoever on whether Origen would have used it. I agree that the 
debate between Tes deux Denys’ is very important for assessing the authenticity of the Commentary on 
Hebrews  fragment,  but  I  draw  from  it  an  entirely  different  conclusion.  The  fact  that  Denys  of 
Alexandria rejected the term, and his reasons for so doing, make  it very likely that Origen would also 
have rejected the term, for the same reasons.
134  So  Bethune-Baker  (1901),  p.11  and  (1933),  pp.106-7,  Stevenson  (1927),  p.99  and  Kelly  (1956), 
pp.236-7. Beatrice (2002), pp.246-7 and 270 rejects this view, but his arguments are not convincing.
122included the precise equivalents of substantia and persona, the Eastern Church would not have lagged 
so far behind its Western counterpart. Of course this argument is in part an apology for the theologians 
of the  East,  an  attempt  to  vindicate  their  doctrinal  orthodoxy  and  to  present  them  as  unwilling  and 
unwitting  prisoners  of  an  underdeveloped  theological  vocabulary.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
apologists  for  Origen.  As  we  have  seen,  Hanson,  Jay,  Wolfson  and  Bethune-Baker  are  all  keen  to 
defend  Origen  by  pointing  out  the  poverty  of the  Greek  language  at  this  date.136  Had  he  had  the 
necessary  words  at  his  disposal,  Origen  would  have  readily  accepted  the  ‘three-persons  and  one 
substance’  formula. He simply lacks the correct terminology to express himself. That is to say, it is the 
vagueness of Origen’s theological vocabulary, and that alone, which keeps him from pre-empting the 
Nicene  formula.  The  fundamental  problem highlighted  by  Origen’s  apologists  is  the  (mis)use  of the 
crucial  term ouoia  to  mean a  ‘person’.  Had he  understood oOoia  to  mean  ‘substance’,  Origen would 
readily have conceded that the three persons of the Trinity were bpoououx;.137
I  cannot  accept  this  argument.  We  have  seen  in  some  detail  how  Origen  always  interprets  ouoia  as 
‘substance’  or  ‘nature’:  he has no use for Aristotle’s  ‘primary ouoia.138 Moreover,  it is axiomatic that 
the ante-Nicene Greek Fathers had no need and no desire to preach the substantial unity of the Father 
and  the  Son.  Their  Trinitarian  theology cannot  be  explained  and  excused by simple  reference  to  the 
constraints of the language in which they wrote. The rejection of 6poouoio<;  is rather the expression of 
a deep-seated belief in the  fundamental difference between the Father and the  Son,  specifically of the 
subordination of the latter. It was only in the aftermath of the Arian controversy that the equality, even 
the  identity,  of the  Father  and  the  Son  came  to  the  forefront  of the  theological  debate.139  For  the 
preceding  centuries,  the  theologians  of the  Eastern  Church  had  sought  rather  to  distinguish  and  to 
differentiate the two, distancing themselves as far as possible from the pestilent and prevalent heresy of 
Monarchianism.
Patristic  scholarship  must  always  avoid  the  dangers  of  anachronism  and  must  always  resist  the 
temptation to project the concerns of a later age.  The developing theology of the Early Church makes
135  Kelly (1956),  p. 136  appears  to  share  this  view,  when he  writes  that  “the matter went deeper than 
words.”
136 Chapter 1, section 6.1.
137 This position is championed by Hanson (1985).
138 Chapter 1, sections 6.2-6.3.
139 This did not happen immediately. As we have already argued, the Eastern Bishops continued to be 
wary  of the  doctrine  of consubstantiality.  Williams  (1995),  p. 15  points  out  that  it  was  not  until  the 
publication of Athanasius’  de Decretis (352/3)  that a Greek theologian began explicitly to  defend the 
Trinitarian doctrine of the Council of Nicaea.
123sense only within the correct historical and theological milieu.  It is only within the specific polemical 
context of the Monarchian controversy that we can understand the antipathy to the term 6poooaio<;  in 
ante-Nicene Greek theology. Scholars must always appreciate the constantly shifting scene of the great 
theological debates and the constant need to revise existing paradigms.140
The  Greek  suspicion  of 6|ioouoio<;  is  not  simply  a  semantic  accident.  It  is  not,  as  so  many  scholars 
have argued, a temporary theological hiccup arising from the improper use of ouoia  to mean ‘person’. 
It  is  rather  the  reflection  and  expression  of crucially  important  theological  convictions.  While  the 
Western Church was happy to proclaim the substantial unity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, the Greeks 
were  extremely wary of compromising  in  any  way the  eternal  distinction  of the  three persons  of the 
Trinity.  The Monarchian threat had left an indelible mark on Greek Trinitarian theology:  its enduring 
legacy was subordinationism, the distinguishing feature of all ante-Nicene Greek theology. 
CONCLUSION 
(8)
We  can conclude  sections  (5),  (6)  and (7)  with the  firm assurance that the  whole  Eastern theological 
tradition was wary and suspicious of the term bpoouoiog. For the Greeks, the term was forever tainted 
with the  slur of heresy,  forever associated with  Monarchianism.  Faced  with  such evidence,  it  is  very 
hard to believe that Origen would have used the term. The Monarchians were Origen’s main doctrinal 
enemies: it is inconceivable that he would have adopted their most distinctive rallying cry.
In sections  (1)  and (2),  we  saw that Rufmus had both the  opportunity and the motive  for altering the 
original  text  of the  Commentary  on  Hebrews.  It  would  certainly  have  been  to  Rufmus’  apologetic 
advantage to present Origen as anticipating the most famous slogan of Nicaea and Rufmus’ method of 
translation allowed him ample opportunity for this kind of ‘textual emendation’. In section (3), we saw 
that  the  claim  that  the  Father  and  Son  are  6|ioo0oio<;  does  not  help  to  refute  the  charge  that  Origen 
believed the Son to be innatus. It is extremely unlikely therefore that it was part of Pamphilus’ original 
responsio.  A more  likely scenario is that the bpoouoioq passage was appended by Rufmus in order to 
refute an entirely different charge, namely the charge that Origen believed the Son to be a creature. By 
the time that Rufmus came to translate the Apology, it was this new charge that was most prevalent and 
most  in  need  of refutation.  In  section  (4),  we  saw  that  the  claim  that  the  Father  and  the  Son  are 
6|ioo\3oio<;  contradicts the  fundamental tenets of Origen’s Trinitarian theology.  Throughout his works,
140 This is the main argument of chapter 1, most fully discussed in the introduction and conclusion.
124Origen  responds  to  Monarchian  modalism  by  arguing  that  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  are  three 
separate and individual ouoiai, eternally different and distinct from one another. It is inconceivable that 
he would ever reject this and come to believe that there was in fact only one divine ouoia. We briefly 
recalled  how  Origen’s  Trinitarian  theology  is  characterized  by  a  thorough  and  obvious 
subordinationism, and argued that this alone precludes consubstantiality. We also saw how the basis or 
justification for the 6|ioouoio<; claim,  that the  Son was ex ipsa Dei substantia generator,  is elsewhere 
vehemently rejected by Origen.  We  further  argued  that  Origen  did  not  describe  the  ‘oneness’  of the 
Father  and  the  Son  in  terms  of substantial  unity,  but  in  terms  of shared  will  and  common  purpose. 
Finally, by analysing the arguments of Commentary on St John  13.25 and Contra Celsum 8.14 we saw 
how  Origen  elsewhere  interprets  Wisdom  7.25-26  and  Hebrews  1.3  in  a  strongly  subordinationist 
sense.  This cast further doubt on the controversial fragment and allowed us to reconstruct the original 
exegesis.
In  the  theological  ferment  of  the  late  fourth  century,  Rufmus  could  not  allow  himself  a  faithful 
translation of Origen’s Commentary on Hebrews. It would have been madness to proclaim to the Latin­
speaking world that Origen was a subordinationist, particularly for a translator whose main aim was the 
defence  of Origen  and  the  establishment  of his  orthodox  credentials.  Acutely  aware  of the  negative 
implications  of Origen’s  original  exegesis  of Hebrews  1.3  and  Wisdom 7.25,  Rufmus  added  a  gloss 
that  in  effect reversed  the  original  meaning  of the  fragment.  In the  hands  of such a  skilful  apologist, 
Origen is permitted to say only what his posthumous audience is willing to hear.
RUFINUS’ OTHER EMENDATIONS 
(9)
In  the  final  section  of this  chapter,  we  discuss  various  other  passages  in  which  Rufmus  foists  upon 
Origen  the  same  spurious  and  anachronistic  orthodoxy.  It  will  be  immediately  apparent  that  the 
emendation  detected  in  the  Commentary  on  Hebrews  fragment  is  far  from  unusual.  Rufmus’  Latin 
versions of the works of Origen frequently include the assertion of consubstantiality.
At Commentary on Romans 7.5 (P.G.  14,  1169BC), Origen/Rufmus interprets the verb ‘to evangelize’ 
as meaning ‘to announce good things’. The exact nature of these ‘good things’ is then specified in a list 
of credal  articles  which the  bonus  nuntius  must preach.  The  relationship between the  Father  and  the 
Son  is  top of the  list.  The orthodox position is contrasted with that of two heretical groups.  We meet 
again Origen’s old enemies, the Monarchians, who deny the Trinity in favour of a strict unitarianism.
125The Monarchians are joined by another group who are guilty of the opposite heresy, namely believing 
that the Father and the Son are different in nature and in substance:
aut enim  male separant Filium  a  Patre,  ut alterius naturae Patrem,  alterius Filium  dicant:  aut male 
confundunt,  ut  vel  ex  tribus  compositum  Deum,  vel  trinae  tantunmodo  appellationis  in  eo  esse 
vocabulum putent.
The bonus nuntius must tread the narrow middle path between these two extremes. While allowing the 
Father and the Son their own individuality, he will nonetheless announce that they are  ‘one substance’ 
and  ‘one nature’:  qui autem  bene annuntiat proprietates quidem Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto suas 
cuique  dabit;  nihil  autem  diversitatis  esse  confitebitur  in  substantia  vel  natura.  A  little  later, 
Origen/Rufmus  epitomizes  the  orthodox position  by  claiming  that  naturam  Trinitatis  et substantiam 
unam esse.
What are we to make of this passage? Is Rufmus providing a faithful translation of Origen’s Greek text 
for  the  benefit  of his  Roman  readers,  or  is  he  once  again  skewing  the  original  argument  to  suit  the 
critical tastes of the pro-Nicenes? It seems to me much more likely that this passage is another example 
of Rufmus’  well-intended  textual  emendations.  The  arguments  of this  chapter  and  of chapter  1   have 
shown that Origen vehemently refuted the belief that there was only one substance or one nature in the 
Trinity.  This  was  the  Monarchian  heresy.  Moreover,  it  is  hard  to  identify  a  group  of heretics  in 
existence in the mid-third century who claimed that the Father and Son were ‘different in nature and in 
substance’ (alterius naturae Patrem, alterius Filium dicant). Or, rather, this belief was not a heresy.  It 
was the conventional Trinitarian paradigm,  which Origen himself espouses throughout his works.  It is 
highly unlikely that Origen would place this belief in the same heretical category as Monarchianism.1 4 1  
Delarue, the editor of the Patrology edition of the Commentary on Romans suspects an interpolation by 
Rufmus.  He  suggests  that the  first group of heretics,  who separate the Father from the Son and argue 
that  they  are  different  in  nature  (male separant Filium  a  Patre,  ut alterius  naturae Patrem,  alterius 
Filium dicant), are the Arians142 and that it is in response to this new heresy that Rufmus insists that the 
Father and the Son are one nature and one substance. Many of the arguments of this passage from the 
Commentary' on Romans are much better suited to the theological controversies of Rufmus’ day than to
141  It is possible, even likely,  that in this passage Rufmus is reporting the views of Origen himself and 
ascribing them to anonymous heretics.  The reader is referred to the famously controversial passage at 
Commentary  on  Romans  5.10,  where  it  appears  that  Rufmus  has  followed  exactly  this  technique: 
Origen’s  doctrine  of the possibility of a  second  fall  is reported third-hand (aiunt enim  .  .  .)  and then 
refuted.
126the mid-third century.  It seems undeniable that Rufmus has substantially added to this excerpt to give it 
a  greater  contemporary  relevance.  By  the  time  that  Rufmus  came  to  translate  the  Commentary  on 
Romans, it was imperative that the ‘good preacher’ did not fall into Arianism.
We  must also  take  careful note of the use  of the  term proprietates  in this passage.143 Origen/Rufmus 
insists  that  the  ‘good  preacher’  must  allow  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost  his  own proprietates 
{proprietates  quidem  Patri  et  Filio  et  Spiritui  Sancto  suas  cuique  dabit).  So  far,  so  good.  One  of 
Origen’s  main complaints  against the  Monarchians  is  their refusal  to allow the  Father,  Son and Holy 
Ghost their own i8i6xrj<; (see especially Commentary on St John 2.2 and fragment 37). But the further 
claim  that  the  ‘good  preacher’  will  not  admit  any  distinction  of substance  or  nature  {nihil  autem 
diversitatis esse confitebitur in substantia vel natura) is a glaring contradiction of the first claim.  For 
Origen,  the  term  i8i6xr|<;  does  not refer to personal  qualities that distinguish particular individuals,144 
but  to  generic  characteristics  shared  by  and  common  to  a  whole  group  (obola).145  In the  context  of 
Origen’s semantic framework, it would be impossible to claim (a) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost 
are  one substantia (ouoia), but (b)  that each has  its own proprietates (i8i6xr|q).  As Orbe puts it,  ‘una 
obma,  una  i8i6xr|<;.’146 Rufmus has  obviously altered the  original  text of this passage  and put a post- 
Nicene ‘spin’ on the crucial and controversial term proprietates (i8i6xrj<;).
I am similarly suspicious of a passage from the Homilies on Numbers, singled out by Stead as proving 
Origen’s  orthodox  tendencies.147  Origen’s  12th   Homily  on  the  Book  of Numbers  takes  the  form  of a 
detailed exegesis of the Lord’s command to Moses -  Gather the people together and I will give them 
water  (Numbers  21.16).  Origen/Rufmus  begins  by  reminding  his  congregation  that  water  is  an 
extremely  common  Biblical  metaphor  for  the  nourishment  given  by  God  to  the  faithful.  Solomon’s 
advice to his son  - bibe aquas de puteorum tuorum fonte (Proverbs 5.15) - is singled out for particular 
discussion.  The crucial point  in this short verse is that Solomon speaks of one spring {fans), but many 
wells  {putei).  Origen/Rufmus  interprets  the  verse  as  a  reference  to  the  Trinity,  in  which  there  is  one 
source or spring  for the Father,  Son and Holy Ghost.  Stead is correct to point out that the image does 
not  imply  that  the  Father  is  the  spring  of divinity,  the  cause  of existence  for  the  Son  and  the  Holy
142 forte Ariani?
143 This is the Latin translation of the Greek I8i6xr|c;.
144 During the Arian Controversy, the term  came to have precisely this meaning.
145 See chapter 1, section 5.4 and 6.2 and section 4.1  of this chapter.
146 Orbe (1991), p.43.
147 Stead (1977), p.214 and pp.249-50 trusts Rufmus’ translation.
127Ghost.  Origen/Rufmus is explicit that the Father himself is a well (puteus). The theory developed here 
is that of a prior, superior source providing existence and divinity for all three persons.148 
I am extremely wary of the argument of this passage, which seems at such variance with Origen’s usual 
Trinitarian  paradigm.  Nowhere  else  in  his  extant  oeuvre  does  Origen  suggest  the  existence  of  a 
primeval  Gott-grund from which the Trinity emerges.  As we have seen,  it is Origen’s emphatic belief 
that the unbegotten Father is  the  one  and only cause  of existence  for the  Son  and the  Holy Ghost.149 
The idea of a cause prior to even the Father seems very odd indeed in the context of Origen’s overall 
theology.  What  follows  is  more  doubtful  still.  Having  identified  the  three  wells  with  the  Father,  Son 
and  Holy  Ghost,  Origen/Rufinus  reaches  his  dramatic  conclusion:  est  ergo  haec  trium  distinctio 
personarum  in  Patri et Filio  et Spiritu Sancto,  quae ad pluralem puteorum  numerum  revocatur.  sed 
horum puteorum unus est fons.  una enim substantia est et natura Trinitatis (in Num. Horn.  12.1).
In  this  passage,  Rufmus  once  again presents  Origen  as  the  great defender of Nicene  orthodoxy.  The 
central  triumph  of the  Council  of Nicaea,  the  ‘three  persons  and  one  substance’  formula,  is  boldly 
prominent.  But  it  seems  odd  indeed  in  the  mouth  of an  ante-Nicene  Greek  theologian.  As  we  have 
repeatedly argued,  it was only the Arian Controversy that forced the theologians of the East to accept 
this controversial formula. In the period before 325, there was no need for such a formula, indeed great 
danger in  it.  Moreover,  if we recall that Origen used the terms ouoia  and  u7i6oxaoi<;  as synonyms,  it
becomes  extremely difficult  to  reconstruct  the  original  Greek  of the  phrase  distinctio personarum  in 
juxtaposition to the phrase una substantia.150
I  cannot  therefore  accept  the  accuracy  of Rufmus’  translation  of this  passage  from the  Homilies  on 
Numbers.  It  seems  obvious  to  me  that  a  major  revision  has  taken  place.  In  particular,  I  strongly 
disagree  with  Stead’s  gloss  that  Origen  did,  at  times,  believe  that  there  was  one  substance  in  the 
Trinity.151  Stead  cites  this  passage  in  support of the  authenticity of the  controversial  Commentary on 
Hebrews  fragment,  i.e.  in  corroboration  of  the  6|ioo0oioq  claim.  I  have  an  entirely  different 
interpretation.  The  passage  from  the  Homilies  on  Numbers  discussed  above  seems  to  me  to  provide
148 Stead (1977), p.249-50.
149  This  Trinitarian  paradigm  is  most  clearly  developed  in  the  Commentary  on  St John  and  the  de 
Principiis. See chapter 1, sections 10.1-10.2 for a full discussion of the relevant passages.
150  It might be  thought  that Rufmus was  translating the term rcpdocorcov as persona, but an exhaustive 
analysis  of the  indices  to  Origen’s  works  has  revealed  that  he  never  uses  the  term  npdoocmov  in  a 
Trinitarian  context.  Indeed,  as  Bigg  (1913),  pp.73-4  has  pointed  out,  the  term  was  used  by  the 
Monarchians  to  describe  the  various  masks  assumed  by  the  Unitarian  God;  for  this  reason  it  was 
studiously avoided by the ‘orthodox’.
128further proof of Rufmus’  willingness  to  alter  Origen’s  original  text to  suit  the  suspicious  ears  of his 
Roman readers.
I  have  further doubts about Rufmus’  translation of Origen’s  Commentary on  the Song of Songs  3.12, 
where  we  read  that  idem  namque  ipse  qui  ibi  Trinitas propter distinctionem personarum,  hie  Deus 
intelligitur pro  unitate substantiae.152  Rufmus’  version  of de Principiis  1.2.6  is  similarly  suspicious. 
Having compared the begetting of the Son to the birth of Seth from Adam, Origen/Rufmus tells us that 
the image illustrates the unity of nature and substance that pertains between the first two persons of the 
Trinity:  quae  imago  etiam  naturae  ac substantiae Patris  et Filii continet  unitatem.l53  Finally,  in  his 
translation  of Origen’s  13th   Homily  on  Leviticus,  Rufmus  inserts  an  overtly  Nicene  exegesis  of the 
shewbread  commandments  (Leviticus  24.5-8).  After  a  detailed  analysis  of the  exact  proportions  of 
flour  to  be  used  in  each  loaf,  Rufmus  concludes  that the  shewbread  is  obviously an allegory for the 
Father and the Son. The Father and the Son have one will and one substance (they are  ‘one loaf), but 
are two distinct persons (each loaf is made from ‘two-tenths of flour’):  nunc autem  ‘unus' quidem est 
‘ panis’  -   una  enim  voluntas  est  et  una  substantia  -   sed  ‘duae’  sunt  ‘ positiones’,  id  est  duae 
personarum  proprietates  (.Homilies  on  Leviticus  13.4).154  Once  again,  both  the  argument  and  the 
terminology of this passage are blatantly anachronistic.
It  is  my  belief that  in  each  of the  above  passages  Rufmus  has  taken  great  liberties  with  the  text  of 
Origen. So keen is he to vindicate his master from the posthumous slurs of Epiphanius and Jerome that 
Rufmus  alters  the  entire  argument  of  various  key  passages.  Rufmus’  ‘translations’  are  so  firmly 
couched  in  the  language  of  orthodox  propaganda  that  we  must  surely  doubt  the  integrity  of  the 
translator.  More  importantly,  the  works  of  Origen  which  survive  in  the  original  Greek  openly 
contradict the  claims made  in the above passages.  The battle with Monarchianism was Origen’s life’s 
work.  It was in deliberate refutation of unitarianism that Origen developed his Trinitarian paradigm of 
three  individual  and  distinct  ouoiai.  By  suggesting  that  Origen  pre-empted  the  Nicene  doctrine  of 
consubstantiality,  Rufmus  has  distorted beyond  recognition one  of the  most  important  theologians  of 
the Early Church.
151 Stead (1977), p.214.
152 Bigg (1913), p.203 rightly suspects ‘the hand of Rufmus’.
153 Stead (1977), p.214 accepts Rufinus’ translation as genuine.
154 Oddly,  Scherer (1960), p.30 and Bigg (1913), p.218  accept this passage as a faithful translation of 
the original Greek text.
129ORIGEN’S CHRISTOLOGY IN CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION.
1 . 1 .
Origen  devotes  the  sixth  chapter  of  the  second  book  of  the  de  Principiis  to  a  description  and 
explanation of the Incarnation.  At 2.6.2, he states that Christ had both a divine and a human nature:  in 
uno eodemque ita  utriusque naturae veritas.'  The  Saviour’s divine nature  is proved (testatur) by the 
evidence of his many miracles, most importantly the miracle of the Resurrection.  His human nature  is 
proved (testatur) by the fact that he had a physical body, that he was seen as a man in Judaea, that he 
was bom from a  woman’s  womb, that he cried like any other baby, that he was troubled and,  finally, 
that  he  died.  Origen  is  rather  fond of distributing  in this  way the  various  thoughts,  words  and  deeds 
ascribed to Christ by the Evangelists. It is according to his human nature that Christ feels tired and falls 
asleep;2 it is his human nature that is tempted,3 that experiences the Agony in the Garden4 and that feels 
emotional and physical suffering;5 it is because of his human nature that he is unable to carry the Cross 
and  needs  the help  of Simon of Cyrene;6  it is his human nature that  is crucified and dies7 and that is 
resurrected and glorified.8 The experiences of each nature are peculiar and specific. At Contra Celsum 
4.15, for example, Origen insists that the Saviour’s divine nature suffered none of those things suffered 
by his body or soul.  It is according to this distinction of Christ’s two natures that Origen feels able to 
explain the differences between the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth Gospel. Matthew, Mark and Luke 
are much more interested in Christ’s human nature than in his divinity. This is obvious from the way in 
which  they  begin  their  accounts  with  elaborate  genealogies.  St.  John  is  much  more  interested  in 
Christ’s divine nature, hence his Gospel begins with a complex discussion of the Logos.9 This different
1   For an elaboration of this belief in the two natures of Christ,  see the long ‘Creed’  at Commentary on 
St. John 32.16 (9), aimed at both the Adoptionists and the Docetics.
“ Homilies on Saint Matthew, Frag. 3.21-35.
3 divinitas autem intentabilis erat (Commentary Series on Saint Matthew 92); manifestum,  non Deum, 
sed hominem fuisse tentatum (Homily on St. Luke 29).
4 Commentary Series on St. Matthew 92.
5 de Principiis 4.4.4.and Contra Celsum 2.9.
6 Commentary Series on St. Matthew 126.
7  Commentary on St. John 32.25 (17).
8 Commentary on St. John  32.25 (17).
9 See, for example, Contra Celsum 4.77.
130focus explains why the Temptation and the Agony, experiences peculiar to Christ’s humanity, figure so 
prominently in the first three Gospels, but are entirely missing from the fourth.10 
To  distinguish  in this way Christ’s human and divine nature  can be a helpful  exegetical  tool,  used to 
explain various ‘problem’ texts in the Bible.1 1   When, for example, Celsus ridicules the fact that the one 
whom the Christians call God was afraid and ran away (John 12.54), Origen can reply that the retreat to 
Ephraim  was  an  act  of  Christ’s  human  nature.1 2   Christ’s  physical  and  emotional  distress  can  be 
explained  in  the  same  way.  Origen  even  manages  to  turn  such  ‘problem’  passages  to  his  positive 
advantage. As proof of the Saviour’s genuine humanity, they can be quoted in refutation of the docetic 
heresy.1 3
Neat though it is, however, there are some problems involved in this Christological paradigm.  It might 
first  be  objected  that  Origen  is  positing  a  kind  of  proto-Nestorianism,  a  Christological  dualism, 
according to which Christ acts alternately as God or as man. This method would seem to upset and to 
undermine  the  fundamental  unity  of  Christ’s  person  and  to  ascribe  to  him  two  distinct  and  very 
different loci of action.14 But it was not really until the fifth century that theologians began to concern 
themselves with the question of the unity of Christ’s person. A much more worrying problem is what 
‘happens  to’  Christ’s  divine  nature  when  he  is  acting  solely  according  to  his  humanity.  When,  as  a 
man,  he  is  ignorant,  where  is his divine omniscience?  When,  as a man, he is being tempted, where  is 
the perfect goodness of his divine nature? When, as a man, he is being arrested and crucified, where is 
his divine omnipotence?
1.2 .
10 notandum  est autem quoniam Marcus quidem Lucas hoc ipsum  (scil.  the Agony) scripserunt,  qui et 
tentantum  exponunt a diabolo lesum.  Joannes autem passionem  quidem  exponit,  quemadmodum alii: 
orantem  lesum  ut transiret ab  eo  calix non  introducit,  sicut nec  tentantum  exponit a  diabolo  lesum. 
causam autem hanc arbitror esse, quoniam hi quidem magis secundum humanam eius naturam exponit 
de eo  quam secundum  divinam;  loannes  autem  magis secundum  divinam  quam secundum  humanam 
interpretatur  naturam;  divinitas  autem  intentabilis  erat.  ideo  tres  quidem  evangelistae  exposuerunt 
tentatum.  loannes autem secundum quod coeperat  -  ‘In principio erat  Verbum ’ -  nescit Deum  Vebum 
posse  tentari.  sic  et hie tres quidem  isti retulerunt lesum postulasse a  Patre ut transiret calix ab eo, 
quoniam et proprium hominis erat,  quantum ad infirmitatem pertinet carnis,  velle evadere passionem. 
loannes  autem,  propositum  habens  exponere  lesum  Verbum  Deum,  sciens  quia  ipse  est  vita  et 
resurrectio, nescit Deum impassibilem refugere passionem (Commentary Series on St Matthew 92).
1 1  Sode Faye (1923) III, p. 133.
12 Contra Celsum  2.9.
1 3  About the fact, for example, that the Saviour is tired and falls asleep, Origen can conclude: quia vere 
humanum portabat corpus quod corruptibile induerat,  ipse corpore dormit {Homilies on St.  Matthew 
Frag.  2.28-29).  Similarly,  the Agony in the Garden becomes proof of the  full reality of the  Saviour’s 
human  body:  suscipiens  enim  naturam  camis  humanae,  omnes  proprietates  implevit,  ut  non  in 
phantasia habuisse carnem existimaretur, sed in veritate {Commentary Series on St. Matthew 92).
14 So Bicknell (1950), p. 83 and Madigan (2003), pp.263-4.
131At this point it must be noted that Origen’s understanding of kenosis does not allow that the Logos was 
permanently  emptied  of  any  of  its  divine  attributes.  In  the  preface  to  the  de  Principiis,  Origen 
emphatically states that the  Incarnated Christ remained what he was,  namely God,15 and at 4.4.3,  it is 
explicitly denied that the Logos lacked or lost any of its divine qualities.16 The same is said at Contra 
Celsum  4.15:  6  A.6yo<;  if|  ouotqt  p£vcov  A.6yoq.17  Most  of  the  time,  Origen  is  content  to  gloss
Philippians 2.7 as a reference to the Incarnation tout court, simply as a recognition of the fact that the 
Logos  was  bom  as  man.18  In  these  passages,  Origen  will  not  specify  what  exactly  this  ‘emptying’ 
means,  if anything.  Indeed, at de Principiis  1.2.8, Origen interprets the kenosis as the revealing of the 
fullness of the Godhead:  exaniens se fdius,  qui erat in forma dei, per ipsam sui exananitionem studet 
nobis deitatis plenitudinem demonstrare.
However,  in  the  Homilies  on  Saint  Luke,  Origen  seems  to  accept  that  at  the  Incarnation  the  Logos 
really did empty itself of something, namely wisdom. Origen’s comments form part of a gloss on Luke 
2.40:  the  child grew  and  waxed strong  in  spirit, filled  with  wisdom.  This  verse  has  always  caused 
problems for exegetes: how can the omniscient Son of God be  ‘filled with wisdom’? At the start of the 
18th   Homily,  Origen  remarks  that  the  Evangelist  is  certainly  not  describing  the  development  of an 
ordinary  child:  before  the  boy  was  forty  days  old  he  had  received  full  wisdom.19  In  the  following 
Homily, Origen similarly argues that human nature does not allow a child under the age of twelve to be 
‘filled  with  wisdom’.20  Origen  explains  this  extraordinary  precocity  as  Christ’s  re-filling  what  had 
previously  been  emptied  'evacuaverat  se ’  Filius  Dei,  et propterea  rursum  completur sapientia.  ‘et 
gratia  Dei erat super eumnon quando  venit ad adolescentiam,  non  quando  manifeste docebat,  sed 
adhuc  cum  esset parvulus,  habebat gratiam  Dei;  et  quomodo  omnia  in  illo  mirabilia fuerat,  ita  et 
pueritia mirabilis fuit,  ut Dei sapientia compleretur (in Luc.  Horn.  19.2). The crucial point here is that
1 5 novis temporibus se ipsum exaniens homo factus est,  incarnatus est,  cum deus esset,  et homo factus 
mansit quod erat, deus (de Principiis, preface 4).
16 ut neque aliquid deitatis in Christo defuisse credatur.
1 7 Henry (1957), col.  61, refers us to  Contra Celsum 4.18 and in Lev.  Horn.  2.3 - (quamvis enim vilem 
servi  gesserit formam,  plenitudo  tamen  in  eo  divinitatis  habitabat)  -  for  the  same  argument.  He 
concludes  that  ‘le  fait  kenotique  central,  c est  lTncamation  meme.  Nulle part,  chez  Origene,  il  n’y a 
trace,  a propos Phil.  2.5-11,  d’un theorie kenotique suivant laquelle le Christ, en s’incamant,  se serait 
vide d’attributs divins.’
1 8  de  Principiis  -   preface  4,  1.2.8,  2.6.1;  Contra  Celsum  6.7;  Commentary Series  on  Saint Matthew 
135. This was the usual Patristic position.  So, Pannenberg (1968), 308: Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine all ‘connected Phil 2.7 to the coming of the Logos in the flesh (and) 
meant  by  the  term  ‘kenosis’  the  assumption  of  human  nature,  but  not  the  complete  or  partial 
relinquishment of the divine nature or its attributes.”
19  nec  dum  quadraginta  dies  purgationis  impleverat,  necdum  Nazareth  venerat,  et  iam  totam 
sapientiam recipiebat (in Luc. Horn.  18.1).
132the  kenosis  is  only  temporary.  Christ  very  quickly  replaces  anything  that  had  been  lost.21  The  same 
conclusion is reached in the Homilies on Jeremiah (1.7). Christ emptied himself and took up the form 
of a  servant,  but  this  ‘emptied’  state  is  restricted  to  his  early  childhood:  e i  yap  e k £ v (d o ev  feauxov
Kaxa0aivcov  fevxauGa,  Kai  KEvtooag  fcauxdv  EXdjiflavE  7taA.iv  xauxa  d(p'  tbv  e k 6 v c o o £ v   Eauxov  ctcuv 
KEvaxjag  feauxdv,  xi  axo7iov  abxdv  Kai  7tpoK£KO<p6vai  oo<pi<jt  Kai  f|^lKb?  KQt  X^piTi  ^apa  Kai 
dv0pd)7toig;22
Joseph Leinhard23 draws attention to two passages in the Homilies on St Luke where Origen claims that 
the Christ child merely pretended to act like an ordinary boy (according to his human nature).  In the 
Temple, Christ asked questions of the rabbis, rather than answering them, so that he could teach future 
generations a valuable moral  lesson,  i.e.  the need for young children,  however bright,  to respect their 
teachers.24 Christ assumes the role of the humble child for this simple didactic purpose. He appears to 
be  asking  questions,  but  is  really  teaching.  There  is  nothing  that  Christ  needs  to  learn.25  Leinhard 
concludes that “some (of Christ’s) actions appear to be human, but only because (he) willed them so. In 
general, his deity controls his actions.” This is the major characteristic of Origen’s Christology.  In the 
following  chapter,  we  examine  the  ways  in  which  Origen  constantly  subordinates  the  Saviour’s 
humanity to his divinity. The former is merely a mouthpiece or puppet of the latter.
There  is  one  other  important  passage  which  cannot  be  ignored  in  this  discussion.  At  Commentary 
Series  on  St.  Matthew  55,  Origen  considers  Christ’s  claim  that  not  even  he  knows  the  date  of the 
Parousia  (Matthew  24.36).  In  his  gloss,  Origen  seems  to  accept that  the  Saviour might be  genuinely
20 hoc hominum natura non recipit, ut ante duodecim annos sapientia compleatur (in Luc. Horn.  19.1).
■'  Leinhard (1993), p.290 refers us to in Luc.Horn.  20.6  for the same argument:  quoniam evacuaverat 
se formam  servi  accipiens,  id  quod  amiserat  resumerat,  et  replebatur  virtutibus,  quas,  paulo  ante 
assumptio corpore,  visus fuerat relinquere.  The reader is also referred to the  12th  Homily on Leviticus, 
where Origen interprets the verse in an explicitly anti-kenotic sense: the boy  'grew in spirit ’ on account 
of the  many great  works  which  he  had done  (in  Lev.  Horn.  12.2).  That  is  to  say,  the  Evangelist  is 
describing the gradual manifestation of the Christ Child’s divine nature.
22  We  should  note  in  this  passage  Origen’s  emphasis  on  the  voluntary  nature  of the  kenosis.  The 
impression  given  is  of an entirely conscious  and  calculated  decision  to  empty and  to  refill.  Origen’s 
addition of bccov to Phil.  2.7  is highlighted by Lyman (1994), p.77. The passage from the Homilies on 
Jeremiah  is  also  discussed by Raven (1923),  pp.  28-9.  Raven agrees that Origen’s Christology is  not 
kenotic.
23 Leinhard (1993), pp.290-1.
24  quoniam  vero parvulus  erat,  invenitur  in  medio praeceptorum,  sanctificans  et  erudiens  eos.  quia 
parvulus erat,  invenitur in medio, non eos docens, sed interrogans,  et pro aetatis officio, ut nos doceret 
quid pueris,  quamvis sapientes  et eruditi sint,  conveniret,  ut audiant potius  magistros,  quam  docere 
desiderent,  et  se  vana  ostentatione  non  iactent.  interrogabat,  inquam,  magistros,  non  ut  aliquid 
disceret, sed ut interrogans erudiret (in Luc. Horn.  19.6).
25 profuit lesus  magistris suis,  et eos  quos  interrogare  videbatur,  docuit in  medio  eorum  loquens,  et 
quodammodo concitabat eos ad queres locorum,  utrum scirent,  an ignorarent, posse non poterant (in 
Luc .Horn. 20.1).
133ignorant of the day and the hour, but -  and this is the crux of the exegesis -  this ignorance is restricted 
to his humanity. There is no suggestion that the Logos was unaware of the Father’s plans: homo qui.   .  . 
proficiens proficiebat quidem super omnes scientia  et sapientia,  non  tamen  ut veniret iam  quod erat 
perfectum, priusquam propriam dispensationem impleret.  nihil ergo mirum est, si hoc solum nescivit ex 
omnibus,  id  est  diem  consummationis  et  horam.  But  Origen  is  not  satisfied  with  this  exegesis  and 
suggests at least four other possible interpretations.26
We can safely conclude that Origen believed that Jesus of Nazareth was God, that the Logos itself was 
incarnated.  Moreover,  there  is  no  suggestion  that  the  Logos  was permanently  emptied  of any  of its 
divine powers. When Celsus complains that the Incarnation must have involved a change for the worse, 
Origen insists that God is always God.27 The Incarnation meant simply the assuming of a human body.
1.3
Although the nature of God  is unchangeable,  the way he reveals himself changes constantly.  One and 
the same God appears in a variety of different ways to suit our different needs.28 The Incarnation is the 
supreme  example  of  this  providential  accommodation.  Although  Origen’s  Christ  was  in  full  and 
conscious  possession  of all  his  divine  powers,  fallen  man  would  have  been  unable  to  bear  the  full 
revelation of this divinity. To those unable to understand God as God, he appeared as man.29 This does 
not mean that the Incarnation, the assuming of a human body, diminished the divinity of the Logos;  it 
simply  veiled  it.  Harl  draws  attention to an  important passage  in the  Commentary on  St Matthew in 
which  Philippians  2.9  is  interpreted  as the measuring out God’s divine powers (p£xpov  8uvd|iea)c;)  to 
suit the capacity of the world  (o  Excbpci  ev  Kdopco  Trpdypaxa).30 We find similar arguments in the 
Homilies  on  the Song of Songs.  The  divinity of the  Incarnated  Christ appeared  as  merely a  ‘drop  of 
myrrh’  or a  ‘stone  of the mountain’.  We should have been unable to bear any more than this: si ergo 
videris  Salvatorem  meum  ad terrena  et  humilia  descendentem,  videbis  quomodo  a  virtute  magna  et 
maiesate divina ad nos modia quaedam stilla defluxerit.  .  .  nec poterat humana fragilitas totius montis 
magnitudinem capere, sed lapsis offensionis, petra scandali descedit in mundum (in Cant. Horn.  2.3). It
26 (1) That Christ is warning the disciples not to believe those who claim to know when the world will 
end;  (2) that God has not yet decided the date of the Parousia; (3) that in this passage  ‘Christ’  is to be 
understood as ‘the Church’; (4) that it would not benefit the disciples to know the date and that it is for 
this reason that Christ feigns ignorance.
27  6  Xdyoq  xp  oi)oi<?  |i£vcov  Xdyoq  (Contra Celsum 4A 5).
28 It is with this  in mind that Origen develops his famous theory of the £7uvoiai of Christ.  We discuss 
this below, sections 5.3-5.4.
29 This point is well discussed by Harl (1957), pp. 201-4 and 228-233.
30 Commentary on St Matthew 11.17.
134is for this reason that Origen claims, in the Commentary on St John, that the divinity of the Incarnated 
Christ was merely a shadow of the Godhead.31
The  doctrine  of the  Incarnation  as  providential  accommodation  to  the  weakness  of  fallen  man  is 
extremely  important  to  Origen.  He  repeatedly  insists  that  the  figure  of the  Incarnated  Redeemer  is 
simply a  necessary  first  step  in our understanding  of God.32 The  mature  Christian will  transcend  the 
(dis)guise of assumed humanity and see God as God. In this sense it is true to say, with Harl, Girod and 
Chadwick,33 that the Incarnation hid God as much as it revealed him. But this is not a kenotic theory. It 
does not mean that Christ was emptied of any divine powers.  It is simply that the Saviour is deciding 
how much of his divinity to reveal, when and to whom.  At the Transfiguration, for example, Christ has 
decided that three of the disciples are capable and worthy of witnessing his full divine glory.34
1.4
But  if the  Incarnated  Christ  retained  all  the  attributes  of his  divinity,  how  would  it  ever have  been 
possible for him to experience life wholly and simply as a man? How can Origen claim that the Agony 
in the  Garden,  the  Temptation and the Passion are  experiences peculiar to  Christ’s human nature?  In 
the Commentary Series on Saint Matthew, Origen seems to be arguing that at certain times Christ took 
the  deliberate  and conscious  decision to  ‘switch off  his divinity,  to  ‘put  it to  sleep’.  In Gethsemane, 
Christ  consciously  restrains  his  divine  powers  and  allows  himself  to  be  arrested  by  the  soldiers: 
Christus,  qui post  tanta prodigia  et  virtutes  quas fecit  volens  tradidit se  ad vincula,  soporans  in  se 
divinitatis virtutem et adquiescens ut alligaretur (Commentary Series on St Matthew 115). This is not a 
kenosis. The Saviour has not lost any of his divine power; he is simply choosing not to use it.35 We are 
back to the doctrine of providential accommodation, the decision to reveal only a ‘measure’ of divinity. 
A crucial point in Origen’s exegesis of the Passion is that Christ remains consciously aware of the fact 
that he is God. As such, he always had the ability to avoid the Passion. Had Christ not actively wanted
31  Commentary on St John 2.6 (4). Passage cited in Harl (1957), p. 197.
32 For more on this, see sections 5.3-5.4.
33 Chadwick (1953), ad loc.  Contra Celsum 2.67:  en£[i(p0r|  yap  oi)  pdvov,  iva yvcooGfi,  hlX  i'va  Kai 
Xa0r|.  He refers to Contra Celsum 2.72, 4.15 and 4.19 for similar claims. Girod (1970), p.64 speaks of 
the  ‘ambiguite’ involved in Origen’s doctrine of the Incarnation:  ia chair du Fils est une manifestation 
visible, mais en fait elle est aussi un obstacle a la decouverte de la divinite.’
34 On this, see especially Contra Celsum 2.64, 4.16 and 6.68. For a full discussion, see section 5.4.
35  Origen’s  argument  here  is  similar  to  Irenaeus’s  idea  of the  ‘quiescence’  of the  Saviour’s  divine 
attributes. For a discussion, see Hall (1898), p.3.
135to  be  arrested,  imprisoned  and  crucified,  the  efforts  of the  Roman  soldiers  would  have  been  to  no 
avail.36
Origen’s Christ never forgets that he  is God and, as such,  omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. 
At any moment he chooses, Christ can call upon these divine powers. There are in fact no situations in 
which Origen allows Christ to act wholly as a man and to ignore completely his divine nature.  It is the 
argument of this chapter that, for Origen, it is Christ’s divine nature that directs and dictates the whole 
course of his earthly life. Despite claiming that Christ experienced the Temptation and the Agony as a 
man, Origen’s exegesis of these episodes reveals Christ making full use of his divinity. Even his death 
is  seen  as  the  supreme  manifestation  of the  Saviour’s  miraculous  powers.  Origen’s  Christ  constantly 
exploits the advantages of his divinity.
In the second half of this chapter, we discuss Origen’s exegesis of three crucial episodes in the life of 
Christ,  the Temptation,  the Agony and the  Crucifixion,  as an illustration of this Christological bias.37 
We  also  discuss  in  detail  the  arguments  of de  Principiis  2.6,  the  philosophical  foundation  for  this 
Christology:  this chapter describes the process by which the Saviour’s humanity was entirely absorbed 
by his divinity.38 We shall also see how Origen’s understanding of the Redemption and the Atonement 
leaves very little soteriological scope for the Saviour’s humanity.39 
CHRISTOLOGY AS AN HISTORICALLY SENSITIVE PHENOMENON.
2 . 1.
This  emphasis  on  the  Saviour’s  divinity  is  of course  a  Patristic  common-place.  The  Fathers  of the
Church  are  often  accused  en  masse  of refusing  to  recognize  the  vital  contribution  made  by  Christ’s
human nature. Although the Church might always have insisted upon the recognition of the two natures
of Christ,  it is the prerogative of each age to concentrate upon and to emphasize either the humanity or
the divinity of the Saviour. Christology is very much an historically sensitive phenomenon, the delicate
*
barometer  of  external  circumstance.  It  is  well  known,  for  example,  that  the  poets,  artists  and 
theologians of the later Middle Ages in the West concentrated to an unprecedented degree on the figure 
of the  Suffering  Servant.  For them,  it was  the  Saviour’s human nature  that was  most important.  This 
bias  was  obviously  the  direct  response  to  the  bleakness  of the  contemporary  situation.  The  fall  of 
Jerusalem,  the  failure  of the  Third  Crusade  and  the  ravages  of the  Black Death  led men to  seek the
36 In sections  16.1-16.3, we look in detail at Origen’s doctrine of the Saviour’s voluntary death.
37 Sections  10.1-16.3.
38 Sections 8.1-9.6.
136comfort  of  a  suffering  and  sympathetic  Saviour.40  A  similar  emphasis  on  the  Saviour’s  humanity 
characterizes much modem theology. Various academics advocate an extreme de-mythologizing of the 
Gospel  narrative  and  are  explicitly  rejecting  such  overtly  ‘divine’  acts  as  the  Virgin  Birth,  the 
Resurrection and the Ascension.41  Even the average church-goer is much more likely to see Christ as a 
supremely virtuous man and as a role model for good behaviour than as God Incarnate.42 
The Christology of the Early Church is characterized by the opposite tendency.  Christians of the  first 
five centuries felt it incumbent upon themselves to emphasize the divinity of Christ and to concentrate 
exclusively  on  his  divine  nature.43  This  bias  is  apparent  not  only  in  the  works  of philosophers  and 
theologians, but also in Christian art and poetry.44 For example,  it was not until the sixth century that 
the Crucifixion became a popular subject for artists and even then the Cross was depicted as a golden, 
jewel encrusted objet d ’art. Christian sculptors were similarly unwilling to produce realistic portraits of 
a  Jewish  outcast.  Instead,  they  produced  statues  of  beautiful,  idealized  youths,  clean-shaven  and 
muscular,  not  unlike  the  cult  statues  of young  gods.  The  murals  of the  Catacombs  were  likewise 
dependent upon pagan religious  iconography:  Christ commonly appears  as the god Pan.45 Neither do 
the  poets  of this  early period  describe  the  pain  and  suffering  of the  Passion.  The  Crucifixion was  a 
taboo subject.46
There are obvious historical explanations for this emphasis.  Before the conversion of Constantine, the 
Church was a minority and persecuted group. Attacked and ridiculed by the pagans,  it would not have 
helped the cause to admit that Christ was  indeed a poor,  weak and suffering man.  The martyrs in the 
arena would be comforted not by recalling the suffering of Christ, but by concentrating on his mighty 
Resurrection  and  glorious  Ascension.47  Of course,  after  312,  the  situation  changed  entirely  and  the 
Church  became  a  privileged,  national  institution.  A  mood  of great  triumph  permeated  the  Christian
39 Sections 5.1-7.5.
40 On this, see Raby (1927), pp.417-457.
41  The best examples of this de-mythologizing theology are Tillich,  The Dynamics of Faith, Robinson, 
Honest to God, Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Cupitt, Sea of Faith. For an overview of 
the de-mythologizing agenda, see Meta (1966).
42 Bicknell (1950), p.78 describes the average modem Englishman as an Adoptionist.
43  Nock  (1933),  p.210:  it  was  certainly  not  the  human  character  of Christ,  as  described  in  the  four 
Gospels,  that converted the  world;  evangelism was  rooted  in the glorification of the  Saviour’s divine 
nature.
44 For the manifestations of this tendency in the Carolingian era, see Chazelle (2001).
45 See Munro and Rudorff (1961), p.61.
46 Thierry (1972).  In Thierry’s anthology of Greek Christian poetry,  from the 2n d to the  5th  centuries, 
there  is  not  one  that deals  with the  Passion.  Raby (1927),  pp.  1-111  gives  a  similar picture  of early 
Latin poetry.
137conscience for at least two centuries. Artists were urged to depict Christ in glory, Christ Pantocrator.48 
Poets of both East and West hymned Christ as the triumphant, conquering hero.49 
In the course of this study,  it will emerge that Origen’s Christology is very much in keeping with this 
general bias.  Like all his contemporaries, Origen was very concerned to stress the divinity of Christ at 
the  expense  of his  suffering  humanity.  For  Origen,  this  was  a  vital  aspect  of the  apologetic  agenda. 
Origen’s depiction of Christ was developed almost entirely as a response to the mockery of the pagans. 
PAGAN POLEMIC AS A BACKGROUND TO ORIGEN’S CHRISTOLOGY.
3.1.
It  is  impossible to understand Origen’s Christology without  first understanding the  intellectual milieu 
in which he was writing. Origen’s theological doctrines are almost always a reaction and a response to 
the views of others, be they heretical groups within the Church itself or its pagan opponents.
By  the  mid-second  century,  the  pagan  intelligentsia  were  finally  beginning  to  take  note  of  the 
intellectual  threat  of Christianity.  For  the  first  time,  the  faithful  were  facing  the  prospect  of pagan 
philosophical  attacks.50  No  longer  was  Christianity  simply  a  nuisance  to  the  law-keepers  of  the 
Empire,51  but  a  fast-growing  sect  with  converts  from  the  highest  echelons  of  educated  society.52 
Criticisms  of  Christianity  had  previously  been  restricted  to  ridiculous  accusations  of  love  orgies, 
cannibalism and  general  anti-social  behaviour.  The  claims  were  not particularly  intelligent  and  were 
certainly not based upon even the slightest acquaintance with the Christian religion.53 It was only later, 
with Galen, Celsus and Porphyry, that pagans felt sufficiently threatened by the new religion to launch 
systematic,  philosophical  attacks  on  its  various  doctrines.  Origen’s  whole  theological  enterprise  is 
inspired and prompted by such attacks.  The apologetic mode may not always be explicit, but the very 
fact that Origen’s explanation of the Christian religion is so rigorously philosophical is the direct result 
of his passionate engagement with its pagan critics  and his realization that he must,  so  to speak, beat
47  See,  for  example,  Luke’s  description  of the  martyrdom of St.  Stephen  (Acts  7.51)  and  Perpetua’s 
vision of Christ in glory (Passio 4,  11-13).
48 See, for example, the great mosaics of the Hagia Sophia.
49 The  Te Deum, written c.  400,  is the perfect example of this:  Christ is celebrated as the rex gloriae, 
not the Suffering Servant.
50 For a brief overview of this crucial period, see Dodds (1965), p. 106.
51  From  Pontius  Pilate  to  Pliny,  Roman  Governors  had  been  troubled  by  the  social  threat  of 
Christianity. On this, see Benko (1980), pp. 1056-1081  and Wilkes (1984), pp. 1-30.
52 Wilkes (1984), pp. 127-9.
53 For a discussion of these early anti-Christian arguments, see Hoffman (1994), pp.  137-145 and Grant 
(1988), pp.29-31.
138them  at  their  own  game.54  Ironically,  it  was  the  ferocity  of the  pagan  opposition  that  galvanized 
Christians  into  becoming  philosophers.  Origen  is  a  fine  example  of this  new kind  of believer:  it has 
been  argued  that  he  was  the  first  Christian  theologian,  the  first  to  turn  his  religion  into  a  coherent 
philosophical system.55 The attacks of Celsus and his fellows forced Origen to take a fresh, intellectual, 
look at the central doctrines of faith.
Lebreton,  in  a  long  analysis  of  the  first  few  centuries  of  Christianity,  charts  the  gradual  rise  of 
philosophical  speculation  within  the  Church.56  He  cites  Minucius  Felix  and  Justin  Martyr  as 
inaugurating  this  important  new  approach  to  religion.  They  deliberately  adopt  the  language  of those 
whom they are  seeking to convert:  for the  first time, philosophy has become an important apologetic 
tool.  The  next  generation  of Apologists  further  exploited  the  evangelical  advantages  of philosophy. 
Irenaeus,  Tertullian,  Hippolytus  and  Novatian  all  made  deliberate  and  systematic  use  of  pagan 
philosophical  categories  in  order  to  explain  central  Christian  mysteries.  I  would  categorize  Origen’s 
theology as very much part of this new approach to Christianity.  Lebreton disagrees. He prefers to see 
Origen, together with Clement, as custodians of a secret gnosis, an arcane esoteric theology which was 
to be kept a closely guarded secret.57 Of course there is an important element of elitism and secrecy in 
Origen’s  theological  system,  but  it  is  an  intellectual  elitism.58  Origen  is  a  rigorous  philosopher, 
saturated with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. The spiritual elite which Origen favours are not muddle- 
headed mystics nor esoteric Gnostic adepts; they are intellectual heavy weights, enormously well read 
in both secular and sacred texts.59
3.2.
54  I  disagree  with  Scheffczyk’s  claim  (1969),  p.82  that  “Origen,  though  still  associated  with  the 
tradition  of  the  Apologists  (c.f.  the  Contra  Celsum)  inaugurates  a  new  approach  to  the  Christian 
world.”  I  would  rather  not  separate  in  this  way  Origen’s  ‘apologetic’  method  from  his  ‘new’  (= 
philosophical)  approach  to  Christianity.  The  two  are  inextricably  linked:  it  is precisely because  he  is 
defending  Christianity  against  pagan  philosophical  attack  that  Origen  is  so  concerned  to  make 
Christianity a coherent philosophical system.
55 Jaeger (1962), p.49:  “Philosophy penetrates (Origen’s) whole understanding of the religion of Jesus 
and the Apostles, transforming it into theology.”
56 Lebreton (1925).
57 Lebreton (1925), p. 492. See also Trigg (1981), Hanson (1954), pp.73-90 and Jaeger (1962), pp.66-7.
58 Lot-Borodine (1932), p.531  recognizes that Origen’s elitism is intellectual: “il est le vrai aristocrate .
.  .  bien plus intellectualiste que moraliste, et qui etablit une veritable barriere entre les simpliciores et 
les ‘les vraie brebis de la maison d’Israel’: aux uns les miettes, aux autres le pain.”
59  Gregory Thaumaturgos,  Panegyric  13  is  a  detailed  description  of the  wide-ranging  curriculum of 
Origen’s  school.  The  important point  to  note  is  the  centrality of pagan philosophical  texts.  See  also 
Origen’s  Letter  to  Gregory  (=  Philocalia  13.1-2),  in  which  he  advises  his  pupil  to  study  Greek 
philosophy as the perfect preparation for the understanding of Christianity. On this last point, see Heine 
(1993), p. 90.
139In all his works, Origen is striving to distance himself from the blind belief of the simpliciores and to 
explain  Christianity  in  philosophically  coherent  terms.  This  noble  aim  has  overtly  apologetic 
intentions. Origen’s writings were not restricted to those already within the Church: their wide-ranging 
readership would almost certainly have included educated pagans, men and women ripe for conversion. 
We  must  remember  that  Alexandria  in  the  second  and  third  centuries  after  Christ  was  a  bustling, 
cosmopolitan  sea-port.60  Inter-faith  dialogue,  amongst  Christians,  Jews  and  pagans,  was  a  common 
phenomenon.61  There  is  of  course  evidence  that  Origen  was  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Jewish 
community:  he  was  taught  Hebrew  by  one  of  its  Rabbis  and  was  clearly  influenced  by  Jewish 
allegorical  exegesis.62  Both  Origen  and  his  pagan  contemporary,  Plotinus,  were  intrigued  by  the 
religions of the East: it is tempting to detect a Buddhist influence on both thinkers.63 We also know that 
Plotinus and Origen were on speaking terms with various Gnostics: Jerome, for example, quotes from a 
famous  public  debate  between  Origen  and  the  Gnostic  champion,  Candidus.64  Most  important  to  the 
present enquiry, however, is the fact that Christians and pagans were in daily contact with one another. 
There seems to have been no  ‘ghetto-mentality’  in this free thinking university town. It is possible that 
Origen studied in his youth under the pagan philosopher, Ammonius Saccas.65 Conversely, we are told 
that  Anatolios,  a  Christian,  held  the  chair  of mathematics.66  There  are  at  least  three  passages  in  the 
Enneads in which Plotinus appears to be attacking specifically Christian doctrines.67 Celsus’  attack on 
the  Christians  must  be  the  fruit  of years  of enquiry,  of a  very  close  contact  with  various  Christian
60 For a brief, but useful description of Origen’s Alexandria, see Trigg (1983), pp.3-7.
61  Stroumsa (2003) tries to refute what he calls the  ‘myth of multi-culturalism in Alexandria’.  I am not 
convinced.  Although  his  paper  provides  a  useful  insight  into  some  religious  and  racial  tensions,  he 
ignores the all important traffic of intellectual ideas.
6‘  See,  for example,  the  references  to  ‘my  Hebrew teacher’  at de Principiis  1.3.4  and 4.3.14.  For an 
exhaustive analysis of the influence of the Jews on Origen, see de Lange (1996).
63 See, for example, Porphyry’s claim that the young Plotinus joined the Emperor Gordian’s expedition 
in the hope of meeting the Brahmins (Vita Plotini 3).  It is possible that the references to re-incamation 
that are found in both Origen and Plotinus were in part suggested by the Buddhist doctrine of kharma 
(Williams (1927), p. 215). More interestingly, Origen’s doctrine of the buvoiai of Christ (see sections
1.3, 5.3-5.4) is remarkably similar to the Buddhist doctrine of levels of enlightenment.
64 Jerome, Apologia contra Rufinum 2.9. Plotinus, Ennead 2.9 (Against the Gnostics) reveals a detailed 
knowledge  of his  enemies’  system.  Origen  is  similarly  knowledgeable  (see  especially  the  verbatim 
quotations from the Gnostic, Heracleon, in the Commentary on St John. Meredith (1985), Runia (1984) 
and Sinnige (1999) have shown how, despite such vociferous enmity, both Origen and Plotinus were in 
fact greatly influenced by the Gnostics.
65 This is an immensely controversial subject, which cannot be discussed here. The interested reader is 
referred to Langerbeck (1957), Dodds (1960) and Edwards (1993).
66 Bidez (1923), p. 12.
67 Ennead 3.2.8, 4.8.5 and 6.8.7. For a discussion of the last two passages, see Sinnige (1999), p.45 and 
Armstrong (1982).
140groups.68  On  the  other hand,  Origen almost certainly held public  debates  with his pagan confreres,69 
We have indisputable evidence that educated pagans were present at the Mass for Catechumens. In the 
13th   Homily on  Genesis,  Origen  addresses  the  pagans  directly  and  notes  that they will appreciate  his 
familiarity with saeculares  litteras.10 It was this type of educated pagan whom Origen was most keen 
to convert.7 1
Like  the  Apologists,  Origen  recognized  the  immense  value  of  philosophy  for  the  conversion  of 
educated pagans and for the establishment of Christianity as a respectable, intelligent religion. Eusebius 
has preserved a letter, written by Origen, in which he defends his liking for philosophy by stressing its 
evangelical potential:
fenei 8£ &vaK£i|i£v(p  poi xcjj Xdyto, xf|q <Pn|ir|q 5iaxpexouor|<; rcepi'  xrjg e£,ea><; qpcov,  rcpoapeaav  6xe  |i£v 
aipexiKoi, 6x£ 8£ oi hno xdiv'EXXriviKWv pa0ripdx(ov  Kai paXioxa  xcov fev  cpiXoooq)ig, e 8 o £ e v   e^exaoai 
xd xe xcov aipExiKwv  86ypaxa  Kai xa imo  xdjv (piXoo6<p(ov Kepi dXr|0£ia<; X6y£iv crcayyEXXdpEva. xouxo 
8£  7i£7toii]Kap£v  pipriodpEvol  xe  xov  rcpo  r|iJ.d c> v  noX.X.oO <;  axpE^Tjoavxa  Lldvxaivov,  oi)K  6Xiyr|v  e v  
EKEivoiq  £axr|K6xa  7iapaoK£uf|v,  Kai  xov  vuv  e v   xco  TipEoPuxEpico  Ka0£^6|i£vov  ' A X £ ^ a v 8 p 6 to v  
HpaKXav,  ovxiva  Eupov  napa  xa>  8i8aaKdXcp  xwv  (piXoo6<pcov  pa0r|pdxcov,  f|8ri  ti£ v x e  e x e o iv   auxw 
KpooKapx£pf|oavxa 7ipiv f|  ap^ao0ai  dKOUEiv  e k e iv c o v   xcov  Xdycov  (Eusebius, H.E.  6.19).72 
The  pagans  must  not  be  allowed  to  mock.  “Only  believe”  was  no  longer  the  rallying  cry.73  Unlike 
Tertullian, Origen realized that Jerusalem had a great deal to leam from Athens. Moses and Plato were 
not  to  be  pitted  against  one  another,  but  fused  together  to  form  an  exciting,  new  and  remarkably 
successful religion. In this ‘new religion’, there must be rational explanations for every doctrine. Belief 
must  be  subjected  to  the  rigorous  scrutiny  of reason.74  Van  Winden  has  highlighted  an  important 
passage  in  the  Contra  Celsum,  in  which  Origen  explicitly  responds  to  the  charge  that Christianity  is
68 Frede (1999), p. 133 calls Celsus “surprisingly well-informed.”
69 Chadwick (1953), p.  ix suggests that the Contra  Celsum  is, at least in part, the fruit of real debates. 
Bardy (1923), p. 14 agrees.
70 Passage quoted by Bidez (1923), pp. 12-13.
71  It  must  have  been  a  great  disappointment  that  Origen  failed  to  convert  the  philosopher  Porphyry, 
who travelled all the way from Tyre to Caesarea to hear the great man speak (Eusebius, H E.  6.19). But 
the  very  fact  that  Porphyry  travelled  such  a  distance  for  such  a  purpose  tells  us  a  great  deal  about 
|j>agan/Christian interaction. For a discussion of this, see Wilkes (1984), p. 129.
2 Dillon (1988), p.216 and (1992), p.8 describes the apologetic and evangelical advantages of Origen’s 
pagan  philosophical  education.  He  argues  that  Origen  attended  Ammonius’  lectures  to  ‘aid  his 
apostolate to the Alexandrian intelligensia.”
73 Contra Celsum  1.9. Even Tertullian was proud to claim that certum est quia impossibile est and that 
nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum lesum. Last passage cited by Dodds (1965), p. 106).
74  On this,  see  especially  Contra  Celsum  5.20.  Harl  (1957),  pp.262-3  and Hovland (1984), pp. 196-8 
discuss this point.
141founded  upon  moxic;  rather  than  upon  Xdyog  and  dtrcoSei^eK;  (Contra  Celsum  1.10-11).75  Origen’s
response contains two vitally important points. He admits that nioiiq is the modus credendi of the mass 
of ordinary believers,  of those  who  are unable  to  devote themselves to philosophical  studies.  But the 
mature,  intellectual  Christian  will  not  be  satisfied  with  belief  simpliciter.  his  aim 
is  TrioTu;  |!ETd  X6yov.  Marguerite  Harl  has  drawn attention to a  little known fragment  from Origen’s
Commentary  on  I  Corinthians,  in  which  we  find  a  very  similar  argument.76  In  this  passage,  Origen 
draws a sharp distinction between ‘wisdom’ (oocpla) and ‘faith’ (tugxk;).  ‘Wisdom’ is vastly superior to 
‘faith’.  It is to be revealed only to the  intellectually astute.  Taking his cue  from St Paul, who will not 
entrust  the  heady  mysteries  of  oo<pia  to  the  childlike  Corinthians  (I  Corinthians  2.4-7),  Origen 
epitomizes his famous ‘two-tier’ Christianity:
aXko  yap  caxiv  Eioayaysiv  xivaq  eic,  ti)v  Trioxiv,  aXXo  xqv  ao<piav  xoo  0eoO   dnoKaXunxEiv. 
dvanxuaoojiEv  ouv  xr)v  oo<piav  xou  0eou  oil  xoiq  £iaayo|i6voi<;  oi)8£  xoiq  &pxo|i£voi<; 
oi)8£  xoT^  pr|8£7ico  67i68ci^iv  xou  uyiouq  piou  8e8< dk6oiv  6XX’  ox’  av  yu|ivaadp£vo<;  ov 
8ei  xpdnov  xa  aio0rixf|pia  7ipoq  8idicpiaiv  KaXou  xe  Kai  KaKof)  £7uxf|8£io<;  y^vrjxai  Kai  npoq  xo 
dKouoai  ocxpiav,  x6xe  XaXoupEv  ocxpiav  ev xoig xeXeiok;  (Commentary on I Corinthians, fragment IX 
in the Journal of Theological Studies 9 (1907), p.238).
It is against this background that we are to understand Origen’s explanation of the Resurrection of the 
Body. This was a doctrine that particularly repulsed pagan opponents.77 Origen is not content with the 
facile  reply  that  everything  is  possible  with  God.78  He  must  explain  and  defend  his  belief  with 
reference to standard philosophical arguments,  oi)K  drcocpdoEi  bXka  Kai  X6yq>  (Contra  Celsum  5.22).
Specifically,  Origen  makes  use  of the  Stoic  doctrine  of the  oKEppaxiKoq  X6yo<;  coupling  it  with  St
Paul’s  image  of the  grain and  the  wheat (I  Corinthians  15.35-38).79 Chadwick has drawn attention to 
Contra  Celsum  3.41,  4.57  and  6.77,  where  Origen makes  use  of the  philosophical  doctrine  of prime 
matter “in order to make the Resurrection of the Body intellectually respectable.”80
75 Van Winden (1966).
76 Harl (1957), p.266.
77 Frede (1997), p.231.
78  Celsus  scoffs  that  this  was  the  typical  reply  to  pagan  enquiries  (Contra  Celsum  3.70).  At  Contra 
Celsum  5.20,  Origen  criticizes  Celsus  for  learning  about  the  Resurrection  of the  Body  from  those 
Christians who ‘only believe’, i.e. cannot explain the doctrine.
79  This  argument  is  also  used  at  Contra  Celsum  7.32.  For  discussions  of Origen’s  doctrine  of the 
Resurrection of the Body, see Grant (1952), pp.251-5, Chadwick (1948), Bynham (1995), pp.63-8 and 
Borret (1969), pp.70-71.
80 Chadwick (1948), p. 101.
142Although  he  might  not  always  have  succeeded  in  his  philosophization  of the  faith  and  although  his 
views might not always have been acceptable to later orthodoxy, Origen certainly deserves the credit of 
looking  at  Christianity  in  a  way  that  would  later  result  in  its  lasting  triumph  as  a  world  religion.  It 
would cease  to be  the  belief of illiterate  fisherman  and  would become  a  complex  theological  system 
that could match and better any pagan alternative.
3.3.
This  new,  philosophical  approach  is  epitomized  in  Origen’s  theology.  Origen  has  abandoned  the 
inscrutable  Biblical  Deity  in  favour of a  God  who  could  appeal  to  the  most critical  pagan audience. 
One of the corner-stones of Origen’s theology is the belief that even God is bound by the law of reason: 
as such, there must be rational, philosophical explanations for all his acts.  Many scholars have argued 
that  the  fundamental  difference  between  paganism  and  Christianity  in  the  first  few  centuries  after 
Christ centred upon this very question of the rationality of God.81 They have emphasized the contempt 
felt  by  pagan  intellectuals,  most  famously  Galen,  for  the  blind  faith  of the  Christians,  their  simple 
acceptance of the arbitrary will of God and the concomitant doctrine that all natural science was a vain 
conceit.82  Galen  posited  a  strong  distinction  between  Jewish/Christian/Biblical  theology  and 
pagan/philosophical  theology.  Origen,  however,  refuses  to  fall  into  line.  Although  a  Christian,  he 
appears  to  reject  the  traditional  theology  of his  co-religionists  and  to  adopt  rather the pagan model, 
according to which the freedom of God is constrained by the bridle of philosophical possibility.83 
Origen  agrees  with  the  pagans  that  God  is  constrained  by  the  laws  of nature.  This  is  an  explicit 
rejection of Biblical theology. God’s miraculous intervention in the day-to-day running of the physical 
world,  his  abrupt  and  unexpected  subversion  of the  natural  order,  is  a  leit-motif of both the  Old  and 
New Testament.  The  Biblical God is inscrutable and incomprehensible, precisely because he does not 
conform  to  expected  norms  and  acts  in  wildly  unpredictable  ways.  Man  must  never  attempt  to 
understand God nor,  interestingly, the world he has created.  So  in the Book of Job,  the  Lord answers 
the hero out of the -whirlwind and warns against precisely this kind of vain curiosity:  can Job explain 
the  movements  of the  stars,  the  origin  of light  and  darkness,  the  cause  of rain,  hail  and  snow,  the
81 Dihle (1982), pp. 1-19, Bregman (1984), p.217, Hovland (1984), p. 196.
82  Epitomized  in  Rabbi  Gamaliel’s  discussion  with  the  emperor  of  Rome.  The  Jew  argues  that 
everything  that  happens  happens  only because  of the  will  of God  and  that  it  is  therefore  useless  to 
attempt to understand or to  explain the  cosmos  (cited in Dihle  (1982),  p.4).  See  also Walzer (1949), 
pp.25-28.
3  I  agree  therefore  with Bigg (1913),  p.  201,  who  argues  that,  according to  Origen,  God’s power  is 
indeed limited, but limited only by his own reason and his own beneficence.
143gestation period  of wild  goats  (Job  39)?  While  pagan  natural  scientists  were  occupying  themselves 
with exactly these sorts of question, the Jews and Christians were urged to suspend all curiosity.
Origen,  however,  will  not  accept  that  God  is  inscrutable  and  incomprehensible.  On  the  contrary,  he 
believes  that God  makes  sense  because  he  necessarily conforms  to  the  laws  of nature.  The  world  in 
which  we  live  was  built  upon  the  firm  foundations  of reason:  as  such,  its  aims  and  purposes  are 
certainly  within  the  scope  of  human  comprehension.  Origen  seems  to  have  been  very  strongly 
influenced by the Stoic idea that the meticulous providence of God extends to the minutiae of creation: 
there  is,  for example,  a particular reason why particular stars  occupy particular positions.84 Although 
Origen believes that we shall only truly be able to rerum cognoscere causas in the after-life, the point 
remains  that  God’s  creation,  in  so  far  as  it  conforms  to  the  dictates  of reason,  will  be  eventually 
understood  by  the  creatures  themselves.85  God  was  not  free  to  create  as  and  what  he  liked,  but  was 
constrained by the laws of reason.
Robert Grant has drawn attention to an  interesting passage  from the Homilies on Jeremiah,  in which 
Origen argues, a propos human physiognomy, that there is a reason and cause for everything and that it 
is  man’s  duty  to  find  out  what  that  is  {in  ler.  Horn. 39).86  Grant  argues  that  this  passage  is  a  direct 
response to Galen’s de usu partium.  In the de usu partium, Galen argues that there is a particular and 
precise  reason  why  the  human  body  was  made  in  the  way  it  is;  every  constituent  part  has  its  own 
function and purpose -  even eyebrows. As we have seen, Galen regularly criticized Biblical cosmology 
as  referring  everything  to  the  inscrutable  will  of God,  thus  dismissing  any  attempt  at understanding 
creation.  Origen  refuses  to  accept  this  criticism:  in  the  Homilies  on  Jeremiah,  Origen  repeats  the 
argument of the de usu partium. His insistence that God’s work can and must be understood places him 
firmly on the ‘pagan’ side of this debate.
This brief over-view of Origen’s  theology  is  the perfect  illustration of his  subjection of the Christian 
faith  to  the  dictates  of pagan  philosophical  reasoning.  I  believe  that  it  was  in  direct  response  to  the 
criticisms  of Galen  and  his  fellows  that  Origen  altered  so  radically  the  traditional  depiction  of the 
Christian Deity. That is to say, Origen’s theology is consciously and deliberately apologetic. In the next
84 The doctrine of meticulous providence is also of course a central tenet of Christianity, enshrined in 
the Bible (see, for example, Luke  12.6: are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and not one of them is 
forgotten  before God?).  It seems to me however that there  is  a very important difference between the 
Christian  doctrine  of meticulous providence  and the  pagan,  particularly Stoic,  version.  Christians  are 
not expected to understand, but simply to accept.
85  These  ideas  are  most  fully developed  at de Principiis  2.6.7  and 2.11.6-7.  O’Clerigh (1992),  p.  21 
discusses this theory and agrees with me that it is Stoic in origin.
144section of this chapter, we shall see how pagan criticisms of the Incarnation were the prick and spur to 
Origen’s re-interpretation of this central Christian belief.
4.1
For the pagan opponents  of Christianity,  the  Incarnation was  the  most ridiculous  aspect of the  whole 
religion.87  There  were  two  main  objections.  The  first  was  the  philosophical  absurdity  that God  ever 
would or could incarnate himself and the second was that the Christ of the Gospels behaved in a way 
entirely  unsuited  to  his  supposed  divine  nature.  These  were  stock  arguments  of the  anti-Christian 
polemic, used and re-used throughout antiquity.
The  increasing  dominance  of Platonism  in  the  second  and  third  centuries  AD  led  to  a  widespread 
emphasis on philosophical dualism. Although dualism had always been an important element in Greek 
thought,  by  this  date  it  had  become  sufficiently  propagated  to  become  one  of the  most  important 
philosophical  doctrines.88  This  was  particularly  true  of  Origen’s  own  intellectual  milieu  at 
Alexandria.89  Matter and spirit, body and soul,  the visible and the  intelligible universes were seen as 
absolute opposites and, furthermore, were identified with the moral polarities of good and evil. Man in 
his present state was a  fallen being,  imprisoned  in the shackles of the body as a punishment for some 
pre-camate sin:  it was his task and duty to escape the horrors of the physical universe and to return to 
the intelligible, spiritual world whence he came and where he truly belonged.  Part of the popularity of 
dualism  was  that  it  could  be  used  as  a  successful  theodicy.  In  the  Timaeus,  for  example,  the 
imperfections  of the physical  world  were blamed,  not on  the  craftsman,  but  on the  lousy material  he 
was forced to use.90
86 Grant (1983), p.535.
87 Nock (1933),  pp.236-7.  As  Frede (1997),  pp.229-30 and 236-41  points out,  Christianity and pagan 
philosophy were  in many ways very compatible.  He believes that there  were only three major aspects 
of Christianity  that  were  absolutely  unacceptable  to  the pagan  intelligensia  -  the  Resurrection  of the 
Body, the Incarnation and Christ’s behaviour and general attitude as described in the Gospels.
88  Dualism began with  the  Pythagorean and Orphic  religions.  From there,  it was  adopted by Plato  to 
form the backbone of many of his dialogues,  especially the  Timaeus and the Phaedo. The subsequent 
Academic  tradition  developed  this  doctrine  to  become  (arguably)  the  corner-stone  of  its  whole 
philosophy.  Although the  Stoics  and Aristotelians  were  originally scornful  of dualism,  by the  second 
and  third  centuries  AD  even  they  were  becoming  amenable  to  the  idea.  One  of the  most  obvious 
examples of this shift is the re-interpretation of de Anima  3.5  to allow for the immortality of the soul. 
The  quest for homodoxia  in the  first centuries after Christ forced peripatetic philosophers to abandon 
some  of  the  fundamental  beliefs  of  their  master  in  favour  of  the  tenets  of  Platonism.  A  similar 
development  is  apparent  in  Stoicism.  Although  the  founders  of  the  Stoic  school  were  rigorously 
monist,  by the  third  century even  some  Stoics  were  preaching  a  version of soul  survival  and  escape 
from  the  wretched  physical  world.  The  Sceptics,  Epicureans  and  Cynics  remained  untouched  by 
dualism, but their doctrines by-passed the mainstream intellectual debate.
89 On Alexandrian dualism -  Gnostic, Plotinian and Origenist - see Meredith (1985).
90 Bicknell (1950), p.58.
145Within the context of such extreme dualism, the Incarnation would obviously seem an absurdity and an 
impiety.  Pagan philosophy could make no sense of the  idea that God would ever contaminate himself 
with  the  filth of matter.  St.  Augustine  admits  that  in his  youth he  found  the  idea  turpe\  Celsus  calls 
it  aioxpdv.91  Of course  Origen  was  profoundly  influenced  by  contemporary  pagan  philosophy.  His
dualist sympathies are well known and well documented.92 Origen fully understood how the doctrine of 
the Incarnation could offend pagan sensibilities, sensibilities that were to a certain extent also his own. 
As  both  a  philosopher  and  an  apologist,  Origen  needed  to  find  a  way of accommodating the  central 
Christian belief within the framework of metaphysical dualism. Origen’s doctrine of the soul of Christ, 
as  developed  at  de  Principiis  2.6,  is  the  perfect  example  of his  valiant  attempts  to  make  the  faith 
philosophically credible.93 As we shall see when we come to discuss this important chapter,94 Origen’s 
main  reason  for believing that Christ assumed a human  soul  is  in order to explain the process  of the 
Incarnation. The Saviour’s human soul plays the vital role of intermediary, allowing two fundamentally 
opposed entities (God and matter) to associate with one another. Origen’s explanation of the mechanics 
of the process  is entirely consistent with established philosophical doctrines.  Few philosophers would 
have disagreed that a soul,  by nature,  is equally able to be united with God as to assume a body.  The 
fall and return of souls was a story told by almost every philosopher Origen would have been likely to 
read. He is simply making new use of a very old theory.95
4.2.
Although  the  doctrines  of contemporary pagan philosophy would not allow God to become  man,96  it 
was still possible within the context of such systems to believe in divine men, in men inspired by God
91  Confessions 5.10.19 and Contra Celsum 4.2 (both cited in Frede (1997), p.321).
92 Especially by Meredith (1985). Origen’s dualism is most obviously expressed in his belief that God 
did not originally intend to create the physical universe; he was obliged to do so only after the fall of 
souls (de Principiis 2.1.1-2; 2.9.1-2). It is also evident in his extreme wariness of taking the doctrine of 
the Resurrection of the Body literally (de Principiis 2.10.1-4;  3.4.4 and Contra Celsum 5.17-19;  7.32; 
8.49-50).
93 Origen’s predecessors made few attempts to explain the actual process of the Incarnation.  So, Kelly 
(1977), pp.145-153.
94 Sections 8.1-9.6.
95 On this, see Stead (1994), pp.  189-90.
96  I  cannot  accept  the  remarks  of de  Faye  (1923),  pp. 136-7  that  the  Greeks  were  used  to  stories  of 
incarnations  and  that  the  Eastern  Church  therefore  had  very  little  trouble  with  the  doctrine  of the 
Incarnation of Christ, de Faye seems to be confusing incarnation with theophany. Of course the Greeks 
were  very used to the former:  from Homer onwards,  their mythology was full of gods and goddesses 
appearing to men. But this is certainly not the same as God becoming man. Moreover, de Faye seems to 
have made the mistake of concentrating on the religion of the people rather than on the doctrines of the 
philosophers. It was the latter which shaped the theology of the Eastern Church.
146and hence somehow in possession of supernatural powers.97 Theoretically at least, pagan philosophers 
could  have  placed  Christ  in  this  category  and  ranked  him  alongside  such  luminaries  as  the  much 
discussed Apollonius of Tyre.98 In fact, however,  it seemed all too obvious that the story of the life of 
Christ recorded in the four Gospels offered very little to suggest that he was anything like a divine man. 
Contrasts between (what was seen as) the wretched life of Christ and (what was seen as) the glorious 
life of divine men became a topos of the anti-Christian polemic. The pagan apologists also revived the 
old  myths  of  divine  epiphanies  and  made  use  of  such  stories  as  further  ammunition  against  the 
Christians.  We  often  find  Christ  unfavourably  compared  with  Asklepius"  and  Dionysus.100  Christ 
might have performed a  few miracles,101  but  these were ridiculed as very small  fry indeed compared 
with the fantastic feats of the pagan heroes.102 The pagans also attacked the miracles of Christ as being 
inspired  by  evil  demons.  The  streets  and  market  places  of the  Eastern  Empire  were  full  of people 
levitating,  disappearing,  casting  out  demons  and  curing  the  sick;  it  was  easy  to  see  Christ  as  just 
another  of these  ‘wizards’.103  But by  far  the  most  worrying  aspect  of the  life  of Christ  and  the  one 
totally  unbecoming  a  divine  man  was  the  central  episode  of the  Passion.  It  was  a  great  help  to  the 
pagans to concentrate their attacks on the physical and mental suffering of Christ recorded in the four 
Gospels. Naturally, they ignore those episodes of his life, such as the Resurrection and the Ascension, 
which reveal the Saviour’s divine nature. The pagans preferred to emphasize the Agony in the Garden, 
the  Arraignment  before  Pilate  and,  most  importantly,  the  Crucifixion,  the  most  degrading  form  of 
execution.  For  pagan  critics,  the  Passion  revealed  Christ  as  weak,  pathetic  and  entirely  human. 
Dionysus  and  Apollonius,  who  found themselves  in very similar situations,  show how gods  ought to 
behave.  Dionysus,  imprisoned by Pentheus,  breaks  free to the accompaniment of an earthquake and a
97 Frede (1997), pp. 231-2, 235-6 and (1999), pp. 144-5.
98 Philostratus, the author of the Life of Apollonius of Tyre, was bom c.172. After the publication of the 
Life,  its hero became  immensely popular and attracted a huge  cult following.  For his  adoption by the 
pagan polemicists,  see  especially Hierocles.  Hierocles  dedicated a  long,  detailed work to proving  the 
superiority  of Apollonius  to  Christ.  The  work  survives  in  fragments  in  Eusebius  and Lactantius.  See
also Porphyry, Against the Christians (in Macarius Magnes Apocrit. 3).
99 So Julian the Apostate, Contra Gallienos 200A, 235B-C.
100 So Celsus, Contra Celsum 2.34, 3.22, 3.42, 8.41
101  Almost all the opponents of Christianity were willing to concede this.  It was an age when everyone
believed in miracles. On this, see Frede (1997), p.235 and Grant (1952).
102 Julian, Contra Gallienos 200A, compares Christ’s miracles with those of Asklepius.
103 This is exactly how Celsus deals with the miracles of Christ (Contra Celsum  1.6,  1.68,  1.71, 2.32  -  
passages cited by Chadwick (1953), p.102).  On this,  see Frede (1997), p.235.  It is interesting to note 
that the Christians used exactly the same argument to attack the pagans. Eusebius, for example, laughs 
at  the  miracles  of  Apollonius  as  paltry,  insignificant  and  inspired  by  evil  demons  {Against  the 
Followers of  Apollonius 4, 27; 31-35).
147blazing fire; he returns to his companions and wreaks a terrible vengeance on his enemy.104 Similarly, 
Apollonius  is  twice  imprisoned  and  twice  escapes  punishment.  The  first  time,  he  so  terrifies  the 
Emperor’s  minister  that he  is  acquitted  105  and  the  second  time  he  miraculously disappears  from the 
court-room.106  Celsus  explicitly  asks  why  Christ  did  not  do  the  same  as  Apollonius  (Contra  Celsum 
2.69).  Since gods and heroes cannot be arrested,  imprisoned or killed, the Passion was seized upon as 
obvious  and  indisputable  evidence  that Christ was  not divine:  the Gospels  describe  the wretched and 
cowardly life of a mere man.
Moreover, the Passion of Christ, as described in the four Gospels, was extremely hard to reconcile with 
the  popular  philosophical  tradition  of  the  ‘noble  death’.107  When  he  wrote  the  Phaedo,  Plato 
bequeathed  to  antiquity  an  immensely popular philosophical  ideal:  absolute  indifference  to pain  and 
death.  Stories  of the  most  amazing  fortitude  during the  most  appalling tortures became  an  important 
topos  of moral  philosophy.  Christian  Apologists  were  keen  to  place  Christ  within  this  category  of 
philosophical  ‘strong men’;  his  attitude  to death  is explicitly compared to that of Socrates.108 For the 
pagans,  however,  Christ’s  behaviour  in  Gethsemane  and  before  Pilate  showed  him  to  be  the  exact 
opposite of this popular heroic ideal.
I  believe  that  it  was  in  direct  response  to  these  pagan  jibes  that  Origen  developed  his  peculiar 
interpretation  of Christ’s  life  on  earth.  It  was  to  answer  the  likes  of Celsus  that  Origen  deemed  it 
necessary to concentrate  almost exclusively on the  Saviour’s divine  nature.  Any reference to Christ’s 
suffering  humanity  would  be  grist  to  the  pagans’  mill.  This  explains  why,  for  instance,  the  very 
moment of Christ’s death must become ‘the supreme manifestation of royal authority’ (Commentary on 
St.  John  19.16 (4)).109 We  shall  also see how Origen takes great pains  to  ‘Stoicize’  the Redeemer,  to
104 The  most  famous  version of the  story of Dionysus  is  Euripides’  Bacchae.  Passages are  quoted by 
Celsus (Contra Celsum 2.34) as a contrast to the life of Christ.
105 Life of Apollonius ofTrye 1A. Before the acquittal, he assures his companions that he will never be 
executed and magically breaks the chains binding his legs.
106 Life of Apollonius of Tyre 8.8.  Before  his  disappearance he tells Domitian:  “You will not kill me, 
since  I  tell you I am not mortal.” The  final end of the sage is definitely not an ordinary human death. 
Philostratus  tells  us  that his  hero  was  extremely old (perhaps  more  than  100),  but  still beautiful,  and 
(according to one story) that he simply disappeared from the earth (ibid.  8.29-30).
107  Nock  (1933),  pp. 194-196  discusses  the  topos  of philosophical  endurance,  with  illustrations  from 
Plato,  Horace  and  Epictetus.  Sterling  (2001)  provides  an  interesting  insight  into  the  difficulties  of 
reconciling the story of the Crucifixion with pagan philosophical ideals of the ‘noble death’.
108 See Frede (1997), p. 120 , (1999), pp. 141-3 and Sterling (2001), p.384.
109 This important phrase is discussed below, section 16.3.
148compare him favourably with the greatest heroes of the pagan philosophical tradition: he is in fact far
braver than Epictetus and Anaxarchus.110
4.3.
The  contemporary  emphasis  on  the  virtues  of  a0£ia  caused  even  more  problems  for  Christians.
Most philosophers saw the apathetic life as a moral ideal:  the wise man strove to free himself entirely 
from all passion and emotion.111  This was the constant state of God and must therefore be the aim of 
any man seeking the elusive  bpoioxng  tc d  0ecp. The difficulty for the Christians was that the Christ of
the Gospels, even God himself, did not seem to conform to this moral ideal. In the Old Testament, God 
is  said to be angry (Jeremiah  15.14),  regretful (1  Samuel  15.11),  vengeful and jealous (Exodus 20.5) 
and to love and pity his chosen people (Psalm 49.6). In the New Testament, we read that ‘God so loved 
the world that he sent his only Son to die  for us’  (1  John 49).  Christ, the Son of God,  is said to have 
been  sorrowful  (Matthew  26.38),  troubled  (John  13.21),  grieved  (John  11.33-5)  and  despairing 
(Matthew 27.46). The pagan apologists constantly ridiculed the Biblical depiction of God.112 They had 
already  rejected  the  absurd  anthropomorphism  of  their  traditional  myths.113  The  allegorizing  of 
religious mythology,  particularly stories  from Homer, began with the  Stoics, but was quickly adopted 
by other philosophical schools. It was particularly popular in Alexandria. Plotinus’ Ennead 3.5.2 is the 
perfect example of the re-interpretation of established religious texts: Aphrodite, Zeus and Kronos have 
become  allegories  of the  Plotinian  hypostases.114  To  the  pagans  it  seemed  laughable  that  Christians 
could  still  believe  that  God  experienced  emotions.  Moreover,  to  those  preaching  the  moral  value  of 
hnaQeia, it seemed all too obvious that Christ’s life on earth was that of a mere man - clearly God could 
not  experience  such  emotions  -  and  a  particularly  pathetic  man,  who  had  not  yet  learnt  to  curb  his 
passions and control his emotions.
In  response  to  this  criticism,  philosophically  minded  Christians  were  forced  into  a  radical  re­
interpretation  of the  Biblical  descriptions  of God  and  his  Son.  Clement  of Alexandria,  for  example,
110 Contra Celsum 7.53, discussed in section 12.4.
111 This way of life is usually associated with the Stoics, whose suppression of passion and emotion has 
become  proverbial.  But  it  was  also  an  important  ideal  for  the  Platonists:  the  Pheado  explicitly 
advocates  the  eradication  of  passion.  The  later  Academic  tradition  developed  the  idea:  Plotinus’ 
Ennead 3.6 is an extended commentary on this very topic. For a discussion, see Dillon (1983) and Fleet 
(1995).
112 See, for example, Contra Celsum 4.71; Julian the Apostate Contra Gallienos 155C-172A.
113 See Fedou (1993), pp. 247-8.
114 For a discussion of Plotinian allegory, see Hadot (1981). For a discussion of allegory in general, see 
Sandmel (1979), pp. 17-28, Stead (1994), pp. 143-4 and de Lang (1996), pp.248-50.
149makes the bold claim that God, Christ and the Apostles were entirely without passion and emotion and 
that  this  should  be  the  aim  of every  good  Christian.115  Origen  too  is  full  of praise  for  the  virtues 
of  <Jmd0£ia. He cannot accept that God the Father genuinely experienced the emotions ascribed to him
in the Bible. The Alexandrian is very ready to follow the pagans’  lead and allegorize any references to 
God’s  anger,  vengeance  and  jealousy.116  Moreover,  Origen  clearly  believes  that  the  best  kind  of 
Christian is the one who lives an apathetic life. Passion and emotion are rooted in and are a response to 
the physical world, particularly the physical body.  d7ia0£ia, by contrast,  is a purely intellectual virtue,
linked especially with right doctrine and a proper understanding of God.117 At various points,  Origen 
explicitly argues that the  suppression of emotion is the safest way to avoid temptation and sin.118 For 
some reason, critics have been slow to admit that Origen admired the apathetic life, but the evidence is
115 See Casey (1925), pp.61-63 and 87-88, Mozley (1926), pp. 54-9, Spanneut (1969), pp. 248-50, 292- 
3 and Sorabji (2000), pp. 386 -391. The locus classicus for this view is Stromateis 6.9.
116  See,  for  example,  de  Principiis  2.4.3-4  (including  the  famous  claim  deus  impassibilis  est)\  de 
Principiis 4.2.1; Homilies on Jeremiah  18.6; Homilies on Judges 2.4 and Contra Celsum  1.7 (last two 
cited in Crouzel (1956), p. 244). Mozley (1926), p.60 refers to Contra Celsum 4.71-2 in which Origen 
claims that it is impious to believe that God experienced human passions; he also cites in Num.  Horn.
23.2,  where  Origen  explicitly  denies  that God  can be  angry.  Edwards  (2002),  p.57  refers  to  Contra 
Celsum 4.72 as an explicit denial of the possibility of divine wrath.
There  is,  however,  one  much  discussed  passage  in  which  Origen  admits  that  God  the  Father 
experiences  the passio  charitatis  (in  Ezek.  Horn.  6.6).  Origen  feels  obliged  as  a  Christian  to  preach 
God’s love for his creation and to cite this love as the major motive for the Incarnation. But we must be 
very careful  how we  interpret Origen’s doctrine  of the  love  of God.  It  is  certainly not proof (Dewart 
(1976),  p.284)  that  Origen’s  theology was  basically  ‘Biblical’  and not  ‘philosophical’.  Stead (1994), 
p. 130 writes of this passage that  ‘Origen’s embarrassment is obvious’  and Nemesheygi (1960), pp.49- 
50  warns  against placing  too  much  emphasis  on  it.  Fedou  (1993),  pp.  248-50  rightly points  out  that 
Origen’s only concern is with love. Love is a special case, a unique kind of passion. To claim that God 
experiences  the  passio  charitatis  does  not  therefore  contradict  Origen’s  basic  premiss  that  God  is 
impassible.  God’s love  is simply an expression of his essential being.  Even Clement allowed God and 
the  Gnostics  to  love  one  another  (so,  Casey  (1925),  pp.87-88,  Mozley  (1926),  pp.58-9  and  Lot- 
Borodine (1932), pp.529-30). Sorabji (2000), pp.388-89 tells us that even some Stoics allowed the wise 
man to love.
117  This  is  an  important  argument  in  Origen’s  Selecta  in  Psalmos  (PG  12,  1085AB;  1205D;  1424C; 
1600C;  1628B;  1672C).
118 See, for example, Origen’s comments on David’s description of himself as the deaf man who hears 
not (Psalm 38.14).  Origen argues that d7 id0£ia  is the deafness which keeps us from hearing the words 
of the  tempter:  K(0(p6tr(<;  81  e o t i v   f|  dnd0£ia,  8i’  qv  o 6 k   qxouEv  auxdav  (Selecta  in  Psalmos  PG  12, 
1368C;  cf.  ibid.  1681C).  Similarly,  in the 9th  Homily on  Genesis,  Origen argues that passions  are the 
chains  with  which  the  devils  bind  us,  until  we  crucify the  body  and  its  desires  (PG  12,  214B).  The 
reader  is  also  directed  to  Origen’s  discussion  of the  ‘sins  of passion’  at  de Principiis  2.10.5:  amor, 
zelus,  livor,  ira,  tristitia.  See  also  Origen’s  description  of the  ideal  Christian  at  Commentary  on  St 
M atthew\5.\l:  dvSpcioc;  x a i  Sixaioc;  x a i  adxppaiv  x a i  e k to c ;  rcavxoi;  7td0oi><;  .  .  Xty(o  5£  xqv  b ta iv  
ETijv  drca0£iav  x a i  n a a a v   x t)v   dp£xf|v.  In  the  same  Commentary  Origen  cites  dnd0£ia  as  one  of the 
‘spiritual foods’ (Frag. 65).
150undeniable."9  Since  Origen clearly believed  that  dndGeia  was  the  goal  to  which  all  good Christians
strive,  he  must  also  believe  that  Christ,  the  moral  exemplum par  excellence,  was  entirely  free  of 
passion and emotion.  When we  look at Origen’s discussions of Christ’s  Last Hours,  we  shall see that 
this is certainly the case. Origen’s exegesis of the Agony in the Garden and of the Arraignment before 
Pilate are deliberate and obvious attempts to cast Christ in the guise of a Stoic sage, proverbially calm 
in the face of death.
4.4.
We conclude therefore that Origen was constantly aware of the criticisms of his pagan opponents. The 
desire to convince and to convert philosophically minded contemporaries inspires his whole theological 
enterprise.  Apology  may  not  always  be  explicit,  or  even  conscious,  but  it  remains  the  driving  force 
behind almost all Origen’s doctrines.  In the following section of this chapter, we shall see how Origen 
developed  a  soteriology  that  could  directly  appeal  to  the  pagan  intellectual.  Origen  makes  very  few 
references to the  significance of the Crucifixion,  and there are good apologetic reasons for this.  Most 
philosophers  would  have  been  repulsed  by  the  centrality  of  suffering  and  death  in  the  Christian 
religion.  Hence the soteriological significance of Origen’s Christ is primarily didactic. He is the leader 
of a  moral  reformation,  whose  mission  is  to  guide  souls back  to  the  Father.  This  is  a role  which  the 
pagans could readily accept.
ORIGEN’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE FALL AND OF REDEMPTION.
5.1.
In  a  recent  study,  Joseph  Trigg  has  suggested  that  Origen  does  not  have  a  fully  developed 
understanding of the Redemption, of the exact ways and means by which Christ redeemed the world.120 
What  is  particularly  important  for  us  is  the  fact  that  he  almost  completely  ignores  the  role  of the 
Saviour’s humanity in the  soteriological process.  Origen has  little comprehension of the  reasons  why
119 The Sources  Chretiennes editors of de Principiis Vol.  4, pp.60-61  try to argue that Origen veered 
more  towards  an Aristotelian  iiexpiOTidGeia  than a  full-blown drcdGEia.  They write:  “L’extreme rarete 
du vocabulaire de l’apathie dans son oeuvre -  les emplois origeniens se comptent sur les doigts d’une 
main -  contraste avec 1’usage continuel qu’en fait son maitre Clement.” It is patently incorrect to claim 
that Origen used the term rarely: the  TLG gives forty-six references. Sorabji (2000), p.387 accepts that 
Origen presented drcdGEia  as a moral  ideal,  but for some reason he  has  missed the  most obvious  and 
interesting discussions from the Selecta in Psalmos. Roldanus (1968), p.337 rightly sees that ‘le combat 
contre  le peche  est lie,  aux yeux d’Origene,  le  combat contre  les pathes -  ce  sont principalement les 
desirs  charnels.’  Lot-Borodine  (1932),  pp.531-2  also  recognizes  that  drcdGeia  was  a  moral  ideal  for 
Origen.
120 Trigg (1983), p. 100. Trigg restricts his comments to the de Principiis. I would go further and claim 
that Origen never provides a satisfactory explanation of the Redemption.
151the  Redeemer  need  be  a  suffering  Redeemer  or  why  Christ’s  death  on  the  Cross  was  the  central 
moment in the history of Salvation. Although Origen cannot deny the Biblical fact of the Passion, it is 
for  him  a  rather  embarrassing  episode  and  one  that  could  have  no  place  in  his  own  philosophical 
system.1 2 1   We shall also see how Origen rejects the popular Apologist doctrine, according to which the 
success  of salvation depends  upon the  identity of the  Saviour’s humanity with the humanity of those 
who are to be saved.122 For Origen, by contrast, it is the Saviour’s divinity that is the locus and centre 
of his salvific success. The nature of his humanity is irrelevant.
In the  following  section of this chapter,  we  shall  consider Origen’s doctrine(s) of the Redemption as 
developed  in his  major works.  It will  quickly become  apparent that,  for Origen,  the humanity of the 
Saviour has no direct salvific  imput:  it is  simply the medium through which the message is delivered. 
We  shall  also  see  how  Origen’s  understanding  of the  fall,  in particular  his  refusal  to  recognize  any 
weakness or handicaps characteristic of a fallen race, leaves very little room for any kind of Redeemer. 
Origen’s man saves himself; Christ simply points the way.
5.2.
In  the  de  Principiis,  Origen  rarely  mentions  Christ’s  death  and  never  considers  its  soteriological 
significance.  The rare references  to the Crucifixion are simply a nod to established orthodoxy,  what 
Origen calls the  ‘Apostolic doctrine.’123 In the preface to the de Principiis, Origen provides his readers 
with a brief overview of orthodox theology. This simple creed naturally includes the article that Christ 
was  crucified  (de Principiis, preface 4).  In the  Summary of the  work’s  most  important doctrines,  the 
Crucifixion  is  again mentioned,  but only in passing (de Principiis, 4.4.4).  What is  noticeably lacking 
from  the  de Principiis  is  any discussion  of the  purposes  of Christ’s  suffering  and  death.  What  did  it 
achieve  or  solve?  What  was  the  benefit  for  fallen  man?  Indeed,  in  this  exhaustive  analysis  of the 
fundamentals  (principia)  of  the  Christian  faith,  the  very  fact  of  the  Incarnation  is  sidelined  and 
marginalized.  Kelly points out that “the Incarnation as such really stands outside the logic of Origen’s 
system.”124  Hal  Koch  and  Marguerite  Harl  express  disappointment  that  the  chapter  devoted  to  the 
Incarnation  (de  Principiis  2.6)  provides  no  analysis  of the  aims,  purposes  and achievements  of God
1 2 1  See sections 4.2-4.3 for an explanation of this ‘embarrassment’.
122 Epitomized in Irenaeus’ famous claim that ‘the unassumed is the unhealed’.
123  For  a  discussion  of this,  see  Bennett  (1997),  pp. 195-6;  Le  Boulluec  (1985)  II,  p.441  and  Outler 
(1939), pp.212-221. See also the Introduction to Chapter 1.
124 Kelly (1977), p. 137. Even Danielou (1948), 259 admits that “La theorie de lTncamation tient peu de 
place  dans  l’oeuvre  d’Origene”,  but  c.f.  sections  5.7  and  6.1  for  an  overview  of Danielou’s  usual 
position.
152becoming man.125  The chapter is  simply a description of the process  of the  Incarnation -  how it was 
possible  for  God  to  assume  a  human  body  -   and  of the  end  result  -   the  relationship  between  the 
Saviour’s humanity and his divinity.
Furthermore,  the very notion of Redemption fits very ill with the overall  scheme of the de Principiis. 
The pivotal thesis of this work is the power and influence of the will for the salvation of souls. Even the 
devil could be saved, if only he wanted to be.126  Although God certainly provides a complex system of 
providential intervention to educate the soul and to encourage it to return to heaven,127 the fact remains 
that it is the individual himself who is the author of his own salvation. We are saved simply by wanting 
to  be  saved.  This  obviously  removes  the  necessity  for  a  Redeemer.128  In  the  de  Principiis,  Origen 
minimizes  the  significance  and  the  consequences  of  the  fall.  And  of  course,  by  minimizing  the 
significance  and the  consequences  of the  fall,  Origen undermines the  fundamental Christian belief in 
the  need  for  a  Redeemer.129  For  Origen,  man  could  have  managed  very  well  by  himself,  since  he 
suffers none of the handicaps traditionally associated with the fallen race.
For Origen, the fall can mean one of two things: either the fall of souls ffom pre-camate bliss or the fall 
of the  historical  Adam.  Perhaps  the  two  need  not  be  mutually  exclusive,  but  exactly  how  Origen 
connected them is a very difficult question to answer.130 In the de Principiis, Origen’s only concern is 
with the fall of souls.131  The fall of souls ffom heaven and their descent into the body and the material 
universe as the result of pre-camate sin is the central theme of the de Principiis. Mankind is therefore a 
fallen race  which exists only as the result  of sin.  But having said this,  it is very hard to pin point the
125 Koch (1932), p.63 and Harl (1957), p. 106.
126 For a further discussion of this, the comer-stone of Origen’s philosophical system, see section 8.2.
127 On the subject of God’s pedagogic providence, see especially Koch (1932).
128  de  Faye  (1931)  III,  p.213-15  has  recognized  the  fundamental  importance  of the  will  in  Origen’s 
explanation of salvation: “Dans la doctrine de notre theologien, le libre arbitre est un element essentiel. 
L’entite  rationelle  qui  de  chute  en  chute  est  devenue  un etre  humain,  a  failli parce qu’elle  l ’a  voulu. 
Elle ne se relevera pas sans qu’elle le veuille.  Elle choisira le bien, et c’est alors que commencera son 
retour a Dieu .  .  . ainsi, dans (la) relevement comme dans (la) chute, (7aj liberte joue le role principal” 
(my emphasis).  Hal Koch (1932), pp.75-6 similarly argues that the central importance of free will and 
pedagogic providence in Origen’s philosophy removes any need for Redemption: “Wenn es richtig ist, 
dass  die  zwei  Brennpunkte  in  der  Theologie  des  Origenes  der  Gedanke  an  eine  erzieherische 
Vorsehung und den ffeien Willen des Menshen sind, mocte man zu der Anschauung neigen, dass ihm 
Erolsungs- und Versohnungstheologie recht fern lagen.”
129 So, Holloway (2000b).
130 Bammell (1989), pp.68-9 attempts an explanation. She suggests that Origen believed that there were 
two falls, the fall of souls,  followed by the fall of man.  Pisi and Harl (cited in ibid, footnote 34) argue 
that the two are not connected and that they cannot easily be reconciled. But, as Bammell reminds us, 
Origen is not a dogmatic theologian.  He is very capable of airing two entirely different interpretations 
of the fall. For more on this, see section 6.1.
131  Williams  (1927),  pp.215-6  refers  to  de  Principiis  4.3.1,  where  Origen  ridicules  the  literal 
interpretation of the story of Adam and Eve: who is so stupid as to believe it?
153precise  consequences  of this  fall,  other  than  the  abandoning  of heaven  for  the  earth.  It  is  certainly 
wrong to cite the pre-camate fall as the cause of a universal sinful tendency.132  It is of course true that 
all  men  must  have  sinned  at  least  once  in  order  for  them to  exist  as  men,  but there  seems  to  be  no 
suggestion that this first sin somehow made further sinning more likely. It is abundantly clear that even 
fallen souls retain the liberty of indifference.133 That is to say, there is no bias towards sin as a result of 
the fall. Neither is there any hint that fallen souls have lost their knowledge of good and evil and their 
ability  to  distinguish  successfully between the  two.  For most theologians  of the  Early Church,  moral 
ignorance  was  the  major  characteristic  of fallen  man.134  Origen,  by  contrast,  emphasizes  again  and 
again that all men, as soon as they reach the age of reason, have the ability to distinguish good and evil, 
to choose the former and thereby be saved.135
At de Principiis 3.5.6, Origen does provide a brief discussion of the purposes of Christ’s life on earth. 
It is important that this  is not an explanation of the purposes of the Incarnation, of God’s assuming a 
human body,  but simply of God’s direct communication with man.  The task of the Saviour described 
here is basically the same as that of the ‘ministers, rulers and helpers’, those angels who are the agents 
and  instruments  of God’s providential government.  Origen believes that Christ’s salvific  mission was 
primarily didactic and exhortative. Christ came to teach and to encourage, but it is up to the individual 
whether or not he heed this teaching. Although Origen does admit that there was only one, the Creator 
himself,  who  was  able  to  restore  order  and  to  save  the  world  ffom  imminent  destruction,  the  fact 
remains  that  Christ’s  life  was  simply  an  intense  version  of  an  on-going  soteriological  process. 
Throughout  history,  God  has  sent  his  angels  to  deliver  the  message  of salvation;  now  he  sends  his 
Son.136
Various  scholars  claim  that  Origen  explained  the  soteriological  significance  of the  Incarnation  by 
arguing that the hypostatic union was the prototype and the guarantor of our own union with God. This 
idea was very popular with the Apologists.  Irenaeus is famous for claiming that God became man that 
man  might  become  God  and  that  the  unassumed  is  the  unhealed.137  This  explains  the  Apologists’
132 Williams (1927), p.217 agrees that in the de Principiis there is “no idea of an inherited bias towards 
evil.”
133 For references and a full discussion, see section 8.2.
134 See de Bruyn (1993), pp. 23 and 41.
135 See de Principiis 3.1.2; Contra Celsum  1.4, 8.52. This idea is central to the Commentary on Romans 
(PG  14  892A-894C  and  1014A-  1016B).  For a  full  discussion  of this  crucially important topic,  see 
section 5.6.
136 For more on this, see section 5.7.
137 For a discussion of this, see Lot-Borodine (1932), pp. 31-2.
154insistence that Christ’s humanity be exactly the same as ours.  According to Wiles, this precedence of 
soteriology explained and characterized all early Christology:  what happened to Christ will happen to 
us.  The  identity  of  Christ’s  nature  to  ours  was  thus  the  crucial  and  necessary  condition  for  our 
redemption.138
Fournier, in a detailed discussion of Origen’s doctrine of the Redemption, claims that “l’lncamation est 
le moment supreme de la Redemption, parce que l’humanite du Verbe rend seule possible la reunion de 
Dieu  et de  l’homme.”139 This passage  is  quoted by Nemeshegyi  in support of his  own thesis that the 
union of Christ’s humanity with the Logos is the precursor of our own deification. Specifically, he cites 
the  Logos’  absorption of the  soul of Christ140 as the  first stage of Redemption.141  Refoule agrees that 
the  importance  of  Origen’s  doctrine  of  the  soul  of  Christ  is  basically  soteriological:  “son  union 
mystique  au  Verbe  se  presente  necessairement  alors  comme  le  prototype  de  la  notre.”142  Marguerite 
Harl  claims  that the  Incarnation realized for the first time the union of a man with God,  a union that 
would later be imitated by every Christian soul.143
For all these scholars, the Incarnation -  the union of humanity with divinity -  was an extraordinary and 
supernatural  event.  Its  salvific  importance  is  thus explained as the raising of man,  exemplified in the 
man  Jesus,  above  and beyond his natural  state  and thus  enabling an otherwise  impossible union with 
God.  But while this might be a useful way of understanding the Christology of the Apologists and of 
later orthodox theologians, it is not the way that Origen understands the Incarnation. Throughout the de 
Principiis,  (especially  at  de  Principiis  1.6.2),  Origen  argues  that  salvation  is  simply  a  return  to  the 
beginning.  Souls participated in the Logos before the fall and will do so again. There is no suggestion 
that  salvation  involves  a  fundamental  change  in  the  nature  of created  souls  or that  it  is beyond  their 
normal capacities.  On the contrary, participation in the Logos is our natural state, the life  intended by 
God  when  he  first  created  souls  (de  Principiis  2.6.3).  Divine  intervention,  to  achieve  the  hitherto 
impossible,  is unnecessary.  As we have  already argued,  the de Principiis provides a coherent scheme
138  Wiles  (1969).  Lot-Borodine  (1932),  p.31-4  agrees  that  Irenaeus’  explanation  of the  Incarnation 
became the ‘nerve meme de la pensee patristique.’ He quotes extensively ffom the Fathers to prove his 
point. See section 9.4 for a discussion of Origen’s utter rejection of this central Patristic thesis.
139  Fournier,  Exposition  critique  des  idees  d ’Origene  sur  la  Redemption  (Strasbourg,  1890),  p. 10. 
Quoted in Nemeshegyi (1960), p. 156.
140 Described at de Principiis 2.6.  This crucial aspect of Origen’s Christology is discussed in sections 
8.1-9.6.
141 Nemeshegyi (1960), p.  164.
142 Refoule (1961), p.264.
143  Harl  (1957),  pp.204  and  259.  See  section  9.3  for  a  further  discussion  of this  point,  including 
quotations ffom other scholars.by which man  saves  himself.  It  is  not  the place  to  discuss  in  detail  Origen’s  doctrine  of the  soul  of 
Christ as developed at de Principiis 2.6.144  Suffice it to say that its significance is not soteriological in 
the sense of providing a salvific paradigm. The union of the soul of Christ with the Logos, or rather the 
transformation of the former into the latter, is not intended to be an imitable pattern of behaviour, nor is 
it the necessary precursor of our own deification. It is not the case, as Refoule and the others argue, that 
the final status of the soul of Christ is the status planned for the elect.145
5.3.
In the first few books of the  Commentary on St John, written at the same time as the de Principiis,146 
we  find  a  similar view of the  Incarnation.  The  redemptive  role  of Christ described  here  is basically 
pedagogic.  Christ came to earth, not to suffer and to die, but to teach. And, as Bicknell points out,  if 
Christ’s  salvific  function  is  reduced  to  this,  a  docetic  epiphany  would  do  just  as  well  as  an 
Incarnation.147 The assumption of a human body was just a way of communicating. To those unable to 
understand God as  God,  he  appeared as man.  God became man in providential condescension to our 
crippling  weakness.  In  deference  to  this,  God  veiled  himself with  a  human  body,  revealing  only  a 
‘stone  of the  mountain’  or a  ‘drop of myrrh’.148  It is  in the  first few books of the  Commentary on St 
John  that Origen develops  most  fully the  theory that the  Incarnation hides  and veils  God rather than 
reveals him.  What Origen will not accept is that the Incarnation had any intrinsic  importance or value 
(it  was  simply  the  means  to  an  end)  or  that  the  man  Jesus  revealed  the  true  nature  of God.  The 
assuming of human flesh was but a necessary and temporary disguise, a didactic tool.
The  figure of the Incarnated Redeemer is just the  first stage, the lowest rung on the ladder to the true 
understanding of God, a sop and a comfort to children and beginners.  The aim is that,  in due course, 
we  should  see  beyond  the  veil  of flesh and understand the  divinity which it concealed.  As they grow 
and leam, the catechumens will no longer need to imagine God as man: they will be able to understand 
God  as  God.149  At  Commentary  on  St.  John  2.2-3,  Origen  epitomizes  this  important  argument.  He
144 We do so in sections 8.1-9.6.
145  There  are two points here.  (1) That union with the Logos  is within the grasp of any rational soul; 
indeed  it  is  its  natural  state  and  (2)  that  the  kind  of union  enjoyed  by  the  soul  of Christ  is  entirely 
different  from  the  kind  of union  enjoyed  by  ordinary  souls.  These  points  are  discussed  in  detail  in 
sections 9.3-9.4.
146 For the chronology of Origen’s writings, see Harl (1957), pp. 379-386.
147 Bicknell (1950), p.58.
148 For these images, see section 1.3.
149 On this important topic, see Louth (1981), p.  65:  “So the  soul,  it seems, passes beyond faith in the 
Incarnation in its ascent to God. The Incarnation is only a stage.  It would seem that Origen’s Platonist 
presuppositions  here  are  proof against  the  impact  of the  Christian  doctrine  of the  Incarnation:  the
156categorizes  believers  according  to  intellectual  capacity,  according  to  their  different  ways  of 
understanding  God.150  At  a  very  low  level  are  those  who  look  no  further than  the  physical  and  the 
material, those who cling to Christ Incarnate.151
The doctrine of the Incarnation as providential accommodation is best understood within the context of 
Origen’s theory of the fenivoiai of Christ, one of the most important and most discussed aspects of his 
Christology.  In  the  first  two  books  of  the  Commentary  on  St  John,  Origen  analyses  the  various 
Christological  titles  and  shows  how  the  one  Logos  appears  under  a  variety  of  different  aspects 
(emvoiai).  The Logos accommodates himself to the different needs of different individuals. To some, 
he  appears  as  the  Good  Shepherd,  to  others  Truth,  Wisdom  or  Light.  Origen  distinguishes  those 
etuvoicu  that belong to Christ’s eternal and divine nature and those which are aspects of his humanity. 
While  it might be helpful for children and beginners to consider Christ according to his lower aspects 
(those  aspects  which describe  his  Incarnated nature),  the mature Christian concentrates on his eternal 
and divine aspects (God in himself, not merely in relation to man).  The divine  etuvowu  represent the 
true  and  eternal  nature  of the  Logos,  while  the  £7tivoiai  which  describe  Christ’s  human  nature  are 
temporary guises assumed for the sake of man.  Harl rightly draws attention to the distinction between 
Eivai  and  yiyv£o0ai:  the  Logos  is  always  Truth,  Wisdom  and  Life,  but  merely  becomes  the  Good
Shepherd,  the  Vine,  etc.152  The  former  describe  the  nature  of the  Logos  in  and  for  itself;  the  latter 
describe his relations to us (fipiv /rcpo<;  r||aaq).153
In the  Commentary on  St John, the Incarnation is seen as the  supreme example of the condescension 
and accommodation of the  Logos.  It is  itself an ETtivoia,  a way of revealing and a way of seeing.  At 
one  particular time  and  in one particular place,  the  Logos  chose  to  appear as  the man Jesus.  But the
Incarnation is not really central, but simply a preliminary stage.” See also Greer (1972), p.53  and von 
Hamack  (1896)  II,  p.369,  who  writes  that  “the  whole  humanity  of the  Redeemer  together  with  its 
history  finally disappears  from the  eyes  of the  perfect one.  What remains  is  the principal,  the  divine 
reason, which became known through Christ.”
150  Origen  is  at  heart  an  elitist.  Only  the  few  can  really  understand  God  in  himself.  The  majority 
( to  7iXf|0o<;)  are attached to the man, Jesus.  Lebreton (1923),  argues that Origen has developed a two 
tier Christianity, the faith of the simpliciores and the knowledge or wisdom of the perfect.
151 "ETEpoi  5£  oi  |ir|5£v  £i86x£<;  "Ei  pr)  Trjoouv  Xpioxov  xai  xouxov  Eoxaupcopfevov”,  xov  y£v6p£vov 
oapica  >.6yov  to   rcav  vopioavx£<;  Eivai  xou  X6you,  Xpioxov  Kaxa  oapica  pdvov  yivcooKouor  xoio
Gxov  86  Eoxi  to   7tXf|0o<;  xcov  7i£7tiox£UK6vai  vopi£op6vcov  (Commentary on St John 2.3).
152 Harl (1951), p. 122.
153  Harl  (1957),  pp.  118  and  130.  I  disagree,  however,  with  her  claim  that  the  distinction  between 
yiyv£o0ai  and dvai  ‘ne  doit pas  etre  comprise  chronologiquement’.  It  is  obviously the  case  that the 
Logos  ‘becomes’ the Good Shepherd etc. only at the Incarnation. Origen explicitly tells us that if there 
had been  no  sheep  to  guide,  the  Logos  would  not have been the  Good  Shepherd.  There  is  a  definite
157Incarnation does not represent nor reveal the true and eternal nature of the God. We are explicitly told 
that the  assuming  of flesh hid  Christ’s  divinity to  such  an  extent that it appeared  as  a  mere  shadow. 
Origen contrasts  the  Logos as he  is  in heaven -  faithful and true -  with his  incarnated state:  xupioc;
yap  Kara  xdv  Mcoota  Tuoxdq  xai  d>.r|0ivd<;-  xai  dXr|0ivd<;  yap  rcpd<;  dvxi8iaaxoXi)v  oxiag  xai  ximoi) 
tcai  eixdvog,  'enei  xoiouxo<;  6  e v   xq>  dvEcpydxi  oupavw  Xdyoq-  6  yap  £7ii  yf|<;  oi)  xoiouxoq  6noio<;  6
ev  oOpavco,  axe  yEvdfiEvoq oap^  xai 8ia oxiaq  xai xfmcov xai  Eixdvcov  XaXoupevo<;  (Commentary on 
St John 2.6 (4)).154
Origen goes on to say that the majority of believers are disciples of this  ‘shadow’:  only the select few 
are capable of understanding God as he really is.
That the assumption of a human body is only a temporary disguise, the necessary response to the needs 
of the moment, is reflected in Origen’s belief that the exalted Christ is divested of all corporeality.  He 
becomes what he once was, pure spirit,  one with the Logos.155 Having completed his earthly mission, 
having delivered the  salvific  message,  there  is no further need  for a human body.  The  Logos puts off 
his flesh and returns to his pristine state:  xou  A.dyoi)  £7iav£>.0dvxo<;  drco xou  O£oapKd)O0ai fecp’ o  ify   e v
dpxfl  rcpbq  xdv  0 e6 v  (Commentary  on  St John  1.7  (9)).156  The  man  Jesus  ceases  to  be  a  man  and 
becomes  the  Logos.  This  is  in  fact  Origen’s  definition  of the  Exaltation,  the  exalting  of Christ’s 
humanity  to  become  God:  f|  8£  UTtEpovj/oioK;  xou  oiou  xou  dvOpwrcoi),  y£vo|i£vr|  aux<i)  8o^daavxi  xdv
0eov  ev  xo)  fcauxou  0avdx(p,  auxr)  i^v,  xo  pr|K&xi  EXEpov  abxdv  Eivai  xoG  Xdyou  dAAa  xdv  aoxov  auxd) 
(Commentary on St John  32.25  (17)). As Harl puts it, “(Origene)  isole en quelque sorte l’lncamation 
comme un moment de la vie du Verbe.”157 This belief became one of the major issues of the Origenist 
controversy.  It seemed to  strike right at the heart of traditional Biblical Christology and to undermine 
the hope of the faithful in Christ’s constant intercession. There seems to be no recognition in Origen of 
the  need  for  the  continued  existence  of the  humanity  of Christ  if he  is  to  be  the  affective  mediator 
between  God  and  man.158  Yet,  beginning  with  Pamphilus  and  continuing  even  today,  Origen’s
chronological development. On this point, see Heine (1993), p.97: “the latter (yiyv£o0ai) implies a time 
of not being followed by being; the former (eivai) applies to a continuous state of being.”
154 Passage cited in Harl (1957), p.  197.
155 Hamack (1896), p. 371.
156 Passage discussed by Harl (1957), p. 198.
157 Harl (1957), p. 198.
158  St  Paul  insists  that our mediator with the  Father is  the  man  Jesus Christ (I Timothy 2.5).  On this 
point, see Forrest (2000), pp.  133-4.
158apologists  have  tried  to  defend  him and  to  assert his  orthodoxy on  this  point.159  But  it  seems  to  me 
indisputable  that  Origen  believed  the  exalted  Christ  to  be  entirely  incorporeal.  First,  there  is  ample 
evidence, not only ffom the Commentary on St John.160  Moreover, if the assuming of flesh is merely a 
pedagogic tool, there would be no need for its continued existence.1 6 1
5.4.
We find similar arguments in the Contra Celsum, where Origen claims that the purpose and aim of the 
Incarnation was to reveal theological truths and to offer moral guidance. As Harl points out, the Christ 
of the  Contra  Celsum  is presented as the  leader of a philosophical sect.162 This point is most clearly 
made at Contra Celsum 4.3. When Celsus explicitly asks what was the point of the Incarnation, Origen 
replies that it was to correct and convert.  Similarly, when Celsus asks how Christ saved men,  Origen 
replies that it was by teaching them (Contra Celsum 6.68). At Contra Celsum  1.56, Origen asserts that 
the  purpose  of  the  Incarnation  was  to  teach  the  way  that  leads  to  God 
(6v0pd)7ioi<;  djv  6  Xpioxoq  8i5a^p  tt) v  cp6pouoav  Ttpoq  0£ov  6Sov). Similarly, at Contra Celsum 3.34, 
Origen claims that he  ‘admires’  Jesus as the one who changed our way of thinking and taught us how 
to worship God. The Contra Celsum contains very little discussion of the soteriological significance of 
Christ’s  humanity,  specifically of his  suffering  and death.  As  we  shall  see when we  look at Origen’s 
descriptions  of the  Agony  and  the  Crucifixion,  his  main  aim  is  to  present  Christ  in the  guise  of the 
Stoic sage, proverbially calm in the face of death.163 Origen’s apologetic method in the Contra Celsum 
seems  to  be  a  constant,  rather petty  one-upmanship:  Christ  was  braver  than  Epictetus,  had  a  better 
theology  than  Plato  and  converted  more  people  than  Asklepius.  Origen  is  less  interested  in  the 
innovations of the  new religion than in its similarities to existing models.164 Christianity was not very 
different from its predecessors, but nevertheless vastly superior.
159 Pamphilius (.Apology 7, PG  17, 60IB) argues that Origen simply meant that Christ had ceased to be 
mortal,  subject  to  death  and  decay.  This  interpretation  is  followed  by  the  Sources  Chretiennes  and 
Patrologia Graeca editors of the Homilies on St Luke (ad. loc. in Luc.Horn. 29).
160  See  especially  Homilies  on  Jeremiah  17.5.  Commenting  on  the  verse  -   cursed be  the  man  that 
trusteth in man (Jeremiah  15.6) -  Origen reassures his congregation that Christ is no longer a man. He 
quotes  II Corinthians  5.16 as  Scriptural proof for this claim: yea,  though  we have known  Christ after 
the flesh, yet now henceforth  we know him  no more.  See also Homilies on St Luke 29,  where Origen 
tells us that tunc homo fuit, nunc autem homo cessavit.
161  We  also  point  out  that,  since  Origen  is  so  wary  of allowing  even  ordinary  humans  a  corporeal 
Resurrection, he is unlikely to preach the bodily Resurrection of Christ in any literal sense.
162 Harl (1957), p.307.
163 Sections  12.1-12.5;  16.1-16.3.
164 See chapter 1, section 1.2 on the apologetic advantages of this.
159Origen’s  failure  in the  Contra  Celsum  to  explain the  soteriological  significance  of the  Passion could 
perhaps be  explained  and excused by the  apologetic  nature  of the  work.  Pagan philosophers  such  as 
Celsus would not be interested in the minutiae of the doctrine of the Redemption and would have been 
repulsed  by  the  centrality  of suffering  and  death  within  that  process.  They  would  have  been  much 
more  likely  to  admire  an  intelligent  theologian,  a  moral  reformer,  a  brave  hero  submitting  with 
equanimity to the will of God and to the barbarism of his tormentors.  The Christ of the Contra Celsum 
fits  perfectly the  genre of the  work,  namely philosophical apologetic.165  But,  as we have  seen above, 
the  views  expressed  in the  Contra  Celsum  are repeated in works written for an exclusively Christian 
audience.  It is not simply in deference to a pagan readership that Origen marginalizes the Incarnation 
and the Crucifixion.
In  the  Contra  Celsum  Origen  repeats  the  idea  that  the  figure  of the  Incarnated  Redeemer  is just  a 
necessary  first stage,  which the mature  Christian no  longer needs.  At  Contra  Celsum  6.68,  we  again 
read that the Incarnation was the supreme example of the condescension of the Logos. To those unable 
to understand God as God, he appeared as a man and spoke as a man:  £y6v£xo oap^, iva xa>pr|0f| two 
xojv  pq  8uva|i6vcov  aoxov  PXetieiv  Ka0o  X6yo<;  fjv  xai  Ttpoq  0£ov  rjv  xai  0eo< ;  i'jv.  But,  as  in  the 
Commentary on St John, Origen insists that the aim and purpose of Christ’s life on earth was to lead 
men  to  the  contemplation of the  eternal  Logos,  the  Son  of God  as  he  was  before  the  assumption of 
human  flesh:  pcxa  xouxo  auxotit;  dvaPipdop  £iti  to  ISeT v  auxdv,  orccp  t )v  rcpiv  y£vr|Tai  odp^  (Contra
Celsum 6.68).166 The assuming of a body was simply the means of communicating with the fallen race. 
The majority of Christ’s contemporaries were unable to bear the full revelation of his divinity. It was to 
accommodate them that he appeared as the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53. Only Peter, James and John 
were capable of witnessing the Transfiguration -  the revelation of Christ’s true divinity.167 Alone of the 
disciples, these three were worthy of seeing God as God. As Harl points out in Origene et La Fonction 
Revelatrice du  Verbe Income, it is when he ceases to be a man, ceases to have a body, that Christ truly
165  On the  general  question of the  intended readership of Apologetic  literature,  see chapter  1,  section 
1.2. For a discussion of the intended readership of the Contra Celsum, see Frede (1999), pp. 152-4.
166  See  Contra  Celsum  4.15  for exactly the  same  arguments.  The assumption of flesh was  simply the 
‘first stage’; at the final stage, we shall be ‘lifted up’ to contemplate the Logos in its pristine state.
167  Contra  Celsum  2.64  and 4.16.  There  is  an  important moral  dimension to  this  argument.  It  is  not 
simply that most people are intellectually incapable of knowing God. They are morally incapable: their 
sins blind them and prevent them from seeing the Saviour’s full glory and full beauty. This is an aspect 
of  the  fundamental  Origenist  doctrine  of  the  correlation  between  knowledge  and  virtue:  only  the 
spiritually pure can know spiritual truths. On this, see Crouzel (1989), p. 189.
160reveals God.168  His  flesh is a veil hiding his true nature, preserving the mystery of God for the  select 
few, for those who are intellectually and morally capable of the supreme revelation.
Origen believes that Christ reveals himself gradually and progressively in response to the spiritual and 
intellectual development of the individual believer.  So at Contra Celsum 4.16, we read that the Logos 
assumes  different  forms  in  direct  correlation  to  our  differing  capabilities:  KaGcog  fcxdaxco  xwv  eig
eTnoxqpqv  dyop£v(ov  cpalvexai  6  X6yog,  dvdXoyov  xf|  e^ei  xou  eiaayop£vou  f|  kn  6Xtyov 
7tpoK67txovxo<;  f|  £7ti  rcXetov  f|  Kai  eyyug  rjSrj  yivop£vou  xqg  dpexqg  q  Kai  ev  dpexq  yeyevqp£vou. 
Harl suggests that this is an idea taken from pagan philosophy:  Platonism especially stressed the need 
for  an  active,  personal  quest  for  God,  a  step  by  step  discovery.169  The  important  point  is  that 
redemption (knowledge of God) is a personal, individual achievement. Everyone works in his own way 
and  at  his  own  pace.  Origen  does  not  like  the  idea  of  fallen  man  redeemed  en  masse  by  the 
Incarnation.170  God  becoming  man  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  story.  Salvation  requires  each 
individual  to  discover  for  himself the  reality  behind  the  disguise,  the  divinity behind  the  humanity. 
Some, Peter, James and John, are quick to do so. Others, the majority of believers, are still far off. This 
idea  is  very clearly stated at  Contra  Celsum  2.64,  as part of an exegesis of the Transfiguration.  This 
passage epitomizes Origen’s theory of the Redemption,  the way in which God accommodates himself 
to  the  wants,  needs  and  capacities  of individual  men.  This  is  the  doctrine  of the  em voiai,  which we 
have already met in the Commentary on St John:
o ’lqooug  etc;  djv  nXelova  xq  emvoiq.  rjv,  Kai'  xoig  pXdtouoiv  ot>x  bpolcog  rcaoiv  bpibpevog.  Kai  oxi 
p£v  xf| enivouji  rcXeiova i^v,  Kai oa<p£g £K xou ’ eycb d p i  q 68og  Kai q dXqGeia Kai q  Ccot) Kai xoi)  ’  eyeb 
eipi  6  apxo<;  Kai  xou  ’ eycb  eipi  q  0i>pa  Kai  aXXeov  pupicov.  oxi  8£  Kai  pXe7 r6pevo<;  oux  cooauxax; 
xoiq  P ^tiouoiv  eepaivexo,  h X X '  coq  excopouv oi pX^xcovxec;,  oaep^q eoxai  xoiq etpioxaoi, 8ia xi  p^XXcov 
pexapopcpouoGai  ev  xw  uvj/qXeo  opei  ou8^:  xo0< ;  6tioox6Xou<;  n&vxaq  napeiXqepev  dXXapdvouq  xov 
nSxpov  Kai  xov’IdtKCDpov  Kaixov’Itodvvqv,  ox;  p6vou<;  xcupouvxaq  xijv  x6xe  86^av  ahxou Getopqoai 
(Contra Celsum 2.64).1 7 1
168 Harl (1957), p.204.
169  Harl  (1957),  p.341.  Lyman  (1993),  pp.45  and  81  likewise  stresses  Origen’s  emphasis  upon 
individual, personal discoveries.
170 On this,  see Harl (1957), p.  131. Neither does he like the idea of a  ‘fallen race’.  For Origen, each 
individual  falls  in  his  own  particular  way  and  is  therefore  redeemed  in his  own particular  way.  See 
sections 5.5-5.6 for a discussion of Origen’s doctrine of the fall.
171  See also Contra Celsum 2.65  and 2.67. McGuckin (1985) writes very well on this subject of Christ 
accommodating himself to our varying needs. He stresses the soteriological inspiration behind Origen’s 
theory of the  ‘changing forms’  of Christ.  It is not,  as  it was for the Gnostics,  simply an expression of 
docetism.
1615.5.
As is perhaps to be expected, there is no discussion of the fall of Adam in the Contra Celsum: Origen’s 
pagan  readers  would  not  be  expected  to  bother  themselves  with  the  complexities  of  a  peculiarly 
Christian doctrine. Williams draws attention to Contra Celsum 4.40, where Origen explicitly rejects the 
literal interpretation of Genesis 3.172 Adam and Eve are not historical individuals, but metaphorical or 
mythological  exempla  of  the  universal  human  condition.  Even  the  fall  of  souls,  an  ubiquitous 
philosophical  common-place,  is  referred  to  only  obliquely  (Contra  Celsum  5.29,  5.55  and  7.50), 
without discussion of any handicaps  that might accompany this  fall.173  In the enormous  Commentary 
on St John  there  is only scant reference to this fundamental Christian doctrine.  The reason for this is 
surely to be found in the work’s polemical bias. Origen wrote the Commentary on St John primarily as 
a  refutation  of (his  interpretation  of)  Gnostic  determinism.174  In  this  context,  it  would  obviously  be 
wise  to  emphasize  the  freedom of the  will,  specifically the  liberty of indifference,  and to  ignore  the 
possibility  of a  lapsarian  bias  towards  evil.175  We  have  already  seen  how  references  to  the  fall  are 
noticeably lacking in the de Principiis.116
Indeed,  it  is  hard  to  find  any  mention  in  Origen  of the  permanent  consequences  of the  fall  of man. 
Although Adam certainly fell  and was certainly expelled ffom Paradise,  the implications for posterity 
are  left  very unclear.  In  the  Homilies  on  St Luke  and  the  Homilies  on  Leviticus  Origen  stresses  the 
importance of infant baptism,  but this  is not proof of his belief in original  sin.177 The discussions are 
rather a melange of Platonic wariness of the corporeal and Jewish fears of the ritually unclean.178 In his 
lengthy exegesis of the Presentation at the Temple (Luke 2.  23-4), Origen tells us that even Christ was 
in need of purification.  We can safely conclude therefore that Origen did not associate the congenital
172 Williams (1927), p.229.
173  It  should  perhaps  be  noted  that  in  the  pagan  version  of the  fall  of souls  (e.g.  Plato,  Phaedrus 
253CfT), there is no question of souls being permanently damaged by the primaeval fall.
174 Origen’s main opponent  in the  Commentary on  St John  is  the Valentinian,  Heracleon, whose own 
Commentary  is  extensively  quoted.  There  is  some  discussion  as  to  whether  Origen  has  really 
understood the complexities of Gnostic determinism (Dihle (1984), pp.  150-57).
175 See, for example, Commentary on St John 32.18(11). We discuss this and similar passages in detail 
in  section  8.2.  Williams  (1927), p.218  agrees  that Origen’s  insistence  on the autonomy of the will  is 
‘irreconcilable’ with the notion of an ‘a-priori inclination to wickedness.”
176 See section 5.2.
177 As Bigg (1886), pp. 202-3 claims. Passage cited (and rejected) by Bammell (1989), p. 92 n. 96.
178  So  Crouzel,  Fournier  and  Perichon  (1962),  p.219.  Williams  (1927),  p.224  suggests  that  Origen 
“seems for a long time to have experimented with the idea of ritual impurity, or ‘bad manna’, assumed 
by  the  Levitical  law  to  infect  the  physiological  process  of  conception  and  to  need  ‘expiation’.” 
Williams cites Homilies on Leviticus 8.3 in support of this.
162sordes  with sin:  neque enim  idipsum significant sordes atque peccata  (in  Luc.  Horn. 14.3).179  Indeed 
Origen  explicitly  states  that  babies  could  not  have  committed  sins.  Infant  baptism  was  not  to  be 
understood  as  a  purification  for  sins  that  had  actually  happened  and  was  not  therefore  a  genuine 
recognition of the effects of the fall. Origen’s argument here is in stark contrast to Augustine’s famous 
description  of selfish  and  greedy  babies  squabbling  over  their  nurse’s  milk  (Confessions  1.7).  For 
Origen the baptism of children was emphatically not the admission of a universal sinful tendency, nor 
the  recognition  of  the  vicious  legacy  of  Adam:  parvuli  baptizantur  in  remissionem  peccatorum. 
quorum peccatorum,  vel quo tempore peccaverunt? aut quo modo potest ulla lavacri in parvulis ratio 
subsistere,  nisi iuxta ilium sensum de quo paulo ante diximus -   'nullus mundus a sorde,  nec si unius 
diei quidem fuerit vita eius super terram ’? (in Luc. Horn. 14.5).180
In the twelfth Homily on Leviticus, Origen discusses the Jewish ritual of purification and compares it to 
the Christian practice of baptism. He notes how both Jews and Christians recognize that the newly bom 
are unclean: omnis qui ingreditur hunc mundum,  in quadam contaminatione effici dicitur. propter quod 
et  Scriptura  dicit  ‘nemo  mundus  a  sorde,  nec  si  unius  diei fuerit  vita  eius’  (in  Lev.  Horn. 12.4). 
However, as Borret rightly says, this  ‘souillure n’est pas identique au peche’.181 As in the Homilies on 
St  Luke,  Origen  identifies  the  sordes  of infants  as  simply  the  inevitable  consequence  of corporeal 
existence.  Indeed,  throughout  this  chapter,  Origen  refers  to  the  bodily process  of procreation  as  the 
cause or reason for ritual uncleanliness.182 What we must carefully note is the absence of any reference 
to  the  doctrine  of original  sin.  Infants  are  ‘unclean’  simply because  they  are  physical  creatures,  not 
because they have somehow inherited the stain of Adam’s sin. We also note how Origen continues the 
sermon with an allegorical interpretation of ‘birth stain’: we become contaminated when we sin.
Of course,  infant baptism was  far from common  in the  second and third centuries after Christ.  It was 
much  more  usual  at  this  date  for Christians  to be baptized as  adults.  Origen’s  various  discussions  of 
adult baptism reveal a similar reticence to recognize the hardships and handicaps of fallen man.183 The
179  Williams  (1927),  p.225  ad  loc.  writes  that  “Origen  carefully  distinguishes  ‘sordes’  from 
‘peccatum’.”  Crouzel,  Fournier  and  Perichon  (1962),  p.223  claim that the  ‘souillure’  described  here 
‘n’a rien de peccamineux.’ See also Bigg (1913), p.247 for the same point.
180 See Benoit (1994), p.  lvii:  “si l’Alexandrin atteste de maniere indiscutable l’existence du bapteme 
des touts petits enfants, on ne saurait faire de lui un representant de la doctrine du peche originel.”
1 8 1  Borret (1981), p.178. Bigg (1913), p.247 agrees.
182 hoc ipso ergo quod in vulva matris est positus et quod materiam corporis ab origine paterni seminis 
sumit,  in patre et in matre contaminatus did potest (in Lev. Horn. 12.4).
183 For most of this paragraph, we are dependent upon Benoit (1994), pp.liv-lv. He bases his argument 
upon a variety of key texts: Exhortation to Martyrdom  17 and 30; Homilies on Joshua 4.2; Homilies on 
Ezekiel 6.5; Homilies on Judges 5.6
163sacrament of baptism is certainly not seen as  the  necessary first stage,  the sine qua non  of the godly 
life.  It does not wash away the stain of original sin and prepare the Christian for a lifestyle conversion. 
On the contrary, Origen believes that it is the task of the individual believer, of his own accord, to fight 
sin and the devil and to break the vicious habits of the ‘old man’. It is only after this long struggle, after 
forty years of wandering in the wilderness,184 that the convert can be baptized.  Baptism is simply the 
public acknowledgement of a personal, private achievement.
5.6.
In the Commentary on Romans, Origen provides his fullest discussion of the fall and its consequences. 
The exegesis of Romans 5 fills the whole of the fifth book of the Commentary. It is unfortunate that the 
discussion  survives  only  in  Rufinus’  Latin  version,  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  his  translation 
represents the substance, albeit abbreviated, of the original.185 But before we examine the details of this 
particular book,  it  would  be  useful  to provide  a  brief overview  of some  of the  major themes  of the 
Commentary as a whole.
The Epistle to the Romans, like the Fourth Gospel, was a favourite text of the Gnostics. The Apostle’s 
famous  doctrine  of  predestination  was  seized  upon  as  the  perfect  Scriptural  proof  of  Gnostic 
determinism.  In  response  to  this  ‘misappropriation’  of the  Biblical  text,  Origen’s  Commentary  on 
Romans  took the  form of a detailed and  systematic  refutation of Gnostic  exegesis.186 It is within this 
specific polemical arena that Origen develops the  major themes of the  Commentary.  For example, he 
will  not accept the possibility of moral  ignorance.  The most interesting discussion of this  is Origen’s 
exegesis  of Romans  2.15,  Paul’s description of the righteous gentiles who show the work of the Law 
written  in  their hearts.  This  verse  is  interpreted as Biblical proof of the existence of a natural  law,  a 
moral  code  or  standard  inscribed  on  the  hearts  of all  men by  which they  instinctively know  what  is 
right and what is wrong:  haec lex in cordibus gentium scripta e st.  .  .  verbi causa,  ne homicidium,  ne 
adulterium faciant,  ne furentur,  ne falsum  testimonium  dicant,  et horum similia (in Rom.  2.9; PG  14,
184 Origen often interprets the wandering of the Jews as a typological metaphor for spiritual conversion. 
See Trigg (1983), p. 193  for a further discussion of Origen’s doctrine of adult baptism, particularly his 
symbolic use of the Crossing of the Jordan.
1   5 There would have been no need for Rufinus to alter the original. At this date, questions of original 
sin,  grace  etc.  were  legitimate  subjects  of  enquiry,  with  no  fixed  dogma.  Moreover,  Origen’s 
discussions  in the  Commentary on Romans were widely applauded by Rufinus’  readers as the perfect 
riposte  to  the  determinists  of the  day.  On  this,  see  Amacker  and  Junod  (2002),  pp.9-14  and  Bardy 
(1923), pp.90-92. It was not until Pelagius produced his own immensely controversial Commentary on 
Romans  that  Origen’s  views  became  suspect.  On  this  last  point,  see  de  Bruyn  (1993),  pp. 17-18, 
Bammell (1977), p. 426 and Souter (1922).
164892B).  This theory of moral conscience is repeated at Commentary on Romans 5.1  (PG  14,  1014 B), 
where Origen excuses a violent child on the grounds that he is not yet rational, i.e. has not yet reached 
the age of moral responsibility. The point  is  that no adult can claim that he did not know that he was 
sinning. For Origen, there is no such thing as moral ignorance, except in small children.
Armed with this detailed knowledge of virtue and vice, the individual is entirely free to choose one or 
the  other.  Origen’s  moral  system  is  strictly  voluntarist  in  the  sense  that  knowledge  of virtue  is  an 
insufficient cause of virtuous acts. There must be a subsequent act of will, a deliberate choice of what 
we know to be virtuous. In the Commentary on Romans, Origen cites the will of the rational soul as the 
locus  of moral  responsibility.  It is  this entirely free  will which decides whether to  follow the  vicious 
desires of the body or the virtuous desires of the spirit.187
It is surely with the Gnostics firmly in mind that Origen develops his exegesis of the Pauline doctrine 
of predestination. Throughout the Commentary on Romans, Origen insists that predestination is simply 
another term  for divine  foreknowledge.  It  is because,  and  only because,  God has  foreseen the  future 
virtue  of x  that  x  is  described  as  predestined  for  salvation.  For  example,  in  his  exegesis  of Paul’s 
description of himself as  ‘separated unto the Gospel of God’  (Romans  1.1),  Origen utterly rejects the 
implication of divine election.  Predestination is simply the recognition of God’s foreknowledge of our 
future acts (dvwxepa)  86  eoxi  xou  npoopiopou  f|  7tp6Yvcooi<;). The fact that these acts are freely chosen 
(6<p’  qjiiv)  is  paramount  (Commentary  on  Romans  1=  Philocalia  25.1-4).  When  he  discusses  the 
formidable  problem  of  weakness  of  will,  Origen  is  similarly  keen  to  stress  the  autonomy  of  the 
individual.  It  is  the  individual  himself who  is  the  cause  of both  his  sinful  habit  and  his  subsequent 
reform.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Origen  does  not  explain  weakness  of will  with  reference  to  our 
fallen nature: to do so would undermine our moral responsibility. It is for this same reason that Origen 
must also argue that it is the individual himself, and not the grace of God, who overcomes the habit of 
sin.  By  constant  effort,  practice  and  training,  anyone -   even  the  most hardened sinner -  can achieve 
virtue.188
186 In the Preface to the Commentary, Origen clearly states that his reason for writing was to refute the 
Gnostics. On this point, see Bammell (1977), p.424.
187  A  discussion  of this,  with  particular  reference  to  Origen’s  tricotomist  anthropology,  is  given  in 
section 8.2.
188  Origen  compares  the  achievement  of  virtue  with  the  achievement  of wisdom:  sed  tamen  cum 
voluntas  adfuerit,  adhibendus  est  labor,  studium,  sollicitudo,  vigiliae,  doctrina,  institutio;  et  vix 
aliquando  usu  longo  et  mediatione  continua  sapiens  efficitur.  iste  ergo  ab  initio  quidem  statim 
voluntatem habuit ut esset sapiens, sed non statim adfuerit ei opus sapientiae (Commentary on Romans 
6.9; PG  14,  1088B).
165From this brief overview of the Commentary on Romans it must be clear that Origen’s main aim was to 
prove to the Gnostics the power and influence of free will, specifically the liberty of indifference, and 
the  importance  of moral  responsibility.  The  Epistle must be rescued ffom the clutches of the heretics 
and  the  words  of the  Apostle  stripped  of all  negative  connotations.  Origen’s  exegesis  is  carefully 
crafted to suit this polemical agenda. His commentary on chapter 5, Paul’s description of the fallen race 
and the legacy of Adam’s sin, reveals a similar emphasis on individual autonomy.
Origen clearly believes  that Adam was  an historical individual and that he was the father of all men. 
We were all ‘in his loins’ when he sinned and hence were all expelled with him ffom Paradise.189 But it 
must be emphasized that for Origen our presence  in Adam was a purely physical presence and hence 
our  inheritance  ffom him  is  a  purely physical  inheritance,  namely mortality: per ipsum  (scil.  Adam) 
mors,  quae  ei  ex  praevaricatione  venerat,  consequenter  et  in  eos  pertransiit  qui  in  lumbis  eius 
habebantur (Commentary on Romans 5.1  = PG  14,  1010A).190 Origen also seems to accept the Pauline 
idea of the  ‘body of sin’.  Crouzel refers to a Greek ffagment of the Commentary on Romans,1 9 1   where 
Origen refers  the  uniqueness  of Christ’s  body to  the  fact that he  was  bom of a  Virgin.  We have  the 
same  passage preserved  in  Rufinus’  Latin version.  Origen points  out that Adam knew Eve  only post 
peccatum.  In  this  he  would  seem to  be  anticipating  the  Augustinian  idea  of ‘sin’  passed  on  via  the 
sexual act.192 Christ is exempt ffom this because he was bom of a Virgin. He came only in the likeness 
of sinful flesh (Romans 3.5).  What exactly Paul means here by the term  6|iolcoai<;  is not immediately
obvious;  the  verse  is  debated  even  today.  But  in  Origen’s  exegesis  the  stress  is  very  much  on  the 
difference  between  Christ’s  flesh  and  ours,  not  the  likeness.  Similar  remarks  are  made  in  the 
Commentary on  St Matthew (fragment  ll) .193  In  this  passage,  Origen  defines birth (y£vvr|ai<;)  as  the 
inheritance  of a  sinful  and passible  nature.  Christ’s birth nature  is without the usual  sinful tendencies 
because he was bom of a Virgin. Again, in the Homilies on Leviticus, it is the Virgin birth that exempts 
Christ  from  the  sordes  of ordinary  human  existence  (in  Lev.  Hom.MA).  Origen  seems  therefore  to
189 omnes homines qui in hoc mundo nascuntur,  et nati sunt,  in lumbis erant Adae,  cum adhuc esset in 
paradiso;  et  omnes  homines  cum  ipso  vel  in  ipso  expulsi  sunt  de paradiso,  cum  ipse  depulsus  est 
(Commentary on Romans 5.1  = PG  14,  1009D-1010A).
190  cf  Commentary  on  St.  John  1.20  (22)  and  13.34  for  the  idea  that  universal  mortality  is  the 
consequence of the fall. See also Commentary on St John, Fragments 45 and  120, where Origen argues 
that we inherit from Adam our physical constitution. These passages are referred to by Bammel (1994), 
p.90  but  she  has  missed  the  main point  that  Origen  does  not mention any kind of spiritual  or moral 
inheritance.
191 Journal of Theological Studies 14 (1912), p. 17. Passage discussed by Crouzel (1956), p. 137.
192 Williams (1927), p.304 notes Origen’s horror of the sexual act, epitomized in his self-castration.
193 Passage quoted in Bammel (1984), p.81
166believe that there was a real and important difference between the nature of Adam before and after the 
fall and that it was his fallen nature that was passed on to us. We inherit from him the ‘body of sin’ or 
‘sinful  flesh’.  But  what  does  this  mean  in  practical  terms?  Is  it  an  admission  of  a  universal  and 
unavoidable  propensity  to  sin?  I  do  not  think  so.  Although  we  may  have  to  struggle  with  worse 
temptations  that  the  unfallen  Adam,  we  are  still  entirely  free  and  perfectly  able  to  resist  these 
temptations.194 Origen admits that the body is the source of unclean desires,195 and this may well be the 
result  of the  fall,  but  this  belief  is  no  bar  to  his  basic  doctrine  of individual  freedom  and  moral 
responsibility.
Origen  does  not believe  that we  were  ‘spiritually’  present  in Adam,  in  the  sense  that we  inherit  our 
souls as well as our bodies from our first father. A traducianist theory would fit very ill with his overall 
theological  system.  Hence  Origen  does  not  believe  that  posterity  inherited  any  moral  or  spiritual 
defects from Adam.  There  is no suggestion that fallen man is biased towards evil.196 On the contrary, 
throughout Book  Five  of the  Commentary on  Romans,  Origen emphasizes that it is entirely up to the 
individual  whether he follow the example of Adam or the example of Christ. No one is automatically 
damned or automatically saved.197 This is an early echo of Pelagius’ controversial theory.198 We are all 
created  free  and  must  decide  our  own  moral  destiny:  per  delictum  morti  regnum  datur,  nec potest 
regnare in aliquo,  nisi ius regni accipiat ex delicto, per quod indicari videtur,  quod cum libera a Deo 
creata sit anima,  ipsa se in servitutem  redigat per delictum,  et velut chirographa immortalitatis suae, 
quae  a  creatore  suo  acciperat,  morti  tradat  (Commentary  on  Romans  5.2  =  PG  14,  1026C).  By 
insisting that every soul is created free - (libera a Deo creata) -  Origen is rejecting any suggestion that 
the  fallen  have  a  congenital  bias  towards  sin  and  evil.  Once  again  we  see  that  the  comer  stone  of
194 For more on Origen’s understanding of temptation, see sections  10.1-10.2.
195 See especially de Principiis 3.4, with our discussion at section 10.2.
196  Origen’s  position  can  be  usefully  compared  to  the  Augustinian  explanation  of  original  sin. 
According  to  Augustine,  mankind  was  present  in  Adam  spiritually  as  well  as  physically  when  he 
sinned.  It can therefore be said that we ourselves  sinned,  that we ourselves are responsible and hence 
that  we  ourselves  can  be  blamed  and  punished.  Any  fair  and  coherent  explanation  of original  sin  is 
necessarily  founded  upon  traducianism.  On  this,  see  Gilson  (1961),  p.51,  Williams  (1927),  p.237 
Bonner (1963), pp.371-73 and O’Daly (1983), pp. 190-91.
197  initium  quidem  vitae  datur  a  Christo,  non  invitis,  sed credentibus  et pervenitur ad perfectionem 
vitae  perfectione  virtutum,  sicut  et  in  mortem  dudum  praevaricationis  similitudine  et  vitiorum 
expletioneperventum est (Commentary on Romans 5.2 = PG 14,  1024D-1025A).
19  Consider also Origen’s discussions on ‘social heredity’, i.e. the doctrine that we are taught to sin by 
parents: et non tarn natura urgentur in mortem peccati quam disciplina {Commentary on Romans 5.2 = 
PG  14,  1024A).  This  is also a Pelagian doctrine,  another attempt at reconciling Paul’s doctrine of the 
fallen race with the freedom of the individual Christian. This point is found in Williams (1927), p.230.
167Origen’s anthropology is the freedom of each individual man. At one point, he even suggests that there
were perfect men, i.e. men without sin, before the Incarnation.199
5.7.
It  is  clear  therefore  that  Origen’s  tendency  is  to  reduce  the  significance  of  the  first  sin  and  the 
consequences  of the  fall.  He  advocates  a particularly optimistic  doctrine  of man  in his present  state. 
Although  the  theories  of the  mature  Augustine  are  without  precedent  in  the  Patristic  canon,  it  is 
nevertheless true to say that the Early Church as a whole had a clear and definite understanding of the 
limitations  and  disabilities  of fallen  man.200  With  such beliefs  as  a  foundation,  it could  voice  a  firm 
conviction  in  the  necessity  for  Redemption.  Origen’s  insistence  on  the  primacy  of man’s  free  will 
proves to be a major stumbling block to the full acceptance of traditional Christian doctrine.
If the above points are valid descriptions of Origen’s system, it is very hard to incorporate within it the 
need for Redemption.201  It is true that there are times when Origen hints at an intellectual consequence 
of the  fall,  that  man has  lost  his  understanding  of God  and that Christ’s  task is to re-educate him.202 
This  explains  Christ’s  role  as  teacher as  described  in the  Contra  Celsum  and the  Commentary on  St 
John.  But while this might go some way to explaining the need for some kind of intervention on the 
part  of God,  it  cannot  explain  the  need  for  a  human,  suffering  Redeemer.  Moreover,  Hal  Koch and 
Marguerite Harl are right to point out that the Logos’  teaching and instruction is an on-going process: 
the  Incarnation is certainly not the definitive soteriological solution. The Logos has been active in the 
world since the fall and will continue to be so until the final Apokatastasis.203 This point is most clearly 
made  at  Contra  Celsum  4.3-4,  where  Origen  compares  the  Incarnation  to  the  preaching  of  the 
patriarchs  and  prophets:  both  are  examples  of the  Logos  descending  to  earth  to  teach,  guide  and
199 Commentary on Romans PG  14,  1019AB.
200 On this, see de Bruyn (1993), pp. 23 and 41.
201  So,  de  Faye  (1923),  p.  230:  “On  peut  la  considerer  comme  une  sorte  d’annexe  de  sa  doctrine 
generate  du  salut.”  So,  too,  Koch  (1932),  p.  76:  “der  Gedanke  an  eine  Versohnung  kann  in  der 
Theologie des Origenes kein organisches Glied gebildet haben.”
202 On this, see Girod (1970), p.29.
203  The  main  thesis  of Koch’s  excellent  book  is  the  centrality  of pedagogic  providence  in  Origen’s 
system.  By quoting extensively from a variety of works,  Koch shows how the salvific  function of the 
Logos  is  constant  and  continual.  It  is  not  restricted  to  the  historical  fact  of the  Incarnation:  “Die 
Aufgabe des Logos vor, wahrend und nach der Inkamation ist in allem wesentlichen dieselbe: namlich 
als kluger Padogoge die Seelen zu locken” (Koch (1932), p.64.) For further discussion of this important 
doctrine, see also von Hamack (1896) II, pp.366-7, Jaeger (1968), pp.66-7, Danielou (1948), p.259 and 
Harl (1957), pp. 107-8.
168correct. The Incarnation is simply one aspect of a long series of providential revelations. As the Logos 
once spoke through the patriarchs and prophets, so he also spoke through the man Jesus.204 
We conclude that Origen allows no central role to the Incarnation in his explanation of the Redemption. 
The  fact  that  God  became  man,  that  he  assumed  a  human  body  and  a  human  soul,205  has  no  direct 
salvific significance.  It is merely the tool through which the epiphany is affected. This view is accepted 
by  many  eminent  Origenists.  Hal  Koch  writes  that  ‘die  Inkamation  an  sich  als  geschichtliche 
Begebenheit fur die spiritualisierende Auffassung Origenes’ keine entscheidende Rolle wie in anderen 
theologischen  System  spielt.’206  de  Faye  similarly  argues  that  ‘il  est  clair  que  dans  la  doctrine  de 
Redemption de notre theologien il n’y a pas de place bien marquee pour la mort sur la croix.’207 There 
are other scholars however who have challenged the conclusions of Koch and de Faye and who have 
tried  to  show  that  in  Origen’s  doctrine  of  the  Redemption  the  Cross  is  central  and  pivotal.  This 
interpretation  is  championed  by Crouzel,  Danielou  and de  Lubac.208  de  Lubac  ventures to  claim that 
‘peut-etre n’y a t-il point de verite sur laquelle Origene insiste davantage que la redemption par le sang 
de Jesus.’209 He concludes that, for Origen,  ‘La Croix est le symbol absolu.’210 How are we to deal with 
such a glaring difference of scholarly opinion?
6.1.
The  doctrine  of the  Redemption  is  the  perfect  example  of the  almost  insurmountable  difficulty  in 
interpreting  Origen.  He  constantly  contradicts  himself and  attempts  to  confine  him to  one  particular 
point of view are bound to fail.211 There is ample evidence for the views of Koch and de Faye and there 
is  ample  evidence  (soon  to  be  discussed)  for  the  views  of Crouzel,  Danielou and de  Lubac.  As  Harl 
points  out,  most  Origenists  have  a  particular  axe  to  grind:  they  highlight  texts  which  suit  their  own 
agenda  and  ignore  the  others.212  Koch  and  de  Faye  are  interested  in  seeing  Origen  as  an  influential 
conduit of Middle Platonic philosophy and in stressing his debt to particular pagan forebears. Crouzel, 
Danielou and de  Lubac  are all keen to present Origen as a faithful son of the Church and to advocate
204 Moreover, Origen insists that this education continues after death:  at de Principiis 2.11.6 and 3.8.9, 
he  describes  a  kind  of heavenly  university  in  which  souls  pass  through  various  levels  as  they  leam 
more and more.
205 Origen’s doctrine of the Saviour’s human soul is the subject of sections 8.1-9.6.
206 Koch (1932), p.63-4.
207 de Faye (1923), p.230.
208 Crouzel (1989), pp. 194-7, Danielou (1948), pp.264-269 and de Lubac (1950), pp.86-91.
209 de Lubac (1950), p.88.
210 de Lubac (1950), p.91.
2,1 Lyman (1993), p.44.
212 Harl (1957), pp.334-5.
169his  rehabilitation.213  It  is  these  specific  agendas  that  explain  the  different  emphases  of the  different 
scholars, de Lubac, for example, would not want to draw attention to the rather heterodox arguments of 
the de Principiis.  Similarly, de Faye would not quote from the Homilies in order to illustrate Origen’s 
familiarity with Platonic philosophy.
Before  we  continue  our  discussion  of Origen’s  atonement  theory  (theories),  it  would  be  useful  to 
consider why and how Origen felt able to present such conflicting views on such a fundamental topic. 
It should first be remembered that Origen is writing within the tradition of Platonic dialectic, a tradition 
which  eschewed  definite  conclusions  in  favour  of the  airing  of various  possibilities.214  Origen rarely 
presents  himself as  a  dogmatic  teacher  of Christian  doctrine.215  At  de  Principiis  3.6.9,  for  example, 
Origen invites his readers to muse on the problem of the Resurrection of the Body and choose between 
two  alternative  explanations.  Lyman  draws  our  attention  to  several  other  passages  in  which  Origen 
deals with a difficulty by airing several possible answers as topics for discussion.216 The de Principiis 
is similar in style to Plotinus’  Enneads and may likewise reflect genuine classroom discussions.217 It is 
also possible that Origen’s beliefs changed and developed over time. It is claimed, for example, that the 
famous  passage  ffom  the  Commentary on  Romans  (5.9)  in  which  Origen  denies  the possibility  of a 
second fall is a deliberate and conscious rejection of the arguments of the de Principiis.218 
Finally, and this is most important, it is well known that Origen suited his words to the intellectual and 
spiritual capacity of his readers. He understood how different people are helped and guided in different 
ways.  Like  the  Logos,  accommodating  himself  to  our  variant  needs219  and  like  God  the  Father 
meticulously  careful  of  the  peculiar  wants  of  individual  souls,220  the  Christian  teacher  must  be 
constantly  aware  of his  readership.221  Origen’s  role  model  is  St  Paul  who  was  always  aware  of the 
differing  needs  of his  diverse  flock.  The  Corinthians  are weak and  spiritually immature:  to them,  the
213  Harl  (1957),  pp.334-5.  Dillon  (1988),  p.215  makes  a  very  similar  point:  one’s  views  of Origen 
depend almost entirely upon the kinds  of texts  one chooses to highlight.  But Dillon warns against the 
black  and  white  characterisation  of Origen  as  either  a  conventional  Biblical  exegete  or  an  esoteric 
Middle-Platonic  philosopher.  He  believes  that  Origen’s  new  system  is  a  powerful  and  successful 
combination of the two.
214 For a further discussion of the dialectical nature of Origen’s writings,  including relevant quotations 
and references, see the Introduction to chapter 1.
215 So Bammell (1989), p. 83: “his aim was not to dogmatize.”
216 Lyman (1994), p. 44: de Principiis 2.3.7, 2.8.4 and 2.8.5.
217 For a discussion of the dialectical form of the Enneads, see Fleet (1995), pp.xvii-xviii.
218 So Molland (1932), p.162 and Otis (1958), p.103.
219 This is the doctrine of the etuvouu discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
220 See especially de Principiis 3.5.8
221  See Harl (1957), p. 259: “de meme que Jesus adapta son ensegnement aux capacites diverses de ses 
auditeurs, ainsi le predicateur chretien doit precher le Christ d’une maniere adaptee et progressive.”
170Apostle preaches  Christ crucified.  The  Ephesians  are much more advanced:  to  them, he preaches the 
higher, spiritual truths. Only Timothy and Luke are capable of receiving the greatest mysteries: to them 
alone St Paul reveals what he saw in the Third Heaven. This method, epitomized in Paul’s claim that he 
became all things to all men (1  Corinthians 9. 22), inspired Origen’s own teaching and explains why he 
felt able, even obliged, to present such a variety of arguments.222
It  also  explains  why  Origen  wrote  so  competently  in  such  a  wide  range  of different  genres.  The  de 
Principiis and the Commentary on St John were written for the intellectuals of the Church and it is here 
that we find the most complicated philosophies and the most daring theologies. In the Contra Celsum, a 
work of apologetics, Origen is constantly aware of the need to answer Celsus in his own terms, in ways 
that would make sense to a pagan philosopher. The depictions of Christ as a Stoic sage fit the present 
context perfectly, but would be very out of place in the Homilies. These sermons were written for the 
simpliciores  of the  Church  at  Alexandria  and  Caesarea.  Such people  were not to be  trusted  with the 
heady doctrines developed  in Origen’s early works223  and would not be  impressed by comparisons of 
Christ  to  Epictetus.  What  they needed  and  expected  was  moral  guidance,  supported by conventional 
exegesis.  In the Homilies, Origen appears as a simple presbyter urging his flock to mend their wicked 
ways.  The  Dialogue  with  Heraclides  is  different  again.  It  is  a  work  written  by  a  senior churchman, 
investigating  a  possible  heresy.224  Origen’s  remarks  are  disappointingly  bland  and  conventional; 
everything he says would have been immediately and obviously acceptable.
Origen is very sensitive to the intellectual and spiritual capacities of his readers; the different genres in 
which he wrote reflect the different needs of different groups. Interpretations of Origen thus depend, to 
a very large extent, on the particular works consulted. The arguments of the Homilies are very different 
from the  arguments  of the  de  Principiis  or the  Commentary on  St John.225  It seems to me  that those 
scholars who claim that Origen’s doctrine of the Redemption is Biblical in origin and that it takes full
222  For  a  discussion  of this  topic  and  for  quotations  from  pertinent  passages,  see  Lebreton  (1948), 
pp.943-4.
See  Byard  Bennett  (1997),  p. 196.  Bardy  (1923),  pp. 10  and  14  and  Trigg  (1981),  p.6  describe 
Origen’s  annoyance  at  Ambrose  for  publishing  the  de  Principiis:  such  ‘higher  truths’  were  not  for 
public  consumption.  At  Contra  Celsum  5.19,  Origen quotes the words of Tobit -  it is good to hide a 
king’ s mystery -  as Scriptural justification for this reticence.
224 For a discussion of the context and setting of the Dialogue, see Scherer (1960), pp. 16-24.
225  On  this  point,  see  Jaeger  (1968),  p. 129.  Jaeger  contrasts  the  different conclusions  reached by de 
Faye  and by Volker,  pointing out that the  latter based himself on the Homilies and so concluded that 
Origen was a conventional urban pastor.
171account of the salvific value of the Cross are relying too much on the Homilies, to the exclusion of the
more speculative and (arguably) more important works.226
7.1.
In  his  analysis  of Origen’s  doctrine  of the  Incarnation,  Crouzel  refers  to  an  interesting  work by  the 
Spanish  scholar  Jean  Alcain  that  purports  to  be  an  exhaustive  analysis  of Origen’s  doctrine  of the 
Redemption.227  Alcain  organizes  his  discussion  according  to  various  ‘models’  by  which  Origen 
attempts to explain the Redemption. Crouzel concludes that each of the models discussed depends upon 
the humanity of the Saviour for its efficacy.228
One of the most important models discussed by Crouzel is the ‘warrior model’, according to which the 
Redemption  is  presented  as  Christ’s  victory  over  the  devil  and  the  opposing powers.  Danielou  also 
emphasizes  this  scheme  and  argues  that  it  was  the  usual  way  for  the  Early  Church  to  explain  the 
Redemption.229  Christ’s  death  on  the  Cross  becomes,  paradoxically,  the  moment  of  his  greatest 
triumph. There is of course a Scriptural base for this kind of explanation (e.g. Colossians 2.14-15) and 
it is hardly surprising that we  find Origen,  the  Pauline scholar,  repeating the dictum.  One of Origen’s 
favourite images is of the devil being nailed to the Cross in Christ’s place. The Old Testament story of 
Joshua (' IriooOq in Greek) defeating the King of Ai and hanging him on a nearby tree becomes a type 
for Christ’s victory over the devil (in Jesu Nave Horn.  8.3).230 The idea of the Crucifixion as a military 
triumph  is  certainly  important  to  Origen,231  but  Crouzel  is  surely  wrong  to  refer  the  victory  to  the 
Saviour’s humanity.  It is Christ’s glorious divinity that crushes the devil and his minions, not the man 
on  the  Cross.232  As  we  argue  in  section  16.3,  Origen’s  descriptions  of  the  Crucified  Christ  are 
descriptions  of the  great  and  glorious  God,  acting  with  kingly  power  and  might.  The  pain  of the 
Passion  (physical  and  mental)  is  very  far  from  Origen’s  mind.  And  the  fact  of Christ’s  death -   the 
death of a suffering man -  is irrelevant. For Celsus and his fellows, the death of Christ was an obvious 
target  of ridicule.  As  an  apologist,  Origen  feels  obliged  to  turn  the  Crucifixion  into  a  scene  of final 
victory,  the definitive proof of the  Saviour's power and glory.  Christ’s death becomes the greatest of
226 The question of the importance and ‘value’  of Origen’s different works will be discussed in section
7.5.
227 Cautiverio y redencion del hombre en Origenes (Bilbao  1973).
228 Crouzel (1989), p. 194.
229 Danielou (1948), pp.264-7.
230 For the same image, see  in Lev. Horn. 9.5.
231  See also in Jesu Nave Horn.  1.1; in  Cant.  Horn.  2.11;  in Num.  Horn.  17.6 and  18.4;  in Ex.  Horn.  5 
and  11; Contra Celsum  1.60, Commentary on St Matthew 12.18 and 40.
172his miracles.  In the  Early Church,  the  figure of Christus  Triumphator was usually identified with the 
Resurrected or Exalted Christ. For Origen, even the man on the Cross is a victorious warrior. This is a 
deliberate attempt to refute any suggestion of humiliation or defeat, however momentary. In the words 
of Cadiou:  “le Christ souffirant d’Origene apparait d’abord comme le cavalier de l’Apocalypse, dresse 
sur  un  cheval  blanc,  symbol  de  la  verite  qui  repond  son  eclat,  les  vetements  tients  du  sang 
triomphal.”233  The  defeat  of the  devil  is  the  victory  of Christ’s  divinity.  In  this  explanation  of the 
Redemption, the Saviour’s humanity has (once again) no soteriological role to play.234 
Moreover, Christ’s triumph is certainly not the definitive defeat of the opposing powers. Origen insists 
that each one of us must fight a personal battle and win a personal victory. Once more we can detect a 
proto-Pelagian  slant  in Origen’s  soteriology:  Christ  is basically a  role  model,  an example  to  imitate. 
This idea comes across most clearly in the first of the Homilies on Joshua. Origen begins by comparing 
the victories of Joshua over the heathen to Christ’s victories over the opposing powers. But, as is usual 
in  his  sermons,  Origen’s  main aim  is  moral  exhortation.  He  urges  the  congregation to  imitate  Christ 
and, like him, defeat the devil. Famous Biblical verses which describe the triumph of Christ are applied 
to the individual Christian soul, winning its own personal victory:
denique  dum  nos  bellum  gerimus  adversus  inimicos  nostros,  at  colluctamur  adversus 
principatus et potestates et rectores tenebrarum harum, adversus spiritalia nequitiae in coelestibus, sol 
nobis iustitiae indesinenter assistit,  nec deserit unquam,  nec festinat occumbere,  quia ipse dixit  'Ecce 
ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus ’ non solum autem duplicatio die nobiscum est, sed omnibus diebus 
est usque ad consummationem saeculi,  donee et nos obtineamus adversarios nostros  ...  sunt quaedam 
adversarium potestatum  gentes  diabolicae,  adversum  quas  nobis  certamen geritur,  et agones  in  hac 
vita desudantur.  quantascunque ergo  ex his gentes pedibus nostris subdiderimus235 quantoscunque in
232  This  point  is explicit  in  Contra  Celsum  1.60:  Christ overthrows the  demons because of his divine 
power (if|q  £v  aoxw  0ei6ir|Toq).
233 Cadiou (1935), p.368. He refers explicitly to Commentary on St John 2.5 (4), where Origen actually 
quotes Revelations  19.11.
2 4 c.f.  Harl (1957), p.359:  “lorsqu’il rappelle la Croix, e’est comme signe de victoire  .  .  .  laissant les 
souffrances a l’homme .  .  . Origene songe surtout aux manifestations du Fils .  . . il s’interesse au Verbe 
incame, surtout dans les moments ou il cesse d’etre chair; bien loin d’etre un devot du Christ humilie, 
souffrant,  crucifie,  Origene  s’attache  a  suivre  le  Christ  se  revelent comme Dieu transfigure,  mourant 
sur le Croix, mais comme un triompheur, ressucitant.”
235 c.f. Hebrews  1.13 and 10.13, in which it is Christ who tramples his enemies under his feet.
173certamine vicerimus,  ipsorum regiones,  ipsorum provincias et regna,  Iesu nobis Domino distribuente, 
capiemus (in Iesu Nave Horn.  1.1 ).236
Origen  will  not  accept  that  Christ  won  the  victory  on  our  behalf.  This  would  undermine  his 
fundamental belief in the importance of individual autonomy. Origen’s sense of fair play and of the just 
application of praise and blame requires each individual to work out his own salvation and to fight his 
own  battles.237  Even  Crouzel  admits  as  much:  “This  victory  (scil.  Christ’s)  does  not  automatically 
ensure  our  freedom  and  that  is  a  point  that  must  always  be  kept  in  mind,  especially  when  reading 
Origen,  the theologian par excellence of free will.”238 If we ask what Christ’s victory over the  devils 
has actually achieved for individual sinners, the answer is “very little.” It is certainly not the case that 
the devils have lost their powers and no longer menace the world, de Principiis 3.6 is proof enough that 
Origen was very aware of the tremendous might and influence of the opposing powers and of the need 
for constant strength and vigilance.
7.2.
Another  ‘model’  discussed  by  Crouzel/Alcain  is  the  ritual  model.  Crouzel  provides  a  long  list  of 
references in which Origen supposedly explains the Redemption in terms of a ritual, with the crucified 
Christ playing the part of the definitive sin offering.  In the eighth Homily on  Genesis, we are provided 
with  a  typological  exegesis  of the  sacrifice  of Isaac.  Christ  appears  as  both  Abraham  and  the  ram 
sacrificed  in Isaac’s place,  i.e.  both priest and victim (in  Gen.  Horn.  8.9).  But there  is no analysis of 
exactly how Christ, as the Lamb of God, takes away the sin of the world, or what the sacrifice actually 
achieves.  The  ritual  model  is  also  used  in  the  Homilies  on  Leviticus.  In  the  ninth  Homily,  Origen 
attempts a Christianization of the Jewish Festival  of Yom Kippur.  Christ is the true High Priest,  who 
entered the Holy of Holies (Heaven) on the true Day of Atonement, when he ascended to his Father to 
propitiate him.  Christ is also identified with the man appointed to drive the scapegoat (the devil)  into 
the wilderness (hell) (in Lev.  Horn.  9.5). But, in his usual homiletic style, Origen concludes by warning 
his congregation of the need for moral virtue. Christ intercedes only for those who deserve his prayers, 
for those who pray and fast and meditate  on the Gospel.  He does not pray for sinners,  for those who
236 c.f.  in Ex.  Horn. 11. Once again, it is the individual believer who must win his own victory over the 
Devil. God will not fight our battles for us.
237  See  Harl  (1957),  p.295:  “La  Redemption  se  presente  done  comme  une  victoire  du  Christ,  que  le 
Chretien put desormais reproduire . . . donner aux esclaves le courage de se liberer eux memes.”
238 Crouzel (1989), p. 195.
174have followed the scapegoat into the Wilderness.239  Once again, the onus is on the individual to work 
out his own salvation.  It should also be noted that in this passage, there is no mention of Christ as the 
sacrifice, only as the priest. Christ’s salvific  importance lies in his petitioning of the Father, not in his 
death on the Cross.
In the Commentary on St. John Origen returns to the theme of the Lamb of God and provides us with a 
more detailed discussion. At Commentary on St. John  1.32 (37), in his famous overview of the various 
Christological titles,  Origen considers John the Baptist’s words -  Behold the Lamb of God that takes 
away  the  sin  of the  world  (John  1.29).  Christ’s  death  is  then  presented  as  a  purification  and  as  a 
medicine  against  the  opposing  powers:  oito)< ;  xqj  Bavdtcp  auxou  f||iei<;  ndvzec,
Ka0ap0d>|i£v,  dva8i8op£vco  xpdrcov  (pappdKou  'em  xaq  dvxiK£iji£vaq  £V£py£la.  But  the  ritual  model 
soon  becomes  the  warrior  model  as  Origen turns  to  discuss  Christ’s  battles  with  the  devil.  Christ  is 
depicted as fighting against those powers who wage a continual war against the human race. The fight 
will not end until he has trampled all his enemies under his feet. An important point to note is Origen’s 
insistence  that  this  is  an  on-going  process.  The  Crucifixion  did  not  win  the  war.  Once  again,  the 
significance of the  Incarnation is worryingly reduced.  It is but one small part of a complex scheme of 
providential  intervention.  Origen draws attention to the fact that John spoke in the present tense. This 
shows that the Lamb of God is constantly taking away the sins of the world:
6 ’Icodvvr|q  8eikv6<;  auxdv  cppoiv-  T8e  6  dpvog  xoi)  0£oC  6  alpcov  xi)v  dpapxiav  xoO  Kdapoo- 
ouxi  o' p£kA.(Dv p£v  aip£iv  ouxi 6&  xai  aipcov  p8r|,  xai obxi b anaq p£v ouxi 86  K«t aipcov exi. xo yap 
alpciv  £V£py£i  £iti  fevoq  feicdaxou  xcov  ev  xco  k6o|ico,  ecjq  dixo  ixavxoq  xoi)  k6o|iod  dcpaip£0fi 
p  dpapxia  (Commentary on St John  1.32 (37)).
At  Commentary on  St.  John  6.51-55 (32-37),  Origen provides his  fullest discussion of the Johannine 
formula. He repeats the idea of the Homilies on Genesis that Christ is both High Priest and Victim. His 
divine nature sacrifices his human nature.240 Origen must at all costs avoid the inference that Christ was 
simply the passive sacrifice. He quotes one of his favourite Biblical verses -  No man taketh  (my soul) 
from  me.  I have power to  lay it down  and I have power to  take it again  (John  10.18) -  to prove the 
point.  The  voluntary  nature  of Christ’s  death  is  extremely  important  to  Origen;  in  one  passage  he
239 non enim exorat pro his,  qui in sortem veniunt eius hirci,  qui emittitur in desertum. pro illis exorat 
tantum,  qui sunt sors Domini,  qui eum pro foribus  expectant,  qui non  recedunt a  templo,  ieiuniis  et 
orationibus vacantes (in Lev. Horn. 9.5).
240'o  8£  upooayaydiv  xouxov  xov  dpvov  £ni  xt) v  0uolav  6   ev  xco  dv0pcb7t(p  fjv  0 e6<;,  p£ya<;  dpxiepe^ 
(Commentary on St John 6.53 (35)).
175explicitly states that Christ killed himself.241 Christ on the Cross is not an agonized, dying man, but the 
omnipotent God calmly deciding the exact moment to release his  soul  from his body.  For Origen,  it 
would be an insult to the majesty of the Redeemer to suggest that the Crucifixion caused Christ’s death. 
It was Christ himself, as both Priest and Victim, who engineered the whole Passion -  from the arrest in 
Gethsemane to the moment of his death.242
Origen goes on to list the various ways in which the Lamb of God can be said to ‘take away the sin of 
the world’:
1.  He cancels our debts by his blood.243
2.  He purifies heaven and earth.244
3.  He removes all trace of past sin.245
4.  He defeats the opposing powers.246
We can therefore have confidence, because we know that the world has been vanquished:
Kai Oappeiv yoi>v  0Xifk)|i£voi  ev  xco  Kdopco  8i8aoK6|ie0a, xijv aixiav  xou  Qappeiv pavOavovxec; xauxqv 
etvai, xo vevncr|o0ai  xov  xbopov  Kai  8r|Xov6xi  imoxexdx0ai  xa> viKijoavxi  ai>x6v (Commentary on St 
John 6.55 (37)).
These chapters could perhaps support the conclusions of Crouzel, Danielou and de Lubac that Origen 
did  find a place  for the  Cross  in his  theory of the  Redemption.  But  against this,  it must be  said that 
Origen’s  comments  are  forced upon him by the  words of the  Gospel.  As  a meticulous exegete,  he  is 
obliged to comment in detail on every verse. Moreover, his remarks in these chapters hardly constitute 
a  coherent  theory  of the  soteriological  significance  of the  Crucifixion.  They are basically a  cobbling 
together  of  various  Pauline  ideas,  with  no  attempt  to  explain  the  exact  processes  involved.  For 
example, what does it mean to say that Christ has  ‘cancelled our debt’? To whom was the debt owed? 
How was it cancelled? Why did Christ cancel it, and not one of those actually indebted?
At Commentary on St. John  10.16-17 (13) Origen takes a final look at the figure of the Paschal Lamb, 
but offers a very different explanation.  His comments form part of a detailed discussion of the Jewish 
festival of the Passover. The basic thrust of the exegesis is that the rites and rituals described in the Old
241 Commentary on St John  19.16(4).
242 For a detailed discussion of this important subject, see sections 16.1-16.3.
243 Commentary on St John 6.53 (35);  ibid. 6.55 (37).
244 ibid. 6.53 (35).
245 ibid. 6.55 (37).
246  ibid.  6.55  (37).  This  ‘warrior model’  is  repeated  a  few  lines  below,  where  Christ  appears  as  the 
conquering hero (ibid. 6.55 (37)).
176Testament are symbols and types of spiritual truths. The Passover must be understood allegorically, as 
pointing  to  some  fundamental  Christian  reality.  The  most  obvious  and  most  popular  typological 
interpretation  of  the  Passover  was  to  see  the  Paschal  Lamb  as  the  Crucified  Christ  making  the 
definitive atonement for the  sins of the world.  Origen does refer, briefly,  to this  idea,247 but his main 
point  is  to see  the  Lamb  of God as the Word of God in the  literal sense,  i.e.  as the writings of Holy 
Scripture.  As  the  Hebrews  were  commanded to  eat  the  slaughtered  lamb,  so  Christians  must eat  the 
Lamb of God,  i.e.  study Scripture. This is the path to salvation.  Origen explains the Lord’s command 
that the  Lamb be  roasted with fire (Exodus  12.9)  as  meaning  that the  Bible  must not be  interpreted 
literally -  ‘raw’ -  but must be ‘cooked’ by the fire of the enquiring mind seeking the spiritual truths.  It 
is important that Origen does not understand the ‘eating’ of the Lamb of God in a sacramental sense, as 
referring to the Eucharist.  In keeping with the  spirituality of his overall theology, Origen places very 
little  emphasis  on  the  physical  act  of  communion.  While  such  motions  might  be  of  use  to  the 
simpliciores, the mature Christian needs only the spiritual Eucharist -  the study of scripture.248 
If readers  of the  Commentary  on  St John  expected  a  Christian  exegesis  of the  Passover  that  saw 
Christ’s  death  upon  the  Cross  as  the  definitive  sin-offering,  they  would  be  severely  disappointed. 
Origen’s  Christ does  take  away the sin of the  world, but the Crucifixion is  certainly not the  defining 
moment in this process. The Word of God is constantly at work and it is through a gradual process of 
education  and  enlightenment  that  individuals  come  to  salvation.  Origen’s  main  emphasis  at 
Commentary on  St John  10.16-17  (13)  is  on the  educative  role  of the  Logos, particularly the  way in 
which he communicates with man through the medium of Scripture.
7.4.
247 Commentary on St John  10.17 (13).
248  Stone  (1909),  pp.26-8  provides  a  useful  overview  of  Origen’s  doctrine  of  the  Eucharist.  He 
concludes  that,  for  Origen,  the  eating  of the  flesh  of Christ  almost  invariably  meant  the  study  of 
Scripture.  At  Commentary  on  St John  32.24  (16),  Origen  argues  that,  although  the  physical  act  of 
communion might be useful to the simple, those capable should eat the Word of God ‘spiritually’, i.e. 
study the Bible (nepi  xoi)  xpocpipou  xf|<;  6Xr|0eiaq  X6you). Danielou (1944) discusses this topic in great 
detail.  He concludes:  “Nous ne pouvons pas ne penser, en lisant ces textes, a l’opposition qu’Origene 
faisant,  a propos de Paque,  entre  la foule,  qui a besoin de signes sensibles,  et les spirituels,  qui n’ont 
besoin que  de  la  Paque  spirituelle.  Le  culte  visible  et des  sacraments  semblent necessaires  seulement 
pour  les  simples.  II  y  a  une  affirmation claire  de  la  superiority  de  la  manducation  spirituelle.  II  faut 
noter,  a ce sujet,  que pour Origene, le pain est un symbole du Logos” (p.77). Danielou compares this 
attitude to the Eucharist to Origen’s general tendency to ignore the significance of the historical Christ 
and to reject the literal interpretation of the Bible.  Origen’s whole theological enterprise is to find the 
spiritual truths hidden behind the physical symbols. While the Incarnated Christ, the act of Communion 
and the literal reading of the Bible might be of use to children and recent converts, the mature Christian 
has  passed far beyond  such banalities  (pp.  260-261).  I  find myself in full  agreement with Danielou’s 
remarks here.
177One final ‘model’ used by Origen to explain the Redemption is the mercantile model. According to this 
model, Christ buys us back (literally ‘redeems’ us) from the devil. This is of course a good Scriptural 
metaphor  (Mark  10.45,  Colossians  1.14,  1   Peter  1.18-19,  Ephesians  1.7).  Origen  often  argues  that 
Christ’s blood was the ransom paid to the devil  in return for the captive souls.249 This explanation of 
the  Redemption would indeed seem to hinge upon the humanity of the Saviour,  specifically his death 
upon the Cross.  But the theory involves a worrying number of unsolved problems.  First and foremost 
amongst these is the question why God would ever have made such a pact with the devil. Could he not 
simply have  snatched the  souls back, with the power and might of his divinity? The Apologists,  who 
first  elaborated  the  ransom  theory,  argued  that  the justice  of God  demanded  that  he  act  fairly  even 
towards his greatest enemy.  As the devil did not capture man by brute force -  the first sin was freely 
chosen -  so God must not redeem man by brute force.250 Yet this idea of fair play would have meant 
very little to Origen, for whom the deception of the devil was axiomatic.251
The  most  important  deception  of the  devil  is  described  at  Commentary  on  St Matthew  16.8,  where 
Origen suggests that the ransom promised to the devil was Christ’s human soul.  In return for this, the 
devil had agreed to release  the  souls of fallen man.  Of course the ransom will not be paid.  The devil 
was a fool to think that he would ever be able to keep hold of such a soul:
xivi  8£  e8o)K£  x t)v  yi)X*)v  aOxou  X.uxpov  dvxi  rtoXXwv;  o  ou  yap  8i)  xco  0£(p-  pqxi  oijv 
xco  7iovr|p<i);  ouxoq  yap  £tcpdx£i  qiicov,  £co<;  8o0f|  xo  im£p  qptov  auxcp  A.uxpov  f|  xoi>’Ir|aou 
&7taxr|06vxi  coq  8uvap£vcp  at>xf|<;  KupiEoaai  Kai  oOx  bpcovxi  oxi  oi)  cp£p£i  xijv  £ni  xco  xax6x£iv  auxqv 
(Jaoavov (Commentary on St Matthew 16.8).
The episode concludes with the triumphant soul of Christ leading the kidnapped souls out of hell. The 
devil loses both the ransom and the booty, because he has failed to understand the peculiar nature of the 
soul of Christ. The crux of this story is that Christ’s soul was not the soul of an ordinary human. Once 
again, we see Origen’s insistence that the Saviour’s divinity be the lynch-pin of the redemptive process. 
This ransom theory is not a fair exchange between two consenting parties. Christ’s descent into hell, as
249 in Ex. Horn. 6.9; Commentary on St John 6.53 (35); Commentary on Romans 2.13.
250 On the Apologists, see Grenstead (1920), pp.36-7, 88-90. Later writers who use the theory similarly 
emphasize  God’s  fair  dealings  with the  devil  (ibid.  pp.  44-49).  On the  general  subject of the  devil’s 
rights, see Williams (1927), pp.292-4.
251 See section 10.5.
178described in the Commentary on St Matthew, is a violent storming of the enemy camp and a snatching
back of hostages. We are back to the warrior model.252
7.5.
While  it  might  be  possible  for  Alcain,  Crouzel,  Danielou  and  de  Lubac  to  wade  through  the  whole 
Origenian  corpus  and  pick  out  every  reference,  however  small,  to  the  role  of the  Crucifixion  in  the 
process of Redemption,  it remains the case that for Origen this is not the definitive salvific event.  He 
might  refer,  from time  to  time,  to  standard  Biblical  explanations  of the  Redemption,  but  these  are 
merely passing comments; they do not constitute a satisfactory theology of cur deus homo. Indeed, the 
very fact that Origen offers his readers so many different  ‘models’  would seem to suggest that he has 
not fully understood the exact ways and means by which Christ redeemed the world.253 When Origen 
does offer a traditional explanation, it is usually an exegetical necessity, a response forced upon him by 
the  words of Scripture.254 A congregation listening to a Homily on the binding of Isaac would expect 
the standard typological reading.
In  his  major  philosophical  works,  the  de  Principiis,  the  Contra  Celsum  and  the  Commentary  on  St 
John,  Origen  has  very  little  to  say  about  the  Cross.  It  is  in  the  Homilies,  preached  before  the 
simpliciores  of the  Church,  that  we  find  most  of the  references  to  the  soteriological  function  of the 
Crucifixion, de Lubac has clearly read, in detail, the whole of Origen’s oeuvre, but he has failed to note 
that  the  evidence  for his  claim that the  Cross  is  the  ‘symbol  absolu’  comes  almost entirely from the 
Homilies. This is Origen’s message to simple believers, and it would be useful to them as milk is useful 
to babies.255 Only the philosophically astute could be trusted with the theories of the de Principiis and 
the Commentary on St John. And I believe that it is here that we find the true Origen. These are works 
written  for  men  who  have  achieved  the  Origenist  ideal:  mature,  philosophically  intelligent  believers 
who  have passed beyond the belief in Christ crucified and who are  capable  of understanding God as 
God.  The theological system developed in these works has no place for the central Christian idea of a 
Saviour  who  suffers  and  dies.  The  importance  of the  Incarnation  lies  not  in the  Crucifixion  and  the 
Resurrection, but in the revealing of God to man.256
252 For the Patristic depiction of the Harrowing of Hell as a violent storming of the Gates of Hades, see 
McCulloch (1930), pp.217-222.
253 So Grenstead (1929), p. 188.
254 de Faye (1923), p.76.
255 On this point, see Harl (1957), p.266 (a propos fragment 12 of the Commentary on I Corinthians).
256 We could almost say that the role of Origen’s Christ is to impart a salvific gnosis. There is a strong 
likeness  to  Gnostic  theories  of redemption,  de  Faye  (1957),  pp.216-217  writes  that  Christ  ‘est  un
179It is the conclusion of this section that Origen’s understanding of the fall and of salvation leaves very 
little room for a Redeemer or even for a Redemption.  Specifically, Origen has failed to understand the 
full  importance  of the  Saviour’s  assuming  of a  human body  and  the  consequent  suffering  and  death 
experienced by Christ. This is part of a general failure to take adequate cognisance of the humanity of 
the  Saviour.  It  is  an  examination of this  Christological  bias  that  forms  the  back-bone  of the  present 
chapter.  The  theory  of the  soul  of Christ  developed  in  the  de  Principiis  provides  the  philosophical 
foundation  for  this  bias.  It  explains  the  process  by  which  the  Saviour’s  human  nature  was  entirely 
subjected to his divinity.
ORIGEN’S THEORY OF THE SOUL OF CHRIST.
8.1.
Origen was the first theologian of either the Eastern or Western Church to deal in any detail with the 
soul of Christ.257 The main philosophical reason for believing Christ to have assumed a human soul is 
given  at  de  Principiis  2.6.3.258  It  is  by  means  of this  soul  that  Origen  feels  able  to  explain  the 
mechanics of the process of the Incarnation. It explains how God was able to mingle with a body.  The 
soul of Christ acts as the crucial intermediary which unites these two fundamentally opposed entities. It 
is  a  human  soul  that  is  able  to  play this  vital  role  of intermediary,  because  it  is  not  contrary to  the 
nature of soul either to assume a body or to receive God:
hac  ergo  substantia  animae  inter  deum  carnemque  mediante  (non  enim possibile  erat  dei  naturam 
corpori sine mediatore misceri)  nascitur,  ut dicimus,  deus-homo,  ilia substantia  media  existente,  cui 
utique  contra  naturam  non  erat  corpus  assumere.  sed  neque  rursum  anima  ilia,  utpote  substantia 
rationabilis, contra naturam habuit capere deum.
With  this  argument,  Origen  provides  a  very  powerful  response  to  the  major pagan  objection  to  the 
possibility of the Incarnation. As we have seen, pagan philosophy of the second and third centuries was
revelateur.  II  illumine  des ames par la gnose  qui  sauve.’  Dillistone  (1968),  pp.47-48  makes the  same 
points, de Faye also points out that the Origenist idea (developed in the de Principiis) that the end is the 
same as the beginning is Gnostic in origin (ibid.  pp. 211-213). Harl (1957), p.  Ill, however, is keen to 
distinguish Origen from his heretical contemporaries by claiming that in his system knowledge was the 
end, but not the means. In saying this, Harl has failed to grasp the fundamental importance to Origen of 
Christ the teacher.
257 It was referred to, but only briefly, by Tertullian and Irenaeus. So, Wiles (1965), pp. 140-41.
258  In this  section,  we  concentrate on the de Principiis.  In the Dialogue with Heraclides (5-7) Origen 
discusses the soteriological importance of Christ assuming a human soul. It seems to me, however, that 
Origen’s  main  concern  in these  chapters  is  to prove,  against the  docetics,  that Christ assumed  a  real
180rigorously dualist and could make no sense of the idea that God would ever contaminate himself with 
the filth of matter. Origen himself was of a sufficiently philosophical turn of mind to adopt many of the 
tenets of dualism.259 He accepted the  fundamental belief of his pagan intellectual contemporaries that 
spirit  (God)  and  matter  (body)  were  opposites  and  could  not  associate  with one  another without the 
help  of an  intermediary.  By  claiming  that  it  was  Christ’s  human  soul  that  played  this  vital  role  of 
intermediary, Origen is explaining the central Christian mystery in a way that would make sense to any 
third  century  thinker.  His  explanation  of the  mechanics  of the  process  is  entirely  consistent  with 
established philosophical doctrines.  Few philosophers would have  disagreed that a soul, by nature,  is 
equally able to be united with God as to assume a body. The fall and return of souls was a story told by 
almost every philosopher Origen would have been likely to read.  He  is  simply making new use  of a 
very old theory.
At de Principiis  2.6.5-7,  Origen anticipates  a possible objection to his belief in Christ’s human soul. 
People will point out that he believes, indeed has insisted throughout the de Principiis, that every soul 
enjoys the  liberty of indifference,  that they are free to choose between virtue and vice.260 This would 
mean that Christ,  insofar as he possesses  a human  soul,  must be boni malique capax.  A belief in the 
liberty of indifference is the comer-stone of Origen’s moral philosophy and the major argument of his 
anti-Gnostic  polemic.  So why would it be a problem to believe that Christ was capable  of both good 
and  evil?  Why  should  Origen devote  so  much  time  and  effort,  three  chapters  of dense  and complex 
argument,  to  dealing  with  this  anonymous  objection?  The  answer to  these  questions  lies  in Origen’s 
peculiar understanding of the freedom of the will. For Origen, the ability to choose between good and 
evil  is  not  a  simple  solution  to  the  problem  of determinism.  Like  Plotinus  and  Augustine,  Origen 
recognizes  the  dangers  involved  in  this  kind  of  freedom.  The  ability  to  choose  evil  is  in  fact  an 
ontological  flaw  that blights  the  created  order.  The  goodness  of God  is  independent  of this  kind  of 
moral choice, superior to it, and for Origen it is imperative that his Incarnate Son be similarly exempt. 
The remaining chapters of de Principiis 2.6 are devoted to Origen’s attempts to individualize the soul 
of Christ and to exempt it from the liberty of indifference.  But before we examine the arguments, we 
must  understand  their  philosophical  background.  What  was  Origen’s  understanding  of  moral
human  body.  Mention  of the  Saviour’s  soul  and  spirit  are  really just  asides  to  make  a  convenient 
Christological formula.
259 On Origen’s dualist sympathies, see section 4.1.
260 quam utique animarum naturam boni malique capacem per omnes disputationes nostras frequenter 
ostendimus.
181freedom?261 Why did it seem to him so dangerous and so harmful to have the ability to choose between 
good and evil?
8.2.
According to Origen, the seat of moral freedom is the rational soul.262 The will of this soul is entirely 
its  own  master.263  Although  it  can be  influenced  and  guided  by  good  or  evil  angels,  it  remains  the 
prerogative  of each  soul  to  decide  whether  to  reject  or  to  accept  the  suggestions  of these  spirits.264 
Moreover,  by  claiming  that  each  of  us  has  a  good  and  an  evil  attendant  angel,  suggesting 
(simultaneously)  good  or evil  thoughts,  Origen re-inforces  the  claim that it  is  the  individual himself 
who makes the choice between equal influences.265 Origen’s discussions of the freedom of the will are 
often  set  within  the  context  of a  trichotomist  anthropology.266  The  soul  is  envisaged  as  the  middle, 
morally neutral entity, absolutely free to choose whether to follow the vicious desires of the body or the 
virtuous desires of the spirit. The locus classicus for this theory is de Principiis 3.4.2: 
constat quod huius  animae  voluntas  media  quaedam  est  inter carnem  et spiritum,  uni sine  dubio  e 
duobus  serviens  et  obtemperans,  cuicumque  obtemperare  deligerit  quaeque  cum  se  delectationibus
261  In  this  section,  we  use  the  term  ‘freedom’  as  short  hand  for  the  ‘liberty  of  indifference’.  As 
Armstrong (1992), pp.  121-2 rightly notes, the theologians of the ancient world had two very different 
concepts  of freedom.  The  first  was  the  liberty  of indifference,  the  ability  to  choose  between  moral 
alternatives. The second was the freedom to choose only the good and the reasonable.
262  Rationality is  an extremely important aspect of Origen’s explanation of morality.  It is beyond the 
scope  of the present chapter to  discuss  the  topic  in detail,  but  see  section  5.6.  Otis  (1958),  p.102  is 
wrong to say that Origen,  ‘like Socrates, did not believe that anyone could knowingly do evil.’ It would 
upset  his  sense  of fair  play  and  the  importance  of individual  freedom  to  believe  that  sin  could  be 
excused by ignorance. On this, see Benjamins (1993), p.218.
263 In the de Principiis, Origen uses a wide range of vocabulary to convey the idea of ‘will’. We are, of 
course,  considerably  hampered  by  the  fact  that  much  of the  work  survives  only  in  Rufinus’  Latin 
version.  We  do  however possess  the  Greek text of chapter 3.1,  in which we  often find the  technical 
Stoic  terms  Ttpoaipeou;,  ouyKaxdGeaiq,  fx>ixi)  xoi>  f|yepovucou,  e056Kr|oi<;,  x6  abxe^ouoiov  and  xo  fe(p’ 
f||iiv.  In Rufinus’  Latin translations of the de Principiis, the most common word for ‘will’  is voluntas, 
presumably  translating  06>.r|pa  In  the  Commentary  on  St John  we  most  often  find  xo  fctp’  f||iiv  and 
npoaipeait;.  In the Commentary on Romans, Origen uses voluntas, arbitrium and libertas arbitrii.  I do 
not feel that it is possible to find any semantic pattern in Origen’s choice of vocabulary. For example, 
the term voluntas is used equally of the unchanging will of God and the fickle will of men and women. 
Rist (1974) argues that the term Tipoalpeoiq  is used exclusively for rational decisions.  This is not the 
case (see, for example, Commentary on St Matthew fragment 141).
264 God makes much use of his angels to teach and encourage fallen souls. Similarly, the devil sends his 
demons  to  sow  evil  thoughts  into  the minds  of the  unwary.  See  especially de Principiis  2.10.7,  3.2,
3.5.4-6.
265 de Principiis 3.2.4. On this, see Crouzel (1962), pp. 171-2.
266 On this important topic, see the discussions by Crouzel (1956), pp. 131-3 and (1962), pp. 171-2. See 
also Verbeke (1945), pp.456-7.
182carnis subdiderit, carnales homines facit, cum vero se spiritui iunxerit,  in spiritu esse hominem facit et 
propter hoc spiritalem nominari261
It is the will of the soul that is in complete control of an individual’s moral status. It decides whether a 
man  leads  a virtuous/spiritual  life or a vicious/camal  life.268 This moral  theory has a great number of 
advantages.  Most importantly,  it avoids the  simplistic  and question-begging dualism advocated (most 
of the time) by St.  Paul,  by Plato and almost all his  followers, by Philo and at times even by Origen 
himself (e.g Commentary Series on St.  Matthew 94). A dualism which envisages the moral dilemma as 
simply  the  struggle  between  good  and  evil  is  an  insufficient  explanation  of virtue  and  vice.  There 
surely needs  to  be  a  third element to  decide  the  outcome  of this  struggle.  For Origen,  it  is  the  soul 
which fulfils the vital role of independent arbiter.269
At  Commentary on  St.  John  32.18  (11),  Origen  again cites  the  soul  as  the  crucial  intermediary that 
chooses  between  good  and  evil:  xqpfioaf;  fev  Traafl  xf|  ypacpfi  Siacpopav  \|/uxf|<;  Kai  rcveupaxoc;  Kai
p£oov  pev  xi  0eoL>pd)v  elvai  xf|v  y\)xf|v  K a i  E7ti5exop£vr|v  dpexfiv  K a i  K a K la v .  At  Commentary  on 
Romans  1.18  (PG  14,  866A-  867B),  Origen develops  an  elaborate  metaphor to  illustrate  the  theory. 
The  soul  is  imagined  as  the  owner  of  a  house,  with  the  spirit  and  the  body  acting  as  advisors 
{consiliarii)\ outside the house, in separate groups, stand the virtues and the vices, each group awaiting 
the  approval  of the  soul.  In  the  course  of this  discussion,  Origen  quotes  Deuteronomy  30.15:  See,  I 
have set before you  this  day life and good,  and death  and evil.  Countless  Christians  have  used  this 
verse  as  Biblical  proof that morality depends  entirely upon our  free  choice  of good  or evil.  But the 
particular success  of Origen’s exegesis  is his  addition  of a  third,  morally neutral  entity that does  the 
actual choosing: sicut scriptum est -   ‘Ecce posui ante faciem tuam vitam et mortem,  ignem et aquam' -  
habet ergo in arbitrio suo anima, si velit,  eligere vitam Christum, aut in mortem diabolum declinere.27° 
Origen clearly believes that during its earthly life every soul possesses an absolutely free will and that 
it  is  the  will  of this  soul -   and  that alone -  that decides  an individual’s moral  status.  Moreover,  this 
ability  to  choose  between  good  and  evil  can  never  be  lost.  Even  the  blessedness  of the  elect  is 
dependent upon a constant choice of the morally good.  It is because the saints retain this capacity for
267 c.f.  in Lev.  Horn.  2.2:  constat animam esse,  quae vel in carne,  vel in spiritu seminat,  et illam esse 
quae vel in peccatum ruere possit,  vel convertia peccato.  nam corpus sequela eius est ad quodcunque 
delegerit: et spiritus dux eius est ad virtutem, si eum sequi velit.
268 Sorabji (2000), p.315 has failed to notice the crucial point of this argument. He claims that Origen 
believed that there were two wills.
269 c.f. similar arguments at de Principiis 2.8.4.
270 c.f. Commentary on Romans 1.5 (PG 14, 850AB) for similar arguments.
183moral  choice  that  a  second  fall  is  possible.  Jerome  quotes  various  passages  supposedly  from the  de 
Principiis in which Origen specifically refers to the possibility of a second fall.271 There are even traces 
of the  doctrine  in  Rufinus’  sanitized  version  of the  text.  At  de  Principiis  2.3.3,  we  read  that  it  is 
‘apparently possible’ for the rational souls to fall again, precisely because they continue to possess free 
will: possibile enim videtur ut rationabiles naturae, a quibus numquam aufertur liberi facultas arbitrii, 
possint iterum  aliquibus  motibus subiacere.  The  crucial  thesis  of the  de Principiis  is  the power  and 
influence of the will as the cause of both our fall and our salvation. There is absolutely no suggestion 
that  the  freedom of the  blessed  is  in  any way  qualified  the  second  time  around.  Conversely,  as  it  is 
possible  for  the  elect to  fall,  so  it  is possible  for the  damned to be  saved.272  Even the  devil remains 
capable of virtue:  any day, he might repent of his  sins and become the  good angel he once was.  The 
salvation  of the  damned  is possible precisely because  they still possess  free will  (quod inest in  ipsis 
liberi facultas arbitrii) and are still able to ‘desire better things’ (meliora cupientes).273 
This insistence upon the permanent possession of the liberty of indifference must be understood within 
the context of Origen’s anti-Gnostic polemic.  It is a deliberate and conscious refutation of the Gnostic 
theory of soul natures. St Jerome tells us that the doctrine of the possibility of the devil’s salvation was 
developed as a direct response to Gnostic determinism: assertit Candidus (a well known Gnostic of the 
day)  diabolum  pessimae  esse  naturae  et  quae  salvari  numquam  possit.  contra  hoc  recte  Origenes 
respondit non  eum periturae  esse substantiae sed voluntate propria  et posse salvari.214  Similarly,  at 
Commentary on St John 20.24 (20), Origen points out to the Gnostic, Heracleon, that a sinful soul is of 
the  same  substance  (ouoia)  as  a  virtuous  soul  and  that  the  devil  is  therefore  capable  of virtue.275 
Origen’s  insistence  upon  the  pre-camate  possession  of the  liberty  of indifference  is  another  integral 
element  in  this  elaborate  anti-Gnostic  Weltanschauung.  At  de  Principiis  2.9.5-6,  Origen  insists  that 
souls fell only because they wanted to fall and that their subsequent station in life is entirely dependent 
upon  pre-camate  choice.  To  believe  otherwise  would  be  to  endorse  Gnostic  determinism and  would 
undermine both the justice of God and the autonomy of individual souls.
271 Jerome Letter to A vitus 7.
272 Denis (1884), pp.  344-5  is wrong to present the doctrine of universal salvation and the doctrine of 
the  second  fall  as  opposite  and  contradictory.  They  are  two  sides  of the  same  coin,  two  possible 
manifestations of the permanent possession of the liberty of indifference.
273 de Principiis  1.8.3-4. See also Jerome, Letter to Avitus 3.
274 Contra Rufinum 2.19.
275  TtoXXdtKK;  8e  elK opev,  o il  cav  ooYxa>pr)0fj  t o u t o   t o   dSuvaxov  (>.6700  8k  t o   elv a i  obaiaq  fcxkpaq 
Kai  6v£7u8£ktov  tcd v  Kp£iTT6v(ov  xov  8id(3oXov),  7i£pi  p.£v  e k e I v o u   &7to>.OYr|a6p£6a  coq  oi)8ajiou  a ix l
184By itself, this belief in the permanent possession of the liberty of indifference is just an extreme version 
of the denial of ethical determinism. Ethical determinism,  first defined by Aristotle, is the belief that a 
series of moral choices will eventually lead to the establishment of an unchangeable moral character.276 
Origen  will  not  accept  that  an  individual’s  moral  choices  and  moral  acts  can  have  any  permanent, 
irrevocable effect upon the essential nature (ouoia) of his soul. That no one can become good or evil by 
nature  is  the  comer  stone  of Origen’s  moral  philosophy.  Of course,  every  Christian  was  bound  to 
accept the possibility of radical character change, the conversion of the worst possible sinners. Origen’s 
daring is simply to apply the belief sub specie aetemitatis. While anyone could accept the conversion 
of  St  Paul,  the  conversion  of the  devil  was  much  harder  to  countenance.  It  has  been  suggested, 
however, that this insistence on the permanent possession of the liberty of indifference implies merely 
the possibility  of moral  waywardness.  The  salvation  of the  devil  and  the  damnation  of Gabriel  are 
possible futures.  And, as Origen knew very well, a future can be possible even if it will definitely not 
happen.277 Origen’s doctrine of freedom could thus be excused as implying merely the possibility of a 
second fall  or of universal salvation.  However,  in the de Principiis  and other works there is a further 
argument which makes moral instability the essential characteristic of created beings.  xpercxdxriq  is not 
merely a possibility; it is a certainty.278
8.3.
Origen’s  system  lays  great  stress  on  the  ontological  gulf between  creator  and  created,  between  that 
which exists eternally and that which came into existence at a particular time.279 Moral instability is an 
ontological  flaw  inherent  in  all  created  nature  insofar  as  it  is  created  ex  nihilo.28°  Only God,  being 
eternal,  is good by nature; created beings are only ever accidentally good. The crucial point is that an
ou  xf|<;  7tovr|pia<;,  xo  8£  eyKXripa  xcp  auxov  oixncboavxiKai  8r||iioupYf|Gavxi  rcpoadvj/opev,  orcep  eaxi 
rcdvxcov  dxoncbxaxov (Commentary on St John 20.24 (20)).
276 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1105a.
277  For  a  discussion  of Origen’s  familiarity  with  the  Stoic  doctrine  of possibilities,  see  Rist  (1981), 
pp.70-71  and  Roberts  (1970),  pp.440ff.  The  doctrine  is  explicitly  used  at  Contra  Celsum  2.20, 
Commentary on  Genesis (Philocalia 23.9) and Commentary on Romans (Philocalia 25.30-5) as a way 
of harmonizing the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge with human freedom.
278  Armand  (1970),  p.301  seems  to  have  made  the  mistake  of  interpreting  Origen’s  doctrine  of 
xpe7tx6xr|<;  in a wholly positive light, as simply an assertion of freedom and a rejection of determinism.
279  I  cannot  agree  with  Berchman  (1984),  p.155,  who  argues  that  the  distinction  between  God  and 
creation  is  “not  permanent,  but  transitory  .  .  .  not  predetermined  ontologically,  but  determined 
wilfully.” The arguments of section 8.3 will prove that this is certainly incorrect.
280 The fact of creatio ex nihilo is crucial to Origen’s system. Williams (1987), p.142 has missed a great 
deal when he writes that  ‘it is a moot point whether Origen would have readily described the rational 
creation as ex nihilo.’ Otis (1958), p.102 and Bostock (1992), p.254 make the same mistake.
185accident is not permanent. As Stead puts it,  ‘anything which occurs can be reversed’.281 The goodness 
of creatures, whenever achieved, is liable to be lost. This is an idea found throughout the de Principiis. 
At de Principiis 2.9.2, Origen explicitly states that the rational beings, because they were created from 
nothing, are necessarily subject to change and alteration.  At de Principiis 4.4.4, we read that the very 
fact  of creation  makes  all  intellectual  nature  changeable  and  convertible.  The  same  is  said  at  de 
Principiis  1.2.10. Rist, discussing Augustine, describes the “weakness (which) depends on the element 
of non-being, otherness, which is necessarily inherent in anything created ex nihilo.”2*2 These remarks 
apply equally well  to  Origen:  they are simply a theological  elaboration of a traditional philosophical 
maxim,  i.e.  the weakness  of non-being.  Lyman suggests that this means  that the  fall  of souls  was  an 
inevitable  expression  of their created nature.283  This  is  exactly Origen’s  claim at de Principiis  1.2.4. 
God foresaw that souls would fall, precisely because their goodness is accidental and not essential.284 
An interesting discussion of this subject is Commentary on St Matthew (Frag.  141).285 Commenting on 
Matthew 7.11  -  you,  being evil,  know how to give good gifts to your children -  Origen wonders why 
Christ refers to the disciples as ‘evil’. The answer is that they possess that dangerous waywardness that 
characterizes all human nature. There is no guarantee of their future virtue:  7tpoaipeoiq  is  fickle and
unpredictable.  Only  the  Son  of God  (in  both  his  humanity  and  his  divinity)  is  morally  drpeTtioq:
nwq  8£  xofj^  pa0r|Td<;  7tovr|pou<;  eKdXcoEv;  ei  yap  Kai  qKO>.ou0ov)v  ek  Ttpoaip^OEtoq, bXX  styov  to 
ipETixdv xoi)  dv0p(O7uvou. p6vov 8£  axpETrxoc;  fjv Kai  0£6xqxi  Kai  dv0p(O7t6xr|Ti 6 xoi>  0eou ui6<;.
At  Commentary on  St John  (Frag.  77),  Origen  offers  an  allegorical  interpretation of the  sickness  of 
Lazarus that illustrates exactly the same point. It is because of the changeability of human morality that 
those  who  were  once  ‘friends’  of Jesus  can  sicken and die (i.e.  turn to  sin).286 In the  16th  Homily on 
Numbers,  Origen  contrasts  God  and  man  on  precisely  the  same  grounds:  cum  utique  homines  non 
faciant, quae dicunt, et vitio humanae fragilitatis in his non permaneant, quae loquitur; mutabilis enim 
est homo,  immutabilis  vero Deus.  Otis is right to stress the  importance of moral rigorism in Origen’s
281 Stead (1983), p.249. Origen is making explicit use of Aristotle’s notion of the accidental.
282 Rist (1974), p.507.
283 Lyman (1993), p.61.
284 This important passage is ignored by Lyman.
285 Referred to by Stead (1983), p.249, but not discussed.
286  enei  8£  Tp£7ixf|  feoxiv f)  dv0pamlvr|  (pooic;,  Kav  do0£vf|aai  noxi  xoi)Tr|ooi>  (piXog-  do0£vf|oai 8’av 
ot£  pi)  rcapEOTiv  abxco  6  Ir|ooi><;, Kai oi)  pdvov  do0£vr)oai  (ilka Kai  drcoOdvoi.  Passage also referred 
to, but not discussed, by Stead (1983), p.249.
186system.287  The  tendency  to  lapse  is  a  characteristic  of the  human condition;  even the  saints  must be 
vigilant and constantly aware of the tempter’s guile.288 St Peter’s denial of Christ and the disciples’ fear 
at  the  Last  Supper  as  to  the  identity  of the  traitor become  for  Origen  perfect  Biblical  proof of this 
universal human weakness.289
At Commentary on Romans 5.10, in a famous and much disputed passage, Rufinus reports the views of 
an anonymous group  of ‘heretics’  concerning the possibility of a second fall.  The heretics begin their 
argument by claiming that it is absurd to  imagine  the  life  of the  elect as one  of stagnation,  in which 
nothing (good or bad)  is  done.290 The rational  souls are by nature active and must always be making 
some  kind  of moral  choice,  good  or  evil.  Various  scholars,  notably  Chadwick,  have  argued that the 
views  ascribed  to  the  anonymous  heretics  are  the  views  of Origen  himself.291  They  understand  the 
passage as Rufinus’ valiant attempt to save his master from the slur of heresy by putting suspect views 
into  the mouths of others.  This  seems to me very likely.  There are two passages  in the de Principiis 
where  Origen  explicitly  argues  that  rational  souls  cannot  be  idle  or  inactive:  they  must  either  be 
choosing virtue or choosing vice.292 And,  although Rufinus felt it prudent to omit it, the arguments of 
Commentary  on  Romans  5.10  allow us  to  deduce  the  original  implication  of this  claim,  namely  the 
denial  of the  security  of the  elect.  Once  again,  we  see  how rational  beings  are  by their  very nature 
changeable  and  wayward,  xpE7tx6xr|<;  is  an  inescapable  ontological  fact.  There  is  no  moral  security.
Jerome’s Letter to Pammachius and Oceanus may be a bitter polemical diatribe, but its attack on the 
Origenist system is basically correct.293 Gabriel  can become Caiaphas and Judas can become St Peter
28/Otis (1958), p.103.
288  See also Roldanus (1968), p.337,  who speaks of “l’ambiguite constante de penitence et d’humilite 
qui doit etre propre au pneumatique.”
2 9  Commentary Series on St Matthew 81  and  88  and  Commentary on St John  32.18-19 (11-12).  See 
especially 32.19 (12),  where Origen writes that it is the very possession of free will  (npoaipeon;) that 
makes  the  continued  loyalty  of the  disciples  uncertain:  sp£pvr|vxo  ydp,  oTpai,  avGptoTtoi  ovxeq,  oxi 
xpetcxt5 !   eoxiv  f|  7ipoaipEai<;  .  .  .  Kai  E7ti8exop£vq  xo  fevavxia  0£A.eiv  olg  Trpdxspov 7tpo£0£xo.
290 nunquid potest saeculum esse aliquod in futuro ubi neque boni neque mali agitur, sed stupeant res, 
et aneant profunda silentia? absurdum hoc videri asserunt.
291 Chadwick (1947), p.41.
292  certum  est  quia  nullum  animal  omnimodi  otiosum  atque  immobile  esse potest,  sed omni genere 
moveri  et  agere semper  et  velle  aliquid gesit.  multo  ergo  magis  rationabile  animal,  id est  hominis 
naturam necesse est semper movere vel agere (de Principiis 2.11.1). liberi namque arbitrii semper est 
anima, etiam in corpore hoc, etiam cum extra corpus est; id est libertas arbitrii vel ad bona semper vel 
ad mala movetur,  nec umquam  rationabilis sensus,  id est mens  vel anima,  sine motu aliquo  esse vel 
bono vel malo potest (de Principiis 3.3.5).
293 Jerome Letter 209, chapter 7.
187because, being creatures, neither can be certain of his future moral choices. Origen’s rational souls are
caught in an everlasting moral predicament.294
8.4.1.
In  contrast  to  the  eternal  xpercx6xr|<;  of  created  nature,  Origen  insists  that  God  is  secure  in  his 
unchanging  and  unchangeable  goodness.  An  understanding  of  this  aspect  of Origen’s  theology  is 
crucial  to  the present  study,  insofar as  it reveals  Origen’s  fear of freedom and his recognition of the 
dangers involved in moral choice. It is very important to recognize that Origen’s God is good by nature 
and not by will. Origen’s system is not voluntarist in the sense suggested by Lyman.295 
Lyman  argues  that  Origen’s  God  is  free  to  act  solely  and wholly as  his  will  dictates.  She  devotes  a 
whole  chapter  of  her  book  to  discussing  the  freedom  of  God,  laying  particular  emphasis  on  the 
generation of the  Son and the creation of the world.296 But I would argue that the theology of the de 
Principiis  is  much  more  similar  to  contemporary  pagan philosophy,  especially that of the  Enneads, 
than to traditional Christian voluntarism.297 For example,  Origen believes that the Son exists first and 
foremost for the fullness and perfection of the Godhead: without the Son, the Father would be  aXoyoc,
and  aoocpot;.298  This Trinitarian paradigm makes  the existence of the  Son both necessary and eternal: 
he is not merely the Father’s instrument ad extra, whom he creates when he has decided to create the 
world.299  Lyman stresses Origen’s various references to the will of the Father in his discussions of the 
generation of the  Son (de Principiis  1.2.2,  1.2.6,  2.6.9,  4.4.1).  But we  must be  very careful  how we 
interpret these references. There is no suggestion that the Father could have chosen not to generate the 
Son.  Origen  is  not  speaking  here  of a  yi)|iv6<;  {k>\3A.r|ai<;,300  of a  freedom to  will  or not  to  will.  For 
Origen, the will of the Father is intimately linked to intellect,301 which is his very essence.302  Surely  we
294 Gregg and Groh (1981), p. 180.
295 Lyman (1992), pp. 39-81.
296 Lyman (1983), pp. 47-58.
297 See Armstrong (1992), p. 122: “I do not think that Origen would have found much to quarrel with in 
the great treatise Free Will and the Will of the One”, i.e. Ennead 6.8.
298 See especially de Principiis 4.4.1; Commentary on Ephesians  (Frag 10)  and Commentary  on St John
2.19 (13). For a full discussion of this, see chapter  1, sections 3.1-3.3.  Lebreton (1925),  pp. 15-19, Otis
(1958)  p. 104  and  Pollard  (1955),  p.287  make  the  mistake  of seeing  the  Son’s  existence  as  purely 
instrumental or economic.
299  This  was  the  Apologist  paradigm  (Scheffczyk  (1970),  pp.57-60),  which  Origen  deliberately  and 
consciously rejected. For a full discussion of this, see chapter 1, sections 1.2-1.3.
300 On this term, see Armstrong (1982), p.403.
301 See de Principiis 1.2.6. On this, see Lyman (1994), p.53.
302 See de Principiis  1.1.6.
188have here the Plotinian doctrine  of the absolute  congruence of will and nature.303 There  is no duality 
and no distinction between God’s will and God’s nature and hence no scope for real choice. For both 
Origen  and  Plotinus,  the  will  of God  is  not  a  free  choice  between  possible  alternatives,  but  the 
inevitable expression of an unchanging and unchangeable nature.
Similarly, the creation of souls, as described in the de Principiis, is organic and not voluntarist.304 The 
goodness  of God  necessitates  creation:  causa  creandi  bonitas  Dei  (de  Principiis  2.9.6;  4.4.7).  It  is 
extremely important  that Origen believed this  first creation  to  have  been  ‘equal  and  alike’,  simply a 
myriad  of rational  souls.305  This  was  the  only  possible  kind  of creation:  there  is  no  scope  here  for 
creatorial choice.306 Origen’s insistence that the second creation, the creation of the physical universe, 
was  the  direct  response  to  the  virtues  and  vices  of individual  souls,  is  an  obvious  rejection  of the 
hegemony of creatorial will.307 It is the creatures, not the creator, who decide the nature of the world.308 
To  explain  the  varied  creation  in  terms  of  the  will  of  the  creator  would  be  to  endorse  Gnostic 
determinism,  to admit that God was unfair and arbitrary in his dealings with men. In Origen’s system, 
no  one  can be  allowed  to  complain that he  was bom a man and not  an angel,  a barbarian and  not a 
Greek:  our  lot  in  life  is  the  direct  result  of freely  chosen pre-camate  acts  (de Principiis  2.9.3-8).309 
Finally, Origen’s belief that everything in the world has a rational explanation, a reason and a purpose 
which  man  will  eventually  understand,  strikes  at  the  very  heart  of the  Biblical  description  of God. 
Origen’s  God  is  not  free  to  create  simply  as  his  will  dictates:  his  acts  are bound by the  dictates  of 
reason.310 
8.4.2.
303  On Plotinus’  rejection of the duality of will  (|3ouA.r|Oi<;)  and nature (oboia),  see Armstrong (1982), 
pp. 403-4.
504 So Meredith (1985), p.393.
305 See de Principiis 1.5.3 and 2.9.6. On this, see Scott (1991), p. 153
306 hie cum in principio crearet ea, quae creare voluit,  id est rationabiles naturas, nullam habuit aliam 
creandi causam nisi se ipsum,  id est bonitatem suam.  quia ergo eorum quae creanda erant,  ipse extitit 
causa,  in  quo  neque varietas aliqua  neque permutatio neque impossibilitas inerant,  aequales creavit 
omnes  ac  similes  quas  creavit,  quippe  cum  nulla  ei  causa  varietatis  ac  diversitatis  existeret  {de 
Principiis  2.9.6).  Note  that  Origen  still  makes  use  of  the  language  of  willing,  but,  as  with  the 
generation of the  Son,  there  is  no  suggestion  of a  choice  between possible  alternatives.  There  could 
only ever have been one kind of creation.
307  Meredith  (1985),  p.394  is  wrong  to  highlight  Origen’s  reference  to  the  voluntas  creatoris  at  de 
Principiis  1.5.3. This is the Gnostic argument which Origen proceeds to demolish. For a mythological 
elaboration of the traditional view of the sovereignty of the creatorial will, the reader is referred to C.S. 
Lewis  The Magician’s Nephew, chapter 9.  Which of the animals become talking beasts? Simply those 
whom Aslan chooses.
308 Williams (1987), p. 141: “the world we inhabit as material beings is not ‘created’ by God: it is made, 
or at least conditioned, by the choices of his creatures.”
309 On this, see Scott (1991), pp. 134-7.
189From  this  brief  survey  of  Origen’s  theology,  it  must  be  clear  that  he  did  not  espouse  Christian 
voluntarism.  Origen’s God is not free in the sense of choosing between possible alternatives. His acts 
are not arbitrary and unpredictable.  They are  the  inevitable expression of a good and rational nature. 
God  cannot act otherwise that he does.  Specifically,  he  cannot  be  evil  or irrational.  This  is  the clear 
message of the  Contra  Celsum.  At  Contra  Celsum  3.70  Celsus,  in the  guise of the Jew,  argues  that 
God can do everything and that it must therefore be his will and not his nature that is the guarantee of 
his goodness.311 Origen replies that God cannot do what is evil. If he could, he would cease to be God, 
who is by very definition good and wise. Once again, we see that it is the nature of God that dictates, 
even necessitates, his acts. As sugar cannot make anything bitter and light cannot make anything dark, 
so God can do nothing that is evil:  'ppeit; 86 cpapev on, OKmep ou  Suvaxai to  TtEcpuKoq yXuKalveiv  xco
yXuicO  Tuyxaveiv  Ttncpd^eiv  rapa  xi)v  abxoG  pdvpv  aixiav,  o\)86  to  7 te<puKO<;  cpcori^eiv  to>   elvai  (pax; 
OKOTiCeiv,  o uto lx;  0O8’  6  Geoq  Suvaxat  &8ikeiv-  evavuov  ydp  feaxiv  ai)Tou  xf|  0£i6xr|Ti  Kai  xf|  Kax’  
ai)xi)v  rcdap  Suvdpei p xot>  dSiKeiv  Suvapiq.  Origen’s views are in fact the same as those as Celsus, as 
reported  at  Contra  Celsum  5.14:’aAX  ouxi  ye  xa  aiaxpa  6  0eo<;  8uvaxai  ob86  xa  rcapa  cpuoiv 
pouXexai.312
Origen  concludes  that  the  inability  to  choose  evil  is  proof of God’s  omnipotence.  Like  Augustine, 
Origen believes that humans  are  less  free than God and less powerful because they are unable not to 
choose  sin:  ei  86  xi  xtov  ovxcov  8ovaxai  d8iK£iv  xco  Kai  rcpoc;  xo  d8iK£iv  7t£cpuK6vai,  80vaxai
dSiKEiv  ouk  exov  ev  xfi  cp\3o£i  xo  |ip8apdx;  8uvao0ai  d8iK£iv  (Contra  Celsum  3.70).313  For  Origen, 
ultimate freedom and ultimate power is not the liberty of indifference. The ability, or rather the need, to 
choose between good and evil  is the sorry  lot of created nature.  Only the eternal God is exempt.  His 
goodness  is  the goodness of an unchanging and unchangeable nature.314 The goodness of creatures  is 
(precariously) dependent upon will.
310 See section 3.2.
311 Celsus is echoing the opinions of Philo (e.g. Special Laws 4.87).  See Dihle (1987), p.90: “Philo did 
not want to restrict the boundless power of his God.”
312  Passage  referred  to  by  Armstrong  (1992),  p.402.  c.f.  Contra  Celsum  5.23:  if God  did  anything 
shameful, he would cease to be  God.  In the next chapter, Origen makes the even stronger claim that 
God cannot even want what is evil. This view can be compared with that of Porphyry: although God is 
able to want what is evil, he will always be thwarted (Grant (1952), p. 131).
313 On this, see Denis (1884), p.253: for Origen, the freedom of God is the freedom not to sin.
314  See  Commentary on  St John  2.17  (11):  only God is truly immortal, because only he possesses an 
unchanging and unalterable life (xr)v  a x p E 7 ix o v   7td v x p   K a i  d v a X k o ic o x o v   Ccopv).
190At  Contra  Celsum  5.21,  Origen  similarly  claims  that  God  is  unchangeable  (dxp£7ixov)  precisely 
because he lacks free will (e<p'  f||-riv)- The context of these remarks is a discussion of the Stoic theory of 
world  cycles,  according  to  which  everything  that  happens  has  been  repeated  and  will  be  repeated 
eternally.  Origen rejects the theory on the grounds that the consequences of human freedom can never 
be predicted because they are, by very definition, contingent.  What is particularly important about this 
passage  is  the  contrast between  the  fickleness  of men  and  the  constancy of God.  It  is  interesting  to 
compare Priscillian’s denial of world cycles with that of Origen. The argument of the former hinges on 
the fact that the will of God is free and hence unpredictable.315
8.5.
It is because of his peculiar understanding of the freedom of the will that Origen cannot allow Christ to 
possess  an  ordinary  human  soul  and  thereby enjoy  ordinary  human  freedom.  To  do  so  would  be  to 
admit that Christ  was  morally wayward,  constantly liable to  lapse  into  sin.  In Origen’s system,  to be 
capax mali made  it worryingly likely, even inevitable, that one would at some point be malus.  It was 
for this reason that Origen deemed it necessary to distinguish,  in Christ, sinlessness tout court and the 
inability to sin.316 It was not enough for Origen to believe that Christ was simply without sin: he had to 
be unable to sin.  Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, must be good by nature and not simply by will.  In 
order to guarantee the goodness of Christ, Origen was obliged to make him incapax mali.
Although it was philosophically necessary for Origen to believe that Christ assumed a human soul as 
well as a human body, he recognized the immense difficulties involved. The arguments of de Principiis
2.6.5-7 are Origen’s attempt at a solution, his response to the objection that if Christ assumed a human 
soul  he  must  be  capax  mali.  In  dealing  with  this  objection,  Origen  must  show  how  Christ’s  soul 
achieved the divine quality of impeccability.  It will emerge, however, that the only way to do this was 
to make Christ’s soul sui generis, entirely different from every other soul. Origen’s doctrine of the soul 
of Christ thus  forms  an obvious anomaly  in his philosophical  system.  It is the unique biography of a 
unique soul.
9.1.
315 For Priscillian, see Dihle (1982), p. 164.
316  In  Gesche’s  useful  terminology,  to  distinguish  impeccance  from  impeccability  (Gesche  (1962), 
p.200). Origen’s follower, Didymus the Blind similarly distinguished impeccabilitas from impeccantia 
de facto  (Gesche  (1962),  pp.200-202;  Grillmeier  (1975),  pp.274-5;  Le  Boulluec  (1985),  p.225),  but 
unlike  Origen  concluded  that  it  was  theoretically  possibile  for  Christ  to  sin.  Both  Grillmeier  and 
Gesche make the mistake of conflating Origen’s Christology with that of Didymus, i.e. they ignore the 
crucial fact that Origen’s Christ was unable to sin.
191At its creation,  the soul of Christ was of exactly the  same nature and in exactly the same position as 
every other soul.  Like  them,  it participated  in the  Logos  (this was the  life  intended by God when he 
first created the souls)317 and like them, it possessed the liberty of indifference (equally able to choose 
either virtue or vice). But while every other soul abused the gift of free will and fell from bliss, this one 
soul constantly chose virtue.318 Origen then claims, in an argument that seems to owe a very great deal 
to  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  that by this  long  series  of moral  choices  a  habit or nature developed.319 
This soul gradually began to lose its ability to choose evil and eventually became good by nature, i.e. 
incapax  mali.32°  It  lost  forever all  susceptibility to  change  and  alteration  and  thus  achieved  a  moral 
nature that was safely axpETCToq.
The very nature and essence of this soul has been permanently and irrevocably changed by a series of 
freely willed moral  acts.  Origen illustrates this theory with the  famous  image of an iron thrust into a 
fire.321 At first, the iron is able to receive both coldness and heat, but having remained for a sufficiently 
long time in the fire it loses its ability to receive coldness; finally, the iron in some sense becomes the 
fire.  The  iron  represents  the  soul  of Christ  and  the  fire  represents  the  Logos,  in  which  all  souls 
originally participated.  At  first,  the  soul  of Christ  is  able  to  choose  either  good  or  evil,  but  by  the 
constant choice of the former it comes to  lose  its  ability to choose evil;  finally, the  soul becomes the 
Logos.322
de Principiis 2.6.3.
318 verum cum pro liberi arbitrii facultate varietas unumquemque ac diversitas habuisset animorum,  ut 
alius ardentiore, alius tenuiore et exiliore erga auctorem suum teneretur,  ilia anima, de qua dixit Iesus 
quia  ‘nemo  aufert  a  me  animam  meam ’,  ab  initio  creaturae  et  deinceps  inseperabiliter  ei  atque 
indissociabiliter inhaerens . . .  {de Principiis 2.6.3).
319  Nicomachean  Ethics  1105a.  Let  it be  remembered  that the possibility of the  development  of this 
kind of moral ‘habit’ is elsewhere expressly denied by Origen (section 8.2).
320  haec  anima,  quae  Christi  est,  ita  elegit  diligere  iustitiam,  ut  pro  immensitate  dilectionis 
inconvertabiliter ei atque  inseparabiliter  inhaeret,  ita  ut propositi firmitas  et affectus  immensitas  et 
dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscideret,  ut quod in 
arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu iam versum sit in naturam {de Principiis 2.6.5). Origen repeats 
this vitally important point in his summary of the de Principiis: ita et fuisset quidem in Christi humana 
et rationabilis anima  credenda  est,  et nullum  sensum  vel possibilitatem  earn putandum  est habuiisse 
peccati. sola omnium animarum peccati incapax fuit {de Principiis 4.4.4).
321 de Principiis 2.6.6.
322 It must be emphasized that this union is  founded upon the soul’s love for the Logos {de Principiis 
2.6.3).  Dewart (1976),  p.  286-7  makes  the  mistake  of intellectualizing  the union:  he  explains  it  as  a 
kind  of  Plotinian  union  of  contemplation.  Refoule  (1961),  p.264  is  correct  when  he  writes  that 
“Origene mettait l’accent sur l’amour et sur la volonte.”
192It is very important that Origen believes that this soul was originally capax mali and that its anointing 
as the Messiah was the reward for freely chosen virtue.323 The rigours of his anti-Gnostic polemic force 
Origen to suppress any implication of divine election. This soul chose God; not vice-versa. This idea is 
most  clearly  stated  at  de Principiis  2.6.4:  ut non fortuita  out cum  acceptione personae animae  eius 
assumptio,  sed virtutum suarum ei delecta .  .  .  delectionis igitur merito unguitur oleo laetitiae (Psalm 
45.7),  id  est  anima  cum  verbo  Dei  Christus.  The  expression fortuita  aut  cum personae  acceptione 
occurs throughout Origen’s oeuvre.  It is his usual short-hand for Gnostic determinism.  To refute this, 
Origen must argue that the rank and role of every soul is the reward or punishment for freely chosen 
moral acts. There is thus no partiality on the part of God. Gabriel was not created as Gabriel nor was he 
randomly  chosen  to  be  Gabriel.  His  arch-angelic  rank  was  earned  and  deserved.324  Similarly,  the 
assumption by God of the soul of Christ was not an arbitrary divine decision, but the direct reward for 
freely chosen moral acts. At Commentary on Romans 2 {Philocalia 25.2), in a passage devoted to the 
refutation of determinism, Origen argues that it was because of its unique virtue that this soul became 
the ‘image of the image’, i.e. Christ.  The crucial point, as Lyman says, is that its virtue was foreknown 
but  not  predetermined.325  At  Contra  Celsum  6.48,  Origen  is  similarly  keen  to  stress  the  voluntary 
origins of the hypostatic union: the soul of Jesus clings to the Logos because of its virtue.326 
Of course a major problem with this model is that the Incarnation and hence the Redemption become 
entirely dependent  upon  the  (originally)  entirely  free  will  of a  created being.  God  does  not take  the 
initiative,  but  awaits  the  decision  of his  creature.  Although  the  goodness  of the  soul  of Christ  was 
eternally foreknown,  it  was  not guaranteed.  Indeed,  given Origen’s peculiarly extreme version of the 
free will problem, it was just as likely that this soul would have chosen evil. And without a sufficiently 
virtuous  soul  to perform the vital  role  of intermediary,  the Incarnation -  the assumption by God of a 
human body -   would  have  been  impossible.  Origen’s  insistence  on  an  entirely meritocratic  universe 
has led him into very dangerous waters. It is a creature and not the creator who controls and dictates the 
whole course of sacred history.327
323 In some ways, Origen’s Christology is a kind of pre-camate Adoptionism. Geshe (1959), p. 143 tells 
us  that  after  the  condemnation  of the  Adoptionist  Paul  of Samosata,  Origen’s  views  on  the  soul  of 
Christ began to arouse suspicion and were tacitly dropped by his followers.
324 de Principiis  1.5.3.
325 For quotations and a discussion, see Lyman (1994), p.57.
326 Passage quoted in Crouzel (1956), p.230.
327 Very few scholars seem to have noticed this worrying aspect of Origen’s Christology. Stead (1994), 
p. 190  and  Bigg  (1886),  p.337  are  notable  exceptions.  Even  Lyman,  who  is  so  keen  to  stress  the 
voluntarist aspects of Origen’s system, has failed to notice this particular point.
1939.2.
There  is  some  disagreement  amongst  scholars  as to what Origen actually means by claiming that the 
soul  of Christ  has  become  the  Logos.  According  to  de  Faye  and  Crouzel,  he  means  a  metaphysical 
transformation.328  According  to  Refoule,  Lyman  and  Dewart,  Origen  believed  that  Christ’s  soul 
retained its human characteristics, and that the ‘union’ was no more than an agreement of will.329 
Chadwick tells us that the image used by Origen was Stoic in origin.330 For the Stoics, an iron placed in 
a  fire  was  an  example  of  in  which  two  dry  bodies  unite  while  retaining  their  distinctive
characteristics.331  But Origen seems to believe that a lump of iron in a furnace will eventually assume 
the characteristics of the fire that surrounds it. The time will come when the iron will no longer act like 
iron, but like fire:  totam ignem effectam dicimus,  quia nec aliud in ea nisi ignis cemitur; sed et si qui 
contingere atque adtrectare temptaverit, non ferri sed ignis sentiet {de Principiis 2.6.6).
The  iron  has  not  ceased  to  exist;  it  is  still  a  tangible  lump  of metal.  To  speak,  with de  Faye,  of a 
metaphysical transformation is not entirely correct.  In Origen’s psychology, although souls come to be 
they  cannot  pass  away.  The  fact  that Origen  adds  the  image  of a  vase  containing  ointment helps  to 
clarify his position.332 Clearly the vase (Christ’s human soul) continues to exist as a separate, concrete 
entity, but this is not the point of the image. The point of the image is that the jar is so permeated by the 
ointment (the Logos) that it too gives off a scent, i.e. it has assumed the £v6py£ia  of the ointment.333 
Origen’s  Christology  is  thus  proto-Monophysite.  Like  Origen,  the  Monophysites  were keen to  assert 
the  continued  existence  of Christ’s  humanity  with  the  crucial  proviso  that  it  no  longer acted  in  any 
recognizably human way.  Severus of Antioch,  likening Christ’s human nature to an ember in the fire, 
insists that the wood has not ceased to be wood, but that it ‘does what is proper to fire, namely to shine
328 de  Faye (1923)  III, p. 134-5:  “L’union est si  vraiment organique que la nature d’homme qui est en 
Jesus-Christ  subit  une  transformation  .  .  .  il  semble  alors  que  la  psyche  de  Jesus  se  confonde  et 
s’identifie avec le Logos.” Crouzel (1956), p.  137: the union is ‘une veritable transformation physique.’
329  Refoule  (1961),  p.263:  “II  ne  semble  pas  qu’Origene  envisage  cette  unite  comme,  a rigourement 
parler, ontique .  .  . Autrement dit, l’union entre le Christ et le Verbe doit etre en definitive caracterisee 
de  moral.”  Lyman (1993),  p.75  writes  that  “the union is  not  .  .  .  wholly metaphysical  .  .  .  since  the 
distinction  of human  and  divine  remains.”  Dewart  (1956)  devotes  a  whole  chapter  of his  article  -  
“Moral Union in Christology before Nestorius” -  to Origen’s doctrine of the soul of Christ.
330 Chadwick (1951), p. 161.
331  See SVF II, p. 153:  pi^iv  5’  elvai  8\3o  f|  Kai  TiXeibvtov  aaiptixcov  &vxutap£Kxaaiv  8i’   oXcov,  urco 
pevouowv  tg)v  oupcpuwvTiepi  abxa  Ttoioxrjxoov,  ox;  fe7ti  xoi)  nupo;  exei  Kai  xoi)  7t£7tupaKXC0|i£vou 
oiSqpou,  £7ri  xooxcov  yap  8i oXcov  yiyv£o0ai  xwv  ocopaxtov  xqv  dvxi7iap6Kxaaiv.  Passage  cited  in 
Chadwick (1951), pp. 160-61. See Heine (1998), pp.75-76 for a discussion of
332 de Principiis 2.6.6.
333  £v6py£ia  (inoperatio)  =  ‘operation’  is a technical Aristotelian term meaning the proper or natural 
function/purpose of a particular thing.
194and  to  bum.’334  Discussing  this  passage,  Chesnut  concludes  that  the  image  illustrates  how  Christ’s 
humanity has become  the fev6pyeia  of his  divinity.  This  is  exactly Origen’s position.  As he explicitly 
states, the soul of Christ has become God in all its acts,  feelings and thoughts.335  In answer to Wiles’ 
question,336 it is  the  Logos which performs the reasoning and guiding function and which directs and 
dictates  the  whole  of the  Saviour’s  life.  Once  it  has  performed  the  task  of allowing  the  divine  to 
mingle with a body,  the soul of Christ has no active role to play.  His humanity,  if it exists at all, has 
become a mere puppet used by the Logos.337 Origen’s image of the soul of Christ as the shadow of the 
Logos (de Principiis 2.6.7) is the perfect illustration of his views on the subordination of the Saviour’s 
humanity.  Similarly,  at  Contra  Celsum  1.70,  Origen  compares  the  way that the  Logos  used  Christ’s 
humanity  to  the  way  Apollo  used  the  priestess  at  Delphi:  it  is  simply  the  tool  through  which  the 
epiphany is effected.
9.3.
Various  commentators,  both  ancient  and  modem,  have  objected  to  Origen’s  doctrine  of the  soul  of 
Christ  that  it  destroys  the  uniqueness  of the  Incarnation.  They  argue  that  before  the  fall  every  soul 
participated in the Logos and will do so again, that the union between Christ and the Logos  is no more
than and no different from a unio mystica. Other scholars highlight the didactic  and exhortative  purpose
behind Origen’s doctrine of the soul of Christ.  Lyman, for example, argues that the soul of Christ was 
primarily intended to provide a moral paradigm and an imitable pattern of behaviour for all believers: 
we should follow its excellent example and, by constantly choosing the good, achieve a similar union 
with  the  Logos.338  Indeed,  the  consensus  of  scholarly  opinion  is  to  see  the  journey  of  this  soul 
from  xpenxdq  to  axpenxoq  virtue  as providing  an  imitable pattern of behaviour for other souls.  Harl
and Crouzel agree that this soul is held up as a moral example for future Christians.339 Williams, basing 
himself on  Simonetti,  argues  that the soul of Christ provides comforting assurance that Origen did  in 
fact  believe  in  the  possibility  of moral  security,  that  the  problem  of xp£nx6xr|<;  was  not  an  eternal 
problem;340 Nemeshegyi says the same.341  Refoule and Blocher see the final status of the soul of Christ
334 Homily 48. Quoted and discussed by Chesnut (1976), pp.32-3.
335 omne quod agit, quod sensit, quod intelligit, deus est (de Principiis 2.6.6).
336 Wiles (1965), p.142.
337 Kelly (1977), p. 157.
338 Lyman (1993), pp.75-76.
339 Harl (1957), p.l 17 and Crouzel (1956), p. 135.
340 Williams (1981), p. 133.
341 Nemeshegyi (1960), p.219.
195as the precursor of our own deification.342 Le Boulluec, Denis and Roldanus all argue for the protreptic 
value of the Saviour’s human soul.343 But it seems to me that the subject is far more complicated than 
this.
Origen insists that the union between the soul of Christ and the Logos is very different from the kind of 
participation  that  an  ordinary  soul  can  enjoy.  At  de  Principiis  2.6.5-6  Origen  quotes  one  of his 
favourite Old Testament passages -  God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows 
(Psalm 45.7) -  and draws particular attention to the last three words:  this proves that the status of the 
soul of Christ far surpasses that of the prophets and apostles. At 4.4.4, the same verse is used, with a 
similar interpretation. Origen argues that the Logos was not ‘in’ the soul of Christ in the same way as it 
was ‘in’ the souls of, for example, Peter and Paul. This is because every soul, except the soul of Christ, 
has  committed  at  least  one  sin.  Of course  this  belief makes  particular  sense  within  the  context  of 
Origen’s theory of the fall of souls: men would not even exist (as men) unless they had sinned.344 The 
soul of Christ is the only soul that has never committed a sin and this allows it to enjoy a unique union 
with the Logos.  When,  at 4.4.4,  Origen urges us to imitate Christ and partake of the divine nature, he 
adds the all important proviso -  only as far as it is possible (in quantum fieri potest). At de Principiis 
2.6.6, Origen explicitly distinguishes the soul of Christ from the souls of ordinary men and women on 
the grounds that only the soul of Christ enjoys an unchanging and unchangeable union with the Logos. 
The  soul  of Christ  is  the jar  containing  the  ointment  (the  Logos);  we  merely  share  in  it,  receive  its 
perfume,  more  or  less,  depending  on  our  proximity.  The  distinction  is  between  those  who  merely 
‘participate’ (participant) in the Logos and that which actually contains it. Ordinary souls move nearer 
or  further from the perfume,  relative  to their spiritual development;  the  soul of Christ is permanently 
soaked in it.
At  most,  we  can hope  to  return to  our  former glory,  the  blessed  state  from which we  fell,  and once 
again participate in the Logos.345 The soul of Christ, however, has passed far beyond this first stage.  It 
no  longer  simply  ‘participates’  in  the  Logos.  It has  actually become  the  Logos.  Many  scholars  have 
missed the crucially important point that the final status of the soul of Christ is the result of a very long
342  Refoule  (1961),  p.263:  “II  reste  pourtant  qu’il  n’a pu  concevoit l’union de  l’ame preexistente  du 
Christ au Verbe divin que sur le type de union mystique” and p.264: “son union mystique au Verbe se 
presente necessairement alors comme le prototype de la notre.” Blocher (1986), p. 101.
343 Le Boulluenc (1985), p.223, Denis (1884), p.367 and Roldanus (1968), pp.219, 258 and 274.
344  On this  point,  see  Williams  (1981),  pp.132-3.  He  correctly concludes that “We  cannot choose  as 
Christ  has  chosen.”  The  reader  is  also  referred  to  Commentary on  Romans  3.8  (PG14,  949A-950C) 
where Origen stresses the uniqueness of the soul of Christ.
196process. It is a popular misconception that this soul was always united with the Logos and was always 
Christ.346 This is certainly not Origen’s opinion: his is a dynamic Christology. At de Principiis 2.6.5-6, 
Origen explicitly argues that the soul’s anointing as the Messiah was the result of a process that took 
place over a long period of time. The soul had to prove that its love was steadfast and its virtue constant 
by a long series of moral choices. At first, it was exactly like any other soul; it took time for it to reach 
the  next  stage  and to  become  good by nature.347  A  habit cannot  develop  over-night.  A  lump  of iron 
placed in a fire does not immediately become the fire;  it takes time for it to lose its original qualities. 
So, too, this soul, cleaving to the Logos, does not immediately become God; it takes time for it to lose 
its  original  Tp£7rc6ir|<;.  It  is  only when  it has  become  good by nature  that this  soul  can become  the 
Messiah.  Similar arguments are used at Commentary on St.  John  1.28  (30), where Origen makes the 
point that this soul was not always the Messiah. It had to prove itself worthy of this supreme honour by 
loving justice and hating injustice (Psalm 45.7) for a sufficiently long period of time. Origen compares 
this temporal development with the Logos’ eternal status as King. Christ’s status as King belongs to his 
divine nature; his status as Messiah is earned, gradually, over time and is an attribute of his humanity, 
specifically of his human soul:
oi)K  ovxa Paai>.6a, uoiepov  |3aai>.6a y£yov£vai 5ia  xo  f|ya7tr|K6vai  8iKaioauvr|v.
It cannot therefore be  claimed that Origen’s  doctrine of the soul of Christ destroys the uniqueness of 
the Incarnation and that it reduces it to the kind of participation enjoyed by any Christian soul. It is not 
the case, as so many scholars have argued, that the soul of Christ simply remained in the Logos, while 
every  other  soul  fell.  There  was  a  crucially  important  development  in  the  nature  of this  soul  that 
renders it entirely different from any other soul. It has passed far beyond the stage of mere participation 
in  the  Logos:  it  has  actually become  the  Logos.  I  cannot  accept  the  conclusions  of Refoule  and  the 
others  that  Origen  explains  the  Christological  union  in  terms  of a  unio  mystica.  The  kind  of union 
enjoyed by mystics  is  entirely different  from the  kind  of union enjoyed by the  soul  of Christ.  In his
345 Origen insists that the ‘end is like the beginning’ {de Principiis 1.6.2).
346  So,  for  example,  Williams  (1987),  p.145,  Dewart  (1976),  p.284,  Crouzel  (1989),  pp.192-3,  Harl 
(1957), p.l 16 and Roldanus (1968), p.219.
347  Gesche  (1962),  p.201  is  wrong  when  he  says:  “pour  le  grand  Alexandrin,  l’ame  de  Jesus, 
preexistente comme toutes les autres ames humaines, est  indefectiblement restee fidele a Dieu, des le 
moment de sa creation” (my emphasis). Gesche has missed the crucial point that, at first, this soul was 
exactly like other souls,  equally able to choose good or evil:  it was only at a much later stage that its 
virtue and faithfulness became ‘indefectible’.
197many discussions of mystical union,  Origen never claims that the soul of the mystic becomes God.348 
He is always keen to stress the ontological gulf between the creator and the created.349 Where he does 
talk of divinization, he is not to be taken literally.350
9.4.
It  is hard to see therefore how Origen’s doctrine of the soul of Christ can have any kind of moral or
protreptic value. It is rather the case that the development of this soul from wayward freedom to perfect 
impeccability is simply a necessary aside to ensure the sinlessness of the  Saviour,  within the peculiar 
context of the de Principiis. It is a theory that Origen was forced to develop in answer to the objection 
anticipated at de Principiis 2.6.5. It should not be understood as a general theory applicable to the souls 
of ordinary men and women.  The success story of this one soul is not intended to inspire us with the 
hope of our own future perfection and the possibility of our own future impeccability. The belief that it 
is  possible  to  become  good  by  nature  and  unable  to  sin  is  a  blatant  contradiction  of  the  two 
fundamental  theses  of  the  de  Principiis.  (1)  As  we  have  seen,  Origen’s  moral  philosophy  is 
characterized by the vehement rejection of ethical determinism in favour of the permanent possession 
of the liberty of indifference. Anti-Gnostic fervour leads Origen to argue that the most hardened sinners 
and  the  most  virtuous  saints  are  always  capable  of  an  abrupt  and  drastic  character  change.  (2) 
Throughout  the  de  Principiis,  Origen  emphasizes  the  ontological  distinction  between  the  eternal 
Creator and the souls who are created ex nihilo.  Only God, being eternal,  is good by nature.  Created 
beings can only ever be accidentally good; they remain constantly liable to relapse into sin.
Wiles  has  argued  that  the  Christologies  of the  Early  Church  were  almost  entirely  subjected  to  the 
dictates of soteriology.351 The nature of the Redeemer provided a salvific blue-print: what happened to 
Christ will happen to us. The orthodox theologians of the fourth century, for example, inspired hope of 
our own future moral stability precisely by describing a Saviour who was dtpeTixo^  and incapax mali. 
If, in Christ, the weak and wayward human will has been replaced by a sure and steadfast will to virtue,
348  For  a  general  discussion  of Origen’s  mysticism,  see  Rist  (1964),  pp. 195-212  and  Louth  (1981),
see ae Principiis  1.2.3; 2.9.2; 4.4.8. Nemeshegyi (1960) devotes pp.101-128, to illustrating Origen’s 
emphasis on the permanent distinction between God and the created souls. He writes:  ‘il (scil. Origen) 
ne  s’agit  pas  de  pantheisme,  ni  meme  d’une  absorption  dans  le  Logos,  mais  seulement  d’une 
participation  .  .  .  il nous parait certain que  chez Origene  les esprits crees gardent leur etre distinct et 
leur  conscience  dans  l’etat  final  de  eschatologie’  (ibid.  pp.  196,  211).  Russell  (1988),  pp.55-56 
similarly argues that ‘there is no confusion or absorption’ of the rational souls and God.
350  Rist  (1964),  p.202,  suggests  that  Origen  means  no  more  than  ‘attaining  immortal  life.’  On  the 
theme  of divinization  in  the  Early  Church  generally,  see  Winslow  (1979),  pp. 171-201  and  Russell 
(1988). Lot-Borodine (1925), p.526 tells us that it  was ‘jamais ontique.’
198we can hope for the same. For Athanasius and his followers, the nature of Christ was the prototype and 
guarantor of a universal transformation.352 Conversely, the Apologists and the Arians presented Christ 
as a model of freely-willed obedience. The Redeemer presented a salvific paradigm by epitomizing the 
perfection  of ordinary  human  nature,  by  becoming  a  role  model  for  ordinary  men  and  women  and 
providing an imitable pattern of behaviour.353
Origen however does not believe that the nature of Christ provides a salvific paradigm. He pre-empts 
the orthodox Christologies of the fourth century by arguing that the Redeemer must be axpeTtxoq  and 
incapax mali. But this fact has absolutely no relevance for the salvation of ordinary men and women. 
To  believe  that  we  shall  be  ultimately  transformed  by  external  grace  to  achieve  a  supernatural  and 
hitherto  impossible perfection would undermine  the  strict meritocracy of the Origenian universe.  For 
Origen,  man must struggle alone  and rely on his own will to achieve  whatever goodness he can.  Yet 
this  will  is  eternally  xp£7ixd<;,  eternally  liable  to  relapse  into  sin.  While  the  Redeemer  is  safe  in  his 
unchanging and unchangeable will to virtue, those who are to be redeemed remain in an everlasting and 
inescapable moral predicament, condemned to an eternity of rises and falls.354 
We can only conclude that the nature of the Redeemer is irrelevant in Origen’s scheme of redemption. 
When he  discusses  the  theory of the  soul  of Christ,  Origen makes  it clear that this  soul  was unique. 
Every other soul has to choose between virtue  and vice;  only one  soul is,  or rather became,  good by 
nature: sola omnium animarum peccati incapax fuit (de Principiis 4.4.4). It would seem that Origen is 
caught in the following dilemma:
1  a)  The  fervour of his  anti-Gnostic  polemic  and  his  belief in  the  moral  instability  of created  nature 
force Origen to conclude that human souls are eternally xpercxdq.
lb) He cannot therefore allow Christ an ordinary human soul. To do so, would be to admit that he, too, 
was eternally xp£7rx6<;.
2a)  Origen’s  dualist  philosophy  forces  him  to  believe  that  the  Incarnation  (God’s  assumption  of a 
human body) could not have occurred without the help of an intermediary.
2b) He must therefore believe that Christ assumed a human soul as well as a human body. A soul is the 
only nature that is equally able to assume a body as to be united with God.
351 Wiles (1969). See section 5.2 for more on this.
352  For  an  overview  of Athanasius’  Christology  and  soteriology,  see  Stead  (1983),  Lyman  (1994), 
pp.141-4,  155-6 and Anatolios (1998), pp.24, 60,  164.
3  For  an  overview  of Apologist  and  Arian  Christology  and  soteriology,  see  Lyman  (1994),  p. 156,
Roldanus (1968), pp.174 and 274, Gregg and Groh (1981) and Wiles (1969).
199The arguments of de Principiis 2.6.5-7 are Origen’s attempts to reconcile  lb and 2b. But the dilemma 
is  insoluble.  Origen can only conclude that the soul of Christ is unique. The life-story of this soul,  its 
journey  from  Tpemdc;  to  dtpeKToq  virtue  and  its  final  status  of union with the  Logos,  is  a  story that 
stands far outside the philosophical and theological framework of the de Principiis.  It is emphatically 
not intended to provide an imitable pattern of behaviour for other souls.
The fact that the soul of Christ achieved an azpenxoq  moral nature, that he became good by nature and 
unable to sin is an obvious anomaly in Origen’s theological system. For Origen, the nature of Christ is 
unique and does not provide a salvific paradigm.  This is not the function of the Saviour. As we have 
seen, Origen’s Christ came to earth to guide and to teach. The fact that his nature is -  and always will 
be -  entirely different from that of ordinary men and women is of no importance.
9.5.
But this  is not to  deny the  importance  of the Imitatio  Christi in Origen’s overall theology.  Lyman is 
right to refer us to passages in which Origen urges his readers or his congregation to imitate Christ.355 
What  I  object  to  is  the  inclusion  of de  Principiis  2.6.5-7  in  support  of the  general  thesis  that  the 
importance  of Origen’s  Christ  is  basically  exhortative  and  didactic.  As  we  have  already  seen,  the 
Origenian corpus does not form an organic whole and Origen felt at liberty to use different arguments 
in different contexts. Lyman has made the mistake of reading the moral exhortations of the Homilies in 
the  light  of the  philosophical  speculations  of the  de  Principiis.  Origen’s  congregation  at  Caesarea 
would not have read his early works and he would not have wanted them to do so. When the preacher 
urges  his  flock  to  imitate  Christ,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  are  to  recall  his  pre-camate 
transformation and be encouraged to take the same path.
As  argued above,  the distinguishing  feature  of the  Homilies  is moral exhortation.  In this context,  the 
protreptic  function of Christ  is  simply that he  was  without sin.  In fact,  when we are urged to  imitate 
Christ,  we are urged to  ‘imitate’  the perfect goodness of God.  Crouzel has shown that Origen is very 
fond  of telling  us  to  ‘imitate’  God  the  Father;356  his  call  to  imitate  Christ  is  no  different  from  this. 
Christ’s original, pre-camate freedom is irrelevant. The Christ of the Homilies is not a model of freely
Gregg and Groh (1981), p. 180.
355 Lyman (1994), p.76.
356 Crouzel (1956), p.359.
200willed obedience, but of achieved perfection.357 In this context, the goodness of Christ is the goodness 
of God.
9.6.
It is the conclusion of this section that Origen has no use for the Saviour’s human soul other than as an 
explanation  for  the  process  of the  Incarnation.  Origen’s  dualist  philosophy  requires  him  to  find  an 
intermediary to unite God (spirit) with a human body (matter). It is only a soul, fitted by nature for both 
heaven and earth, that can perform this pivotal role. The assumption by God of a human soul is simply 
a  practical  necessity  to  explain  the  mechanics  of the  Incarnation.  The  elaborate  arguments  of de 
Principiis 2.6.5-7 are necessary asides to explain and justify this basic belief. They apply to the soul of 
Christ alone and have no universal protreptic value. It must be emphasized that the nature of this soul is 
unique because it performs a unique task.
The arguments of de Principiis 2.6.5-7 chart the gradual transformation of one particular soul into God, 
culminating  in  the  complete  eradication  of any  genuinely  human  consciousness.  We  have  here  the 
philosophical background to and justification for the major characteristics of Origen’s New Testament 
exegesis. Throughout his life on earth, Origen’s Christ acts as God, in full and conscious knowledge of 
his own divinity. Origen’s discussion of the Temptation is the perfect illustration of this Christological 
and exegetical bias.
THE TEMPTATION.
10. 1.
In  chapter 92  of the  Commentary Series on  St Matthew,  Origen  claims  that the  Temptation,  like  the 
Agony in the  Garden,  was  an experience peculiar to Christ’s  human nature.  In this way Origen  feels 
able to explain the absence of these two episodes from the Fourth Gospel:
notandum est autem quoniam Marcus quidem et Lucas hoc (scil.  the Agony) ipsum scripserunt,  qui et 
tentatum  exponunt a diabolo Iesum.  Iohannes autem  .  .  .  orantem  Iesum  ut transiret ab eo calix non 
introducit,  sicut nec tentatum exponit a diabolo Iesum.  causam autem hanc arbitror esse,  quoniam hi 
quidem  magis secundum  humanam  eius naturam  exponunt de eo quam secundum divinam; Iohannes 
autem  magis secundum  divinam quam secundum  humanam  interpretabatur naturam;  divinitas autem 
intentabilis erat.  ideo tres quidem evangelistae exposuerunt tentatum: Iohannes autem secundum quod
357 Even Lyman (1994), p.76 admits this. This emphasis on the Saviour’s divinity became a major trend 
in  Eastern  spirituality.  Lot-Borodine  (1925),  pp.  40-43  argues  that  the  Orthodox  Church  always 
understood the Imitatio Christi as the imitation of the Saviour’s divine nature.
201coeperat  ‘In principio  erat  Verbum,  et  Verbum  erat apud Deum  et Deus  erat  Verbum',  nescit Deum 
Verbum posse tentari.358
Since it is as a man that Christ experiences temptation, his successful defeat of the devil can provide a 
useful  moral  paradigm.  In  the  Homilies  on  St  Luke  and  the  Homilies  on  Exodus,  Origen  explicitly 
presents  Christ  as  a  role  model  for  his  congregation.  As  Homilies,  these  works  have  an  overtly 
exhortative  and  didactic  purpose.  Origen  urges  those  listening  to  follow  the  example  of Christ  and 
resist temptation.359 Harl and Lyman both discuss Origen’s concern with the Imitatio  Christi and they 
both refer to the Temptation as an important example of this.360 It seems to me, however, that Origen is 
presenting his congregation with an impossible role model.  Despite his claims to the contrary,  it is in 
fact the case that Origen’s Christ faces the devil as God, in conscious knowledge of his own invincible 
virtue.  Origen’s exegesis of the Temptation is thus a perfect, if brief,  example of his refusal to allow 
any place to the humanity of the Saviour.
10.2 .
Before  we  examine  Origen’s  discussions  of the  Temptation  of Christ,  it  would  be  useful  to  look  at 
exactly  what  is  involved  in  temptation  and  in  yielding  or  resisting.  It  seems  to  me  that  temptation 
comprises the following:
(1)  The preliminary desire for what is offered in the temptation.
(2)  Some  reason  why  it  is  right  to  refuse  what  is  offered  and  wrong  to  accept  it.  In  Christian 
terminology, it is a ‘sin’ to yield to temptation.
(3)  Resisting or yielding to temptation must be a freely-willed response and hence worthy of praise or 
blame.
(4)  Resisting temptation must be seen as a difficult struggle. In Christian contexts, temptation is often 
presented as a trial of strength; agonistic metaphors are common.
From  his  various  discussions  of the  phenomenon  of temptation  it  is  clear  that  Origen  accepted  the 
above points. At de Principiis 3.1.4, he considers a situation in which two men, who have both taken a 
vow of celibacy,  are tempted to sleep with a prostitute. The first man succumbs to the temptation and 
the second man resists. The crucial point in Origen’s discussion of this episode is that both men felt the
358 The same is said in the Homilies on St Luke:  manifestum,  non Deum, sed hominem fuisse tentatum 
(in Luc. Horn. 29.5).
359 si igitur Filius Dei Deus pro te homo factus est et tentatur: qui natura homo es, non debes indignari 
si forte tentaris.  quod si tentatus,  ilium imitatus fueris qui tentatus est,  et omne viceris tentamentum (in 
Luc. Horn. 29.5). See also Homilies on Exodus 2.3.
202same  preliminary  desire:  xcdv  ahxcbv  au|ipePr|K6xcov  . . .   oi  p6v  yapyaUo|ioi  Kai  oi  epeBiopoi
oupPaivouoiv.  If the second man had simply been a natural celibate with no desire for the woman, he 
would not have been tempted in the first place and hence could not have been praised for his successful 
resistance  and  for  his  strength  of moral  purpose.  The  temptation  is  presented  as  a  psychomachia,  a 
contest between two conflicting desires, the desire to sleep with the prostitute and the desire to keep the 
vow  of celibacy.  Depending  on  which  desire  is  stronger,  the  man  either  yields  to  the  temptation  or 
resists.361
Origen’s longest and most interesting analysis of the phenomenon of temptation is de Principiis 3.2.1-
3.  Here too the preliminary desire to  sin is  seen as a central part of the experience.  One  of Origen’s 
main arguments  in this  chapter is that all men have the  same  sinful  desires362 -  (caused either by the 
natural needs of the body 363or by the improper suggestions of devils and demons) -  and that it is up to 
the individual to be strong enough to resist them, or at least to keep them in check. Origen also stresses 
the difficulties involved in resisting these preliminary desires. The book is full of agonistic metaphors. 
In  chapter  three,  our  struggles  against  the  flesh  and  against  the  opposing  powers  are  compared  to 
athletic  or  gladiatorial  contests.  In  chapter  five,  Christians  are  presented  as  soldiers  engaged  in  a 
perpetual war against the devil and his minions. Temptation is a trial of strength in which victory is by 
no means assured, but must be won through hard labour. As gladiators and athletes can never be certain 
of winning a competition, so neither can we be certain of resisting temptation.364
360 Harl (1957), pp.283-4 and Lyman (1994), p.77.
361  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  Origen’s  explanation  of  resisting  temptation  is  rather  more 
intellectualist  than  would  perhaps  be  expected  from  a  Christian.  Presumably under  the  influence  of 
Stoic  moral  philosophy,  Origen  explains  the  second  man’s  successful  resistance  by  the  fact  that  his 
rational  faculty  has  been  strengthened  and  nourished  by  practice 
(6  X.6yoq  86,  &xe  eiti  nXciov  ioxupcmoir|0dq  Kai  xpacpdq  xf|  pe>.6xp),  because he has  leamt 
more  lessons  (nX.eiova  paBijpaxa)  and  because  he  has  progressed  through  instruction 
(PePai(D0d<;  xoiq  Sdyjiaai).  But on this subject, see the important remarks by Benjamins (1993), p.218: 
“this  (de  Principiis  3.1.4)  shows  the  role  of reason,  which  has  to  be  developed  by  learning  sound 
doctrines  and practising them as a condition for using external events correctly.  Obviously, however, 
the under developed reason of our ascetic  is no excuse for his licentious act.  Reason,  Origen says,  in
3.1.3,  has a priori possibilities to be developed, i.e.  it is up to us whether or not we train our intellect 
properly.”
62  Origen  uses  various  words  to  describe  these  sinful  desires:  desiderium,  (primus)  motus,  semina 
peccatorum, initia, occasio, commotio, incitamentum.
363 In Williams’ terminology, the body provides the fomes peccati, (Williams (1927), p.218).
364 nec tamen  quoniam  diximus  iusto dei iudicio  unumquemque pro virtutis suae quantitate temptari, 
idcirco  putandum  est  quia  omni  genere  debeat  vincere  qui  temptatur;  sicut  ne  ille  qui  in  agone 
contendit,  quamvis  aequa  moderatione  comparatus  sit  adversario,  non  tamen  omni genere  vincere 
poterit (de Principiis 3.2.3).
203Successful  resistance  is  the  result  of an  arduous  struggle  to  quash the  preliminary desire  to  sin.  The 
most important point in Origen’s discussions of temptation is the fact that our resisting or yielding is 
entirely ‘up to us’. We can therefore be justly praised when we resist and justly blamed when we yield. 
The purpose of the story of the two men and the prostitute at de Principiis 3.1.4 is to illustrate that it is 
an individual’s  ‘free will’,  and not external circumstance,  that is the cause of his keeping or breaking 
the vow of celibacy.365 The two men are faced with the same temptation, but their reactions are entirely 
different. For Origen, a temptation is never irresistible. He goes on to say that it is equally ridiculous to 
excuse  sins by blaming  them on our innate  characters  or physical  constitutions,  to  argue that certain 
kinds of men are pathologically inclined to commit certain kinds of sin. Origen refers to the possibility 
of radical character change, a topos of the moral philosophy of his age, to prove the absurdity of such 
claims.  At de Principiis  3.2,  Origen  further emphasizes the  importance  of individual  freedom in the 
resisting  of temptation.  Everyone has  the  strength to  resist temptation, but  it is up to the  individual 
whether or not he makes proper use of this important gift.366 Moreover, in this chapter, Origen stresses 
the  importance  of free  will367  for  the  coherent  and just  application  of praise  and blame,  reward  and 
punishment. If we could be certain of victory in our struggles against the flesh and against the opposing 
powers,  virtue  would  no  longer be  praiseworthy.  Continuing  the  agonistic  metaphors,  Origen tell  us 
that  God,  the  organiser  of the  games,  makes  sure  that  the  competitors  are  fairly  matched:  to  pit us 
against an opponent who  was  either much  stronger than us  or much weaker would make  the contest 
unfair.  Temptation  must  be  an  equal  contest  or  our  succumbing  and  resisting  would  no  longer  be 
genuinely ‘up to us.’
10.3.
Origen’s  explanation  of temptation  is  philosophically  coherent  and  theologically  sound.  He  makes 
good  use  of traditional  Stoic  arguments  to  illustrate  important  Christian  convictions.  The  problems 
begin  with  his  discussion  of  the  Temptation  of  Christ.  The  exegesis  of  this  Biblical  episode  is 
notoriously difficult and it is  inevitable  that theologians  will  fall  into  one  of two traps.  In his article, 
The  Temptation of God Incarnate, David Werther argues that one must either deny the sinlessness of
365  The  idea  of  ‘free  will’  is  variously  rendered  by  ouyKaxtiGeoiq,  bcrni)  xou  qye|ioviKoO, 
£i)86icr|ai<;  and  xo  abxe^ouolov.  These are all Stoic terms.
366 ea autem  virtute,  quae nobis data est ut vincere possimus,  secundum  liberi arbitrii facultatem aut 
industrie utimur et vincimus, aut segniter et superamus {de Principiis 3.2.3).
367  Again  Origen  uses  Stoic  terminology  to  convey  the  idea  of freedom:  liberi  arbitrii facultas,  in 
nostra potestate, liberi arbitrii potestas.
204Christ or deny the fact of the Temptation.368 The crux of the problem is whether Christ can be said to 
have experienced the preliminary desire to sin. As we have seen, this is the fundamental feature of the 
phenomenon  of temptation.  But  surely  the  desire  to  sin  is  itself a  sin,  even  if accompanied  by  or 
followed  by  a  contrary  and  stronger  desire  to  resist?  369  It  is  a  slur  on  the  perfect  goodness  of the 
Saviour to suggest that he was ever tempted to yield to the suggestions of the devil. Could he, even for 
an instant, have genuinely desired to worship the devil and so gain control of all the kingdoms of the 
earth? If Christ did not, or could not, experience this kind of preliminary desire, then he cannot be said 
to have experienced temptation.
As we have  seen,  Origen believes that Christ was unable to  sin.370 This must include the preliminary 
desire  to  sin.  There  is  even the  suggestion that Christ’s body,  because  it was bom of a  Virgin,  was 
without the usual sinful desires.371  This would give Christ a very unfair advantage over ordinary men 
and  women.  He  would  lack the  ‘seeds  of sin’  described at de Principiis  3.2.2.  He would be exempt 
from what is known as  ‘internal temptation’, the natural concupiscence of the flesh.  In his exegesis of 
the Temptation, Origen insists that Christ had no desire, however fleeting, to yield to the devil. There 
was  no  struggle  to  resist  the  preliminary  desire  to  sin.  Christ  defeats  his  opponent  through  his  own 
invincible  divinity,  not  through  strength  of will  nor  admirable  and  imitable  self-control.  In  fact,  the 
wilderness experiences of Origen’s Christ are not temptations at all. Christ defeats the devil because he 
knows that he is God and, as such, perfectly good. It is this knowledge of his own divinity that explains 
Christ’s  responses  to  the  devil.  The  resisting  of temptation  is just  a  manifestation  of divine  power. 
Origen’s  Christ  knows  that  he  will  never,  can  never,  have  the  slightest  inclination  to  yield  to  the 
suggestions of his  opponent.  This  is  of course  entirely different  from the  way that ordinary men and 
women experience  temptation.  Christ’s defeat of the  devil  cannot therefore provide us with a helpful 
moral paradigm.
10.4.
368 Werther (1993).
369  On  this  important  point,  see  Werther  (1993),  pp.48-9.  Swinburne  (1994),  pp.201-7  and  Forsyth 
(1909), p.301 do not agree.
J > 7 ° See sections 8.2-9.6.
371  On this, see Crouzel (1956), p.  137:  “elle (scil. la chair du Christ) aussi est divinisee par son union 
au  Verbe,  et  l’homme  Jesus  ne  peut  connaitre  la  concupiscence  et  les  luttes  qu’elle  entraine.”  At 
Homilies on Leviticus (12.4),  Commentary on  St Matthew (frag.  11)  and Contra  Celsum  3.14  Origen 
similarly  stresses  the  uniqueness  of Christ’s  body.  See  section  5.6  for  a  further  discussion  of this 
important point.
205There are two surviving passages in which Origen discusses the Temptation of Christ: the Homilies on 
St.  Luke  (29,  30  and  31)  and  the  Commentary  on  St.  Matthew  (catena  fragments  60-67).  The  31st 
Homily on  Luke is devoted to a discussion of the third and final Temptation, the devil’s challenge to 
Christ  to  hurl  himself off the  pinnacle  of the  Temple  and  so  prove  his  divinity  (Luke  4.9).  Origen 
begins  his  sermon by highlighting the  incredible  fact that Christ  followed the  devil’s  lead,  following 
him to  Jerusalem and up  to  the top  of the  temple:  hoc  incredibile est.  Why,  Origen asks,  did Christ 
follow the  devil?  The  answer we  are  given is  that Christ was  completely sure  of victory,  completely 
sure that he would never yield to the temptations of the devil. Here is a Christ who feels no fear and no 
worry  at the  prospect  of temptation,  because  he  knows  that  he  will  resist  whatever  the  devil  might 
offer. Unlike us, who pray lead us not into temptation, Christ actively seeks it out and offers himself to 
it, calmly, willingly and entirely confidently. Origen compares Christ to an athlete agreeing to take part 
in a competition.  Origen is again using agonistic metaphors, but with an entirely different message.  It 
will  be  remembered that  at de Principiis  3.2.2,  Origen noted that the  contests between man  and the 
opposing powers are always fair and equal. As in boxing, beginners are pitted against beginners, boys 
against boys etc., so in the spiritual world no one is tested beyond or beneath his capacity.  In contrast 
to this, the contest between Christ and the devil is entirely unequal. The devil has no chance of winning 
and Christ is  fully aware  of this  fact.  He  approaches the  contest with the blase confidence of a prize 
fighter about to take on a young boy:
hoc  incredibile  est,  ut  diabolus  duceret  Filium  Dei,  et  ille  sequeretur.  sequebatur  plane  quasi 
athleta  ad  tentationem  sponte  projiscens,  non  formidibat  tentatem,  neque  insidias  callidissimi 
pertimescebat inimici, et quodomodo loquebatur:  ‘due quo vis, tenta ut placet, ad tentandum sponte me 
tribuo,  sustineo  quae  suggesseris.  praebo  me  in  quibuscunque  tentaveris,  invenies  me  in  omnibus 
fortiorem ’ {in Luc. Hom.3\).
The implication of this passage is that the devil would not have been able to ‘tempt’ Christ, had Christ 
not consented to play along with the charade. A very similar picture emerges from the Commentary on 
St.  Matthew (catena fragment 62).  Again, Origen’s main point is that Christ willingly offered himself 
to the temptation and that it was he who provided the devil with his means and opportunity.  Origen’s 
Christ knows exactly what the devil has in mind and he makes it his business to facilitate the plans of 
his opponent.  Christ knows that in the first temptation the devil plans to deceive him, as he deceived 
Adam,  through the offering of some kind of food.  The devil is afraid, however, that his plans will go
206awry because  Christ  is  not hungry.  Christ,  therefore,  willingly  fasts.  It  is his  subsequent hunger that 
provides the devil with his opportunity to offer the first temptation:
"ooa  £ve0upeuTO  6  SidpoXoq  pqxavtinaxa  7tpd<;  u7ioaK£>.iop6v  xou  cpaivop£voi) ’ A8dp,  at>xo<; 
fe8i8oxa  >.aPdq.  olov.  IXeyev  ev  fcaoxcp  6  8idPoA.oc;-  xov  Ttpdixov  dv0pa)7iov  8ia  PpfboEax;  f|rcadxr|aa,
ouxo<;  oi) 7t£ivqi  iva ahxov  ’ aTtaxrjriOG) 8ia PpaxjEGx;;  ev68(0ke xf|  m vp  (Commentary on St Matthew, 
Catena Fragment 62A).372
It  could  perhaps  be  said  that  Origen’s  Christ  was  genuinely  tempted  to  turn  the  stones  into  bread 
because he was genuinely hungry. In the  Commentary on  Galatians, Origen explicitly argues, against 
the docetics, that having fasted for forty days Christ was truly hungry (Commentary on  Galatians, PG 
14,  1295CD).  But against this, we have the evidence of the Commentary on St Matthew that Christ’s 
hunger was a deliberate ploy to force the devil to show his hand. There could not therefore have been 
any genuine desire to perform the miracle.
Origen gives a similar exegesis of the second temptation.  Having learnt the plans of the devil,  Christ 
provides  the  means  and  opportunity  for  their  fulfilment  by  willing  climbing  the  mountain.373  Once 
again,  the  experiences  of  Origen’s  Christ  are  not  at  all  the  experiences  of  an  ordinary  human 
temptation. First, only God could have such a meticulous foreknowledge of the enemy’s plans. Second, 
no ordinary human would have such confidence in his ability to resist temptation as not only to accept 
it willingly, but actually to provide the means and opportunity for it to happen.
This  Christ has  no  fear of temptation and  no  difficulty  in resisting  it.  He  knows  full well  and  at  all 
times that he is going to defeat the devil.  Indeed, for Origen, this is the very reason for Christ’s going 
into  the  wilderness:  xo  ftVEupa  xd  ayiov  imocpcovuv  dvqyayEv  auxdv  Eiq  xi^v  Epripov,  uapoppcav
auxdv  f|Sr|  KaOcXsiv  xoi>  8iaP6Xou  x^v  pcya^auxiav  (Commentary  on  St Matthew,  Catena  Fragment 
60A).  Origen  provides  two  other  Scriptural  examples  of God  foreknowing  in  detail  the plans  of his 
opponent  and providing the means  and opportunity for their fulfilment.  It was  God who  allowed his 
own creature,  the  serpent,  to  speak to Eve and it was God who allowed Satan to test Job.374 What is 
important  about  these  comparisons  is  the  implication  that  even  in  the  wilderness  Christ  was
372  See also Catena Fragment 62B,  in which Origen adds the crucial  ekoov  to Matthew 4.2:  when  he 
had willinslv fasted.
373£X£y£v  fcv  feauxco  6  8idPoA.og-  e i  fjv  Eiq  opoq  uv|/r|X.6v,  e8e1kvi)ov  oxqripaxa  Kai  £7tr|yy£X>.6pr|v 
abxco  Kai  7to>AdKi<;  h^axcov  abxdv.  dvf|X.0sv  6  ocoxqp  Eiq  xo  opoq  Kai  e8cokev  abxcp  XaPriqv 
(Commentary on St Matthew, Catena Fragment 62A).
374 Commentary on St Matthew, Catena Fragment 62B.
207(consciously) an omnipotent and omniscient God:  as God once allowed the devil to tempt Eve,  so he 
now allows himself to be similarly tempted.
Despite asserting that the Temptation is an experience of Christ human nature, Origen’s explanation of 
the defeat of the devil seems to depend entirely on the fact of the Saviour’s divinity.375 It is as God that 
Christ  resists  the  Temptation.  But  the  devil  is  entirely  unaware  of this  crucial  fact.  He  is  unable  to 
understand  the  ineffable  mystery of the  Incarnation  and  Christ  is  careful  to  hide  his  true  identity.376 
The  devil assumes that he  is tempting a man,377  albeit an extraordinary man:  dyvckov,  on  6 uiog  xoi> 
0eou  evr)v0pd)nr|O£v  -  £Xa0£  yap  auxov  f|  an6ppr|XO<;  £vav0po)7ir)ai<;  -  0n6>.a|k:v6n  av0po)7io<;  a>v 
qi)6oKf|0r|  xtp  0E Q >  5ia  xaq  dpExaq  auxoi),  Kai  X o ik o v   ccp06vr|O£v  aoxcp  xf|<;  xr|XiKauxr|<;  npf|c;,  a>07t£p 
Kai  xq>  naXaicp  ’ A5dp, Kai  e o k e u o e v   cooncp  e k e iv o v   e k P o X e iv   Kai  xouxov auxf|<;. 810'  Kai  7 tpoo£X0(bv 
Eyyuq  7ipd)ir|v  npooayEi  nEipav  xf|<;  yaaxpi|iapyla<;,  8i’  eIXe  Kai  xov  upcoxov ’ A8dp  (in  Luc.  Horn. 
29, Fragment 56).
10.5.
Origen often discusses the devil’s ignorance of the Saviour’s divinity.  For him, much of the drama of 
the Redemption depends upon Christ’s deception of an ignorant devil.  For example, he goes to great 
lengths to explain why the Virgin Mary should have bothered to marry St. Joseph. The reason for this 
was  to  trick  the  devil  into  thinking  that  Christ  was  an  ordinary  mortal,  conceived  through  ordinary 
marital  relations  (In  Luc.  Horn  6.3).378  It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  the  whole  importance  of the 
Temptation lies in the fact that Christ was tempted as a man; it should make no difference that the devil 
is  unaware  of  his  opponent’s  divine  nature.  There  is  a  vital  soteriological  significance  to  Christ 
experiencing  a  genuine  Temptation,  which  Origen  has  failed  to  recognize.  It  is  crucial  to  the 
Redemption that Christ be  in no way better able  to resist the Temptation than ordinary men.  As man 
fell  by  free  will  (by  a  freely  chosen  sin),  so  he  must  be  redeemed  by  free  will  (by  freely  chosen
375 c.f.  Commentary on St Matthew (Catena Fragment 65A). The devil is ridiculed for thinking that the 
Psalmist’s words -  He will give his angels charge over thee -  refer to Christ, as if he were in need of 
God’s help.  Origen emphasizes the divinity of Christ by quoting his reply to the tempter -  thou shalt 
not tempt the Lord thy God (Matthew 4.7).
376 cum ab ipso diabolo tenteretur,  nusquam confessus est Dei se esse Filium .  .  .  tacuit semper se esse 
Filium  Dei  (in  Luc.  Horn.  6).  Crouzel  (1989),  p. 189  discusses  the  connexion  between  virtue  and 
knowledge  in  Origen’s  system:  “only  a  pure  soul  can  know  God  and  the  divine  realities  and 
consequently  the  devil  is  ignorant  of everything  that  concerns  the  order of salvation:  that  cannot be 
revealed to him because he is incapable of understanding it.”
377 c.f. Crouzel, Fournier and Perichon (1962), p.502: “Le diable, pere des heretiques, professe a l’egard 
du Christ des opinions adptionistes.”
378  Consider  also  the  monumental  deception  of the  devil  that  occurred after Christ’s  death,  when his 
soul descended into Hades (Commentary on St Matthew 16.8). For a discussion of this, see section 7.4.
208virtue).379 This is certainly not Origen’s understanding of the Temptation. Once again, we see Origen’s 
reluctance to allow any salvific role to the  Saviour’s human nature.  Origen’s exegesis of the  last and 
most important temptation, the temptation to avoid the Passion, reveals a similar bias. Christ’s prayer 
for the cup to pass does not express a genuine desire to avoid the Crucifixion.  Origen’s Christ is not 
tempted, however fleetingly, to escape death. As the omniscient and entirely beneficent Saviour, he is 
fully aware of the benefits of his suffering and death. He wholeheartedly wants to die.
THE AGONY IN THE GARDEN.
11.1.
In  his  useful  article,  “Ancient  and  High  Medieval  Interpretations  of Gethsemane”,  Kevin  Madigan 
begins with an over-view of the Christological problems involved in the Gospel story.380
(1)  That Christ appears overwhelmed by passion and emotion.
(2)  That he appears ignorant of his salvific role, of the necessity of his death for the Redemption of 
the world.
(3)  That he appears to be in doubt when he asks - I f  it be possible.
(4)  That he appears to submit to death involuntarily, as he prayed three times to be allowed to avoid it. 
The  task of the Biblical  exegete  was  to  interpret the  story  in such a  way as to avoid the above  four 
problems.  Madigan discusses  a  wide range  of interpretations,  from Ambrose to Aquinas.  It seems  to 
me, however, that no exegesis is quite so full or quite so successful as that of Origen. We shall see that 
in his various discussions of the Agony in the Garden Origen tries very hard to present a Christ who is 
Stoically calm in the face of death, who understands perfectly well the soteriological importance of the 
Crucifixion and who therefore consciously and wholeheartedly wants to die.  We begin our discussion 
with Origen’s solution to problem number (1).
(A)  Solving the problem of Christ’s emotional or mental distress: the Saviour as Stoic Sage.
12.1.
When he had eaten the Last Supper, Christ went with his disciples to the Garden of Gethsemane, where 
he spoke one of the most famous, most controversial and most discussed of all Biblical verses: my soul 
is  exceeding sorrowful,  even  unto  death  (Matthew 26.38).  For the  exegetes  of the  Early Church,  the 
belief that Christ suffered emotional distress caused countless problems.  Physical suffering,  tiredness,
379 On these points, see Swinburne (1989), p.68.
209hunger  and  thirst,  could  be  easily explained  as  the  natural  consequence,  even  the  proof,  of Christ’s 
having assumed a real human body.  Indeed,  these facts were welcomed as  Scriptural evidence of the 
absurdity of docetism.381  Yet the Gospels also suggest that Christ experienced psychological suffering. 
In particular, the Agony in the Garden seems to hinge upon Christ’s fear and worry at the prospect of 
imminent death.
As  we  saw  in  section  4.3,  it  was  a  fundamental  doctrine  of almost  all  ancient  theology,  pagan  and 
Christian, that God could not experience emotion (TttiOoq).  Origen certainly believed that this was the 
case. He was very ready to follow the pagans’  lead and allegorize Biblical references to God’s anger, 
vengeance or jealousy. Furthermore, since dndGeia  was the eternal, blessed state of God, it became the
moral  ideal  for  mortals  striving  for  6poicooi<;  t c d  0ecp.  Origen’s  writings  are  full  of  demands  to
suppress  passion  and  emotion.  To  believe  that  Christ  experienced  emotion  would  seem not  only  to 
refute  the  fact  of his  divinity,  it  would  also  seem  to  reduce  his  status  to  that  of a  weak-willed, 
contemptible man who had not yet learned self-control. Celsus laughs at Christ for being the emotional 
weakling  described  in  the  Gospels.382  It  is  within  the  context  of this pagan ridicule  and  of his  own 
philosophical persuasions that Origen is so unwilling to allow Christ any genuine emotions.
Origen’s longest and most interesting discussion of the Agony is that of the Commentary Series on St. 
Matthew (chapters 90-95). His first solution to the problem of Christ’s emotional suffering is simply to 
refer  it  to  the  Saviour’s  human  nature:  coepit  quidem  tristari  secundum  humanam  naturam.  quae 
talibus passionibus subdita  est,  non  autem secundum  divinam  virtutem,  quae ab huiusmodi passione 
longe remota  est.ni  But although Origen  admits  that Christ’s  human nature  is  theoretically passible, 
we shall see that he takes great pains to minimize as far as possible his actual experience of emotion. 
Origen’s  exegesis  can be  usefully compared  with  that  of St Ambrose.  The  Bishop  of Milan,  writing 
against the Arians, could rejoice in the fact that Christus tim et.  .  .  ut homo turbatur,  ut homo fle t.  .  . 
turbatur anima secundum humanam fragilitatem turbatur.384 Ambrose had no problem with emotions 
per se, only with the heretical suggestion that they might be ascribed to the Son of God and hence be
380 Madigan (1995), pp.158-161.
381 On this, see Gesche (1959), p.385.
382 Contra Celsum 2.9; 2.24; 7.50.
383 It is with this in mind that Origen feels able to explain the absence of the Agony in the Garden from 
the fourth Gospel: Iohannes autem, propositum habens exponere Iesum  Verbum Deum, sciens quia ipse 
est  vita  et  resurrectio,  nescit  Deum  impassibilem  refugere  passionem  (Commentary  Series  on  St 
Matthew 92).
384 Quoted in Peter Lombard, Sentences 15.1 and 17.3 (Madigan (1995), p.162).
210proof of his subordination to the Father. Origen agrees that Christ’s divine nature is impassible, but this 
is  not enough.  He  must  show that even his  humanity  is  free  from such  weakness.  Unlike  Ambrose, 
Origen cannot accept that Christ was really afraid, that he really cried and that he was really confused 
or disturbed. As a firm believer in the virtues of drcdOeia,  Origen must present Christ as the paradigm 
par excellence of Stoic calm.
12.2.
In  chapter 90  of the  Commentary Series  on  St Matthew,  Origen  explicitly  attacks  those  who  try to 
defend or even to advocate the emotional life by quoting the example of Christ in the Garden. Origen’s 
response to this hinges upon a meticulous exegesis of Matthew 26.37 -  He began to be sorrowful and 
very heavy. Origen highlights the word ‘began’ (coepit). It is crucial that Christ be said only to begin to 
be sorrowful and very heavy. For Origen, there is a huge difference between beginning to be sorrowful 
and actually being sorrowful. He concludes that Christ did not experience the full-blown emotion, but 
only the beginnings of it, a foretaste (gustum):
considera quia  non  dixit tristibatur et taedibatur,  sed coepit tristari et taedari.  multum  enim  interest 
inter  tristari  et  incipere  tristari.  si  ergo  aliquis,  defendens passiones  humanas,  profert  nobis  etiam 
ipsum  tristatum fuisse  Iesum,  audiat  quoniam  qui  ‘tentatus  est per  omnia  secundum  similitudinem 
praeter peccatum ’,  hie  non  est tristatus  tristitia passionis  ipsius,  sed factus  est secundum  humanam 
naturam tantum in ipso principio tristitiae et pavoris (Commentary Series on St Matthew 90).385 
Origen feels able to defend the Saviour from the accusation that he was afraid by stressing the fact that 
he  felt  only the  beginnings  of fear  and  that  these  beginnings  are  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
emotion proper.  In this passage Origen is making implicit use of the theory of npo7id0£ia, a theory that 
he fully develops elsewhere.386 Origen is the first Christian author to use the term and the first to make 
use of the theory as an exegetical tool.387 His arguments would prove to be of enduring popularity and 
would be seen as one of the most successful ways of explaining the Agony in the Garden.388
385c.f.  Commentary  Series  on  St.  Matthew  90:  coepit pavere  et  tristari,  nihil  amplius  tristitiae  vel 
pavoris patiens  nisi principium  tantum.  nec  enim  scripta  est quia pavit vel tristatus  est,  sed coepit 
pavere et coepit tristari.
386 Selecta in Psalmos 4.5 (PG 12  1141D-1144B). This passage will be discussed in detail below.
387 So Gesche (1959), p. 191.
388 Origen’s doctrine of 7ipo7id0sia was repeated, almost verbatim, by Didymus the Blind in the fourth 
century.  Jerome’s discussions of the antepassiones in his Epistle to Salvina are basically a repetition of 
Origen’s arguments in the Selecta  in Psalmos.  More  importantly, Jerome follows Origen in using the 
theory  to  explain  the  Agony  in  the  Garden:  aliud est  enim  constritari  et  aliud  incipere  constritari, 
constritabatur autem non timore patiendi, qui ad hos venerat ut pateretur (Commentary on St. Matthew 
94).  See  ibid.,  preface  91,  where  Jerome  admits  to  being  influenced  by  Origen.  The  theory  of
211Gesche tells us that the theory of 7tporcd0£ia  originated with the Stoics.389 Richard Layton provides a 
useful  and  detailed discussion of the pagan philosophical background.390 He begins by reminding us 
that,  according  to  Stoic  psychology,  even  passion  and  emotion  were  dependent  upon  rational 
judgement: they were the result of a considered decision on how to react to a particular situation. This 
theory must of course  be  seen within the  context  of Stoic  monism,  according  to  which the  soul  is  a 
unified  whole,  not  divided  into  ‘rational’  and  ‘emotional’  compartments.  But  this  convenient  theory 
foundered  upon  the  rocks  of undeniable  empirical  evidence.  It  is  obviously  the  case  that  certain 
emotional reactions are not within the control of reason and that not even the wise man is able to avoid 
them.  It  was  in  attempt  to  explain  this  kind  of reaction  that  the  Stoics  developed  the  doctrine  of 
7tpo7id0eia.  According  to  this  doctrine,  emotion  comprises  two  distinct  stages.  The  first  stage  is  an 
involuntary  and  unavoidable  first  movement,  an  initial  disturbance  of  the  soul  occasioned  by  an 
external  stimulus.  The  second  stage  is  a  voluntary  and  rational  reaction,  the  decision  whether  to 
suppress  or  to  develop  these  preliminary  feelings.  It  is  only  at  the  second  stage  that  the  genuine 
emotion  was  believed  to  occur.  Layton  cites  chapter  two  of Seneca’s  de  Ira  as  a  particularly  clear 
analysis  of the  phenomenon  of  npO7td0£ia.  Of  course  Origen  could  not  have  known  the  Senecan 
passage  first  hand,  but  the  general  idea  is  present  in  a  number  of  Stoic  authors,391  and  Origen’s 
familiarity with Stoicism is well known and well documented.392 The use of the doctrine of npo7rd0£ia 
in Origen’s exegesis is almost certainly the direct result of his acquaintance with Stoic philosophy.393 
Origen’s doctrine of 7ipo;rd0£ia is most fully developed in the Selecta in Psalmos 4.5  (PG  12,  1141D- 
1144B). He uses the Psalmist’s command -  Be angry and sin not -  as an illustration of the theory. The
npo7id0£ia was  also popular in the Middle Ages.  It appears  in the immensely influential Sentences of 
Peter Lombard and thereafter became a staple ingredient of Mendicant exegesis. On all the above, see 
Madigan  (1995),  pp.  165-7.  It  is  very  sad  that  neither  the  Mediaeval  theologians  nor  the  modem 
commentators acknowledge Origen as the originator of this popular and successful exegesis.
389 Gesche (1959), p.394. See also Heine (2002), p. 194.
390 Layton (2000), pp.263-265.
391 We are, of course, in the unfortunate position of having lost a great deal of ancient evidence. Origen 
would  presumably  have  known  many  more  references  to  the  theory  than  is  possible  today.  Layton 
refers  to  Aulus  Gellius  19,  1.4-8  (discussed  in  Augustine,  City  of God 9.4).  For  an  analysis  of the 
Augustine  passage,  see  O’Daly  (1999),  p.119.  O’Daly  emphasizes  the  fact that the  second  stage  (at 
which a 7tporcd0£ia might become a 7id0o<;) is entirely under the control of reason, which either gives or 
withholds  its  assent  to  these  first  movements.  On  first  movements  in  pagan  Stoicism,  see  Sorabji 
(2000), pp.66-75. He discusses the Senecan passage in some detail and also refers to Cicero (Tusculan 
Disputations  3.82-3),  Plutarch  {On  Moral  Virtue  449  AB)  and  Epictetus  (4.6.10).  Once  again,  the 
crucial point emerges that it is the sage’s refusal to give the assent of reason to the first movements that 
saves him from experiencing emotion proper. For the Stoics, the achievement of d7id0£ia was a rational 
and voluntary decision. As we shall see, Origen is in full agreement with this.
392 See, for example, Chadwick (1947).
393 All the above comes from Layton (2000), pp.263-6.
212first phrase -  Be angry -  refers to an involuntary (dTtpoalpcxov) first movement (rcpo7id0£iav), a tumult 
( k X 6 v o v )  or disturbance (oeiopov) of the soul. This preliminary ‘anger’  is not a sin (dpdpxripa) and is 
not blameworthy (oi)  yeKidiq). The second phrase -  and sin not -  refers to the second stage at which 
we  decide,  voluntarily,  how to react to these  first movements of anger,  whether to develop them and 
become angry or to suppress them and retain our equilibrium.  Layton draws our attention to a similar 
discussion of the doctrine of npondBeia in the Commentary on Ephesians (fragment 19.68-75).394 Here, 
too,  Origen  carefully  distinguishes  the  two  stages  of anger:  the  first  is  simply  the  involuntary  first 
movement,  occasioned  by  an  external  mishap.  What  is  particularly  important  about  this  passage  is 
Origen’s insistence that not even the ‘perfect’ can avoid experiencing npondBeiai.395 
The theory, although not the technical vocabulary, is also found in the de Principiis. As we have seen, 
the  story  of the  two  men  and  the  prostitute  at  de  Principiis  3.1.4  hinges  on  the  fact  that both  men 
experience the same preliminary sensation (xcov  abxwv  ai)|i|3Epr|K6xG)v  .  .  .  oi  p£v yapyaXiapoi Kai oi 
speGiapoi aopPaivooaiv), but only the first man takes the conscious decision to develop the feeling and 
consummate his desire. As Jackson points out, this story is entirely Stoic in its implications: it is in fact 
lifted directly from Epictetus.396 Similarly, at de Principiis 3.2.2, Origen argues that no one can escape 
the first movements (primi motus) or beginnings (initia) of sin. It is impossible to avoid the preliminary 
feelings of sexual desire, covetousness or anger, but it is the task of the Christian to keep such feelings 
well  under control -   in other words,  to  prevent  a  TtpoTtaGeia  from becoming  a  TtdG oc;.  In these  two 
passages, Origen keeps very close to the original Stoic theory. In particular, he is keen to stress that the 
successful resisting of TtpondGeiai is the work of a properly trained intellect.397
So  for Origen,  a 7rpo7td0£ia  is  an  involuntary and unavoidable  reaction.  The man who  experiences  a 
7ipo7td0£ia is not responsible for the feeling.  It is only when he allows a  nporcdGeia to become a n&Qot; 
that he can properly and fairly be blamed.  It is within the context of such discussions that we are  to 
understand  Origen’s  insistence  that  Christ  experienced  only  the  beginnings  of  fear  and  worry 
(Commentary Series on St Matthew 90). His feelings in Gethsemane are involuntary, unavoidable and
394 Layton (2000), p.267.
395 See Heine’s comments ad loc: “a 7tpo7td0£ia is common to all people and is not under their control.
.  .  Origen  is  clearly  referring  to  a  sudden  flare-up  of anger  which  occurs  simultaneously with  some 
unexpected stimulus ” (Heine (2002), p. 193).
396 Jackson (1966), p.60.
397  These  passages  are  discussed  by  Sorabji  (2000),  pp.346-351.  He  draws  particular  attention  to 
Origen’s use  of the technical  Stoic  term oayKaxdGEoiq  at de Principiis 3.1.4.  Origen’s explanation of 
resisting temptation is worked out within an orthodox Stoic framework. On this, see our discussions in 
section 10.2.
213entirely blameless.  It is vitally important that Christ did not take the voluntary decision to experience 
the full  n&Qoq.  While Origen cannot deny that Christ felt the beginnings of passion and emotion - the 
Gospels  explicitly  state  that  he  did  -  these  can be  explained  and  excused  by  reference  to  the  Stoic 
theory of 7ipo7td0eia.
12.3.
In  the  Commentary  Series  on  St Matthew,  Origen  offers  another,  entirely  different  explanation  for 
these  beginnings  of fear  and  worry.  This  explanation  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  present 
situation and gives Origen even more scope to present Christ in the guise of the immovable Stoic sage. 
Origen  suggests  that  Christ  experienced  these  ‘beginnings’  of  emotion,  or  rather  pretended  to 
experience  them,  for didactic purposes.  This  show of fear was  intended as  a moral lesson, by which 
Christ might teach the disciples the dangers of over-confidence (that pride which comes before a fall) 
and  the  need  for  fear  (that  humility  which  leads  men  to  seek  the  help  of the  Lord).398  For Origen, 
Christ’s  main  pupil  for  this  lesson  is  St.  Peter.  Earlier  in  the  same  Commentary,  Peter  had  been 
severely criticized for boasting at the Last Supper that though all men shall be offended because of thee 
this night, yet will I never be offended (Matthew 26.33).  Overconfident in his own moral strength,  St 
Peter  failed  to  recognize  the  weakness  of  the  human  condition  and  the  constant  need  for  divine 
assistance.  Despite  his  extravagant  claims,  the  disciple  denied  Christ  three  times.399  In  Gethsemane, 
Christ assumed the persona of a humble and fearful man in order to show Peter, and countless others, 
the proper way for a Christian to behave. The Agony in the Garden has become a didactic charade.400 
According to this exegesis, it was not the thought of an impending, terrible death that occasioned these 
‘beginnings’  of fear and worry, nor is  it the case that Christ himself recognized the need for humility 
and dependence upon God. Origen believes that Christ’s behaviour in Gethsemane is, to a large extent, 
a pretence acted out for the benefit of the disciples:
factus  est ..  .  tantum  in  ipso principio  tristitiae et pavoris,  ut ostendat discipulis suis praesentibus, 
maxime Petro magna de se existimanti, rebus istis, quod et postea eis dixit, quia  ‘ spiritus promptus est, 
caro autem infirma  et non est aliquando confidendum in ea, sed semper timendum de ea, quia incauta 
confidentia ad iactantiam ducit, timor autem infirmitatis ad auxilium Dei confugere adhortatur, sicut et
398  This  is  surely  a precursor  of the Athanasian explanation  of Christ’s  emotions  as  mere pedagogic 
condescension. According to Athanasius, Christ pretended to experience passion and emotion in order 
to illustrate certain moral points (Gesche (1959), pp.388-99). In this, as in so much else, we see Origen 
pre-empting the great Christological doctrines of following century.
99 Commentary Series on St. Matthew 88.
214Dominum  ipsum paululum progredi et cadere in faciem  et orare (Commentary Series on St Matthew 
90).401
This exegesis is very similar to Origen’s explanation of Christ retreat to Ephraim at Commentary on St 
John 28.23 (18). Christ left Jerusalem not because he was afraid, but because he wanted to teach future 
Christians the important moral lesson that they should not rush into martyrdom:  xauxa  Kai  xa  xouxoiq 
7iapa7iX.f|oia  dvaY£Ypdcp0ai  vopiCco  pouXop^vou  xou  Xdyov  £7uoxp6cp£iv  hpaq  iind  xou  0£pp6x£pov 
Kai  d>.OYiox6x£pov  ETtiTcrjSav  xa>  e v   xa>  £(o<;  0avdxou  &YO>vi^£o0ai  7i£pi  xfjq  &>.r|0£iaQ  Kai
papxupfiiv 402 Once again, Origen’s main aim is to minimize Christ’s experience of emotion.
12.4.
It is  in the  Contra  Celsum, however, that we find the most extreme examples of Origen’s tendency to 
‘Stoicize’ Christ. It is of course a distinguishing characteristic of the apologetic genre to present Christ 
as  a  moral  exemplum  whom  even  the  pagans  could  admire.  We  have  already  seen  how  pagan 
philosophers placed a premium on the virtues of &7id0£ia  and how they ridiculed passion and emotion 
as the irrational reaction of an untrained mind. The wise man would not be angered by a theft, grieved 
by a death or aroused by a beautiful woman.  But it was one’s attitude to physical pain and death that 
was the real test.
At  Contra  Celsum  7.53,  Celsus refers to two  famous  examples  of philosophical endurance,  Epictetus 
and  Anarxarchus.403  Celsus  contrasts  what he  sees  as  the  cowardly  and pathetic  behaviour  of Christ 
with  the  staunch heroism of the pagan heroes.  Celsus  then wonders  why the  Christians  chose  such a 
wretched  man  to  admire  when  they  could  be  worshipping  the  likes  of Epictetus  and  Anaxarchus. 
Origen’s response  to  these  criticisms  is  to  argue  that Christ is  every bit as  admirable as Epictetus or 
Anaxarchus. In fact, his attitude to death is even more ‘Stoic’ than theirs.
400 So, Harl (1956), p.241.
401  c.f. Commentary Series on St. Matthew 91: ad hoc autem adduxit eos, maxime Petrum magna de se 
confidentem,  ut  videant et audiant ubi est posse  hominis  et quomodo  impetratur .  .  .  et discant non 
magna  de  se  sapere,  sed  humilia  aestimare,  nec  veloces  esse  ad promittendum,  sed  solliciti  ad 
orandum.  ideo et illos duxit qui videbatur Jideliores et fortes, similiter Petro,  in quibus similiter facile 
poterat locus invenire iactantia propter fiducium fidei. See also Commentary Series on St. Matthew 92: 
nam  sicut  multum  confidere  non  debemus,  ne  nostram  virtutem  videamur  profiteri,  sic  multum 
pusillanimiter agere, et diffidere non debemus, ne dei adiutoris nostri videamur pronuntiare.
402  See also Commentary on St Matthew (frag. 70), where Origen claims that it was not because of fear 
(oi)  8ia  5£iXiav)  that  Christ  left  Jerusalem  on  hearing  of the  death  of John  the  Baptist.  His  stay  in 
Capernaum is an allegorical reference to the future conversion of the Gentiles.
403 Epictetus was famous for his indifferent attitude to external misfortune. Celsus refers to the story of 
his master breaking his leg: “When his master twisted his leg, he simply replied -  ‘you’re breaking it.’ 
And when he had broken it -  ‘did I not tell you that you were breaking it?”’ Anarxarchus is less well
215Origen begins by stressing the Saviour’s silence. The meekness of Christ before Pilate was a common­
place of the anti-Christian polemic.404 Origen turns the criticism on its head and cites Christ’s silence as 
grounds  for particular admiration.  While the pagans bothered themselves with memorable bons mots, 
Christ kept a dignified silence. The inference is that Christ could easily have defended himself from the 
spurious charges, but as he had no desire to avoid death there was no need for him to enter into any 
discussion (Contra Celsum 7.55).405 Origen continues his defence of Christ by pointing out his courage 
(Kapxepia),  patient  endurance  (imopovf|)  and  meekness  (7tp<?6xr|<;).406  Whatever  abuse  he  endured, 
Christ refrained from saying anything irritable  (d y a v a K x r ix iK o v )  or cowardly (hyzvic) (Contra Celsum 
7.55).
This  Christ  has  achieved  all  the  moral  ideals  of a  Stoic  wise  man.  He  faces  death  with  absolute 
equanimity.  He  feels no  fear at the prospect of terrible pain.  Even the  vocabulary used by Origen is 
Stoic.407 Yet Origen has perhaps ‘over-Stoicized’ the Redeemer. Gauthier points out that the Stoic ideal 
of  Kapxepia  is  in  fact  the  opposite  of the  New  Testament  virtue  of imopovf|.  Origen  is  wrong  to 
conflate the two.  While the Christian is urged to depend entirely on the grace of God, the  Stoic  sage 
prided himself upon a lordly self-sufficiency.408
At  Commentary Series on  St Matthew  119,  Origen is  similarly anxious to show how Christ’s  silence 
before Pilate was simply a reflection of proverbial Stoic calm: miratus est (scil. Pilatus) videns eum in 
tranquilla et quieta sapientiae gravitate .  .  .  Christus inturbabilis maneret et staret ante mortem quae 
apud omnes  homines  terribilis  existimatur.  The  Stoic  flavour of the  passage  is  more  obvious  in the 
Greek fragments, where Christ is described as  dxapaxov,  axpeuxov and  yaXqvdv. The Gospels make 
no  reference  to  Christ’s  emotional  state  at  this  stage,  but  Origen  feels  obliged to paint  an  elaborate
known. His main claim to fame was his response to the tyrant who was crushing him in a mortar:  ‘Beat 
on! Beat on the pouch of Anaxarchus! You’re not hurting himV (Chadwick’s translation).
404  Frede  (1997),  p. 123.  See,  for  example,  Porphyry’s  Against  the  Christians  (in  Macarius  Magnes 
Apocrit. 3.1).
405 For more on the subject of the Saviour’s silence see Contra  Celsum,  preface  1-2. Gauthier (1949), 
p.231  quotes  from  preface  2  (jieyaX-ocpucoc;  i)7iepea)paK6vai  xooq  Kaxqydpoix;)  and  notes  the  overtly 
Stoic terminology.
406  ‘Meekness’  is  perhaps  not  the  perfect  translation  for  7 tpqtf>xr|<;.  It  does  not  have  connotations  of 
mildness  or  humility.  It  is  the  rough  equivalent  of drcdBeia,  the  opposite  of  dypi6xr|<;  and  6pyq  (so 
LSJ).  See  Gregory  of Nyssa  {de  Beat.  2),  where  rcpq:6xr|<;  is  defined  as  the  victory  of reason  over 
passion.
407  Both  Kapxepia  and  7ip<?6xr|<;  are  used by  Epictetus  (2.22.36,  3.10.6,  3.20.10,  4.5.22,  4.7.12  and 
Enchiridion  10). Origen knew Epictetus first hand (Jackson (1966), p.20). SVF gives many citations of 
both  Kapxepia  and  7rp<?6xr|<;  (3.60.6-7,  3.61.20,  3.64.23,  3.64.35,  3.65.13-14,  3.66.13,  33.66.15, 
3.66.29, 3.67.24, 3.67.40, 3.93.28).
216picture  of complete  and  utter  calm.  Origen  must  always  avoid  the  inference  (seized  upon  by  the 
pagans) that Christ’s silence was an indication of his fear.
12.5.
Having  looked  at  Christ’s  behaviour  before  Pilate,  Origen  turns  his  attention  to  the  Agony  in  the 
Garden  (Contra  Celsum  7.55).  Naturally,  he  denies  that  Christ’s  prayer  for  the  cup  to  pass  was  a 
reflection of cowardice (dno  iyevveia<;). This would be entirely incongruent with the  Saviour’s usual 
moral character, as epitomized in the Arraignment before Pilate. Origen declines to give an explanation 
of what  the  prayer  does  mean;  he  simply  refers  the  reader  elsewhere.  It  obviously  suits  Origen’s 
apologetic  agenda  to  concentrate  upon  Christ’s  fmal  acceptance  of the  cup,  rather  than  his  initial 
refusal.  In  explaining  Christ’s  acquiescence  to  the  Passion,  Origen  once  again  presents  a  man  who 
conforms  to  pagan  heroic  ideals:  navxoc,  oimvooouv  xd  7iepioxaxiKdv  oO  Tipoqyoupevov  elvai 
vopiCovxoq,  d X X '  imop£vovxo<;  xo  pi)  7ipor|youp6vco<;  aupPaivov,  oxav  Kaipoq  KaXf).  aX X d  Kai  oi)K 
ev8s5(OK6xo(;  fjv  f|  cpcavi),  euapeoxoupfevoi)  5£  xotq  aupPaivouai  Kai  rcpoxipcbvxog  xd  dno 
upovoiaq  rcepioxaxiKd f]  Xiyovoa <pcovr|-  rckijv  oi)  xi  eyco  06Xco,  dXX d xi on (Contra Celsum 7.55).
This  exegesis has many advantages.  Origen presents Christ as the fearless hero who  does not merely 
‘give  in’  to  death,  but  who  actually  finds  it  ‘well  pleasing’  and  ‘preferable’.  This  attitude,  the 
traditional philosophical response to external misfortune, was deliberately intended to impress the likes 
of Celsus.  It  is  rather  far  removed  from  the  original  Gospel  passage.  Naturally  Origen  declines  to 
mention the fact that Christ was exceeding sorrowful or that he began to be sorrowful and very heavy. 
Origen’s method in the Contra Celsum is to ignore difficult verses, unless Celsus draws direct attention 
to them. This Christ, like every good Stoic, is stripped of all emotion.
There  are  however  some  major  difficulties  with  this passage.  It  is  surely rather  irreverent to  reduce 
Christ’s Agony to the level of philosophical one-up-man-ship and to compare the Saviour with the likes 
of Anaxarchus and Epictetus. Most worrying of all however is the suggestion that the Crucifixion was 
an  unfortunate  accident  (oopPaivov)  which  befell  Christ  and  that,  although  he  submits  to  it
(i)7to|i6vovxoq),  it is certainly not a course of events that is nporiyoijpevov 409 This exegesis is entirely 
different from the one given in the Commentary on St Matthew, which we shall soon be discussing. In
408  Gauthier  (1949),  p.227.  Gauthier  is  discussing  Clement,  but  his  remarks  apply  equally  well  to 
Origen.
409  nporiyoupevov  is  a  notoriously  difficult  word  to  translate.  For  a  discussion,  see  Sharpies  (1975), 
p.49. The word is often used in juxtaposition with oupPaivov  (as in this passage). In such contexts, it
217the Gospel Commentary, Origen insists that Christ welcomed the Crucifixion because he was fully and 
consciously aware of the soteriological significance of his death. At Contra Celsum 7.55, Christ seems 
basically unwilling  to  die  and  totally unaware  of the  momentous  implications  of the  Passion.  In  the 
end, he acquiesces, but only as the wise man acquiesces to the plans and arrangements of an inscrutable 
providence.
Origen provides  a similar interpretation of Gethsemane at Contra  Celsum  2.25.  Once again,  Christ is 
deliberately presented as a Stoic wise man, praised for his TiapaoKeuq,  ein ovia  and  |i8yaXo\j/uxia. At 
Contra  Celsum  2.42,  Christ  is  said  to  exhibit  Kapxepiav  Kai  |ieyaA.ovjn)xlav.  These  are  certainly not 
New  Testament  virtues.410  In  fact, pEyaXovi/uxia  is  an  inversion  of traditional  Christian morality;  its 
defining feature was an arrogant contempt for everything except the philosophic self.411 The Stoic wise 
man  was  entirely  self-sufficient:  he  did  not  need  even  God.  The  descriptions  of Christ  at  Contra 
Celsum 2.25  and 2.42 are perfectly in tune with pagan moral philosophy. This has obvious apologetic 
advantages.  To  present  a  Christ  who  embodied  the  New Testament  virtues  of love,  pity,  mercy  and 
forgiveness would only have increased Celsus’ scom.
Origen was always very much aware  of the  audience  for whom he was writing.  As we have seen,  he 
was  master  of a  great  many  genres  and  suited  his  style  and  his  arguments  to  the  requirements  of 
each.412 The Contra Celsum was written as a response to a pagan intellectual, in an attempt to convince 
people  like  him  of the  truths  of Christianity.413  Origen  never  forgets  the  fact  that  he  is  writing  for 
pagans, and for pagans steeped in philosophical learning. The didactic platitudes of the Homilies would 
be  no  use  here  nor  would  the  complex  theology  of  the  Biblical  Commentaries.  As  the  Summa 
Theologica is different from the Summa Contra Gentiles,414 so the Commentary Series on St Matthew is 
different from the Contra Celsum.
can  be  variously  translated  as  ‘principal’,  ‘prior  in  importance’,  ‘chief,  ‘purposeful’  (Sharpies  and 
LSJ).
410 Borret (editor Sources  Chretiennes, ad loc.) writes:  “Origene utilise ici la classification Stoi'cienne 
des vertues.”
411  Gauthier  (1949),  p.227.  See  the  definition  of p£yaXov|/ux^a  given  by  Diogones  Laertius  at  SVF 
3.7.127.
412 See section 6.1.
413  The  question  of the  intended  readership  of apologetic  literature  is  much  debated.  See  chapter  1, 
section  1.2  for  a  discussion.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  Contra  Celsum  was  written partly to  re-assure 
fellow Christians (see preface 4) and partly to convert the pagans. Chadwick (1953), p.ix suggests that 
it was the fruit of actual debates which took place in Alexandria.
414  On  the  origins  of the  latter  as  an  aid  to  catholic  missionaries  in  their  attempts  to  convert  the 
Moslems, see Davies (1992), p.6.
218The aims and methods of the Contra Celsum are very apparent in Origen’s discussions of the Agony in 
the  Garden.  Celsus  and  his  fellows  would  have  had  little  interest  in  the  complexities  of Atonement 
theory and  Origen  is  well  aware that they would be  out of place  here.  The pagans  would have been 
much more impressed by the depiction of Christ as the philosophical hero, following in the illustrious 
footsteps  of Socrates  and Epictetus  and accepting with  Stoic  calm whatever blows  might befall  him. 
Throughout the Contra Celsum, Christ is presented as the mighty hero who can match and beat any of 
the  pagan  opposition.  He  is  more  Stoic  than  Epictetus,  more  miraculous  than  Asklepius  and  more 
vengeful than Dionysus.
(B)  Christ’s Prayers for the cup to pass from him and his final acceptance of the Passion.
13.1.
As has been said,  the  Christ of the  Contra  Celsum  is deliberately cast in the guise of the  Stoic  sage, 
enduring with proverbial calm the blows of external fortune. Origen has little concern in this work for 
Christ’s thrice repeated prayer for the cup to pass.  When Celsus draws attention to this embarrassing 
episode,  Origen chides him for quoting only the  first half of the prayer and ignoring the second.  The 
most important point is that Christ, in the end, accepts the cup (Contra  Celsum 2.25). His preliminary 
refusal  is  simply a manifestation or expression of a genuine humanity.  Christ was a real man and,  as 
such,  experienced  that  weakness  of flesh  which  is  characteristic  of all  humanity.  Origen  is  keen  to 
point out that the words Let this cup pass from me are spoken only once, whereas the phrase Not as I 
will but as  thou  wilt is repeated three times.  Christ’s  ‘willing  spirit’  is much stronger than his  ‘weak 
flesh’ (Contra Celsum 2.25).
Origen also  suggests  that the prayer for the cup to pass could be interpreted as an expression of the 
‘purest  philanthropy’  (Crombie’s  translation).  Christ  knows  that  if  he  drinks  the  cup,  suffers  the 
Passion, the Jews will be lost and Jerusalem will be destroyed (Contra Celsum 2.25). It is the desire to 
avoid these wretched consequences that inspires the thrice repeated prayer.415
Once again, Origen will not countenance the thought that Christ’s words are an expression of fear. The 
Agony  is  either  proof of the  Saviour’s  genuine  (non-docetic)  humanity  or  proof of a  far-reaching 
divine beneficence.  But what is lacking in the  Contra  Celsum  is a satisfactory,  Christian, explanation 
of Christ’s  final  acceptance  of the  cup.  We  have  seen  how  Origen  explains  Christ’s  acquiescence 
solely in terms  of Stoic  endurance.  He  agrees  to the Passion,  not because he understands his role  as
219Redeemer of the world, but because he is brave, magnanimous and well prepared. Madigan’s problem 
number (2), that Christ is unaware of the salvific importance of his death, remains unsolved.
13.2.
A  very  different  picture  emerges  when  we  look  at  those  works  written  for  a  specifically  Christian 
audience.  In  the  Exhortation  to  Martyrdom  and  the  Commentary  Series  on  St  Matthew,  Origen’s 
exegesis  of the  Agony  in  the  Garden  hinges  precisely  upon  Christ’s  understanding  of the  salvific 
importance  of his  death.  It is within this context that Origen explains both the initial refusal and the 
final  acceptance  of the  cup of the Passion.  This Christ is not the Christ of the  Gospels, nor is he the 
Christ of the philosophers. This is the Christ of the theologians. All his thoughts, words and deeds are 
carefully (re-)interpreted to avoid the Christological problems inherent in the Gospel narrative.416 
We have already seen how in the Commentary Series on St. Matthew Origen is extremely unwilling to 
admit that Christ in the Garden experienced psychological suffering. At most, he felt the  ‘beginnings’ 
of fear and worry. Moreover, these ‘beginnings’ could be justified as a didactic charade performed for 
the benefit of the disciples. Origen does not believe that Christ was genuinely afraid at the prospect of 
death.  Similarly,  in chapter 29 of the Exhortation  to Martyrdom,  Origen explicitly denies that Christ 
felt any fear (oi)56va  (poPoupevoi)  .  .  .  |ir|5ev6c;  SeikicovToq). It obviously fits the protreptic purpose of
the  treatise  to  show Christ approaching death calmly and bravely.  The would-be martyrs are thereby 
encouraged to have the same attitude.
Having  stripped  Christ  of fear  and  worry,  Origen  has  still  to  deal  with  the  famous  prayer -   O  my 
Father,  if it be possible,  let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt (Matthew 
26.39).  Origen’s  exegesis  of this  verse  is  once  again meticulous:  it hinges  upon one  small  word,  the 
demonstrative pronoun  ‘this’  (touto).  Origen argues that when Christ prays for this cup to pass from 
him,  he  is not praying to be spared the pain of martyrdom in general.  If this were the case, he would 
not have used the demonstrative. Origen believes that Christ is praying to be spared this particular kind 
of martyrdom (this particular cup) and to suffer instead a death even more severe. Christ is asking the 
Father to be allowed to suffer the kind of death that would be of the most benefit to the most people, 
knowing full well that this would involve far greater suffering:
415  See  also  Commentary Series on  St Matthew 92  for the  same  exegesis.  We discuss this passage  in 
section 14.2.
416 Madigan (1995), pp. 158-61.
220opa  xoivuv  si  8ovaaai,  navxoq  |iapxupioi)  xou  Ka0’  bnoiavouv  np6cpaoiv  8£,68ou  dnoxeA-ouiievou 
rcoxrpiou  Ka>.ou|i6vou,  cpdoKeiv  oxi  o()  xd  ytvoq  xou  papxupiou  Kappxeixo  6  Xkyw  "7tapeX0^xco 
hri  epou xo noxijpiov xouxo"  (ecpaaxe ydp a v  7tapeA.06xco hri fepou  xo  rcoxijpiov)  ttW a xdxa xo  etSoq 
x68e.  Kai Ttpdoxe? ei  8uvax6v  evopcavxa  xdv  a(oxf|paxoi<;  eiSeoiv,  iv’  ouxax;  6 vopdoto,  xa>v  noxTpicov 
Kai xoi<; 81’  exaaxov  yevop^voiq av,  Kai  KaxaXapPdvovxa  pexd xivoq pa0\)xdxr)i;  oocpiaq  xaq 5iacpopaq 
x68e xo et8o(; xrjc; e^68oi) napaixeioOai xou  papxupiou  aXXo 8^ :  xa%a papuxepov aixeiv X.eX.r|06x(O(;, i'va 
Ka0oXiKcoxep6v xi  Kai £7xi  7iA.8iou<; cp0avov ebepy^xripa dvuo0fi 81’ fex^pou rcoxriplou- 
Christ is depicted here as the great Redeemer of the world and as consciously aware of the fact. He is 
not  a  suffering  and  agonized  man,  but  the  great  beneficent  God,  calmly  weighing  up  the  relative 
advantages of different kinds of death. As Madigan points out,417 one of the major difficulties with the 
Gethsemane  episode  is  that  it  seems  to  present  Christ  as  entirely  ignorant  of his  salvific  role:  why 
would he ask for the cup to pass from him, if he knew that it was only by his death that mankind could 
be redeemed? In the Exhortation, Origen solves this problem by suggesting a radical new interpretation 
of Christ’s prayer.  This  Christ is  fully and  consciously aware  of the  reasons  for his death and is  not 
seeking  to  avoid  it.  He  is  in  full  possession  of divine  foreknowledge,  even  middle  knowledge:  he 
knows that if he were to suffer X, Y would be the result, but that if he were to suffer P, Q would be the 
result, etc.
14.1.
In the Exhortation to Martyrdom, Origen stresses that Christ welcomed the Passion and that the prayer 
for the cup to pass must not be taken at face value. Similar tendencies are apparent in the Commentary 
Series on St. Matthew, although here Origen does allow Christ at least some human reluctance to suffer 
the Crucifixion.
In the  Commentary, Origen offers two possible  interpretations of Christ’s first prayer in Gethsemane. 
His  first  move  is  to  see  the  prayer  as  simply  a  manifestation  of Christ’s  genuine  humanity  and  to 
exploit  the  didactic  advantages  of the  episode.  Origen’s  readers  are  urged  to  follow the  example  of 
Christ and agree, even against their own will, to follow the will of God: docens ut non oremus nostram 
fieri voluntatem quando factum fuerit ut aliquid quam Deus (Commentary Series on St Matthew 92). 
By constantly deferring to the superior will of God, we shall avoid both over-confidence and despair: 
nam  sicut  multum  confidere  non  debemus,  ne  nostram  virtutem  videamur  profiteri,  sic  multum
417 Madigan (1995), p.159.
221pusillanimiter  agere,  et  diffidere  non  debemus,  ne  Dei  adiutoris  nostri  impotentiam  videamur 
pronuntiare (Commentary Series on St Matthew 92).
According to this first interpretation, Christ’s prayer would appear to comprise two distinct stages:
(1) The preliminary wish not to drink the cup.
(2) Agreeing to act against this wish (acquiescere contra voluntatem suam).
Origen’s Christ is experiencing a literal  ‘agony’, the struggle between two conflicting desires.  On the 
one hand he wants to avoid physical pain, but on the other hand he wants to obey the will of the Father. 
Origen presents the Agony in the Garden as a conflict between the will of Christ and the will of the 
Father. Although Christ finally agrees to drink the cup, this is not because he actively wishes to do so. 
Indeed,  Origen  explicitly  tells  us  that  Christ  agreed  against  his  own  will  (acquiescere  contra 
voluntatem  suam).  It  is  rather  that,  as  a  dutiful  Son  or  good  Christian,  he  obeys  God.  In  this 
interpretation, there is no reference to Christ’s understanding of the salvific importance of the Passion. 
Origen’s main concern here is with the didactic value of the episode. As Christ followed the will of his 
Father, however horrific the consequences, so must we.
But there are surely some rather worrying theological problems involved in the suggestion that Christ 
could  ever  want  anything  so  very  different  from his  Father.  Such  a  suggestion  contradicts  Origen’s 
usual Christology. In the de Principiis, Origen tells us that the Saviour’s soul has become God in all its 
acts and feelings and thoughts,418 and that the man Jesus follows the will of the Logos like a shadow.419 
At  de  Principiis  4.4.4,  we  read  that  Christ’s  soul  was  the  only  soul  that  was  able  to  carry  out, 
unswervingly,  all the wishes and plans of the Logos.420 In Origen’s New Testament exegesis, there is 
very little to suggest that Christ had a human will; his entire life on earth is directed and dictated by the 
will of God. The humanity of Christ has no active role to play, but is simply the passive instrument of 
the Logos.421
Perhaps, then, Christ’s prayer for the cup to pass should be interpreted not as a genuine wish, but rather 
as an instinctive movement of the body whose proper nature is to shun pain and death.  Christ’s first
418 omne quod agit, quod sensit, quod intelligit, deus est (de Principiis 2.6.6).
419 pro eo enim quod sicut umbra corporis nostri inseperabilis est a corpore et indeclinabiliter motus 
ac gestus corporis suscipit et gerit, puto  eum  animae  Christi opus ac motus,  quae ei inseperabiliter 
inhaerebat  et pro  motu  eius  ac  voluntate  cuncta perpetrabat,  ostendere  volentem,  umbram  Christi 
domini hanc vocasse (de Principiis 2.6.7).
420 suscepit.  .  .  animam,  nostrarum quidem animarum similem per naturam, proposito vero et virtute 
similem  sibi,  et  talem,  qualis  omnes  voluntates  et dispensationes  verbi  et sapientiae  indeclinabiliter 
posset implere.
421 See sections 9.1-9.3 for more on this.
222prayer  in  Gethsemane  could  then  be  seen,  not  as  a  conflict  between  the  Father  and  the  Son,  each 
wanting something different, but simply as the expression or proof of the full reality of the Incarnation. 
If we look carefully at the text, we find that this is exactly what Origen means. Christ’s prayer for the 
cup  to  pass  is  the  inevitable  manifestation  of his  having  assumed  a  real  human  body.  It  is  Christ’s 
corporeality -   and  that  alone  -   that prompts  him  to  make  the  prayer.422  It  is  simply  a  natural  and 
instinctive  human  reaction  {proprium  est  omnis  hominis).  Indeed,  the  prayer  is  seized  upon  as  the 
perfect Scriptural proof of the reality of the Incarnation, an unambiguous refutation of the folly of the 
docetics:  suscipiens  enim  naturam  carnis humanae omnes proprietates  implevit,  ut non  in phantasia 
habuisse, sed in veritate (Commentary Series on St Matthew 92).
In the  Greek fragments  of the  Commentary,  Origen explicitly argues  that Christ repeated the prayer 
three times in order to prove that he was a real man: ck  xpixou 8£  Trpooeu^axo  (tePaiajv  oxi avBpamoq 
yeyovEv  .  .  .  Kai  ai)xo<;  anat,  Kai  5ig  Kai  xpixov  xo  aoxd  £cp06y^axo  i)7i£p  xou  TtiacboaoBai  xrjv 
oiKovopiav  (Commentary  on  St Matthew,  fragment  530  II).  These  comments  would  seem to  imply 
that Christ was deliberately anticipating and refuting a future heresy.  It was only because he  foresaw 
the  future  heresy  of docetism that  Christ  spoke  these  famous  words.  Ironically,  however,  this  brief 
exegesis actually undermines the full reality of the Incarnation. Christ’s prayer is no longer a genuine 
expression of a genuine humanity, but a lesson in doctrinal orthodoxy.
St Thomas Aquinas, in his discussion of the Agony in the Garden, provides an interesting overview of 
Patristic exegesis of this episode.423 He cites Origen as interpreting the prayer as an expression of the 
‘natural  will’,  a  reflex  reaction  to  the  prospect  of  physical  pain.  The  prayer  is  not  a  genuine 
(deliberative)  wish  to  avoid  the  Passion,  but  an  unavoidable  human  response.  Aquinas  goes  on  to 
interpret the prayer as an example of velleity, what Christ would have wanted, had the situation been 
different.424
422  Throughout  chapter  92  of the  Commentary Series  on  St Matthew,  Origen refers  to  the  Saviour’s 
human flesh as the cause or justification for the first prayer: Deum veram humani corporis suscepisse 
naturam  .  .  .  qui poterat  compati  infirmitatibus  nostris,  quoniam  et  ipse  circumdatus  erat  infirma 
natura  humani  corporis  .  .  .  participans  corpus  et san2uinem  .  .  .  suscipiens  enim  naturam  carnis 
humanae .  .  .  quia  homo  carnalis  est .  .  .  proprium  hominis  erat,  quantum  ad infirmitatem pertinet 
carnis. velle evadere passionem.
423 Summa Theologica Book 3, question 21,4 contra.
424 See section 14.3 for a discussion of Origen’s anticipation of the Scholastic doctrine of velleity.
223The  majority  of the  Church  Fathers  were  content  to  see  Christ’s  prayer  as  simply  the  inevitable 
manifestation  of genuine  corporeality.425  It  was  not  until  the  sixth  century,  during  the  Monothelite 
Controversy,  that  theologians  began  to  offer  detailed  discussions  of the  Gethsemane  episode  based 
upon an understanding of Christ’s psychology rather than his physiology.426
14.2.
While  Origen’s  first  interpretation  of the  Gethsemane  prayer  can  be  found  in  almost  every  other 
Patristic  writer,  his  second  interpretation  is  (as  far  as  I  can  tell)  unique.427  Origen’s  second 
interpretation  is  that  Christ  wishes  the  cup  to  pass  from him,  not  because  he  is  afraid  to  die,  but 
because he has foreseen that if he drinks the cup (suffers the Passion) the Jewish race will be lost and 
Judas will be damned.428 This interpretation is similar to that of the Exhortation to Martyrdom.  Once 
again Origen presents  Christ,  even in the moment of Agony,  as the all-knowing Son of God and the 
entirely beneficent Redeemer. It is not fear that prompts the first prayer, but a great love for the Jews as 
the  Chosen People.  And,  once  again,  this  Christ is  in possession of a precise middle-knowledge.  He 
knows that if he refuses the cup, the Jews will not be lost nor will Judas be damned, but if he drinks the 
cup, the Gentiles will be saved. Having considered the relative advantages of both, he decides to drink: 
altera  autem  interpretatio  loci  huius  est  talis.  quoniam  quasi  Filius  charitatis  Dei,  secundum 
praescientiam quidem diligebat eos ex gentibus fuerant credituri; Iudaeos autem,  quasi semen patrum 
sanctorum,  quorum  adoptio  et gloria  et  testamenta  et repromissiones,  diligebat quasi  ramos  bonae 
oliviae.  diligens  autem  eos  videbat  qualia  erant  passuri  petentes  eum  ad  mortem,  et  Barabbam 
eligentes ad vitam.  ideo dicebat dolens de eis -   ‘Pater si possibile est,  transeat calix iste a me. ’ rursus 
revocans  desiderium  suum,  et videns  quanta  utilitas  mundi totius  esset futura per passionem  ipsius, 
dicebat -   ‘ sed non sicut ego volo,  sed sicut tu.' videbat adhuc propter ilium calicem passionis,  etiam 
Iudam  qui  ex  duodecim  unus  erat,  filium  fore  perditionis.  rursus  intelligebat  per  ilium  calicem 
passionis, principatus  et potestates  triumphandas  in  corpore suo. propter ergo  hos quos  in passione 
sua nolebat perire,  dicebat -   ‘Pater,  si possibile est,  transeat calix ipse a me. ’ propter salutem autem 
totius humani generis,  quae per mortem eius Deo fuerant acquirenda,  dicebat quasi recogitans -   ‘ sed 
non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu ’ {Commentary Series on St Matthew 92).
425  So  Lethel  (1982),  p.208:  “Meme  si  le  mot volonte  est  employe,  il  s’agit plutot d’un mouvement 
naturel de la chair qui craint le mort. . . il confirme la verite de l’lncamation.”
426 For a useful analysis of the Monothelite Controversy, see Louth (1996).
427  Smith (1928),  in his  exhaustive  over-view of Ante-Nicene  Gospel exegesis,  restricts  it to  Origen. 
Madigan (1985) does not mention it.
224In this second interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, the Agony has become completely internalized. 
Christ has two conflicting desires, based upon two conflicting considerations:
-according to {propter) his great love for the Jews, he wants the cup to pass.
-according to {propter) his great love for future believers, he wants to drink it.
Verse 39B  is thus  interpreted metaphorically.  It is not that Christ is submitting to the superior will of 
his Father, but that he is choosing between two conflicting desires of his own. It is emphatically stated 
that it is Christ’s own wish that, through the Passion, the gentiles be redeemed. Moreover, this conflict 
(agony)  is  rot between Christ’s human nature and his divine  nature:  the two wishes  are wishes  of an 
omniscient God.
The Greek fiagmemts of the Commentary on St Matthew give three further explanations of Christ’s first 
prayer in Gethsemtane: he does not want the disciples to be scattered, nor does he want St Peter to deny 
him, nor docs he vwant the Temple to be destroyed (fragment 530 IIAB).  As in Rufmus’ Latin version, 
Christ  finally  ch»oo*ses  to drink the  cup  in  order to  save  the  Gentiles.  The  Commentary Series  on  St 
Matthew' solves IMadigan’s problem number (2).  Throughout the exegesis, Origen insists that Christ is 
fully aware  nf the  Father’s  plans to  redeem  the world through  the  death  of his  Son {videns  quanta 
utilitQs rmni tontus esset futura per passionem  ipsius). This point is repeated in Origen’s exegesis of 
Christ’s second p»ra-yer (Matthew 26.42). It is precisely because he can foresee the future benefits of his 
death  that  the  SavSiour  decides  to  drink the  cup: propter  ergo  bonum  qui  erat futurus post  bibitum 
aman'tudmen  cmlic^is,  orat  vice secunda  dicens  -   ‘Pater  meus,  si  non  est possibile  ut  transeat nisi 
bibero etrn, fiat  voMmtas tua ’ {Commentary Series on St Matthew 92).  It should be remembered that 
the  Gospels thennsedves  give  no  indication  that  Christ’s  final  acquiescence  to  his  Father’s  will  had 
anything  to  do  wiritli  his  own  understanding  of  the  salvific  importance  of  the  Crucifixion.  The 
Evangelists present  t it  as  the obedient, if rather grudging,  submission to the will of God, whatever that 
will might be Oriiges* is not content with the bald Gospel narrative: he must add his own gloss.
14.3.
Since  he  obviousllj *   understands the reasons for the Passion, the Christ of the Commentary Series on St 
Matthew  caimot  be^e said  to  be  in  doubt  (problem  number  3)  nor  to  submit  to  death  involuntarily 
(problem number  5)5) Origen insists  that Christ wanted to die.429 This  is most clearly seen in Origen’s
428 The sane interpretation is given at Contra Celsum 2.25, (see section 13.1).
429  See sections  16,6.1-16.3  for  a  full  discussion  of Origen’s  doctrine  of the  voluntary  nature  of the 
Passion.
225exegesis  of Christ’s  second  prayer (Commentary Series  on  St.  Matthew 95).  In this passage,  Origen 
argues  that  the  prayer  -   let  this  cup  pass from  me  -   is  not  a  genuine  wish,  but  a  counter-factual 
conditional. Origen’s interpretation is as follows:
(1)  Most of all, Christ wants to avoid the passion, but only if the justice of God would allow it (hunc 
ergo  calicem passionis principaliter quidem  volebat  a  se  transire  . . .   si  tamen possibile  esset 
quantum ad iustitiam Dei).
(2)  If that is not possible, he wants to suffer the passion more than he wants to avoid it (si tamen non 
poterat fieri,  magis  volebat  ut  biberet  eum  .  .  .  quam  ut faceret  contra  voluntatem patemam, 
bibitionem eius effugiens).
(3)  It is not possible (implicit).
(4)  It  is  clear therefore  that he  wants  to  suffer the  Passion (manifestum  est itaque quia  bibere  eum 
volebat).
The  protasis  (If it be possible  .  .  )  is  false  and  Christ  is  well  aware  that  it is  false:  the  condition  is 
contrary  to  known  facts.  Origen  highlights  this  by  replacing  the  indicative  of the  original  with  an 
imperfect  subjunctive  and  adding  the  word  tamen  (si  tamen  possibile  esset).  Christ’s  prayer  in 
Gethsemane is of the sort -  If I were able to run the four-minute mile, I should want to represent my 
country at the Olympics. I am well aware, however, that the protasis is false and so, too, therefore is the 
apodosis.  I cannot genuinely want to represent my country at the Olympics, because I am well aware 
that my athletic skills are far from sufficient. Similarly, Origen’s Christ cannot genuinely want to avoid 
the Passion, because he is well aware that the justice of God could not allow it. So for Origen, Christ’s 
prayer for the cup to pass is not a genuine wish, but a conditional or latent wish based upon a known 
counter-factual.  This theory is very similar to the Mediaeval theory of velleity or conditional willing. 
We have already seen how Thomas Aquinas agrees with Origen that Christ’s wish for the cup to pass 
was simply an expression of the  ‘natural will’, an instinctive and unavoidable desire to avoid physical 
pain.430  Aquinas  goes  on  to  say that had  the  situation been different -  (had there  been no  particular 
reason to suffer the Passion) -  this  is what Christ would have wanted. This is the classic statement of 
the doctrine of velleity.  Saarinen provides an interesting discussion of the doctrine as it developed in 
the  Middle  Ages.431  His  definition  of the  phenomenon  corresponds  exactly  to  Origen’s  analysis  of 
Christ’s  second  prayer:  “x  would  will  p,  but  he  knows  that,  because  of some  other  condition,  he
430 See section 14.1.
226actually wills  not-p.”432 Origen can thus conclude that Christ genuinely wanted to  suffer the Passion: 
manifestum est itaque quia bibere eum volebat and magis volebat ut bibere eum. Despite the words of 
the Gospel -  Not as I will, but as thou wilt -  Origen’s Christ is not leaving it to God to decide whether 
or not it is good for him to drink the cup. Christ himself knows full well that it is only through his death 
upon the Cross that the Gentiles will be saved. He understands the exitum bonum .  .  .  qui erat futurus 
post bibitam amaritudinem calicis.
15.1.
Origen’s  exegeses  of the  Agony  in  the  Garden  reveal  that  he  was  very  much  aware  of the  many 
Christological problems  involved in the  Gospel narrative.  He  tries very hard to remove  any negative 
implications.  First, Origen refutes the idea that Christ was overwhelmed by emotion. As an apologist, 
as  a preacher and as a philosopher, Origen cannot accept that Christ was genuinely afraid or worried 
(Matthew 26.37).  This  verse  must be  interpreted in such a way as to  allow Christ to conform to the 
philosophical ideal of &7rd0eia. In the Contra Celsum, Christ takes on the traditional guise of the Stoic 
wise man,  calmly accepting the blows of external fortune.  It suits Origen’s apologetic task to present 
Christ  as  a role-model  whom even the pagans  could admire.  A rather different Christ appears  in the 
Commentary on St Matthew and the Exhortation to Martyrdom. Here, the emphasis is very much on the 
Saviour’s  divine  nature.  Origen  is  keen  to  stress  that  Christ  was  fully  aware  of the  soteriological 
significance of his death and that he wholeheartedly wanted to die.  The thrice repeated prayer for the 
cup to pass takes on a radical new meaning.  Origen cannot allow that Christ ever genuinely wished to 
avoid the Passion.
But  although  Origen  might  have  succeeded  in  solving  the  Christological  problems  inherent  in  this 
episode,  there  was  a  price  to  pay.  Origen  has  transformed  the  Christ  of the  Gospels  into  someone 
entirely different.  Origen  cannot  allow Christ  simply  to be  Christ.  There  is  far too  much  at  stake  to 
settle for a straightforward reading of the Biblical text.
CHRIST’S ARREST, CRUCIFIXION AND DEATH.
16.1.
The Passion of Christ caused enormous problems for Christian apologists. The story of his arrest, trial, 
suffering  and  death  show  Christ  at  his  most  human.  Naturally,  the pagan  opponents  of Christianity
431 Saarinen (1994), pp. 69-71, 76-81 and 130-31.
227seized upon this  episode  as the perfect proof that Christ was not God.  They saw him as a weak man 
who was unable to defeat his opponents and who died a wretchedly ignoble death, deserted by almost 
all  his  followers  and  apparently  even by  God  himself.  As  we  have  already  noted,  the  behaviour  of 
Christ  during  his  last  hours  on  earth  was  in  stark  contrast to  the  glorious  behaviour  of the  popular 
pagan heroes, Dionysus and Apollonius. They found themselves in very similar situations to Christ, but 
behaved how gods ought to behave, defeating their enemies and escaping from prison.433 In response to 
this, Origen felt it necessary to prove that, even during the Passion, Christ remained the omnipotent and 
glorious God.  This was the safest way to refute the ridicule of the pagans.  While later ages might be 
comforted by descriptions of the Passion that emphasized Christ’s suffering humanity, this was not an 
option for the exegetes of the Early Church 434
At  Contra  Celsum  1.54,  Celsus  makes  the  explicit  claim that  Christ  was  not  God  because  he  was 
unable  to  avoid  capture,  imprisonment  and  death.  This  was  a  stock  argument  of the  anti-Christian 
polemic and one which Origen would presumably have heard again and again from the philosophers of 
Alexandria.  It  is  in  direct  response  to  this  particular  criticism  that  we  are  to  understand  much  of 
Origen’s  exegesis  of the Passion.  The  mistake  of the pagans  is  the  assumption that Christ wanted to 
avoid  suffering.  Against  this,  Origen  emphasizes  the  Saviour’s  voluntary  death.  This  is  his  major 
defence of the Passion narrative. Christ, as the omnipotent Son of God, was always able to escape from 
prison and wreak a terrible vengeance on his enemies. The fact that he suffered and died is proof that 
he wanted to suffer and die. At each stage of the Passion, Origen finds evidence of Christ’s willingness 
to  suffer,  or proof rather  of his  actively wanting  to  suffer.  It  is  not  enough for Origen to  claim that 
Christ  was  willing  to  die.  This  would be  admirable,  but  no  more  admirable  than  the  willingness  of 
Socrates, Epictetus and the like.  Origen must always emphasize the fact that Christ was God:  without 
his consent, the evil intent of his enemies would have been to no avail.
In  the  last  section  of this  chapter,  we  shall  see  how  Origen’s  exegesis  of the  Son’s  last hours  is  an 
extended study of Christ’s glorious, divine powers.  Origen emphasizes the Saviour’s divine nature by 
stressing that he died only because he wanted to die.
16.2.
432 Saarinen (1994), p.70.
433 See section 4.2.
434 See section 2.1.
228Origen’s  Christ  carefully  engineers  each  stage  of the  Passion,  from his  arrest  in  Gethsemane  to  his 
death on  the  Cross.  At  Commentary on  St.  John  28.23  (18),  Origen points  out that  it  is  Christ who 
chooses  the  exact moment for the Passion to begin.  Only a week before,  he had removed himself to 
Ephraim, because the time was not yet right (John  7.30).435 In Gethsemane however the time has come 
and Christ willingly gives himself up. The crucial point in this exegesis is that if Christ had not wanted 
to  be  arrested,  the  soldiers  would  never  have  been  able  to  do  so:  Kara  xouxov  8i  xov  xdnov  tov
sOaYyeXion SrjXouxai oxi  ei p£v  £|3ouA.£xo jit)  &A.a>vai,  ouk av  Kax£ox60r|.436 This claim is repeated, at 
greater  length,  in  the  Commentary  Series  on  St.  Matthew.  The  healing  of  Malchus'  ear  and  the 
instruction  to  St.  Peter to  put up  his  sword  are  proof that  Christ  wanted to be  arrested:  nos  docere 
omnes  quoniam  volens  tradidit  se  ipsum  (Commentary  Series  on  St  Matthew  100).  In  the  same 
Commentary,  Origen  argues  that  Judas  was  well  aware  that Christ  could not be  arrested  against his 
will. It is for this reason that he greets his Master by kissing him, in a vain attempt to conceal the real 
reason for his coming:  ideo hoc signum dedit, sciens iam quoniam si noluisset comprehendi,  nusquam 
comprehensus fuisset,  sed  volens  praebuit  se  in  manibus  peccatorum  (Commentary  Series  on  St 
Matthew 100). At Contra Celsum 2.10, Origen even wonders whether Christ can really be said to have 
been arrested, since an arrest is something that happens against one’s will:  Emsp xo  &A.covai  & kouoi6v
eoxiv,  ot>x  bTqaoix;.  Origen then repeats the claims of the  Commentary on St John that Christ 
waited  for  precisely  the  right  moment  before  he  allowed  the  Passion  to  begin.  The  next  stage,  the 
Arraignment  before  Annas,  Caiaphas  and  Pilate,  provides  Origen  with  further  proof  of  Christ’s 
voluntary death.  Origen stresses the  fact that the charges were  entirely spurious and that Christ could 
easily  have  made  a  successful  defence  and  been  acquitted.  His  silence  proves  that  he  wanted  to 
die:  l)7ro|i6v£i  fcxcov  7ia0£iv  pEyaXocpocot;  urcEpopcov  xou<;  Kaxqydpoix;  (Commentary  on  St  Matthew, 
fragment 545).437
16.3.
This  doctrine  of the  Saviour’s  voluntary  death  is  further  emphasized  in  Origen’s  description  of the 
Crucifixion itself. It is not simply that Christ was willing to die. Origen makes the further claim that, in 
a  unique  and divine  way,  Christ was  the  cause  of his  own death.  Origen is  so  little  interested  in the
435  Origen goes on to  say that even if Christ had stayed in Jerusalem, the Jews would not have been 
able to arrest him, because the time had not yet come.
436 Origen then points out that if Christ had simply repeated “I am he”, the soldiers would again have 
fallen to the ground and he could have walked free.
229Saviour’s human nature that he  can ignore  entirely the process  of the Crucifixion.  It was  Christ who 
killed himself, not the Romans, not the Jews and not the Cross. At Commentary on St. John  19.16 (4), 
Origen  considers  Christ’s  words  to  the  Pharisees  -  where  I am  going you  cannot  come  -  and  their 
wondering that perhaps he means to kill himself (John 7.34ff). This famous exchange provides Origen 
with  the  opportunity  for  a  lengthy  excursus  on  the  voluntary  nature  of the  Passion  and  the  unique 
manner  of  Christ’s  death.  Origen  explicitly  claims  that  Christ  killed  himself,  albeit  in  a  divine 
(Bcidxepov) an extraordinary (e^aipexdv) way; it is obviously not a suicide in the way that a man might 
kill himself with a dagger or a noose. Origen defines death, in the traditional philosophical way, as the 
separation of body and soul.438  He then claims that it was Christ who separated his soul from his body 
and that it was he who decided the exact moment that this should happen.
The crux of the exegesis is that Christ had the unique, divine power to release at will his soul from his 
body. Only he was able to say: no man taketh (my life) from me. I lay it down myself.  I have power to 
lay it down and I have power to take it up again (John  10.18). This is Origen’s favourite proof-text of 
the  voluntary nature  of Christ’s death.439 Ordinarily,  of course,  the souls  of the dying are taken from 
them,  summoned  (h7 taixot>vxcov)  by  their  attendant  angels.440  Even  Moses,  the  Patriarchs  and  the 
Apostles had their souls taken from them. Only Christ gives up his soul of his own accord.
Origen insists that it was not by violent means that Christ died, i.e. not as the result of the Crucifixion. 
He even seems to suggest that there was no cause of death. Christ died simply because he decided, at a 
particular and  carefully chosen  moment,  to  release  his  soul  from his  body:  voqocopev  ydp  xiva  oxe
PouXexai  KaxaXmdvxa  xo  ad>pa  Kai  E£,i6vxa  xa>piq  65ou  xqc;  cpEpouaqc;  bri  xov  Bdvaxov,  qxoi  8ia 
piairov  68cov  q  8id  vdacov,  Kai  n&Xiv  ertav  06>.q  bravidvxa,  Kai  xpcbp£vov  6pydvcp  xcp  ocbpaxi,  o 
Kaxa>.6A.oi7t£v  xov  ydp  xoiooxov  fepoujiEV  |iq  dranxEioBai  xi)v  \|/uxnv-  Kai  rcp6;tov  y£  £7tl  '  xq<; 
Tqaou  v|/i)xq<; ouxco X.6y£iv xov Bdvaxov y£yov6vai (Commentary on St John  19.16  (4)).
Origen  supports  his  argument  by  comparing  Christ’s  manner  of death  with  that  of the two  thieves.
Since the  Evangelists  are adamant that Christ’s legs were not broken,  it is clear that he did not die as 
the result of the Crucifixion. Origen then makes the extremely important claim that Christ’s death is in 
fact  the  supreme  manifestation  of  kingly  power  and  might:  £VEpyqoavxo<;  p£xa  8uvdp£co<;  Kai
437 See section 12.4 for a further discussion of the Saviour’s silence.
438 c.f. Plato, Phaedo 64C.
439 See Contra Celsum 2.16 and 3.32 for similar use of this verse.
440  Origen quotes  the  words  of God  in the parable  of the  rich fool:  This night your soul is  required 
(d7iaixo0oiv) of  you (Luke 20.17).
230E^ouoiat;  ancp  SxpivEv ebXoyov  slvai  t o i e i v   (Commentary on St John  19.16 (4)). This short sentence 
is  an  explicit  and  deliberate  inversion  of the  traditional  pagan  response  to  the  Crucifixion.  Origen 
insists that Christ’s death is in no way a passive response to external circumstance. Christ is the agent 
of his own death; he  ‘acts’  (evepyfjoavTO^) rather than suffers. Christ has made a particular judgement 
(fcxpivcv)  as  to  the  proper (euXoyov)  course  of action  and  acted upon  it (itoieiv).  He  is  in complete 
control of the entire situation.  Origen concludes that the earthquake, the opening up of the tombs and 
the rending of the Temple veil are further proof of the miraculous nature of Christ’s death.
In the Contra  Celsum,  a direct response to the mockery of the pagans,  Origen further emphasizes the 
unique  manner  of Christ’s  death.  It  is  explicitly  described  as  ‘the  greatest  miracle  of all’  (Contra 
Celsum 2.16); Origen repeats the idea that only Christ had the power to release his soul from his body 
and  to  take  it  up  again  at  will:  i'va  fcxouaa  p6v  to  adopa  KaTaXi7tq  q  \|/uxq  oiKovopqoap6vq  86 
xiva  e^co  ai)to\j  7 tdXiv  fe7iav6X0q,  ote  PouXetou;  Once  again,  John  10.18  is  quoted  as  the  main 
Scriptural proof of the unique  manner of Christ’s voluntary death.  Likewise,  at Contra  Celsum  3.32, 
Origen  insists  that  it  was  not  by  natural  necessity  that  Christ  died,  but  rather  by  the  exercise  of 
miraculous  powers: 'eXeye  8i)  6  6po<; Tqoou<;  rcEpi  tq<;  feauxou  v|/i)xqs,  ob  Kara  to  dvBpamivov  xpewv 
XfopiCop6vq<;  too  ocbpaToq  dXXa  Kaxd  xqv  8o0£ioav  abT(p  Kai  rcEpi  tootoo  TtapaSo^ov  E^oooiav, 
t6-  "ooSe'k;  alpEi  ti)v  \|/uxf|v  poo bn  fepob,  dXX’  syd)  Ti0qpi  abxqv  bn  fepauTou".441  At Contra  Celsum 
2.69, Origen draws attention to the uniqueness of Christ’s dead body. It is considered ‘miraculous’ that 
blood and water flowed from his pierced side.  Ordinarily, this would be a sign of life:  in corpses, the 
blood immediately congeals. It was this mystery, along with the earthquake, the rending of the Temple 
veil and the opening of the tombs, which led the centurion to recognize the divinity of Christ.
In the  Commentary Series on  St.  Matthew,  Origen tells us that it was a miracle that Christ died after 
only three hours, without his legs being broken or his side being pierced. This is seen as further proof 
of Christ’s  divine  power,  proof that  it was  he  who  chose  exactly when  to  release  his  soul  from his 
body: qui potestatem habebat ponendi animam suam, posuit earn quando voluit ipse; quod prodigium 
stupuit centurio factum . . . miraculum enim erat quoniam post tres horas receptus est, qui forte biduum 
victurus  erat  in  cruce  secundum  consuetudinem  eorum  qui  suspenduntur  quidem,  non  autem 
percutiuntur  (Commentary  Series  on  St  Matthew  140).  Origen  concludes  that  Pilate  was  amazed
441 Along with John  10.18, Origen quotes John 2.19 {Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise 
it up),  Matthew 27.50 {Jesus cried again  with  a loud voice and gave up the ghost) and Psalm  15.10 
{Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell) in support of this argument.
231(miratus  est)  that  Christ  could  have  died  so  quickly.  This  was  obviously  a  new  miracle  (novum 
miraculum).
Finally, in the Homilies on St Luke, Origen highlights Christ’s last words from the Cross -  Father,  into 
thy hands do I commend my spirit -  as unambiguous Scriptural evidence that Christ did not die in the 
ordinary  sense  of the  word.  The  verb  7iap<m0rpi  proves  again  the  intentionality  of Christ’s  death. 
Moreover,  if  his  death  was  freely  chosen  (kKouoiov),  Christ  cannot  properly  be  said  to  have 
‘died’:  t o   hi  "7rapari0r|pr  t o   fexouaiov  5i8doK£i  to u   raiOouq  Kai  SdKvuoiv,  o t i   o 6 k   drcdXAuTai  (in 
Luc. Horn, fragment 23.46).
Origen cannot allow Christ’s death to be seen as an ordinary human death, as the result of unbearable 
physical  distress.  To  admit  this  would  be  to  play  straight  into  the  mocking  hands  of his  pagan 
opponents. Origen feels it incumbent upon himself, qua apologist, to present the death of Christ as the 
supreme manifestation of his divine power.  Christ was not killed:  he chose,  calmly and carefully, the 
exact moment to separate his soul from his body. It seems to me, however, that by arguing that Christ’s 
death was so very out of the ordinary, Origen is veering dangerously close to the heresy of docetism. In 
the passages that we have been discussing,  Origen argues that it was Christ’s decision to separate his 
soul from his body,  and that alone, that was the cause of his death. In this, Origen would seem to be 
admitting  that  Christ  has  assumed  such  an  extraordinary  kind  of  body  that  nothing,  not  even  a 
Crucifixion, can harm it. Origen never mentions the pain of the Crucifixion and will certainly not admit 
that  it  was  this  that  killed  Christ.  In  Origen’s  peculiar  Christology,  the  Crucifixion  seems  to  have 
become a rather pointless charade.
232CONCLUSION
The arguments and discussions of this final chapter have provided further important proof that Origen’s 
theology is primarily an apologetic theology. The fundamentals of his Christology are developed as a 
direct  and  carefully  considered  response  to  his  pagan  opponents.  The  emphasis  on  the  Saviour’s 
glorious  divinity and the  silencing of his  suffering humanity are  surely intended to  impress potential 
converts from the pagan intelligentsia.
We  have  seen  how  Origen’s  explanation  of the  Redemption  entirely  ignores  the  humanity  of the 
Redeemer.  The  fact  that  God  became  man  has  no  direct  salvific  relevance.  Christ  is  most  often 
presented as the leader of a philosophical sect, sent to deliver the message of salvation. The Incarnation 
is simply a necessary pedagogic condescension, the ways and means to deliver this message. Salvation 
entirely depends upon the individual’s free response to this message: we are saved simply by wanting 
to be saved. The atoning sacrifice of the Cross has no place in Origen’s soteriology. It is also important 
to remember that Origen refuses to recognize the hardships and handicaps of fallen humanity. Without 
adequate cognisance of the fall and its consequences, the need for a Redeemer is greatly reduced. Man 
can  (almost)  save  himself.  Such  a  theory  accords  well  with  contemporary  pagan  theories  of  the 
individual’s quest for progressive enlightenment.
Origen’s  theory  of the  soul  of Christ  is  the  perfect  illustration  of the  main  thesis  of this  study.  In 
response to the ubiquitous pagan objection that God would never pollute himself by assuming a human 
body,  Origen supposes the existence of Christ’s human soul to be  the  intermediary uniting these two 
fundamentally  opposed  entities.  This  theory  is  a  master-piece  of  apologetic  compromise:  no 
philosopher could deny that a soul is equally suited to be united with God as to assume a human body. 
The  Incarnation  immediately  becomes  an  entirely  philosophically  credible  event.  It  was  quickly 
apparent however that the existence of Christ’s human soul was nothing more than a sop to the pagans. 
It has no further role to play and cannot be said even to exist. Origen’s famous image of the iron thrust 
into the fire illustrates the transformation of Christ’s human soul into God: it has become the Logos (de 
Principiis  2.6.5-7).  Origen’s  exegesis  of the  life  of Christ  as  described  in  the  four  Gospels  is  an 
elaboration and illustration of this basic fact: the humanity of Christ has ceased to exist; it is the Logos 
that directs and dictates the Saviour’s human life.
233In  his  discussions  of  the  Temptation  of  Christ,  Origen  describes  a  confrontation  between  the 
impeccable God and the witless devil.  Satan has failed to realize that his opponent is the Son of God 
and,  as such,  is unable to be tempted.  Origen claims that the Temptation is an experience of Christ’s 
human nature  and that it can therefore provide  struggling humans  with a useful  moral  exemplum.  In 
fact however Origen’s exegesis of this episode revolves around the Saviour’s divine nature; we are set 
an impossible example to follow.
Origen’s  commentary on the  Agony in the  Garden must likewise be  set within the  correct polemical 
context. We saw how Origen’s insistence that Christ felt only the beginnings of fear (rcponaGeia) was a 
deliberate  attempt to  cast  the  Saviour  in the  role  of the  Stoic  sage,  proverbially calm in the  face  of 
external mishap. The same tendency is apparent in Origen’s exegesis of the Arraignment before Pilate, 
where Origen makes explicit use of Stoic terminology to describe Christ’s complete and utter calm. In 
the context of constant pagan jibes, Origen must work hard to preserve the bravery and dignity of the 
Saviour.  In  particular,  the  thrice-repeated  prayer  for  the  cup  pass  must  undergo  a  thorough  re­
interpretation.  Origen  cannot allow that Christ  genuinely wished to  avoid the  Passion.  The prayer is 
rather interpreted  a  counter-factual  conditional,  i.e.  what Christ would have wished had the situation 
been different.  Since  Christ,  qua  the omniscient Redeemer,  realized the  immeasurable future benefits 
of the Passion, he wants to drink the cup.
The  doctrine  of the  Saviour’s  voluntary death is  a very important aspect of Origen’s  Christology.  In 
response to pagan polemics comparing Christ unfavourably to Apollonius and Dionysus -  who easily 
defeated their tormentors - Origen repeatedly insists that Christ died only because he wanted to die. His 
tormentors  could  have  had  no power over him,  had he  not explicitly allowed  it.  For example,  at his 
arrest in Gethsemane Christ took the conscious decision to  ‘put to sleep’  (soporare) his divinity.  We 
also saw how Origen refuses to mention the pain and suffering involved in the Crucifixion. This would 
only  have  increased  the  pagans’  scorn.  Instead,  Origen  describes  a  brief  and  painless  event, 
culminating in the calm decision to release the soul from the body.
We  can  conclude  therefore  that  Origen’s  entire  Christology  was  developed  in  response  to  certain 
specific  opponents,  either  within the  Church  or without.  In  chapters  1   and  2,  we  saw how Origen’s 
doctrine  of the  three  divine  substances  was  conceived  as  a  reply to  the  extreme  unitarianism of the 
Monarchian  modalists.  We  also  saw  how  Origen’s  descriptions  of the  Logos  as  the  intermediary 
between God and man must be placed within the context of the pagan philosophical insistence on the
234transcendence of the first God. In this last chapter, we have seen how (1) Origen’s soteriology, (2) his 
explanation of the process of the Incarnation and (3) his exegesis of the Saviour’s life and death have 
an overtly evangelistic aim. Each point is carefully developed to convince and -  ultimately -  to convert 
philosophically  minded  pagan  opponents.  With  his  exclusive  focus  on  the  Saviour’s  divine  nature, 
Origen undermines the basic pagan objections to the Christian religion. It is hard to gauge the ultimate 
success  of this  mission,  but  we  can  cite  at  least  one  philosopher,  Heraclas,  who  owed  his  faith  to 
Origen’s sensitive evangelism.
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